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Abstract 
1 8 JAN 200'1 
This dissertation presents a dynamic theory of personality and 
emotions. The theory offered is explicit in its incorporation of an 
evolutionary-functionalist perspective and suggests that personality 
and the emotions are dynamic within the limits imposed by the 
functions of each. The dissertation begins by discussing the ubiquity 
of goals and goal-organising constructs in living systems. 
Personality, it is argued, is most validly conceptualised as being a 
complex goal-organising construct. Specific attention is then given 
to the consideration of innate motives in a motivational model of 
personality, the process by which innate motives become 
representational goal",. the place of emotions in the elaboration of 
innate motives, and the place of consciousness in goal, 
developmental and emotion processes. Following this, a functional 
conceptualisation of emotions and conscious emotional experience 
consistent with the motivational model of personality is developed. 
Empirical attention is devoted to the relationships between goals and 
emotions, the nature and measurement of conscious emotional 
experience, and the place of emotion in generating adaptive 
behaviour. Overall, the dissertation suggests that emotions and 
personality are necessarily related phenomena, each contributing to, 
and reflecting the other in the process of human striving. 
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Foreword 
Discontent is the first step in the progress of a man or a nation 
Confucian fortune cookie (cited in Lazarus, 1999) 
In many ways this is an unusual dissertation. ill part, it is unusual by virtue of size, 
and for this I apologise. A work of this magnitude was never envisioned by either my 
supervisor or myself, although hindsight does suggest that such a volume was 
inevitable. In part however, size has been necessary given the scope of the theory 
presented, and for this I make no apologies. As will become clear, my belief is that 
psychology, particularly personality psychology, is hampered by the continued 
proliferation of small-scale theories, and an institutional unwillingness to engage in 
large-scale theory construction. 
In explicating my discontent, I would like to briefly draw the reader's attention to a 
number of interrelated issues that first stimulated my concern. The first of these 
relates to a philosophical history of dualism and its manifestations in 
compartmentalised theorising. Separatism is now present at the theoretical, 
methodological and institutional levels (Lykken, 1991), to the point that psychologists 
perpetually investigate, and thus reinforce, the notion of isolated and competing 
systems in human functioning. As theorists, we seem to be perpetually discussing the 
influence of one system upon another, rather than considering each a part of a larger 
functioning adaptive system that co-operatively assist human strivings. At an 
institutional level, each scientist seems to exhibit an almost pathological need to 
distinguish their product from that of other scientists. While this practice is no doubt 
partly a function of the realities involved in academic publication (cf. Wachtel, 1980), 
I do not see the necessity for psychological theories to reflect such a climate. 
In any case, small-scale theories abound. Grazing unmolested in the promised 
meadows of publication, the mini-theory has become the most numerous, resource 
hungry and destructive inhabitant on the psychological plains. Theory is created to 
describe and 'explain' the most inconsequential of phenomena, proliferating with a 
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contemptible disregard for the broader ecosystem of our science. Commentators are 
not unaware of this problem. For some time, writers like Lykken (1991), Meehl 
(1978) and Royce (1985) have voiced complaint regarding the state of the 
psychological sciences. In emotion theory, Scherer (1988) has noted that research 
reports are scattered throughout the sub-disciplines of psychology, giving rise to a 
frustrating situation in which it becomes increasingly difficult to perceive the links 
between research programs. 
Kuhn (1962) would no doubt describe this situation as near-inevitable in the context 
of a pre-paradigmatic science. According to him, the disorganised and diverse 
activity that precedes the formation of a mature science is structured and directed only 
when a single paradigm is adhered to by a scientific community. Tomkins' (1981) 
commentary on the state of the psychological sciences is less forgiving. He reiterates 
his earlier concerns (Tomkins, 1962, 1963), suggesting that personality psychology 
has lost both its heart and its mind through a fear of methodological impurity. In his 
eyes, the latter half of the 20th century has seen the study of personality replaced by 
the study of personality variables. Methodology, he argues, cannot be a substitute for 
theories about personality. 
Such was my mind when I began writing and, to an extent, thus it remains. With 
some few exceptions, personality psychology has ceased to provide writers who are 
willing to theorise 'on the grand scale'. This is unfortunate, for as Lang (1994) has 
noted, the areas of greater interest in psychology show little respect for the conceptual 
divisions we impose. Rather, they penetrate the formal divisions of science, 
depositing new intellectual spores. Although my views regarding personality theory 
(and theorists) have probably softened as I myself discovered the difficulties inherent 
in theorising about personality, my discontent nonetheless remains. 
This dissertation is a first attempt at a large-scale theory of personality and emotion, 
although it is not only a theory of these. Given my concerns and interests, it shows 
little deference to the traditional borders of psychology. Instead, it discusses theories 
from personality; evolution, dynamic systems, emotion, development, philosophy, 
motivation, self, and consciousness literature. Despite this breadth, the work is not 
without its themes or without structure. 
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There are a number of ideas that I find my writing returning to time and again in this 
dissertation. Foremost among these is a conviction that the framework I describe as 
evolutionary-functionalism is central to an understanding of personality. The 
evolutionary 'component' of this approach underscores my belief that informed 
applications of evolutionary theory provide perhaps the only framework capable of 
explaining why phenomena like personality exist. The 'functionalism' component of 
the framework complements (and is part of) the evolutionary, intimating that 
phenomena exist and operate in the way they do for reasons. This is not to say that 
personality and emotion were in any sense 'designed' in order to accommodate these 
reasons, but rather they were selected and retained because they did so. Properly used 
evolutionary theory serves the additional advantage of keeping us mindful of 
anthropocentrism. Humans are certainly special in the grand scheme of life, yet we 
have risen from the same primordial slime, and have yet to transcend it. 
Herein lies the essence of the second and third themes. I believe that life is essentially 
about motivation and the regulation of motivation, irrespective of how these 
'motivations' operate or exactly what they are, and notwithstanding whether the 
organism is conscious or ever experiences such motivation. In operationalising the 
first component of this belief, the concept of goal is employed the length of this 
dissertation. Within the theory I offer here, goals form the basis for both personality 
and the self and are central to an understanding of emotion. Emotions are similarly 
ubiquitous to the theory presented, a theoretical utility I see as paralleling the place 
emotions hold in development, experience and action. 
Finally, and despite my convictions regarding the fundamental importance of an 
evolutionary view, this dissertation underscores the dynamism of the human 
personality and the inherent indeterminism of human functioning. Although a theory 
of personality should be reinforced by an understanding of the evolutionary 
constraints and purposes of human functioning, I do not believe that it should spend 
its entire time 'looking backwards' to explain what and why we are. Rather than 
straightjacket a person through an understanding of their past, a good theory should 
also acknowledge freedom of action and the inherent potential for change, thus 
looking forwards to what we might each become. 
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Structurally, this dissertation is made up of eight chapters, loosely organised into three 
major sections. These three can loosely be thought of as considering the nature, 
development, and process aspects of a personality theory. The chapters are presented 
in order of construction and hence build OIl one another, although forward seeking 
references are made. 
Chapters one and two consider the nature of personality and the self. In adopting a 
strong evolutionary-functionalist view, they present two core points. Initially, it is 
argued that that both personality and the self must be thought of as inherently 
motivational constructs. In developing this assertion, they further suggest that not 
only are living organisms about goals, but that they are also about the organisation of 
goals and the environment. Taken together, the first two chapters suggest that 
personality and self are most usefully thought of as complex and dynamic hierarchical 
goal organisations. Finally, each presents a distinction that runs the length of the 
dissertation, that between the functional and experiential consideration of a 
phenomenon. They argue that the mere fact that humans are eventually able to 
consciously experience motivation and the self does not, cannot, and should not be 
thought of as changing the functions that goals and self serve. 
Chapters three through six then address the development of personality. Despite the 
importance of genetic factors, particularly those involving emotion, personalities are 
not instantiated at birth. Individuals develop as a complex interplay of environmental 
and biological factors. Chapter three begins by arguing that a motivational model of 
personality must initially look to innateness for the content of the initial goals in a 
personality. The simple reason for this orientation is that without innateness in 
motivation there is no place to begin the process of determining what matters. It 
discusses previous theories of instinct and innateness in motivation and personality, 
and presents a functionalist typology of innate motives. 
Moving from this basis, chapter four provides a theory describing how innate motives 
become representational goals. In doing so, it also reconceptualises the phenomenon 
of consciousness in personality, motivation and emotion, suggesting that 
consciousness arises in the process of representing the motives that comprise the self. 
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It reaffirms the importance of consciousness to personality theory, and offers a 
functional conceptualisation of consciousness. In concluding, the chapter argues that 
consciousness can usefully be thought of as the ability to represent the personality 
motive structure, an ability that it has evolved not only as a cognitive meta-manager, 
but as a critical component in the expansion of our emotional repertoire. 
Chapter five provides an introduction to the dynamic systems framework that is then 
used to examine and describe the elaboration of innate motives. It briefly describes 
the core assertions of dynamic systems (DS) theory, emphasising DS approaches to 
development. The DS approach is then critiqued, and it is suggested that while DS 
theories are well-suited to explaining both stability and change in personality 
development, that they must make more explicit reference to innate factors in emotion 
and motivation. 
Chapter six develops a theory conceptualising the place of emotions in elaborating 
and organising the personality. Previous DS theories of personality development are 
described and critiqued as the chapter offers a new mechanism that describes the 
elaboration of personality. While most theories of emotion have argued that the 
emotions serve key functions in an immediate sense, the chapter argues that they can 
also been seen as serving a key function over longer periods of time. It suggests that 
the emotions act as inbuilt systems 'elaborate' innate goals and internalise learned 
associations, thus developing personality. In this theory, emotional responding 
automatically creates new goals in the personality appropriate to the organism-
environment relationship being indicated by the emotion. Over time, the emotionally-
indicated meaning of events is instantiated in the personality as new goals. 
The final section (chapters seven and eight) discusses the process aspects of a 
personality theory, specifically considering the place of emotions in personality 
processes. Chapter seven describes a theory of conscious emotional experience. In 
essence, this theory suggests that conscious emotional experiences are not entirely a 
part of the biological emotion packages. While constrained in their form by the 
functions of the emotion, they are also both motivated and constructed at an 
idiographic level. A study examining the relationships between motivations and 
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emotional expenence IS presented, and implications for development and the 
socialisation of emotions are discussed. 
Chapter eight provides a general conceptualisation of emotions in development, 
experience and action. It draws much from the works of Richard Lazarus (e.g. 1991), 
Carroll Izard (e.g. 1991) and Michael Lewis (e.g. 1993), and emphasises an 
evolutionary-functionalist approach to the emotions. Discussion is initially devoted to 
the necessity for a discrete approach to emotions, and it is argued that discrete 
theories are more viable from a functionalist perspective. The issues involved in 
cognition-emotion relationships are then considered and a series of diary studies 
examining goal-emotion relationships are presented. Substantial attention is then 
given to the importance of function in emotion theory and a typology of function for 
the emotions is presented. Finally, the relationships between the components of 
emotions are considered and two studies examining emotion and behaviour are 
presented. 
Overall, I feel that a work of this breadth provides a coherent and powerful 
framework that enables complementary analyses at both descriptive and explanatory 
levels across a large number of heavily interrelated psychological phenomena. My 
hope is that the theory presented here will demonstrate something of what can be 
attained when theories about 'different' phenomena are developed simultaneously 
within a single explanatory framework. In this model of theory development, 
developments and problems in each particular domain necessitate, but also inform and 
substantiate, developments in the others. 
Given the importance I have attached to emotions throughout my discussion of 
personality, it is perhaps fitting that the creation of this work has evidenced a near-
incalculable variety in my own emotional responses to it. I have had moments of 
crippling doubt and interminable struggle, as well periods of contentment, surety, and 
vision. I have variously been consumed, distraught, fascinated, bored, and elated. In 
introducing this work, it is both my hope and my fear that some of these experiences 
will be shared by the reader. 
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Chapter 1: The Nature of Personality 1: Personality as a Motivational 
Concern. 
Chapter 1.1 - Introduction 
What do we know when we know a person? 
McAdams (1995) 
We seem to spend large proportions of our life seeking to understand or explain why 
. things happen. Often, our attempts at explanation involve considering the part played 
by other people. Imagine for a moment that you are talking to a friend, discussing 
(for example) the causes of a colleague's eccentric behaviour in the last few weeks. 
At one point in the conversation you remark "Well you could say that, but I think it's 
simply what she's like." 
On the face of it this appears a perfectly innocuous remark, and not one to inspire any 
great research endeavours. Upon closer examination however, this statement 
encapsulates several major assumptions that enlighten upon consideration. The first 
of these regards the nature of 'she.' What is a 'she,' or for that matter, a 'he, 'them' 
'us'? When we describe another person or persons, what is it exactly that we are 
describing? Put another way, what is the "stuff' of which people are made? 
At this point, we have at least one interesting question. A second assumption implicit 
in the dialogue is that the 'that' which 'she' apparently is, is somehow related to the 
way in which she behaves. Now there are two questions. What are people? And how 
does what or who people are influence the way they behave? 
Of course this ad hoc analysis could continue, perhaps indefinitely. Yet already it has 
generated substantial food for thought. More importantly in terms of the current 
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dissertation, however, is that a key problem for personality research has been 
introduced. What is a person?1 
Chapter 1 will consider something of the nature of personality. It will outline the first 
major assumption that underlies the current model. Through a discussion of living 
systems theory and personality theory at the motive-personality interface, it will argue 
that motivational concepts of a kind must form the primary basis for any theory of 
personality. Put simply, all living systems (including homo sapiens) must be 
motivated in order to survive and reproduce (if nothing else). The chapter will further 
suggest that there are several reasons why personality psychology should use the goal 
construct as the particular operationalisation of motivation in personality. 
Trait approaches to personality will also be extensively considered and critiqued. It 
will be suggested that (while important), traits are an inadequate basis for personality 
theorising. Rather, it is argued, they constitute a heritable, potentially affective 
(Magai, 1996) 'style' that is analogous to temperament and are more usefully thought 
of as describing the manner in which people pursue goals than they are to describing 
personality itself. 
Finally, a distinction between being motivated and the experience of being motivated 
will be offered. Although the current theory will argue that all life is motivated, it 
will also suggest that the capacity to experience motivation is inherently linked to 
consciousness. Not all organisms have the capacities to experience their motivations 
as we do, nor do they experience motivations regarding 'themselves'. Overall, the 
current model argues that homo sapiens possess goals regarding every aspect of 
functioning. As such, we have goals to do with the way we think, what we believe, 
the ways we feel, and the manner in which we act. 
Given the monumental breadth of the phenomena that a theory of personality is 
intended to describe, predict, and explain, the field of personality research is 
1 There remains some disagreement as to whether a person is the same as a personality (see e.g. 
McAdams, 1995). It may for example be that the concept of 'person' includes elements that are not 
included in the concept 'personality,' say eye colour. The two terms are used somewhat 
interchangeably throughout the current piece and the term 'person' is typically used to denote a 
. 'personality' when I feel a more 'personalised' description may enliven the text. 
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understandably complex. Moreover, it is inevitably riddled with a multitude of "core 
issues" to which any theory must attend, even if this attention is given grudgingly, or 
unknowingly (Pervin, 1993a). Given the aims and domain of this chapter (as outlined 
above), treatment of these issues will be kept to a minimum. Where necessary, the 
reader is referred to a fuller discussion elsewhere. 
The decision to keep the discussion of fundamental 'personality theory' issues concise 
is motivated by two considerations. The first is that this chapter is intended to be a 
discussion of a global organisational backdrop to emotion, motivation, and personality 
processes, rather than a philosophical treatise on the nature of humanity. The second 
consideration is of a more pragmatic nature. Put simply, an exhaustive literature 
review in the areas that this chapter may address is simply not feasible. 
Chapter 1.2 - Goal-directedness as the cardinal attribute of life: An 
introduction to the teleology of living systems. 
As noted by Pervin (1993a), a philosophical view of the person, and of human nature 
tends to underlie theories of personality. From the time of the earliest Western 
philosophy, our basic assumptions about life have influenced both our individual and 
our scientific models of the human race. Some theories have stressed the instinctual 
and causal (e.g. Freud), others the rational and volitional aspects of our functioning 
(e.g. Rogers). Some have preferred to conceptualise humanity mechanistically, others 
to consider us information processors par excellence. The current theory is no more 
isolated from such assumptions than any other. 
It has previously been argued that any theory cannot help but be influenced by its 
author; by their experiences and beliefs, by the culture in which they write - by their 
own personality (Pervin, 1989). This seems an eminently sensible proposition, and as 
is the case above, the theory presented here is no exception. Given such 'bias', it 
becomes necessary to briefly note the contemplations (and assumptions) present in the 
genesis of this particular author's theory. 
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Put most simply, the theory of personality presented here takes as its foundation the 
assumption that life, all life, exhibits purpose. According to systems theorists, 
purpose exists in all systems, at all levels (Skyttner, 1996). It is however, most salient 
in living systems, from the level of a simple cell through to the level of a complex, 
multicellular system such as homo sapiens. Miller's (1976) general living systems 
theory has as one of its central postulates the notion that all living systems exhibit 
purpose. West Churchman (1971), a professor of business administration, has 
similarly emphasised the importance of purpose in systems. According to 
Churchman, all systems are teleological at severallevels2• Finally, Skyttner (1996) in 
a recent text on general systems theory notes that systems interact in such a way that 
an end or final state is being approached. Overall, it can be argued that the presence 
of purpose is a defining characteristic of life and living systems. 
If we can accept that life exhibits purpose, it becomes but a short leap of logic to 
accept that each living system is goal directed. Putting aside (for now) considerations 
of awareness or volition, this shift does not seem unreasonable. In all but the most 
semantic of senses, the notion of 'goal directedness' captures both the sum and 
substance of purpose. It is important however, that we do not confuse being goal-
directed with having goals3. As will be expanded upon in Chapter 4, while all life can 
be regarded as having goals insofar as all exhibit goal-directedness, having goals or 
being intentional (Van Gulick, 1995) is restricted to creatures capable of both 
representational thought and consciousness. 
Binswanger (1991) has recently argued that goal-directedness characterises the 
actions of all living organisms including those of plants. He suggests that in less 
sophisticated systems, goal-directed actions are physiologically controlled. The next 
highest level is present in the lower animals, and entails conscious self-regulation 
through sensory-perceptual mechanisms including pleasure and pain. According to 
Binswanger, human beings possess the highest form of consciousness, namely, the 
2 For the moment, it is only important that the reader be aware of the importance of purpose in a given 
system at the most gross level of description. However, Churchman's idea of teleology at multiple 
levels has important implications for the 'personality as goal structure' argument, especially when 
considering the interactions of goals within a complex dynamic system. Hence, it will be returned to 
below. 
3 My thanks to James Averill (personal communication, December 1998) for ensuring that this 
distinction was not omitted .. 
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capacity to reason. Being volitional, humans have the power to choose their goals and 
pursue long range purposes (see also Ford, 1987). Finally, Killeen (1992) has 
suggested that "the attraction to future events may be a more effective tactic for a 
functional analysis of behaviour than attempts to reconstruct the contextual stimuli 
that give rise to it" (p. 442). 
In some senses, the lengths to which this discussion has gone to explicitly 
acknowledge the ubiquitous nature of purpose and goals seems a trifle redundant 
given that there are few theorists in personality psychology today who would argue 
against the notion. As will be discussed below however, the implications of 
considering all life as possessing purpose are extraordinarily profound, and continue 
to be underestimated. If we fundamentally accept that life has purpose, we (should) 
become logically incapable of conceptualising personality in non-motivational terms. 
Personality, like life, serves and is part of purpose. 
To this point, the discussion of the model's basic assumption about life as exhibiting 
purpose has primarily considered the relationship between life and goal directedness 
at an abstract and predominantly non-psychological level. It is hoped that the breadth 
of the considerations thus far outlined does not bore, nor distract the reader from the 
essence of the argument being presented. Rather, it is hoped that a context of this 
magnitude will serve to reinforce the belief that purpose, goals, and motivation must 
be considered pivotal in any model of personality and emotion - for we, homo 
sapiens, as other organisms, undoubtedly live. 
Chapter 1.3 - Motivation and personality research. 
Introduction 
The precise connections between motivational concepts and major personality 
frameworks have always been hotly disputed in the psychological literature (see e.g. 
McAdams, 1997; Emmons, 1997). Not only has the usefulness of the goals-as-
motivational-construct itself been repeatedly challenged, but the deployment of such 
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concepts within personality theory more generally has also been, and remains, a topic 
of considerable and ongoing debate (Endler & Speer, 1998). 
The following section will briefly argue that motivational concepts have historically 
been considered central within models of personality. It will likewise note that 
several recent models, while more psychometrically and operationally oriented than 
their more descriptive predecessors, share a similar emphasis on personality as a 
motivational structure. In concluding, the section will suggest that the cognitive 
concept of goal constitutes the most useful operationalisation of motivation in 
personality. The consequences of non-motivational frameworks for personality 
research will be considered, as the section will develop the argument above, 
contending that the goal concept is indispensable, not only for an understanding of 
living systems, but in an adequate model of personality. 
Previous consideration of motivation in personality 
As noted some time ago by Pervin (1978), personality theorists have typically not 
concerned themselves with emotion or motivation, and if they have done so it has 
usually been in isolation from cognitive and behavioural aspects. Rather than 
consider cognitive motivational constructs such as that of goal, such writers have 
tended to focus on constructs like arousal (Wundt, 1896; Duffy, 1941, 1951, 1957, 
1962), instinct, or drive (e.g. Freud, 1923/1961). Similarly, and not withstanding 
recent 'fortifications' (e.g. McCrae & Costa, 1995), the leading edge of current 
personality research - trait theory - suffers from its non-motivational emphasis (see 
below). 
Historically however, the notion that humankind is characterised by goal directedness 
or purpose finds considerable support from writers spanning more than 100 years of 
psychology. William James (1890) suggested that "the pursuance of future ends and 
the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criteria of the presence 
of mentality in a phenomenon" (p. 8). Tolman (1932) suggested that behaviour 
'reeked of purpose,' while McDougal (1908, 1930) maintained an emphasis on active 
striving towards anticipated goals. McDougal was in fact so taken with the goal-
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seeking quality of behaviour that he declared himself to be a purposive psychologist 
and defended the view of honnic psychology. 
Writing in approximately the same era as McDougal, albeit from a very different 
perspective, was Alfred Adler (1927/1957, 193111958). He placed a similar emphasis 
on self-selected goals and their role in directing behaviour through expectations of 
outcome. He replaced the notion of drives with that of values and goals, and 
introduced such key concepts as the individual's hierarchy of goals. The Gestalt 
school itself generally emphasised the total action of the organism, goal directed 
action and the differences between drive-like involuntary action and intentional action 
(e.g. Kohler, 1929; Lewin, 1935). 
Adler (1927, 1931), like Jung (191911971), subordinated causal factors to teleology. 
He did however regard infancy as a time of considerable importance. He suggested 
that a "real understanding of the behaviour of any human being is impossible without 
a clear comprehension of the secret goal which he is pursuing" (192711957, p. 29,49). 
According to Adler, we actively select both our fundamental life goals, and the means 
of achieving them. (The distinction that Adler offered above, that between the goals 
themselves, and the methods used to achieve them is useful, and will be returned to 
below when trait theory is considered). Jung (1919) seems to have adopted an 
intermediate position with respect to this issue, arguing that both childhood 
determinants (causality) and the purposes or goals (teleology) of behaviour must be 
attended to. 
Abraham Maslow's (1968, 1970, 1971) contribution to the science of personality 
cannot be overstated. Although most recognisable for his formulation of the 
'hierarchy of human needs' (see below), Maslow was singular in his emphasis of the 
motivated qualities of behaviour and personality. His major work was in fact titled 
'Motivation and Personality' (Maslow, 1970). Maslow offered two groups of 
motivations, termed deficiency (D) motives and growth or being (B) motives, and 
suggested that personality could be conceptualised as a conglomerative function of 
the extent to which these hierarchically organised needs were being met. While the· 
structural details of Maslow's ideas are important, and hence will be returned to 
below, it is his emphasis on motivation that is most conspicuous here. 
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Emmons (1997) describes three major contemporary frameworks within which to 
interpret goal directed action: control theory, living systems theory (see above), and 
action theory. While each of the theories might better be considered a theory of 
striving (as opposed to a theory of personality), each has something to offer the 
personality theorist. Control theory (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998) views 
behaviour as a discrepancy reducing process wherein individuals act in order to 
minimise a mismatch between the present and desired conditions (goals). Living 
systems theory (e.g. Ford, 1987) suggests that people are active organisms who 
intentionally set and strive for goals. Similarly, action theory (e.g. Freese & Sabini, 
1985) provides a highly cognitive framework within which to investigate the 
processes by which people act in order achieve the cognitive representation of a 
desired state. 
David Buss (1990, 1997a, 1997b) has outlined an evolutionary approach to the study 
of personality. While the details of his position are beyond the interests of this thesis, 
Buss does note the importance of motivations, specifically alluding to the importance 
of cognitive motive constructs, such as goals. Although Buss's ideas are different 
from those of the theorists mentioned above, he shares with them the notion that 
humanity is characterised by motivations, and that these motives must constitute the 
foundation for any discussion of personality. 
Chapter 1.4 - Operationalising motivations In personality -units of 
choice? 
Introduction 
What units shall we employ? 
Gordon Allport (1958, cited in Ozer, 1995) 
As is clear from the discussion above, motivation has been considered central in a 
number of both historical and more recent personality conceptualisations. Thus far 
however, the relationships between motivation and personality have been discussed at 
15 
a comparatively abstract level. Several theorists have linked motivation and 
personality, but few have operationalised the precise manner in which they are rel!lted 
(e.g. Freud, 1923; Jung, 1919). There are however some notable exceptions to this 
claim. 
Firstly, there are the developments stemming from the seminal works of Murray 
(1938), the elaborations of these ideas by McClelland and Atkinson (e.g. McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1955), and the work of Maslow (e.g. 
1968, 1970). Secondly, there have recently been a related series of conceptual and 
methodological developments more directly aimed at the personality-motivation 
interface. Researchers such as Klinger (1987), Little (1983, 1995; McGregor & Little, 
1998), Cantor and colleagues (e.g. Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Cantor & Zirkel, 1990; 
Cantor, et. aI., 1991; Fleeson & Cantor, 1995), and Emmons and colleagues (e.g. 
Emmons, 1986, 1996; Emmons & King, 1989) have substantially contributed to a 
reformulation of modern ideas about personality as motivation. 
Murray (1938) provided a highly differentiated set of personality variables, including 
the concepts of need and press. In a manner similar to Freud, Murray concludes that 
humans are motivated by the desire to satisfy tension reducing drives or needs. 
Although reluctant to structuralise personality, Murray suggested that a 'need' 
represents a 'force in the brain' that energises and organises our perceptions, thoughts 
and actions. He posits a great many specific needs, all of which are either biological 
or derive their value through a biological need. It was on the basis of Murray's work 
that both McClelland (1953) and Atkinson (1958) initiated research programs into 
achievement, affiliation, and power motivation, hence Murray's contributions cannot 
be overstated (Tomkins, 1981). 
A recent chapter by Emmons (1997) details four attempts to operationalise the content 
and processes of individual goals as they relate to personality. Each is briefly 
mentioned below. Klinger (1987) has suggested that our experiences are organised 
around the pursuit of incentives, represented by a collection of 'current concerns.' A 
current concern is a hypothetical motivational state that guides a person's thinking, 
feeling and acting during the time they are in it. Current concerns are not necessarily 
present in consciousness, and there is no assumption that a concern is reflected in on-
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line processing. People simultaneously possess a large number of current concerns, 
with a different concern for each goal that the person is committed to. Concerns may 
be narrowly or broadly defined, and may last from a few seconds to a life-time. 
Current concerns have been the subject of relatively few investigations, research 
primarily focussing on the role of concerns in motivated thought processes. Klinger, 
Barta, and Maxiener (1981) for example found that the degree to which concerns are 
valued, committed to, or threatened predicted the frequency with which they were 
thought about. According to Klinger, it is the emotional properties of concerns that 
affects processing. Other research (Klinger, 1989a, cited in Emmons, 1997) has 
shown that the concern relatedness and emotional 'arousingness' of a word predicted 
its recall. 
A related concept is that developed by Little and colleagues (e.g. Little, 1983) - that 
of the 'personal project' (see Little, 1995 for a recent discussion). Closely associated 
with Murray's concept of a serial program, and Nuttin's development of the need 
concept (Nuttin, 1957, cited in Emmons, 1997), personal projects are considered to be 
the organisers of everyday activity. The personal project construct has not been as 
fully investigated as other cognitive-motivational personality constructs, although 
Ruehlman and Wo1chik (1988) reported that social support and hindrance during 
project pursuit were related to well-being and distress. 
Cantor and colleagues (e.g. Cantor et. aI., 1991; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Fleeson & 
Cantor, 1995) have recently developed the concept of a life task. Life tasks constitute 
the problems that people are currently working on. Among other things, life tasks 
organise and give meaning to a person's everyday activities. In line with the origins 
of the life task concept, research into life tasks has tended to focus on one of two 
areas. Namely, either (a) on the ways in which social intelligence is used in strategic 
problem solving by individuals dealing with life tasks, or (b) on how individual 
differences in the construal of particular life tasks (e.g. 'being independent' or 'being 
with others') relate to situational choice, affectual experiences and perceived stress 
(Zirkel & Cantor, 1990; Fleeson & Cantor, 1995). 
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Finally, Emmons and colleagues (e.g. Emmons, 1986, 1996, 1997; Emmons & King, 
1987, 1989) have developed a cognitive-motivational unit measure of personality 
termed personal strivings. Personal strivings represent what an individual is typically 
trying to do (Emmons, 1986). Strivings can be conceptualised as supraordinate 
motivational organising principles that render a cluster of goals functionally 
equivalent for a person (Emmons, 1997). A striving is seen as a unifying construct, 
uniting different goals around a common theme. Thus, a given striving can be 
attained in a variety of ways, and satisfied in terms of any number of more concrete 
goals4 . Unlike the constructs discussed above, strivings represent an ongoing 
concern, and as such rely on doing or being (rather than end-state) criteria for their 
fulfilment. Most importantly in terms of emphasising motivation in personality, 
Emmons (1997) has suggested that each individual can be characterised by a unique 
set of these tendencies. 
Overall then, recent years have revealed a trend away from tension reduction, drive, 
and instinct theories of motivation in personality (e.g. Freud, Jung, Murray) toward 
more strongly cognitive conceptualisations (such as goals) for their understanding 
(Rueda & Moll, 1994; Pervin, 1983; Cofer, 1981; Emmons, 1997). Theorists appear 
gradually more willing to incorporate cognitive motivational constructs into their 
models. So much so in fact, that Emmons (1997) has suggested that this cognitive 
'incorporation' is primarily responsible for the "recent revitalisation of the field of 
personality" (p. 485). 
Goals as the cognitive-motivational unit of choice 
From the above, it can be seen that personality theorists are making increased use of 
cognitive-motivational constructs to account for the (teleological) complexities of 
personality processes. While the present theory is in broad agreement with the 
cognitive-motivational emphasis of these theorists, the current section will briefly 
outline the thinking behind a particular digression (see Pervin, 1989 for a recent 
alternate discussion of the goal concept). Cognitive constructs all share a number of 
4 The notion that particular goals may be represented in, and achieved via, other (lower) goals in an 
individuals hierarchy is not limited to Emmons' ideas, but is an important concept in terms of the 
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advantages over internal/external drivelincentive constructs (see below), yet there are 
several additional reasons to use goals as the particular operationalisation of 
motivation in personality. The current section will thus briefly outline the thinking 
underlying the choice of the goal concept in conceptualising motivation in 
personality. For the purposes of this discussion, goals are defined as "internal 
representations of desired states, where states are broadly construed as outcomes, 
events, or processes" (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; p. 338). 
Ryan (1970) observed that " ... to the layman it seems a simple fact that human 
behaviour is affected by conscious purposes, plans, intentions and the like" (p. 18). 
Locke (1969) similarly observed that the man in the street uses the term "goal", every 
day to explain why he or somebody else is doing something. Taken together these 
observations suggest the implicit presence of goal or (at least) motive concepts within 
lay theories of personality functioning. People seem to organise their explanations 
and understanding of the world around their own and other peoples' goals. 
While the presence of goals within lay theory alone is insufficient justification to use 
goal concepts within a scientific model, the pervading experience of goals at an 
experiential or intrapsychic level does indicate a 'preliminary face validity' for the 
goal construct. Goals are further advantaged over non-cognitive motivational 
constructs such as arousal (Wundt, 1896; Duffy, 1941, 1951, 1957, 1962), drives (e.g. 
Freud, 1923), or instincts (e.g. Jung, 1919) through emphasising the importance of a 
cognitive representation of motives. Kelly (1955, cited in Pervin, 1989) suggests that 
motivational theories have typically been of two kinds - the stick and the carrot. 
According to Pervin (1989), both share a common emphasis on the presence of an 
internal or external stimulus as necessary to activate behaviour. However, in 
representing motives at a cognitive level, the organism is freed from the immediacy of 
current stimuli implicit in drive and incentive models. Now the organism is able to 
orient to the future (Pervin, 1989), insofar as its cognitive capacities permit. 
Considering the above, the reader may reasonably think that there is thus-far little 
reason to use the goal construct over other cognitive-motivational concepts. 
current model, and will be returned to in Chapter 2 when the organisation of personality is discussed. 
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However, goals possess one distinct advantage over and above other cognitive-
motivational personality variables - that of organisation. Compared to other 
concepts, goals provide a more powerful organisational framework for the social 
scientist. No other construct can organise or explain as vast a compilation of 
psychological research as that of goal. No other concept has been as thoroughly 
tested in its utility, and yet been retained. And nothing can truly capture the 
cohesiveness with which personality appears to function as can the concept of goal. 
Put more simply, research examining a vast number of phenomena has implicated 
individual goals as critical variables (see Austin & Vancouver, 1996 for a 
comprehensive review). At one level, such 'conceptual congruence' may simply 
represent the history underlying the goal concept (the goal concept having been used 
for an admittedly long time). As such, goals may well encapsulate the conceptual 
maturity that is reached through careful cellaring. Upon closer examination however, 
this explanation seems unlikely, and even a little ungenerous. 
Thus, rather than ascribe the widespread use of the goal concept to unadorned 
maturity, it seems more reasonable to attribute its continued popularity to simple 
utility and explanatory power. A vast body of research has shown that goals are 
systematically related to almost every aspect of our functioning. The goals of the 
perceiver continue to be demonstrated as important in social cognition. They have 
been shown to alter the perceptual focus (Showers & Cantor, 1985; Srull & Wyer, 
1986), perceptions of intentionality (Jones & Davis, 1965) and what people remember 
(Moore, Kagan & Haith, 1978; Stein, Liwag, & Wade, 1993). 
Relatedly, Bargh (1990) argues that people naturally encode the behaviour of others 
in terms of their intentions and goals. Citing Brewer and colleagues (e.g. Brewer & 
Dupree, 1983), Bargh (1990) suggests that what people remember best over time is 
not the actual behaviours, so much as the person's overall intentions. This immediate 
categorisation of the other in terms of intents and goals seems to operate as a 
personality heuristic, enabling people to quickly categorise others in real time. 
Overall, this suggests that an understanding of goals enables one to quickly predict the 
action of another. 
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It is especially notable in respect of the current model, that goals feature centrally in 
theories of emotions (e.g. Arnold, 1960a, 1960b; Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Lazarus, 
1991a; Scherer, 1984; Fridja, 1986, 1993; Izard, 1971, 1991; Plutchik, 1980; 1994). 
Moreover, the accord among these theories is supported by a huge array of empirical 
data, indicating the relevance of goal frameworks for the many aspects of many 
emotions (e.g. Fridja, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), across many cultures (see e.g. 
Mesquita & Fridja, 1992; Scherer, 1997). Pervin (1990) writes, "social cognition 
involves actors with goals .. their goals affecting their behaviour, their organisation of 
information, and their ascriptions of goals to others" (p. 12). In sum, I believe that 
personal goals constitute the totality and coherence of our functioning regardless of 
(and occasionally despite) awareness or volition. 
Not only is intrapersonal functioning experienced and proven experimentally to 
coalesce around goals, but goals provide a common language for scientists studying 
diverse phenomena (Dweck, 1996). When one examines the mainstream of 
psychological writing, the variety of theoretical perspectives making use of the goal 
concept is quite astonishing. Goals have been used from motivational theory to social 
learning theory, to emotion and to action theory and psychoanalytic theory; from 
Tolman (1932), Allport (1937), and McDougal (1908, 1930) to Bandura (1986) and 
Mischel (1973), to Gollwitzer and Bargh (1996), and to Gedo (1979). 
As further indication of the diverse areas within which goal concepts have been 
applied would serve little purpose, suffice to say that goals matter. Goals are 
implicated at almost every level of our functioning, from the simply biological to the 
most abstractly cognitive. The temporal influence of a goal ranges from a short 
momentary desire to the deep personal goals that can influence the direction, manner, 
and enjoyment of an entire life span. 
A further advantage of the goal concept, albeit one that is shared to a degree with 
other cognitive-motivational concepts, lies in its ability to adequately represent the 
complexities of human functioning. The concept of a hierarchically organised goal 
system (e.g. Maslow, 1970; Powers, 1973; Gedo, 1979; Pervin, 1983, 1989; 
Broadbent, 1985) is the dominant conceptualisation across research domains (Austin 
& Vancouver, 1996). Hierarchies of goals suggest a heavily interdependent and 
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interactive pattern of goals, and raise the probability that the attainment of certain 
goals may be facilitative or incompatible with that of other goals (see Chapter 2). 
Similarly, goals at one level may be connected to numerous other motives both above 
and below that level in the hierarchy. Within the current model, the connections 
between goals are in no way fixed, rather they are seen as in a permanent state of 
emergent flux, perpetually shifting as a function of the totality of the structure (see 
Chapters 2, 6 and 7). Hierarchical or network conceptualisations thus add a much-
needed element of complexity to our models of an organism's functioning (Pervin, 
1989), and enable the extension of goal models to consideration of psychopathology 
(Dweck, 1996). Similarly, in enabling a distinction between the goals themselves and 
the plans through which they are actualised, the organism is permitted a more flexible 
and adaptive functioning5. 
Upon considering the concept of levels, it is thought necessary to pinpoint the level of 
analysis that is most useful (Dweck, 1996). Previous goal-type, personality theorists (e.g. 
Emmons, 1986; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) have typically utilised broad motive concepts 
that represent 'ideographic manifestations of normative goals.' While the current model 
recognises the necessity of normative goal measures, a normative dominated approach to 
personality-as-motivation has the ticklish disadvantage of relying on implicit social or 
theoretical consensus as the sine qua non of whether or not a particular grouping of goals is 
actually important or meaningful (Little, 1995). As a consequence such theories 
prescriptively limit themselves, and as such may well fail to detect potentially important 
individual differences or obscure intrapsychic ally important personality change6• 
Moreover, to examine multiple levels of functioning simultaneously, such models 
must necessarily incorporate other concepts in order to conceptualise both biological 
and lower level motives. Using the goal concept thus has the substantial advantage of 
parsimony in that both normative and ideographic, biological and acquired, and macro 
5 While the current model would dispute the utility of a distinction between goals and plans, instead 
arguing that the choice of plans is no more or less goal oriented that any other aspect of functioning, 
the flexibility inherent in goal conceptualisations is nonetheless once more underscored. Briefly stated, 
the current theory suggests that plans are necessarily conscious phenomena whilst goals need not be. 
6 While there may of necessity always be a trade off between psychometric utility and phenomenological 
validity, the current model advocates that in being able to capture multiple levels within a single concept, that 
the goal concept offers the most profitable compromise between the two concerns. 
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and micro level goal representations can be examined within the same terminological 
framework. 
In sum, a goal analysis of personality enables us to make use of all the elements at our 
disposal (thinking, feeling and acting) in a manageable way (Dweck, 1996). 
Specifically a goal analysis leads us to see affect, cognition and behaviour as 
systematic patterns, ones that occur and are organised in respect of people's goals. I 
have argued that a goal approach holds the promise of allowing us to capture the 
dynamically motivated and hierarchical nature of personality. 
Goals provide a common language, and allow the scientist to express both the 
coherent cognition-affect-behaviour patterns that distinguish individuals from one 
another, as well as to portray the more stable and/or shared aspects of personality. 
Importantly, both are accomplished using a consistent terminology. Finally, of the 
cognitive-motivational concepts, that of goal contains the fewest assumptions about 
exactly what the motives that constitute personality relate to, where they are best 
measured, or the degree to which they may be shared. In this manner, the goal 
concept provides an unsurpassed motivational concept with which to investigate the 
complexity and dynamism of personality. To my mind, goals constitute the 
"explanatory concepts par excellence in personality psychology" (Hogan, 1987, p. 
80). 
Chapter 1.5 - A distinction between being motived and the experience of 
being motivated 
In respect of goals, the current model further advocates that a clear theoretical and 
empirical distinction be maintained between being in a state of goal pursuit and the 
experience of goal pursuil. Although such a division might initially appear trifling 
and against the holistic flavour of the model, there are several excellent reasons for its 
incorporation. 
7 For the moment this distinction will only be remarked upon in respect of motives. However, the 
same reasoning can be successfully put to use when considering the distinction between an emotional 
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. The first of these reasons has its roots in evolutionary theory and the psychology of 
consciousness. Implicit in the reasoning provided by Binswanger (1991), is the 
notion that phylogenetic ally less complex .organisms do not 'experience' the influence 
of their motives in the same manner as we do. Rather, they simply perceive certain 
stimulus conditions (instinctually), and then respond behaviourally as dictated by 
these same hard-wired biological processes. The understanding and importance of 
any 'experience' they might have of being motivated is consequently less important to 
an understanding of their behaviour than it is for humans. Overall, one wonders 
whether it is at all meaningful to speak of their 'experiencing' a motive, and in any 
case, the possibility for such organisms to manifest an incongruence between a motive 
and its experience does not exist8. Conceding however the heavy involvement of 
learning and the development of conscious self-reflection in human functioning 
requires more careful theoretical consideration. 
Perhaps an example will clarify the distinction offered. Few psychologists would 
disagree that the functional motive underlying (to briefly borrow from Murray, 1938) 
the nSex, the nIntimacy, or even the nPower, is frequently a simple reproductive need 
(nReproduction). Hence, people frequently engage in behaviour aimed toward, and 
resulting in, sex, intimacy, or feelings of power without necessarily experiencing the 
nReproduction. They simply experience a motive (whichever, or whatever it might 
be) and act accordingly. However to claim on this basis that the nReproduction does 
not continue to operate as a motive for them is simply untrue. 
Conceptually, the distinction between a goal and its experience has another substantial 
advantage. As was mentioned above, goals are commonly conceptualised as existing 
in hierarchies (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Within the current model, the goals that 
constitute personality are believed to exist in hierarchical goal strands of related 
state and the experience of an emotion (see Chapter 7), and again between the self as a construct and 
the multiple experiences of that construct (see Chapter 2). 
8 As will be expanded upon below (see Chapters 6 and 7), the current theory suggests that goals about 
experience are limited to organisms that possess awareness of the self. Although it may be either 
anthropo or mammallocentric (McGuire, 1993) to suggest that creatures other than homo sapiens do 
not experience emotions, it seems reasonable to suggest that their motivations are not experienced in 
respect of a self. Likewise, it seems unlikely that most organisms have the capacities to develop 
motives about any experience they might have. Hence, a motive and its (if any) experience must occur 
synonymously where there is no conscious self. 
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goals. For example, we might find that a particular goal (for example, to brush one's 
teeth) is attached to or part of other goals (say, to have a nice smile). In tum, this 
motive may be a part of other goals involving attractiveness, which (once more) may 
be subsumed within broader goals involving acquiring a partner, maintaining a self 
image and so on. Ultimately, we can unravel a succession of ever broader, frequently 
more abstract, and most likely motivationally more-powerful goal articulations. 
While only some or one of these goals may be experienced as motivating, it can be 
argued (see Chapter 5) that lower level goals (irrespective of experience) can only 
possess motivational power through their bearing on and connection with higher level 
goals. While the awareness (or consciousness) of a goal is clearly necessary for it to 
be experienced as motivating, such awareness is in no way necessary for a goal to 
influence behaviour, and moreover the two do not constitute the same phenomena. 
As will be expanded upon during consideration of the phenomenon of consciousness, 
the degree of awareness one experiences in respect of a particular goal strand may be 
an important predictor of both success and happiness. 
Chapter 1.6 - An Illustrative Capsule: Some consequences of non-
motivational personality frameworks - Trait theory 
Introduction 
Above, it has been noted that the current model (in line with several other theories) 
considers personality to be primarily a hierarchically networked goal or cognitive-
motivational structure. Yet both scientifically and at a lay level we have tended to 
conceptualise 'personality' in terms of more global units - traits. The following 
discussion of trait theories of personality is being included for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, the discussion is intended as illustrative of the likely consequences 
of deriving a theory of personality without placing motivation at the core. Secondly, 
it will seek to integrate trait findings within the current model. There is no doubt that 
traits exist, nor that traits provide the dominant framework in personality research at 
this time (Endler & Speer, 1998). Consequently, trait-derived findings must be 
attended to. 
25 
Overall, the section will argue that traits cannot constitute the basis for personality. 
Within the goal framework being developed, traits (or stable, stylistic goal pursuit 
differences) are considered to have arisen and to be maintained for the same 
motivated reasons as any other aspect of functioning - namely they represent a goal. 
Hence, while it is possible that goals relating to a particular trait (for example, its 
existence or expression) may occupy a central place in a given goal system or 
personality, this is not necessarily so, hence the trait concept is better considered a 
practical taxonomic description of personal style. 9 
Trait theories of personality 
Trait theory (e.g. Allport, Eysenck, and Cattell), and its chief representative the five 
factor model, share and rest on the supposition that traits are the fundamental units of 
personality (Pervin, 1993b). McCrae and Costa (1995) argue that traits are made 
manifest in the typical patterns of motives, attitudes, and behaviours. Support for the 
model's utility has come from three major areas; factor analysis of trait terms lO in 
language, the relation of trait questionnaires to other questionnaires and ratings, and 
the analysis of genetic contributions to personality. 
Unfortunately, traits are notoriously difficult to define (Pervin, 1994; Winter, John, 
Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998), and there is little agreement (even among trait 
theorists) as to what a trait is (McCrae & Costa, 1995). However, traits have been 
defined by several leading theorists as 'consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings or 
actions that distinguish people from one another' (McCrae & Costa, 1995; Johnson, 
1997). 
A massive range of studies has denoted several key aspects of trait theory, most 
notably the cross-cultural replicability of the five factor model (McCrae & Costa, 
1995; Saucier & Goldberg, 1998), the heritability of traits (Loehlin, 1992, cited in 
9 This position is similar to that offered by Averill (1998, personal communication), who writes, "traits 
... can better be conceptualised as abilities or capacities than as motives." 
10 Epstein (1996) has extensively argued that there is no reason to suspect that factor analysis can 
determine the most useful and fundamental aspects of personality. 
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McCrae & Costa, 1995), and the consistency of traits over time (e.g. Costa & 
McCrae, 1988; and reviewed in Costa & McCrae, 1997). Together these have been 
taken as not only supportive of the model's psychometric utility, but also as indicative 
of its explanatory power. Overall, the internal coherence of research in this area, 
coupled with the sheer press of publication, has lead some authors to conclude that "in 
the past five years, personality psychologists from a variety of perspectives have 
converged on a five factor model of personality" (McCrae & Costa, 1990; p. v; see 
also Saucier & Goldberg, 1998). Perhaps to my own detriment, I do not count myself 
among them. 
A quick critique of trait explanations 
Despite the confidence expressed by the authors above, trait theory and the five factor 
model have not been (Mischel, 1968, 1973; Tomkins, 1981) and are not (e.g. Pervin, 
1994, 1996; Dweck, 1996; Magai, 1996) without their critics. The history of 
psychology has seen repeated attacks on trait psychology (McCrae & Costa, 1995; 
McAdams, 1996a), and the conceptual consideration of traits as basic building blocks 
of personality remains heavily questionable. These criticisms have taken a number of 
forms, and are briefly outlined belowll . 
Tomkins (1981) has argued that personality research has failed to produce a theorist 
of the capacities of Freud or Murray (see also Epstein, 1996 for a similar comment). 
Given this failure he argues, "the field of personality has become fragmented and 
partitioned, one wherein concern with the person as a whole has been replaced with 
the study of personality variables" (p. 445), a "psychology of no one at all" (Lamiell 
& Weigert, 1995; p. 336). Baumeister and Tice (1996) suggest this may be a reaction 
to a perception that historical theory development in personality had previously been 
rudimentary and unsystematic. With a candid degree of self-acknowledged chutzpah, 
Tomkins (1981) reiterates his previous argument (see Tomkins, 1962; 1963), 
suggesting that American psychology has lost its heart through fear of methodological 
II There have been numerous papers on the various inadequacies of trait theory which, ahhough 
substantial, are beyond the scope of the current discussion which is primarily concerned with trait 
theory'S motivational neglects. For fuller treatment readers are referred to the seminal critiques 
proffered by Mischel (1968; 1973) and more recently, by Pervin (1994) and Magai (1996). 
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impurity. He suggests that the dominance of methodological constraints continues to 
limit, if not impoverish theoretical innovation. 
Overall, Tomkins (1981) bluntly suggests that a methodology can never be a 
substitute for a personality theory (see also Magai, 1996). He decries the 
fragmentation of personality research, and indeed, the fragmentation of the aspects of 
personality into part functions: affect, cognition, and behaviour. The current model 
seeks to rectify this situation by explicitly bringing thinking, feeling and acting 
together in respect of a construct that can be shown to synthesise them - that of goal 
(Dweck, 1996). 
McAdams (1997) has suggested that psychologists should not be too quick to 
assimilate every conceptual scheme under the umbrella of the Big Five. He argues 
that while no description of the person is adequate without traits, that trait descriptions 
yield little more than A Psychology of the Stranger (McAdams, 1994). Reducing a 
person to five trait scores will not satisfy those who seek a more differentiated 
portrait. Further, the dimensions do not concern themselves with the issues that have 
traditionally been of interest to personality psychologists - namely motivations. As 
with Tomkins (1981), McAdams (1997) notes that there has been little progress in the 
conceptualisation of the whole person. As is more fully considered below, he 
suggests that developments in our understanding of self should eventually produce a 
viable construct, although he does note that self-based theories have yet to provide the 
breadth and depth necessary to integrate the disparate conceptual strands. 
In defence of the nomothetic nature of the trait concept and particularly the Big Five 
model, Johnson (1997) suggests that a science of personality depends on studying 
consistencies. He notes that traits imply consistent reactions to similar situations, not 
necessarily to different situations, and suggests that a trait does not imply that a given 
behaviour will occur every single time, but rather on average. Similarly, McCrae and 
Costa (1995) have argued that traits are universal dimensions that transcend time, 
place, and circumstance, while goals, beliefs and plans are intrinsically embedded in 
these same contexts. . Overall, they argue that the study of traits alone leads to 
generalisable knowledge in that "explanatory trait concepts trade idiographic fidelity 
for nomothetic utility" (ibid, p. 243). 
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However, while it is true that trait concepts struggle for idiographic validity 
(Tomkins, 1981), the implication that there should need to be such a trade off appears 
somewhat pessimistic. While it is likely that there will always be some tensions 
between theorists preferring the nomothetic and those stressing idiographic concerns, 
to blandly suggest that the two concerns are contradictory or mutually exclusive is 
unprofitable and unnecessarily divisive. As will be discussed more fully below, the 
current model suggests that through careful combination of theoretically derived goal 
domains (nomothetic) and their idiographic expression, we can construct a personality 
framework within which we retain both generality and validity (see e.g. Dweck, 1996; 
Emmons & King, 1989). 
Johnson (1997) argues that a model cannot reasonably be expected to explain or 
describe everything about a unique person. "A useful model" he writes, "is, by 
definition, a simplification: it retains only the important features of the infinitely 
complex domain it represents" (p. 87; his emphasis). While this author is in 
agreement that a useful model should simplify a phenomenon, the notion that 
simplicity should be the primary grounds upon which a theory is evaluated itself 
seems simplistic and sadly unambitious. Likewise, the assertion that traits constitute 
the 'important features' of personality is questionable at best. It would seem more 
valid to suggest that traits constitute the most readily measurable aspects of 
personality. Thus instead of accepting traits as pivotal in personality per se, we 
should modify our measures. 
Compounding the difficulties above is intradisciplinary disagreement among trait 
theorists themselves as to what the trait model is a model of (Western, 1996). Some 
are clear that it is a model of the way laypeople think (e.g. John, 1990) while others 
believe it to be a model of personality per se (McCrae & Costa, 1995). 
The major criticism that has been levelled at trait theories is that they are 
predominantly descriptive rather than explanatory. That is to say, trait theories of 
personality seem better suited to describing the manner in which a given behaviour is 
expressed, than they do to explaining why the behaviour occurred in the first place. 
Counter to the interpretation of Johnson (1997), to say that 'Joe hit Fred because he is 
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aggressive,' will always remain an imprecise and inadequate explanation of 'why'. It 
may well describe a tendency (trait) that Joe possesses, but tells you little of why this 
maybe so. 
As Buss (1997a) has recently argued, a conception of major motives must form the 
core of any major theory of personality. These motives "specify what energises the 
organism, what causes us to do something rather than nothing, and toward what goals 
human behaviour is directed" (p. 327). The failure to sufficiently attend to the place 
of motives continues to pose the major stumbling block to the validity of trait 
conceptualisations. 
As if attempting to counter such adversity, several theorists have distinguished 
between two types or meaning of trait (McCrae & Costa, 1995). Variously referred to 
as surface and source traits (Cattel, 1950), phenotypic versus genotypic traits 
(Eysenck, 1967) or trait! and trait2 (Wiggins, 1984, cited in McCrae & Costa, 1995), 
the former type corresponds to patterns of behaviour and experience, the other to the 
underlying causes of behaviour. 
Although authors such as McCrae and Costa (1995) 'acknowledge' that trait and 
purposive (goal) explanations exist at different levels, the reasons supporting their 
particular predilection seem unconvincing, and these authors have ultimately failed to 
explain the 'why' of traits both distally12 and proximally. Why are the Big 5 
important, and why these particular five (Baumeister & Tice, 1996)? 
Developmentally, we must ask why is one person an extrovert and another not? Why 
is one individual highly neurotic and another less so? According to Magai (1996) 
"What trait theory .. has failed to deal adequately with, is the why, the wherefore, and 
the ontogeny of human personality" (p. 174). Overall, not only are the arguments in 
respect of the origins of traits frequently a little slippery, but as Eder and Mangelsdorf 
!2 There have recently been some evolutionary arguments regarding the adaptive status of traits as 
summarising the most important features of the adaptive landscape (D. Buss, 1989), and of traits as a 
distinctively human characteristic (A. Buss, 1997). While the argument of these two authors could be 
taken as supportive of the trait position, one should note that both authors posit significantly greater 
numbers of traits than most theorists. Furthermore, applying an extension of D. Buss's (l997a) 
'domain specific problem solving' and A. Buss's (1997) 'uniqueness of self-traits' arguments regarding 
personality, beg the questions as to what (exactly) traits are, and why we should use the concept over 
that of motivation, which both authors acknowledge to be the basis for their ideas. 
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(1997) simply note, little is known about the emergence and developmental course of 
traits. 
illterestingly, the most recent formulations of trait theories (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 
1997; Johnson, 1997) have continued to engage in what appears to be a series of 
semantically questionable manoeuvres in order to make the necessary sUbsumption of 
motives more palatable. Overall, such formulations seem to suggest that the trait 
concept is sufficiently broad to subsume motivation and emotion. The trouble with 
this of course is that one wonders where traits come from, how they arise, and what 
motivates them. 
Johnson (1997) for example, attempts to circumvent his explanatory difficulty 
through allusion to a series of unobservable emotional and cognitive traits that 
underlie and (presumably thus) explain behaviour. Through equating a person's 
desires with emotional traits, and their beliefs with cognitive traits, the author seeks 
to impart the necessary motivational validity to the notion of trait. 
For an equivalent purpose, Costa and McCrae (1997) have evolved a similarly 
extravagant notion of trait and its importance to personality. They write "As 
dispositions, traits are dynamic, in some respects equivalent to motives and needs," 
and further, that they are "among the central determinants of the life course and the 
sense of identity" (p. 270). With due respect, it is the opinion of this author that such 
comparisons necessitate an unconvincing distension of the trait concept, and appear to 
have evolved due to an emergent awareness that the concept of trait is inadequate and 
ill-suited to forming the basis for personality research. 
ill a equally clever retrenchment of the trait stockade, Wiggins (1997) offers a 
distinction between the psychometric trait viewpoint and trait theory, suggesting that 
the trait viewpoint has been "judged guilty in virtue of its association with certain 
personality theories" (p. 98). He further argues that while laymen use trait terms in 
lieu of explanations, psychologists have used them as explanatory constructs. 
According to Wiggins (1997), virtually all 'trait' theorists (Allport, Cattell, Eysenck, 
Murray) consider traits to be causal entities rather than categorical summaries. 
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In general trait theory (such as that espoused by Costa & McCrae, and Johnson), the 
behaviour itself is considered phenotypic, whilst the underlying trait is considered 
genotypic. According to Wiggins (1997), this type of theorising is implausible. He 
argues that there are too many reasons not to consider traits as explanatory. For 
example, he suggests that traits may well reside within a pattern of institutional rules, 
rather than within individuals 13. Drawing from research in interpersonal behaviour, 
Wiggins (1997) suggests that the structure of interpersonal behaviour mirrors a set of 
interrelated social rules for classifying behaviour in terms of its likely consequences. 
The position Wiggins (1997) advocates is one wherein trait measures are used and 
considered to predict future behaviour on the basis of past behaviour. He suggests 
that once this is realised, attempts to assess underlying motives become beside the 
point. He follows with a gentle admonishment, suggesting that in our ignorance of 
the nature of human nature, we have lapsed into the lay tendency to allow trait terms 
to 'stand in' for genuine explanations. Interestingly, Wiggins (1997) concludes that 
the trait concept, interpreted as a facet of a person's self-presentational style, serves 
as the best unit of analysis for personality research. 
Conclusions: Traits relocated and reconceptualised 
G. W. Allport (1937) rejected traditional instinct and drive conceptualisations as 
insufficiently dynamic and not paying sufficient dues to personality. Ironically, the 
current model rejects trait explanations as similarly lacking in dynamism, and as not 
paying sufficient attention to goals, emotion, motivation and (hence once more) to 
life. 
The claim that traits 'transcend time, place, and circumstance' (McCrae & Costa, 
1995, p. 243), seems ill-founded and in conflict with other theory (e.g. Wiggins, 
1997), while the notion that traits can explain 'non-motivationally linked' behaviours 
appears virtually inexplicable. Such a claim immediately leads one to reflect on 
13 It should be noted that this position is in direct contrast with that adopted by McCrae and Costa 
(1995) who argue that traits are more useful explanatory concepts than goals precisely because the 
latter are embedded in the immediate historical, cultural, and personal contexts to the point that they 
lose generality. 
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exactly what a non-motivational display of behaviour might look like. As has been 
noted, homo-sapiens do not possess a global monopoly on living, and by extension, 
on having purpose or goals. Rather, all living systems exhibit purpose, and all are 
goal directed. 
Accepting this observation leads to somewhat of a conundrum. If purpose is indeed 
ubiquitous to life, why then foundation our conceptualisations of ourselves at a place 
where purpose plays second fiddle to style? Why site ourselves upon a groundwork 
of semantically-shifting constructs? Why not instead place the goal concept at the 
vanguard of our frameworks in order that we might realistically place ourselves in 
appropriate context? To conceptualise ourselves in a manner thus far-removed from 
our phylogenetic relatives is not only arrogantly anthropocentric, but moreover, is 
very much mistaken. 
The argument above is not intended to suggest that traits do not exist, nor is it to 
suggest that traits are unimportant. Rather, the current model proposes that traits have 
arisen, exist, and are maintained, for the same motivated reasons as any other aspect 
of functioning - namely they represent a goal (see e.g. Little, 1995). However, rather 
than positing these nomothetic, stable, stylistic, 'goal-pursuit' goals as fundamental, 
the current theory simply considers traits to be but one operationally measurable 
version of secondary goals dictating the manner in which each system's or each 
personality's goals will be obtained - a personal style. Such an interpretation is in 
accord with the personality theory of Adler (1927/1957) who suggested that each 
developing child responds to the basic dynamics of life by developing its own style of 
life. This 'style' consists of the child's chosen life goals, and the methods used to 
achieve them. 
Chapter 1.7 - Concluding remarks on personality and personality-motive 
relationships 
Given the explanatory difficulties with the argument offered by. trait theory, 
principally the elements involving confused and shifty logic in respect of motivation 
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and emotion, the current model advocates a less problematic, more probable, basis for 
personality - personality as a goal structure. The emphasis on cognitive-motivational 
concepts is in accord with several leading theorists, most notably Emmons (e.g. 1986, 
1993, 1996, 1997), as well as several key historical figures in personality research. 
Moreover, several leading theoretical commentators in the field of personality 
research have recently denoted the importance of motivation in personality (e.g. 
Pervin, 1994; Shoda & Mischel, 1996; Epstein, 1996). While the precise manner in 
which motives are experienced may vary across organisms as a function of 
phylogenetic and cognitive sophistication, the motive units themselves are 
indispensable. 
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Chapter 2: The Nature of Personality II: The Ubiquitous Need to 
Organise - Goals, Personality and the Self. 
Chapter 2.1 - Introduction 
Following Chapter 1, the current chapter will argue that personality is not only a 
motivational concern, but further that it has its roots in life's ubiquitous need to 
organise. The chapter begins with a functional analysis examining the phylogeny of 
organisational constructs, arguing that every living organism possesses an innate 
structure within which to systematise information. It is then suggested that the 
personality or self is homo sapiens's organising construct. As such, the fact that we 
become aware of and can reflectively experience this construct does not, cannot, and 
should not be thought of as changing the function that self ultimately serves. 
The chapter will then briefly consider something of the relationship between the 
concepts of personality and self. It will outline previous theories of personality and 
self, drawing out the notion of organisation. It will suggest that while the terms 'self 
(experiential) and 'personality' (predictive/scientific) are traditionally used to refer to 
different aspects of a person, that each is fundamentally concerned with the same 
phenomenon. 
In a manner similar to that offered in respect of motives, it will advocate a theoretical 
distinction between a structural or organisational self and our many experiences of 
that structure. In doing so, it will suggest that there can only be one self, although 
there can be multiple experiences of that self. The chapter will conclude with a 
characterisation of self that distinguishes between the self as a structure and the 
experiences of self. 
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Chapter 2.2 - Organisation as Necessary in Living Systems 
If the reader can accept that all life is essentially goal directed, irrespective of exactly 
what these goals are, whether they are 'experienced,' and how they are acted upon 
(for the moment), one is naturally led to consider how goal-directedness might best be 
facilitated. Moreover, if one is to say (for example) that a plant has purpose and is 
goal directed (at least as far as genetic replication), what must the plant be capable of 
in order to proceed? The popular philosopher of science, Fritjof Capra (1996) has 
recently argued that the answer to this type of question can be found in the early 
writings of organismic biologists. Organismic biologists maintain that the essential 
ingredient needed in any model of life (and thus an essential element of life) is the 
concept of organisation. 
Drawing upon and developing on the work of early organicists, systems theorists have 
taken the concept of organisation to the point where it has become the sine qua non of 
living systems theory. To the systems theorist, life is organised (Skyttner, 1996). At 
the most simple level, an organism's ability to operate effectively upon its goals, 
presupposes and ability to distinguish between "that which is me/mine" and "that 
which is not." To achieve this, the system must be able to organise incoming datal 
(Edelman, 1989). 
Evidence suggests that even a simple cell is able to distinguish between itself and 'the 
other,' and that this capacity is needed for even the most rudimentary immunological 
functioning. In fact, when this ability is lost the organism (suffering from a now 
famous auto-immune reaction) frequently dies (Dennett, 1991a). A general 
perspective, informed by living systems theory (e.g. Ford, 1987) would explain this 
finding as indicating that every system has a set of boundaries indicating a degree of 
differentiation between what is included and excluded in the system (Skyttner, 1996). 
To protect itself from pathogens, the cell clearly needs to be able to identify elements 
from within and outside its own system. 
I As shall be discussed in a subsequent section, the grandfather of attachment theory John Bowlby 
(1969) addresses a similar conviction. He writes, "Members of all but the most primitive phyla are 
possessed of equipment that enables them to organise such information as they have about their world 
into schemata or maps," (p. 74), or" .. something more like a working model of its environment" (p. 
110). 
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Similarly, the common dog would seem to possess a fundamental organisational 
need2• At the most basic level, the dog needs to be able to perceive the limits of its 
own physical self (that is my tail, but that's not mine or mer That the dog seems to 
be capable of this feat is however more a testament to humanity's essential difference 
to other organisms, than it is to the dog's heretofore unrecognised capacities. 
The current model suggests that as one moves up the phylogenetic chain, each 
systems' organising construct comes to be progressively more capable, flexible and 
complicated. Capable, in that the range, the speed, and the abilities of the organism 
become progressively greater. Flexible, in that the organism is progressively less 
tightly bound by genetic imperatives or instincts, and complicated, in that the 
development, the organisation, and (inevitably) the scientific conceptualisations of 
that organising construct become ever more so. 
Support for the ubiquity· of organisation can be found in the writings of 
developmentally oriented theorists. Smith (1990) for example, has recently argued 
that "We are forever carving nature at its joints .. dividing it into categories" (p. 33)4. 
According to Smith, the process of organisation is fundamental to (mental) life 
because it greatly reduces the demands on perceptual processes, storage space, and 
reasoning, all of which are known to be limited. Smith (1990) further delineates a 
range of deVelopmental evidence, noting that we categorise from a very early age, and 
that we utilise typicality principles in our judgements. 
Importantly, Smith (1990) also suggests that the notion of category is premised on the 
belief that objects belong together, rather than any objective reality as to their shared 
characteristics. This is important, for it adds an element of complexity to what are 
simple premises. In considering categories as subjective phenomena, we are then in a 
position to more readily explain the variations in categorisation that people display for 
2 While the term 'need' may appear to be overly subjective, it will be used for want of a better 
description. Use of the term is not intended to indicate that a given organism experiences need per se, 
but rather that the organisation of information is an integral part, and defining characteristic of, life .. As 
noted, the distinction between a need, goal, or motive, and the way in which it is experienced is of 
fundamental importance to the current model. 
3 See Dennett (1991a) for a similar analogy involving a hungry lobster. 
4 A fuller discussion of the systemic nature of development can be found in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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the same object. Homo sapiens, more so than other species, learns to categorise. 
Consequently, we do so in a more varied manner than most species. 
For less complicated creatures, primitive organisational goal-directedness is hard-
wired, and made manifest directly through perceptual and instinct systems. 
Behaviours typically occur in response to the perception of particular stimuli, or 
according to biological timetables. In response to most stimuli, there are no 
'decisions' to be made, rather the organism simply 'knows what to do.' Finally, the 
organism is near fully functional from the first moments of its 'birth,' and cannot truly 
be considered self-aware. 
As the creature under scrutiny becomes more complex, we can observe a gradual 
. decoupling of behaviours from the strict demands of genetic make-up and instinct. So 
much so, that by the time one observes homo sapiens, the decoupling is nearly 
complete. Homo sapiens is barely formed at birth, and adult behaviours are organised 
and directed by a complt!x organisational structure that must itself first develop (see 
below). Perhaps most importantly, the organism exhibits awareness of the nature and 
purposes of the organisational construct itself - consciousness. 
Nonetheless, it is in precisely this universal life 'need' for organisation or 
differentiation that the predecessor of the organising construct in homo sapiens 
appears - the construct we interpret and experience as 'the self or 'our personality.' 
An argument of similarly phylogenetic slant is made by Dennett (1991a), who 
suggests that "there is nothing particularly selfy about the primitive precursors of 
humans selves" but that these same structures "lay the foundations for our particular 
human innovations and complications" (p. 356). 
To state this 'functional similarity' between each of our own selves, and the 
organising construct of another organism is not however to suggest that interspecies 
constructs are no different. If the human self simply happened to be the human 
manifestation of some ubiquitous organisational construct, our 'self would be no 
different from any other organism's organising system. Other living systems would 
possess "selves," and any difference would be a question of degree rather than kind. 
As noted above, it should be made clear that I do not think this the case at all. As is 
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discussed below, conscious awareness of the organising construct or self is an entirely 
different matter. 
It is nonetheless my belief that organisational constructs are functionally (if not 
semantically or experientially) equivalent across species, and that each construct has 
as its primary function the organisation of information and motives. In making this 
claim, I am not attempting to suggest that other aspects of the self or personality, the 
experience of, and operations upon each are unimportant. Rather, I believe that each 
'self' ultimately serves, and is the ongoing product of the organisation of information 
and motives. Overall, the network of information and goals that constitute the human 
self appears an innate construct, limited in its particular form to homo sapiens and 
perhaps our nearest biological relatives, and its emergence inevitably timetabled by a 
biological schedule (Stern, 1985). The current model thus suggests as we develop we 
will inevitably develop a self as the organisation and regulation of goal operations and 
information. 
Chapter 2.3 - The self in psychology 
Introduction 
A system is a big black box 
Of which we can't unlock the locks 
And all we can find out about 
Is what goes in and what comes out. 
Kenneth Boulding (1956, cited in Skyttner, 1996). 
Unfortunately for modern SCIence, the self appears a topic more readily 
conceptualised experientially than theoretically. There is "a puzzling disparity 
between the certainty that you are (or have) a self and the difficulty in describing what 
a self is" (Kolak & Martin, 1991). Moreover, the concept of self is so vast, so 
complicated, and so intensely personal that the psychological sciences have typically 
been reluctant to involve themselves (sic) in its study. The study of what 'the self' is 
and means has typically been the province of philosophers, theologians, and mystics, 
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and lies at the very heart of philosophical speculation on human nature (Stern, 1985). 
Some writers would no doubt still argue that this is where it should remain - that 
scientific psychology does not need a self. 
However, if the number of papers published on a topic is an accurate indicator of the 
interest it evokes and the attention it commands, the self continues to hold centre-
stage position in psychology (Banaji & Prentice, 1994). At the time of their paper, 
more than 5000 articles about the self had appeared since the last Annual Review of 
Psychology chapter on the topic appeared seven years prior (Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
Perhaps more importantly, the consideration of goal and emotional functioning from a 
systems perspective presupposes that human strivings are organised in some manner. 
While the argument above has broadly suggested that the self should initially be 
considered a form of systemic goal organisation, the following discussion will take 
this position somewhat further. Through outline of past consideration of the self-
concept, especially as bearing on the concepts of organisation and motivation, it will 
be argued that the self is best conceptualised as a complicated hierarchy or network of 
goals. Overall, it will be argued that consideration of the self in a light other than that 
of organisation is scientifically fraudulent, conceptually futile, and therapeutically 
fruitless. 
Previous thought on the self-as-organisation idea 
Which one of the many people who 
I am, the many inner voices inside 
of me, will dominate? Who, or how, 
will I be? Which part of me decides? 
Douglas Hofstadter (cited in Schwartz, 1987) 
As recently noted by Baumeister (1997), the most obvious and common things are 
sometimes the most difficult to define. This certainly applies to the self (Baumeister, 
1997). Social scientists interested in the concept of self have proffered near-
innumerable definitions, none of which is entirely satisfactory. Unfortunately, the 
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concept has invariably been tied either to the experience of self (e.g. McAdams, 
1996a; Baumeister, 1997) or to identity, the self-in-relation (e.g. Stem, 1985; Harre, 
1991; Neisser, 1991; Brewer, 1991). A plethora of psychological and lay terms such 
as self-knowledge, self-concept, self-improvement, self-esteem, and the ever-popular 
'inner or true-self' and self-actualisation (to name but a few) have resulted, 
destructively complicating the scientific concept of self. 
However, a large number of historical and contemporary models have considered the 
self as the unifying or organising construct in personality. The models of both James 
(1890) and Freud (1923/1961) accept the notion that the self operates as a unifying 
force in a person's strivings toward unity and wholeness. Similarly, McDougal (1908) 
suggested that while personality could be thought of as a number of different instincts 
. and sentiments, that the master sentiment is self-regard, which makes for unity of self, 
or what McDougal called character. 
The concept of self or proprium features centrally in the works of Allport (1955). 
Allport was deeply impressed with the wholeness and unity of personality, and 
suggested that the proprium emerges in developmental stages (see below). Henry 
Murray (e.g. 1938) similarly championed a science of the whole person. Among the 
influential concepts proposed by Murray, was that of the unity thema. Unity thema 
may be viewed as the central organising motif in a person's life. Overall, despite the 
complexity evident in many of these models, many of the personality systems 
proposed during this era share the claim that a person may be viewed as "a unified 
and organised totality" (McAdams, 1997; p. 12). 
Developmentalist Daniel Stem (1985) is supportive of this organisational notion, 
suggesting that we instinctively process our experiences in such a way that they 
appear to belong to some kind of systematic, subjective organisation that we refer to 
as the sense· of self. For Stem, the senses of the self are the primary organiser of 
development. The current model would refine, and then take this claim further. The 
self is indeed the primary organising framework, but not only in terms of experience, 
and not only of development. Rather, the construct we term and experience as 'the 
self' is the primary organising and motivating framework across the entire life span. 
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Recent writers in philosophy share a similar emphasis on the self as an organisational 
concern, although admittedly their accent typically rests on the self as an organiser of 
experience, rather than of goals. Harre (1991) for example argues that each sense of 
identity (self) reflects a particular way of organising perception, thought, memories 
and so on. Just as society uses the public concept of person to organise social 
relationships, so (says Harre) the individual uses the concept of self to help unify his 
or her experience. Similarly, Neisser (1991) suggests that the sense of self allows the 
organism to distinguish itself from the environment. Finally, as noted above Dennett 
(1991a) suggests that the self is first and foremost an organisational phenomenon. 
Things are quiet ..... too quiet: An unremarked discrepancy? 
Currently, the reader could be forgiven for wondering why the current discussion has 
gone to such lengths to emphasise the need to conceptualise and define the self as an 
organisational concern. After all, good rationale to do so can be found within general 
living systems theory (Skyttner, 1996), and the bulk of psychological theorising about 
the self has tended to similarly emphasise the unifying/organisational aspects of self. 
However, a careful analysis of the psychological literature with regards to the self-as-
organising-construct principle outlined above reveals an interesting phenomenon -
what might be termed an ironic discrepancy between philosophy and structure. The 
'grand theorists of personality' appear to have philosophically accepted that humanity 
strives toward and experiences wholeness, yet structurally each has tended to 
conceptualise us as incessantly struggling to reconcile the fractured aspects of 
ourselves. So despite writers from this period being enthusiastically touted as 
champions of the whole person (Tomkins, 1981), most developed structural models 
that explicitly or implicitly fashion us as fractured. As will become evident, this 
ongoing problem appears to have resulted from a generationally-compounding 
theoretical confound between the experience and structure of the self. 
Above it was noted that Freud (1923/1961) was broadly supportive of the self as 
unifying in personality. However, his tripartite division of personality (id, ego, and 
super-ego) as inescapably conflicted has provided the basis for some unhelpful 
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theorising. Writers such as Carl lung and Karen Homey (e.g. 1937, 1945), drawing 
extensively from Freudian theory, have similarly considered the self as fragmentary 
and conflicted. In tum, writers such as Assagioli (1965), the founder of 
psychosynthesis who has been strongly influenced by lung (Schwartz, 1987), view 
people as made up of many 'subpersonalities.' 
More recently, large groups of contemporary writers have continued to advocate 
postmodern models of self that appear similarly more suited to describing experience 
than they do structure (see e.g. Markus & Nurius, 1986; Higgins, 1987; McAdams, 
1995a, 1997). Markus and Nurius (1986) for example conceptualise a person in terms 
of a wide assortment of 'possible selves,' each functioning as a semi-autonomous 
structure. 
Likewise, Higgins (1987) has developed a theory in which 'actual selves,' 'ideal 
selves,' and 'ought selves' coexist in a confederacy of me's (McAdams, 1997). 
Identity theorists generally have underscored the multiplicity of identity, with extreme 
deconstructionists such as Sampson (1985, cited in McAdams, 1997) arguing that the 
self is not unified, but rather exists as a "decentralised non equilibrium ideal, whose 
very being hinges on continuous becoming" (p. 1203). In modernity, the self is 
viewed as a reflexive project that is made rather than given, innate, or conferred 
(McAdams, 1996a). Finally, recent writings from a dynamic systems perspective 
(e.g. Lewis & Granic, in press a) have stressed the view of an emergent self that is 
"both momentary and developing" (p. 11)5. 
Chapter 2.4 - A distinction between the self as a single hierarchical 
organisation and the multiple phenomenological experiences of self 
Earlier (see Chapter 1.5), a distinction was offered between being motivated by a goal 
and the experience of being motivated by that goal. It was mentioned that a similar 
division would be applied later in respect of the self and the experience of the self, 
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hence in respect of the above discrepancy a few words would seem appropriate. 
Within the model being developed, the self is primarily viewed as an organising 
construct, that in the case of homo sapiens primarily serves to organise goals. The 
key point is that the current model argues that the self exists as a single goal 
organisation irrespective of our (multiple) experiences of that organisation6• 
In a manner similar to that outlined above, this position is not intended to suggest that 
experiences of the self are unimportant or not worthy of theoretical consideration. On 
the contrary, goals regarding our experiences of 'me' are of fundamental motivational 
impact within the current model. Likewise, this statement should not be taken to 
suggest that experience of the self-organisation (consciousness) does not have certain 
consequences for the organisation itself. Rather, the decision reflects a theoretical 
preference for prefacing our investigation of self with the notion that our self would 
function as a motivated, organisational structure with or without our experience or 
awareness of that structure. 
The current model thus suggests that to conceive of the self as other than an 
organisational construct is critically flawed. Such a position is not only 
anthropocentric (as if conscious awareness of the self somehow changed the 
phylogenetic ally universal need for, and function of, organisation), but moreover is 
conceptually defective for a number of reasons. Overall, the current model suggests 
that initial consideration of the self in a light other than that of organisation is 
experientially bizarre and conceptually futile. 
Paradoxically, if we considered the self primarily in terms of its experience, we could 
never actually fathom that same experience or identity7. Taken to an extreme, the self 
would fluctuate so rapidly from moment to moment, and there would be so little 
5 The reader should be aware that at the time of writing the paper supporting this reference had not 
gone to press, Hence, page references will vary. 
6 Tesser (1998) has recently (albeit indirectly) suggested that we must take the notion of a "genuine 
(biological) self' seriously, and criticises any singular emphasis on experiences of the self (see also M. 
Lewis, 1997). A similar point is also made by the philosopher H. Lewis (1982) who states that "there 
is a self or subject directly involved in having all the experiences which it does have and yet 
independent, in its own distinctness, of having any of the experiences which in point of fact it does 
have" (p. 46, italics added). 
7 Strawson (1997) makes a related comment when she writes "Even if a single brain is the site of many 
experiences that there are many selves present, each such experience is necessarily experience from a 
single point of view" (p. 9). 
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consistency, that both as scientists and individuals, we could never know who 'we' 
were or was (Marcia & Strayer, 1995). 'I' could never think about who 'I' am, 
because that very thought would itself be nothing more than one 'I' that another (the 
same?) 'I' adopt in order to ask that question of 'myself. Moreover, such a position 
leads to a dilemma when we consider unconscious aspects of functioning. To avoid 
denying 'unconsciousness' in self, such a position must maintain that unconscious 
experiences are possible. As will be expanded upon in Chapter 6, such an assertion is 
highly problematic. 
Ironically then, not only does such a view lead 'one' down a network of conceptual 
blind alleys, but it also fails to do justice to our overwhelmingly predominant 
experience of unity (McAdams, 1996a). As he notes, "most men and women are still 
able to function more or less adaptively in daily life, rarely forgetting their names, 
their histories, and their goals" (McAdams, 1996a; p. 299). Taken together, this 
single concern effectively undermines the single reason that we might utilise such an 
emphasis in the first place. 
To be fair to many of the above writers, their interests have lain in a different 
direction than those of the current thesis, hence any disagreement may well rest on a 
matter of focus. Additionally, authors, like other people, live and write within the 
experience of their own selves. Hence we have been inevitably myopic (or perhaps 
polyopic) in our visions of what a self might be. Perhaps more importantly, the 
populations within which past models have been derived (humans), have tended to 
encourage emphasis on the aspects of self that are uniquely human - consciousness or 
phenomenal experience of self. Finally, the ongoing emphasis on the self-as-
experienced is perhaps partially a result of continual clinical findings that suggest that 
the multiple and conflicted experiences of self are centrally involved in intrapsychic 
conflict, suffering, and psychopathology. 
Horney (1945) for example, argued that the neurotic personality is made manifest in 
the creation of an idealised image. From this point, and despite its implausible 
aspects, the 'idealised self establishes unrealistic standards (which inevitably lead to 
failure), and increase the hate toward, and alienation of the 'true' self. The process 
becomes cyclical, with failure leading to the development of ever more grandiose 
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goals. Thus, she writes, "like Faust, neurotics sell their soul to the devil by 
abandoning their real desires, in favour of the idealised image; and like Frankenstein, 
their creation arises to destroy them." 
Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of Horney's metaphor, the current model 
advocates that a singular theoretical distinction between the self as a structural 
concern and the many selves of experience be maintained. Further, it argues that the 
self should initially be defined in terms of its structural and functional phylogenetic 
ongms. 
Despite what seems to be the ongoing appearance of conceptual complications in our 
ideas about consciousness or experience of self, two major harmonies can be seen to 
consistently emerge within the psychological literature. Firstly, in line with the 
current model, there appears to be an agreement that a motivational framework is the 
best perspective from which to consider the self (see Banaji & Prentice, 1994). 
(Above it has been argued that the same emphasis should be maintained in 
conceptualisations of personality). Perhaps more importantly, one can also discern a 
further unstated agreement that the self (whatever form it might actually take) does 
exist - as a phenomenon. It is here that the current definition will focus. 
The self-as-construct is thus considered to constitute the totality 
of an individual's hierarchical goal organisation or structure. 
Experience of self is thus nothing more or less than the 
experienced aspects of this goal organisation. 
Such a characterisation enables us to escape the "know-nothingism" (Marcia & 
Strayer, 1995) implicit in the postmodern or constructivist conceptualisation of self. 
Instead, phenomena like identity, esteem, and life-narratives (e.g. McAdams, 1996a), 
can be seen as a specialised component of the self-concept (McCrae, 1995), 
constituting little more than a grouping of motives and motive feedback regarding our 
experience of ourselves and the world. In this manner, the function, origins and 
. (hence) goal-operations of the organising self can be usefully discussed as different 
(although related) phenomena from the multiple experiences of that goal organisation. 
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Chapter 2.5 - The self as a single hierarchical organisation 
There is some intuitive appeal to the notion that the variables of personality 
(Paunonen, 1998) and self (e.g. Markus & Nurius, 1986) are organised hierarchically. 
It is, moreover, a common assumption of motivational approaches to personality that 
goals are hierarchically arranged (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990, 1998; Emmons, 
1993; Austin & Vancouver, 1996; King, Richards, & Stemmerich, 1998; see Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996, Averill, 1990 for discussions of alternative goal arrangements). 
Bandura (1987) simply suggests that "goal systems .. usually involve a hierarchical 
structure" (p. 53), while Averill (1990) more generally notes that all "systems are 
typically organised into hierarchies" (p. 388; see also Skyttner, 1996). The simple 
reason for this consistency in the conceptualisations of goal arrangement is that 
hierarchies represent the most highly efficient (and hence viable) means of organising 
phenomena (e.g. Bandura, 1987; Stein & Levine, 1990). 
In a personality hierarchy, higher level goals are typically thought to be relevant to a 
greater variety of situations and events (Flees on & Cantor, 1995) are typically more 
important (King, et. aI., 1998), and are less predictive of specific behaviours 
(Paunonen, 1998). They are likewise thought to be more stable/resistant to change 
(Cropanzano, Citera, & Howes, 1995), are relevant over a longer time frame (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998) and are thought to be more self-definitional (Carver & Scheier, 
1990) and abstract (Carver & Scheier, 1998) than lower level goals. 
A major advantage of a hierarchical conceptualisation of goals is that each goal can be 
considered in terms of the causal conditions that embed and connect it to other goals 
(Stein & Levine, 1990) and to specific behaviours (Killeen, 1989, 1992; Emmons, 
1992). Control theory (Powers, 1973) emphasises the embeddedness of daily goals 
within a motivational hierarchy (see also Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990, 1998). In the 
control hierarchy, the lower levels indicate how and what (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1997) action is to be carried out, whereas the higher levels provide 
information on the purposes of the action (Emmons, 1992). Linking goals with 
behaviour in this way is similar to the dynamic systems model of behaviour presented 
by Killeen (1989, 1991, 1992) and the 'systems of behaviour' model presented by 
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Averill (1990). Like the control theorists, Killeen suggests that both actions and 
incentives are best conceptualised hierarchically in which specific acts rest in 
hierarchies of other acts and more abstract motivations (see Chapter 6; although see 
Averill, 1990 for a discussion ofthe difficulties involved in this approach). 
Yet despite the general view that personality goals are arranged within a single 
hierarchy, there has been comparatively little research that directly examines this 
assumption (King, et. aI., 1998; Schultheiss & Bronstein, 1999). ill fact, some 
research has indicated that there is only a slight correspondence between peoples' 
implicit motives and their self-articulated goals (e.g. Emmons & McAdams, 1991; 
King, 1995; Schultheiss & Bronstein, 1999; see also Chapter 8). King (1995) for 
example measured the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement using a TAT 
procedure and classified self-reported goals with regard to how much each was 
concerned with these three implicit needs. She found little statistical relationship 
between goal and motive measures, a finding that has been taken as suggesting that 
there are multiple systems in human motivation (e.g. Schultheiss & Bronstein, 1999). 
Recent theory from McClelland (e.g. McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) 
likewise suggests that implicit and self-attributed or verbalised motives comprise a 
separate motivational system (see also Biernat, 1989; Shah, Higgins, and Friedman, 
1998 for similar views on motivation). 
ill contrast, the work by King and Emmons (e.g. Emmons, 1989, 1992; King, 1995; 
King, et. aI., 1998) has been explicit in suggesting that "even seemingly trivial 
pursuits may emerge as means to a larger end" (King, et. aI., 1998; p. 714) in the 
broader hierarchy of the person's life plans. Using a within-subject standardisation 
procedure, King et. aI. (1998) found that importance of a daily goal was associated 
with its placement in the broader system of life goals. The more closely a daily goal 
was seen as connected to a life goal, the more important the daily goal typically was8• 
This finding is entirely consistent with the single hierarchy posited by control theory, 
which has previously suggested that the importance of a goal at a low level in the 
hierarchy is somewhat dependent on the degree to which its attainment relates to the 
attainment of higher level goals (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1990). This view of the 
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human motivational system implies that the achievement of one goal is contingent 
upon the completion of each subgoal (Srull & Wyer, 1986; Cropanzano, Citera, & 
Howes, 1995), so much so that Carver and Scheier (1998) have suggested that 
implementing high level goals "consists of carrying out low level acts" (p. 73; their 
italics; see also Killeen, 1989). 
Following these authors, the current theory suggests that personality must be a single 
hierarchical goal structure, in which low level goals and actions are always related to 
(or part of) implicit, higher level, and more abstract motives (cf. Emmons & King, 
1989; Emmons, 1993; King, Richards, & Stemmerich, 1998). Although we know do 
not know exactly how mediurn/low level goals relate to the broader, more abstract 
goals that define a personality (see Chapter 5), the idea that a system could operate 
effectively from more than one motivational set of priorities appears nonsensical. If 
there were multiple motivational hierarchies how, and on what basis, would 
conflicting demands between them be reconciled? Furthermore, new goals can only 
ever be acquired in respect of, or in relation to, the current goals or values of the 
system (see Chapters 3 & 4). So while we can reasonably discuss distinct hierarchies 
within a given motivational system, we should not forget that any separation we 
envisage is purely conceptual and methodological in nature. The mere fact that goals 
frequently conflict with one another or that a given action may simultaneously be 
compatible with one goal while being incompatible with another is not relevant to the 
basic issues involved in realistically considering how they are likely to be arranged. 
Some theorists have argued that the highest levels of motivation in a goal hierarchy 
are unavailable to awareness (e.g. Emmons & King, 1989). Given that the earlier 
(and typically higher) levels of a person's goal hierarchy are most often formed prior 
to representational and linguistic abilities, they tend to be somewhat more ill-defined 
and inaccessible (see Chapter 4), hence, this seems a reasonable assertion. Much 
behaviour is no doubt motivated by goals that we only perceive through their effects 
or lower level correlates. However, there is no reason that any particular goal must be 
unconscious, hence the current model makes no such assumptions (cf. Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996). People may well differ in the level of abstraction that they use to 
8 Interestingly, their data also showed that the daily goals which "killed two birds with one stone" (i.e. 
contributed to attaining a desired future and avoiding a dreaded future) were likely to be the most 
highly valued. 
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describe goals (Emmons, 1992), and the visualisation and consideration of higher 
level motivations is probably determined by both ability and desire (in the Freudian or 
Adlerian sense). Nonetheless, when asked "why" they did something, individuals can 
provide progressively more abstract goals, suggesting that (a) 'higher level' may be 
more a matter of definition than of substance, and (b) the ability to do this may well 
be a key personality variable in health and fitness (Emmons, 1992; see Chapter 4). 
An obvious difficulty with a hierarchical model of personality is that it suggests the 
picture of a dictatorial higher level commanding the lower levels (Carver & Scheier, 
1998) and begs the question of what exists at the top. In a broader sense, the term 
'hierarchy' has been decried as implying a degree of rigidity that does not adequately 
capture the dynamism of personality processes. Goals exist in monstrously complex 
arrangements, the intricacy of which we are only just beginning to comprehend. 
Ortony et. al. (1988) suggest that the goal structure of a person is probably more 
complex than a simple hierarchy. These authors argue that goals are connected in a 
complicated lattice, wherein the overall shape remains 'treelike,' but in which each 
node (goal) is connected with others above, below, and to each side. According to 
them, most goals have multiple connections for multiple goals both above and below 
them in the lattice. Austin and Vancouver (1996) discuss this property of goal 
systems as one of equifinality, likewise suggesting that most goals can be achieved 
through multiple ends, while Averill (1990) describes goal systems as heterarchical, 
noting that goals can have implications for numerous higher level goals. 
In addition to this complexity, the current theory suggests that the goal hierarchy of 
personality is highly dynamic (e.g. Epstein, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1998). Goal 
structures are constantly changing as old goals are realised or abandoned, and as new 
ones are added and emerge - the entire structure is dynamically interdependent. Just 
as a given goal can be obtained via multiple pathways (Austin & Vancouver, 1996), 
so can a specific act have consequences for many goals. While personality is a 
comparatively stable phenomenon at higher levels, and tends to become more so over 
time (see Chapters 5 & 6), there is always room for emergence and change. A 
dynamic hierarchical conceptualisation does not presuppose that changes in the 
overall structure of a personality are simple or predictable, but rather that they may be 
startlingly comprehensive. As is more comprehensively argued in Chapter 8, new 
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goals emerge in a dynamic hierarchy as a function of multiple influences, only some 
of which may be within the system itself. 
Chapter 2.6 - Concluding remarks 
The manner in which several groups of theorists have, and continue to, conceptualise 
the self unintentionally depicts the common person as proud possessor of a split 
personality. Not only does such a position fail to do justice to the predominant unity 
within our self-experience, it is of questionable scientific utility and moreover fails to 
acknowledge the adaptive origins of self as an organising construct. While it may be 
meaningful to speak of multiple selves in respect of experience or identity, these do 
not constitute the entirety of the structural self, which would exist in a primitive form 
were it never experienced. 
The distinction offered between structure and experience is similar to that outlined 
earlier regarding a motive and its experience, and in the same manner is not intended 
to suggest that the self and its experience are unrelated or unimportant affairs. Rather, 
the division reflects a conceptual preference for prefacing our investigation of both 
personality and self by assuming that an objective structural phenomenon exists in 
addition to our experiences of it. Hence in reply to Hofstadter's (cited in Schwartz, 
1987) query above, I can only suggest that whichever part dominates or decides, all of 
them will be 'him,' as each must inevitably be a part of his innate structural self. 
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Chapter 3: The Development of Personality I: Innate goals 
Overview on Development 
In sum, the preceding chapters have argued that both personality and the self are best 
thought of as a very complex hierarchical organisation of goals. However, to this 
point there has been little discussion as to what these goals might be, how they are 
represented at different stages of development, and how they are acquired or come to 
be organised. To address these issues, it becomes both pleasant and necessary to 
introduce emotion to a hitherto dispassionate stew. 
Through consideration of past theories of human goals, the following section will 
outline a theory of lifespan personality or goal development and organisation. Due to 
the complexity of the material, and the number of issues that must be considered, the 
consideration of development is organised within four chapters (innate motives, 
representation and consciousness, dynamic systems, and emotions in personality 
development). It should be noted however that the parsing of the discussion is being 
undertaken for ease of absorption alone, and must not be taken as indicating any 
literal distinctions between the content of each chapter for the dynamic processes 
involved in personality development are inseparable. 
Chapter 3 will consider the content of the goals that initially constitute the innate self 
for ho:r.no sapiens. It will begin with a discussion of previous theories of instinct and 
innate motivation, and through discussion will develop a functionalist typology of 
innate motives as grouped under five headings (Physical Integrity, Reproduction, 
Social, Organisation, and Emotion). While goals are elaborated before and after the 
emergence of the conscious self, such motivations can only be acquired in respect of 
existing motivations. In sum, the chapter argues that without innateness in motivation 
there is no place to begin the valuing process. 
Moving from this basis, Chapter 4 will extensively consider the place of 
consciousness in theories of personality, and the ontogeny of consciousness itself. It 
will reaffirm the importance of consciousness to personality theory, and outline a 
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theory regarding the manner in which innate motives (Chapter 3) become 
representational goals. It will consider contemporary consciousness theory, and 
discuss the possible functions of consciousness. In concluding, the chapter will argue 
that consciousness is usefully conceptualised as the ability to represent a motive 
structure, and that it has evolved not only as a cognitive meta-manager, but also as a 
critical component in the expansion of our emotional repertoire. 
Chapter 5 will provide an introduction to the dynamic systems framework that is then 
used to examine and describe the elaboration of innate motives. It will briefly 
describe the theory that underlies dynamic systems (DS) approaches to development 
and consider the advantages of an explanatory framework that enables the adequate 
consideration of both stability and change. Dynamic models of development are then 
critiqued and it is suggested that many of the weaknesses evident in existing DS 
models can be substantially reduced through explicit reference to innateness in 
motivation and emotion. Finally, the potential of the approach developed is examined 
via the consideration of emotional development and sequencing. 
Chapter 6 will then outline a theory conceptualising the place of emotions in 
elaborating and organising the emerging personality. Previous theories of personality 
development are described and critiqued as the chapter offers a new mechanism that 
describes the elaboration of personality. Although most theory in emotion suggests 
that emotions serve function in a immediate sense, the chapter argues that the 
emotions act as a personality-elaborating mechanism over time. The chapter suggests 
that emotions also act as an inbuilt system that serves to elaborate the personality state 
space by creating new goals appropriate to the organism-environment relationship 
being indicated by the emotion. Overall, the chapter will argue that early interactions 
between the developing self and its environment, particularly those represented in 
age-dependent emotional responding have profound consequences for the eventual 
form of the personality system. 
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Chapter 3.1 - Introduction to innateness 
One of the most fundamental issues in previous personality theory and indeed in 
philosophy more generally, has involved considering the nature of innateness (Pervin, 
1989; Buss, 1990; Ewen, 1993), as well as of innate drives or goals (e.g. D. Buss, 
1997a). Although a recent review has noted a general de-emphasis on the role of 
nature and heredity in personality research (Endler & Speer, 1998), a consideration of 
fundamental human needs or goals is critical to an understanding of personality. 
Moreover, if innate goals exist, are they benign or malignant? Are we but learned 
beasts, cleverly obfuscating our savagery, or are we fundamentally benign at birth, 
haphazardly corrupted or not by the vicissitudes of fate? If innate motives exist, 
exactly what limits the number and nature of such needs? Are they prescribed by 
biology, derived through socialisation processes, or do they arrive via some 
interaction between these two influences that may remain unknowable? 
The following chapter is primarily aimed at constructing a function-based typology of 
innate motives. Although the current dissertation is first and foremost a model of the 
adult (representational) personality, innateness is nevertheless being extensively 
considered. As will be expanded upon in Chapters 4 and 5, consideration of 
innateness is necessary for two reasons, one involving our similarity, the other our 
dissimilarity to other species. Put simply, all living organisms (including ourselves) 
are innately motivated in certain (functional) directions. Secondly, although 
conscious goals comprise a departure from inborn motives, conceptually innateness 
must nonetheless remain the immemorial soil from which representational goals 
bloom. In line with the distinctions offered in Chapters 1 and 2, the current chapter 
will outline a conceptual confound between function, development and experience in 
past consideration of innate motives 1• 
1 It might be more accurate to speak of innate needs than it is to speak of innate motives. However the 
distinction between saying that an organism has innate needs and that they must necessarily be innately 
motivated (to meet them) strikes the current author as unnecessary and unhelpful. 
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Chapter 3.2 - The Functional Consideration of Innateness 
The following section is organised in manner somewhat different from that which 
might be expected. Rather than engage in a laborious literature review, outlining the 
ideas of past writers, the discussion will attend to the literature only as it bears directly 
upon the content of the section. Below, the consideration of innate motives is 
grouped under five function-derived headings (Physical Integrity, Reproduction, 
Social, Organisation, and EmotionslFeedback). Motives representing each of these 
groupings are thought to be present in all living organisms, with only the degree of 
sophistication and the precise nature of each motive's operation varying across 
specIes. 
The first of these two headings (Physical Integrity and Reproduction) are believed to 
constitute relatively discrete function-based descriptions of innate motivations. The 
latter three headings (Social, Organisation, and AffectlFeedback) are to a degree more 
complex, in that each 'group' of innate motives is linked to multiple functions. It is 
suggested that the subtlety with which these innate motivations are made manifest 
precedes, parallels, and results from the increasing complexity of human adaptive 
functioning (A. Buss, 1997). Each of the five motive groups above are nonetheless 
believed to be innate, universal, and inescapable. They are structurally present (if not 
experienced) from the moment of birth, and must form the initial units for any 
motivational approach to the study of personality. 
Before beginning, it may help if the current use of the term 'function' is briefly 
clarified. In the opinion of the current writer, psychological theorists continue to 
confound distal evolutionary or proper (Millikan, 1993) function with descriptions 
regarding the manner in which phenomena function. We have tended to observe the 
way in which a phenomenon occurs and on this basis alone conclude that these 
interpretations describe 'proper function' (Millikan, 1993). However, the mere fact 
that something appears to function in a certain way does not mean that this is its 
function. The ascertaining of distal function requires a more thorough consideration 
of the adaptive challenges that our species may have faced. 
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As is expanded upon in Chapter 8, even where a phenomena is demonstrably 
'universal' does not necessarily mean that it is either innate or that evolutionary 
function can be directly inferred via the manner in which it functions. While 
reasonable inferences regarding evolutionary function are possible through a suitably 
informed examination of proximate functioning (see Chapter 6), the two interests are 
not necessarily the same. For the purposes of this discussion the term 'function' is 
used to refer to proper or evolutionary function, except where otherwise indicated. 
A functional analysis of innateness in motivation has been undertaken in order to 
reflect the current author's preference for considering human functioning in light of 
the context from whence it came. Such an approach is consistent with the view 
proposed by Brown (1991) who suggests that to consider only the uniquely human 
characteristics in examining innateness is anthropocentric and unhelpful. According 
to him, the fundamental challenges that each human organism faces are rooted in 
adaptive challenges that are shared (to a degree) by every living organism. As such, 
while our innate motives may operate somewhat differently from those of other 
species, they bear on the same struggles - hence in this respect, we are not so very 
special. 
A function-based description of innateness is further advantaged in that it enables us 
to distinguish the function of a motive from its multiple experiential manifestations 
(as noted above). This distinction is similar to that offered by Malinowski (1944) 
between a 'basic need' and a 'cultural response,' to the distinction between genotype 
and phenotype, and to that between 'etic' and 'emic' (Brown, 1991) levels of analysis. 
Notably, Brown (1991) argues that the 'answers' to innateness issues will only be 
found at the level of function, not in their many manifestations. Consequently, a 
functional analysis of innateness offers the promise of a level of explanation that will 
inevitably be lacking in other analyses. 
Finally, a functional analysis of innateness allows us to move beyond some of the 
divisions that have previously been utilised in innateness theory. As will be discussed 
below, distinctions such as that between physiological and psychological need (e.g. 
Murray, 1938), have a tendency to obscure function. The current theory suggests that 
innate motives are systemic, in that they are not readily separable or ascribable to a 
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particular aspect of the entire system. Rather an innate motive operates at the level of 
the organism, and may be made manifest or experienced in any, none, or all of the 
subsystems. 
Chapter 3.3 - Physical Integrity 
The current model advocates the consideration of a group of innate motivations 
around the functional need of physical integrity. Motives regarding physical integrity 
are thought to be present in every living organism (including homo sapiens), and 
relate to a universal need to maintain and protect the body - to live. Included in this 
list are innate human motives such as that for nutrition (lung, 1919/1971; Sullivan, 
1953/1968; Fromm, 1964; Maslow, 1970; Cattell, 1950), respiration and excretion 
(Sullivan, 1953/1968), and motivations surrounding the avoidance of pain (e.g. 
Murray, 1938; Dollard and Miller, 1950). Overall, we can probably assume that there 
is little dispute regarding such motives, any theorist who failed to list them 
undoubtedly regarding them as self-evident (Ewen, 1993). 
Additionally, the current theory considers the primate phenomenon of attachment to 
be a fundamental manifestation of the physical integrity motive2• Based in the 
theories of ethology and evolution, Bowlby's (e.g. 1969, 1973) attachment theory 
rests on the premise of an innate 'attachment behavioural system' that regulates infant 
proximity seeking behaviours with one (or a few) specific caregivers who provide 
physical and psychological security (Berman & Sperling, 1994). This system 
generates both proximity seeking and proximity maintaining behaviours, especially 
when the infant is confronted with danger (Rothbard & Shaver, 1994). The survival 
value of the attachment 'drive' - namely, its role in keeping the infant alive - ensures 
that it will be passed on through the process of natural selection (Ainsworth, 1989, 
cited in Berman & Sperling, 1994). 
2 Readers will no doubt be able to imagine other motivations, functions, and consequences associated 
with the attachment dynamic. However, for the moment attachment is being functionally considered 
from the perspective of the neonate. Additionally, attachment research is a domain in which theorists 
observe the manner in which attachment dynamics occur and improperly call such function. 
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Chapter 3.4 - Successful Reproduction 
Almost every personality theorist who has considered innate motives has attended to 
the place of sexual or reproductive motivations (e.g. McDougall, 1908; lung, 
1919/1971; Freud, 1923/1961; Murray, 1938, 1959; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Cattell, 
1950; Erikson, 1968). Realistically, one assumes such attention has occurred because 
it is difficult to adequately describe human (or any) behaviour without doing so. 
Additionally, if one were to posit an organism without innate reproductive motives, 
one would be left with the theoretically untenable question of asking how the 
organism evolved. As D. Buss (1997a) has recently stated, "individuals who failed to 
be motivated in (certain) directions tended to become no one's ancestors" (p. 328). If 
such propensities are heritable, reproduction must necessarily be one such direction. 
However, theorists have not always restricted their consideration of innate motives to 
the functionalist concept of reproduction itself. Rather, they have rarefied the 
reproductive motive, introducing a plethora of other 'innate' motivations, including 
those for sex (above), for mutually enhancing relationships (Erikson, 1968), for 
nurturance (Murray, 1938), and for expressing tenderness to one's offspring (Sullivan, 
1953/1968). Such rarefaction appears necessary given the complexity of the 
behaviours being described in homo sapiens. D. Buss (1997a) for example, has 
recently argued that natural selection producing (and by implication, our 
conceptualising of) an organism as possessing global motives, such as reproduction, is 
the equivalent of telling a chess computer to win (see also Kirkpatrick & Ellis, in 
press). He suggests that millions of years of natural selection have produced highly 
detailed, context-specific adaptations that solve specific problems associated with 
survival. 
However, the theoretical process of discerning sub-motives within global motives has 
been made unnecessarily complex through an ongoing confound between describing a 
functional motive or sub-motive, and describing the experience of that motive. It was 
noted earlier (see Chapter 1) that few people directly experience the functional 
nReproduction, instead experiencing nSex, nIntimacy, nLove, and so forth. At this 
time it was argued that while such motivations may be experienced (hence must be 
58 
considered motivating), they do not constitute a functional description of the motive 
or sub-motive grouping. Experienced motives may vary between cultures and 
individuals as a function of consciousness, values, socialisation practices or learning, 
reporting biases and so on. Functional motive descriptions do not vary in this manner. 
Rather, they exist as phenomena notwithstanding such influences. 
Overall, it appears unnecessarily complicating, and to a degree invalid, to discuss the 
many experiential manifestations of innate motives as if they themselves were the 
innate motives. It is the belief of this author that descriptions of innate motivations 
must be carefully conceptualised in terms of their function, not their experience, and 
that we must be exceedingly precise with our terminologies. Below, two further 
innate motive groupings relevant to Reproduction are discussed with this distinction 
in mind. 
James's (1890) parental love, McDougall's (1908) parental instinct, Cattell's (1950) 
parental protectiveness, Sullivan's (1953/1968) tenderness towards offspring, and 
Murray's (1938) nurturance motives, are readily seen as functionally related to the 
universal reproductive motive, more specifically describing a motive relating to the 
survival of offspring. However, Erikson's (1968) 'need for mutually enhancing 
relationships' is a more problematic concept. While the current theory accepts that 
people are motivated to seek a partner for reproductive purposes, there appears to be 
little additional value in describing such a motive in this particular manner. Not only 
is it debateable as to whether all people experience this motive, but the terminology 
obscures function. To my mind, describing a motive in this manner constitutes little 
more than an embarkation towards a theoretical position where 'innateness' is 
determined jointly by normative consent, theoretical demand, and reporting bias, and 
adds little to our understanding of what innateness is, or might be. 
A second grouping of 'reproduction affiliated' motivations are those surrounding 
control over resources, status, securing opportunity, and the ability to provide for 
offspring. Attracting and retaining mates is the sin qua non of successful 
reproduction (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, in press). Consequently, motivations like 
aggression or destructiveness (Freud, 1923; Murray, 1938; Erikson, 1968), power 
(Jung, 1919; Dollard & Miller, 1950), achievement (Murray, 1938; McClelland, 
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Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1955), acquisitiveness (James, 1890; 
McDougall, 1908; Cattell, 1950) self-assertion (Cattell, 1950), status (Hogan, 1987), 
and dominance (Murray, 1938) can be conceptually linked through their functional 
impact on an individual's abilities to secure the opportunity to reproduce, as well as to 
provide for and protect resultant offspring. 
At this stage, the reader could well be forgiven for thinking that the grouping offered 
here is as usefully thought of as a sub-motive class linked to physical integrity as it is 
to reproduction. Indeed, status and resource-oriented behaviours may serve multiple 
functions for the individual, including but not limited to, physical integrity, 
reproduction, and social motives. Ultimately the choice may rest on a matter of 
preference, although both past (McDougall, 1908), and recent (see e.g. Kenrick, Trost, 
& Sadalla, 1993) consideration of mating behaviour, and mate selection criteria 
suggest otherwise. Irrespective, it is this author's belief that the function of control, 
status or provision motives is most profitably linked to the functional need to 
reproduce. Finally, (as shall be discussed below), there is no good reason to suggest 
that particular motives cannot be conceptualised as functionally relevant to more than 
one motive grouping. 
Chapter 3.5 - Social motivations 
Most personality theorists have considered what might be termed 'social motivations' 
among their taxonomies of innateness. Below, these motives are described as 
belonging to one of three categories - a general need for other people, a grouping of 
motives surrounding identity, and a group of motives relating to societal structures. 
However, while the social motives proposed by past theorists are relatively easy to 
taxonomise, discerning the functional significance of these motives is more 
problematic. Due to the sophistication and complexity of human social motives the 
discussion of innate social motives argues that social motives frequently fulfil 
numerous needs simultaneously. Additionally, theorists interested in social 
phenomena have tended to confound universality with function, hence while the 
topics below are discussed as 'social' motives, their functional origin is likely to be 
multiply determined. 
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General gregarious motives 
Several theorists have proposed a very vague assortment of innate motives that can be 
described no more accurately than as a general motive to be involved with or near, 
other people. Motives like gregariousness (McDougall, 1908; Cattell, 1950), social 
interest (Adler, 1927/1957), the need for other people (Sullivan, 1953/1968; Fromm, 
1964), obtaining love from others (Maslow, 1970), receiving positive regard (Rogers, 
1961), and relatedness (Reeve, 1997) all fall within this umbrella. 
Unfortunately, the majority of the theorists positing such general motives have not 
considered the adaptive function served by the motive. Typically, such writers were 
interested in functionalism only as it applied to the intrapersonal, and had little 
. interest in the evolutionary context within which such motives were previously 
selected. According to Fromm (1955, cited in Ewen, 1993) for example, man is the 
freak of the universe, inextricably bound to his animal heritage, and at the same time 
existentially isolated by his intellect. For Fromm, it is this existential isolation that 
creates the drive toward other people. 
Similar, although less dramatic reasons for a general social motive are found in 
Rogers' (1961) discussion of positive regard, and Maslow's (1970) consideration of 
obtaining love. Overall, many of the writers suggesting general social motives appear 
more interested in rejecting the 'negative' aspects of innateness made famous by 
Freud than they do in considering the function that might be served by their 
replacements. 
One exception to this trend is found in the original work of McDougall (1908). Like 
the above authors, McDougall suggested that the gregarious instinct (or tendency to 
sociability) is of vital importance to human social behaviour and human societal 
forms. However, he argued that the gregarious instinct is rooted in the ancient 
struggle against predation, and the mutually protective affordances of herding-type 
behaviours (see also Alexander, 1979). Interestingly, McDougall noted that the basic 
instinct is frequently confirmed by habit, accounting for the fact that groupings are 
often substantially larger than that necessary for mutual protection, and may occur in 
situations where risk is low. Overall, a phylogenetic consideration of this grouping of 
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concepts suggests that the gregariousness motive has at least some of its functional 
roots in mutually beneficial protection - physical integrity. 
However, recent research indicates that people who are lonely do not lack for frequent 
social contact (and thus mutual protection), but rather lack intimate contact with 
others (Wheeler, Reis, & Nezlek, 1983). Consideration of this finding indicates that 
conceptualising of gregariousness motives as nothing more than residual herding 
motivation may be somewhat simplistic. On balance it may be more useful to 
conceptualise of gregariousness-type motives as being broadly linked to the benefits 
provided by other people. These benefits may then include mutual protection and 
support (as above), mating opportunities, divisions of labour and trade, and the 
internalisation or transferral of social norms (see below). 
Group identity or belongingness motives 
The second grouping of social motives describes an array of motivational concepts 
involving the need to create and maintain identity. The concepts were initially formed 
within existential frameworks, and hence did not purport to describe function (as 
above). However, the innate need to belong (Maslow, 1970; Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Heatherton & Vohs, 1998), affiliate (Murray, 1938), conform (Dollard & 
Miller, 1950), or identify with (Erikson, 1968) can be seen a part of an overarching 
functional need to identify and operate effectively within and between social groups. 
Typically, animals have an innate ability (usually via olfactory senses) to identify 
friends, mates, offspring, and enemies. This enables the organism to 'know' how to 
behave in respect of other organisms both within and between species. Developing 
concurrently with changes to the manner in which homo sapiens lives and functions, 
has been the 'necessary' emergence of a more flexible means of achieving the same 
functional end - experienced as a need to create identity. The current theory 
considers identity-type motivations to be the psychological manifestation and 
functional equivalent of in and out-group olfactory identification. 
Having and perceiving identity enables one to know who belongs to your group and 
who does not, who to trust and who not, and moreover to communicatelbehave 
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relatively automatically in a manner appropriate to this relationship. Although the 
identity motive grouping is considered below in terms of its intrapsychic 
organisational functions, operating on the innate need to belong (through the 
subjective need to create identity) has its basic origins in the facilitation of group 
cohesion, and thus indirectly in mating opportunities, and mutually altruistic 
behaviour. 
Social status/hierarchy motives 
The final grouping of innate 'social' motives describes a grouping of motivations that 
reinforce or maintain the social structure of groups. Groups within most species have 
some form of hierarchical social structure, which implicitly or explicitly influences 
both access to resources and the nature of social interactions. In lower animals, the 
structure is typically upheld through aggressive and deferent-type behaviours. 
Previous theorists have argued that the same is true of homo sapiens. 
Motives like power (Jung, 1919), self-assertion (McDougall, 1908; Cattell, 1950), 
abasement (McDougall, 1908; Murray, 1938), deference and dominance (Murray, 
1938), as well as acceptance and status (Hogan, 1987) appear rooted in an innate 
regard for what one might term the 'rules of engagement.' One does not challenge a 
colleague who is more powerful (either physically or socially), unless of course, one 
has the requisite social support. So while we all seek to maximise self-advantage 
(power, self-assertion, dominance), the social order (and thus one's own success) is 
maintained in the presence of a more powerful creature through exhibiting deference 
or abasement. 
Consideration of the three groupings of social motives outlined above suggests a 
multiplicity in the functional origins of social motivations. Disparate sub-motive 
groupings in the typology above appear connected to different aspects of individual 
adaptiveness. Nonetheless, the motives themselves remain linked through their 
domain of operation - that of the group. So while different social motives may be 
more or less related to physical integrity, to reproduction, and so forth, they 
nonetheless remain conceptually connected to one another. Overall, the current 
theory suggests that the social motives are best described as representing an innate 
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group of motives that fulfil homo sapiens' need to function within and (thus) 
maintain3 the social order. 
Chapter 3.6 - Organisation 
As was extensively discussed in Chapter 2 (above), the current model places 
considerable emphasis upon life's ubiquitous need (and hence motivation) to organise 
information. A biological, function-based consideration of the self as an 
organisational construct was mentioned in this context. The current section will 
outline previous theories of motivation, as they bear on the notion of an innate 
organisational motive. 
Several theorists have proposed innate motives which, although predominantly 
experiential (rather than functional) in interpretation, can be seen as both facilitating 
and manifesting the universal need to organise. Their concepts are discussed below. 
Overall, the section will argue that while organisation-affiliated motives operate, are 
experienced, and made manifest in forms appropriate to the developmental and 
phylogenetic status of the organism, they remain functionally linked through their 
bearing on the innate need to create and maintain an effective internal organisation of 
both the organism's own motives (self) and the world. 
Creating organisation -learning motives 
Both ontogenetically and theoretically, the most sensible place to begin a discussion 
of an organisational motive lies in consideration of learning. The current model 
assumes that as a major part of the general organisational motive, most species, 
including homo sapiens, are innately motivated to learn. Put simply, information 
must be acquired before it can be organised. Acquisition of information in tum 
necessitates learning. 
3 Strict application of individual selection principles might suggest that 'appear to maintain' is a more 
accurate description of this motive grouping. However, the above section is only intended to provide a 
basis for theorising as to the functional origins of the innate motivations that foundation personality. 
As such, it is not the place to consider such issues. 
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Behaviours indicative of a motivation to learn about both the environment and one's 
own abilities and skills can be seen in the behavioural repertoire of many species, 
especially in the behaviour of the young (McDougall, 1908). The innate play 
tendencies of young animals (e.g. a kitten) are thus seen as an innate means to 
practice movement, develop the skills they will need as adults, and to learn the 
physical rules of the environment. It is important to note in this regard that the 
particular organism need not experience such motivation for us to usefully 
conceptualise it as bearing upon the creation of organisation. 
Prima facie, there is no good reason to suspect that innate human play represents a 
different innate need. Play and imitation behaviours occupy an important place in 
developmental theory (e.g. Berlyne, 1960; Piaget, 1962; Vygotsky, 1962), which 
broadly considers play to be central in cognitive, linguistic, and socio-emotional 
development. Developmental theory generally sees playas central to the child's 
ability to learn about both the physical and the social world. It is through play that 
children learn about their own bodies, develop their capabilities and ascertain 
limitations. Through play children learn about 'real world' concepts like mass, speed 
and gravity, and begin to learn the social rules that regulate our conduct. 
Through use of concepts such as curiosity (James, 1890; Maslow, 1970), curious 
exploration (Cattell, 1950) and play (James, 1890; Murray, 1938), personality 
theorists have included learning in their considerations of human nature. Within the 
current theory, both play and curiosity motivations are considered to represent the 
first motive-behaviour grouping in functional motive domain that describes an innate 
learning motive. 
However for homo sapiens, motivations bearing on the creation of organisation do not 
cease to operate with the passing of childhood. In fact, learning is considered by 
many theorists to be a hallmark of human evolution (e.g. D. Buss, 1997a; A. Buss, 
1997). Innate learning-type motives appear to find their experiential analogues in 
later motives like mastery (Fromm, 1964; Erikson, 1968) and competence (Maslow, 
1970; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Reeve, 1997), and ultimately in motivations like that for 
autonomy (Murray, 1938) and self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Reeve, 1997). 
Although such motives have predominantly been described from an experiential 
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perspective and have been considered part of control motives4, they can usefully be 
considered an age-appropriate materialisation of learning motivations. 
The current theory argues that the motives described above represent a motive theme 
that is best described as manifesting an innate learning motive. It further suggests that 
innate learning-type motives should be thought of as existing principally for the 
purpose of organisations. As noted above, information must be acquired (learnt) 
before it can be organised. More importantly, information itself does not assist the 
organism unless it is organised. Innate learning motives are thus seen as a central 
process in the creation of organisation. 
Experiential analogues of creation motives 
The need to create organisation is also functionally apparent in a large number of 
motives that professedly describe the experience of self. Through discussion of these 
ideas, the current section will seek to make two further points. Firstly, it will argue 
that, while varied, motives regarding one's own experience of self (e.g. nldentity, 
nUnderstanding) nonetheless remain functionally rooted in the need to create 
organisation. Secondly, the section will suggest that experiences of the functional 
need to organise change systematically as a function of ability, environment, and 
phylogenetic demand. Overall, it will be argued that the experienced aspects of 
organisational motives do not themselves constitute innate motive groupings, 
although they are inevitable, and cannot help but approximate functionally innate 
motives. 
In the preceding chapter (Chapter 2), it was argued that the experience and function of 
self constituted different phenomena. At this time it was suggested that the 
experience of the self changes as a function of both phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
capacities, and (hence) may exhibit considerable variability. The functional 
4 The place of learning and its relationship to notions of prediction and control are complicated topics. 
Theorists such as Kelly (1970) have argued that anticipating the future is the central motive in human 
nature. However, prediction is readily thought of as the learning and organisation of real world 
relationships, which can then be contained within the organisational motive grouping. 
S One could argue that the concept of learning implies the organisation of information. However, taken 
in the context of latter manifestations of the organisational motive (see below), the conceptual 
subsumption of learning within broader organisational motives appears more useful than the reverse. 
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motivation underlying the self as an organisation does not vary in this manner, either 
within or between species. All organisms are innately motivated to organise, but few 
have the capacity to self-reflectively experience such organisation as motivating. 
Homo sapiens however do possess the capacity to experience the self as motivating, 
hence experiences of the self constitute an important phenomenon for personality and 
motivational psychologists. Research indicates that people frequently report being 
motivated by their experience of themselves (see Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1994), and we clearly possess the requisite faculties for experience. Yet 
while important, experienced motivation is a different matter from motivation itself. 
(To borrow from Freud,) I may never experience myself as motivated to please my 
parents, yet perpetually seek the skills, qualities, or status that will do so. How can 
this be so? And where is the 'true' motivation found? 
One answer is to say that experience itselfis as much a motivated process as any other 
(see Chapter 6). However, while experiences and experiential motivations emerge 
concurrently with the biological advent of consciousness, to describe an experience as 
innately motivating is an oversimplification. While the experience of one's own 
motivation may be inevitable, there is no reason to suggest that the particular form 
that such experiences take (or are given) represent innate motivations6. The need to 
organise takes many forms, any of which mayor may not be experienced depending 
on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic capacities and history of the organism. 
Based on this type of reasomng, the current model VIews motives such as 
nUnderstanding and nOrder (Murray, 1938), the need for meaning (Jung, 1919; 
Fromm, 1964) and even motives regarding identity (Fromm, 1964; Erikson, 1968) and 
religion (Jung, 1919) as uniquely human, and experienced aspects of the more global 
motive towards creating an effective organisation. 
The current theory considers motivational concepts like that of identity motivations to 
represent a description of experience, one which needs careful framing to avoid 
6 This is somewhat of an oversimplification. As is noted in Chapter 6, some aspects of conscious 
emotional experience do seem to be comparatively fixed, presumably due to their importance to the 
function of the emotion. 
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obscuration of the motive's function. Experience of the functional need to create 
organisation can take many forms. The precise experience of the organisational 
motive is likely to be influenced by age, sex, and culture, as well as by other acquired 
motives within the self-hierarchy. It is possible for example that different experiential 
manifestations of the global organisational motive vary somewhat consistently as a 
function of the age and abilities of the organism. 
Very young children, for example, do not exhibit great concern with identity. Rather, 
the organisational motive (at this early stage) is made manifest in learning about and 
organising the physical world, its rules, properties, and so forth. As they age 
however, children become aware and begin to organise the social world into ever-
more precise categories. Typically they begin with categories like sex and age, and 
gradually they incorporate more abstract concepts like race, wealth and status into 
their conceptual organisation of themselves and others. Continued development then 
sees the ongoing emergence of what we might term "fresh perspectives" in 
organisational complexity. It is as if the organism is no longer 'satisfied' with the 
simple organisation of the world it currently possesses, but rather is motivated to 
create ever more complex (and adaptive) layers of organisational perspective7• 
As should be clear, the above argument is not intended to suggest that the systematic 
differences in the domain in which organisation motives are experienced is not to a 
degree innately determined. In fact, the current model fully expects that the 
experiential manifestations of the organisational motive will be closely related to the 
capacities and priorities of the developing self. Organisms attend to and thus 
. experience the need to organise in a pattern conjointly determined by (and reflecting) 
current abilities, environmental demand and phylogenetic history. 
Nonetheless, when asking ourselves whether humans are innately motivated to create 
identity, seek existential meaning and so forth, the answer must be no. That we both 
do and experience ourselves as doing so is important, and of interest, but does not in 
itself constitute an innate motive description. Rather, motivations of this type 
represent an environmentally influenced (hence variable), experiential analogue of 
7 The phrase 'as if' has been very deliberately applied in this context in order that the reader be made 
aware that changes in the levels of organisation are more likely a function of cascading ontogenetic 
ability and phylogenetic "interests" than of experience. 
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innate learning or organisational motives. As noted, the fact that such motivations 
appear universal in no way implies innateness or that the motivation is innate. 
Maintaining organisation - enhancement and esteem 
The following section will consider a range of concepts that bear on the maintenance 
of the created organisation (self). Several personality theorists have proposed innate 
motives or mechanisms regarding the maintenance of the self and particularly the self-
image or self-concept. Through consideration of past theory, as well as of more 
recent developments within the literature on self, the current section will make two 
points regarding innateness in organisation-maintenance motives. 
Firstly, the section will criticise the lack of distal explanatory focus in recent research 
on the self; in particular the continued confounds between the function and experience 
of self, and (implicitly) between innateness and universality. On this basis, it will 
argue that there exist no innate motives regarding our experience of self. Rather, it 
will propose that the 'conservatism of self,' as well as such motive-laden terms as 
self-enhancement, self-esteem, and self-concept represent universally inevitable 
(rather than innate) motivations. 
The discussion will further suggest that while self-awareness inevitably develops (see 
Chapter 4), self-concept or esteem related motivations are best conceptualised not as 
innate motivations in themselves (sic), but rather as simply representing the 
proportion of acquired motives regarding how a self wishes to view itself. The 
section will highlight the scarcity of functional self-theories, and suggest that the 
global organisational motive offered above is best suited to initially describing both 
the function and experience of self-related experiential motives. 
Most recent research on the self has traced its activity to two general sets of motives 
that are termed (a) self-enhancement and (b) self-knowledge (Banaji & Prentice, 
1994). Self-enhancement is related to innate motivational concepts such as that of 
self-esteem (e.g. Maslow, 1970), self-preservation (Fromm, 1964), and the desire for 
a positive global self-concept. Such concepts refer to the desire for positive feedback 
about the self and include both self-protective impulses (avoidance) as well as the 
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ongoing drive (approach impulses) to have a positive sense of self (Banaji & Prentice, 
1994). 
According to these authors, the motivations and strategies underlying the desire for 
self-enhancement underlie a vast range of social behaviours. Research by Dunning 
and colleagues for example, (e.g. Dunning & Cohen, 1992) has shown how the way in 
which people define traits (e.g. those required for leadership) depends on their own 
strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, Kunda and colleagues (e.g. Kunda, Fong, 
Sanitoso, & Reber, 1993; cited in Banaji & Prentice, 1994) have shown that subjects 
who were lead to believe that a particular trait is associated with success rated 
themselves as higher on that trait than other subjects. Overall, research into motivated 
attribution processes suggest people's need for, and strength of, esteem motivates 
. many of their thinking processes. 
However, while research into self-concept-serving behaviours and thought has 
demonstrated the universality of self-concept motivations, the literature appears to 
falter when attempting to clarify the functional origins of them. In a disturbingly off-
hand manner, a recent review (Banaji & Prentice, 1994) suggests that the desire for a 
positive self-concept is "presumably rooted in a more basic tendency to seek pleasure 
and avoid pain" (p. 299, italics added). Such an explanation is evidently 
unsatisfactory on a number of levels. Not only does it do little to clarify exactly what 
a self-concept is, but it also fails to explicate why positive self-concepts should be a 
motivational force and, most importantly, what positiveness is. 
Stated most candidly, the current theory views the self-concept as nothing more than a 
collection of acquired goals regarding how one should (see oneself to) be. As was 
noted in Chapter 2, selves are essentially an organisation of motivations and the 
world. Furthermore, experience of self inexorably emerges as the capacity 
(consciousness) to experience that self develops. Notable however within this 
formulation of 'structural' self is the absence of any need to experience that structure 
in a particular way. While motivations about the experience of self are near-
universally acquired and experienced, they are neither consistent, nor innate. 
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For better or for worse, most human socialisation processes (see Chapter 7) tend to 
entail the acquisition of goals about self-experience. "Don't be like that, it's not 
nice," "Try to be kind," and so forth. Consequently, the current theory suggests that 
early experiences lead to the acquisition of motives about who we will (should) be 
and how we should experience ourselves. While the form that this motive grouping 
or 'image' (e.g. Homey, 1937, 1945, 1950) takes is infinitely varied, and may be more 
or less realistic or attainable, the pursuit and systemic response to status changes for 
these motives will occur in a manner identical to any other meaningful motive - no 
matter what the particular self-concept motives necessitate. 
It is in this same functionalist formulation that we find the answer to the question as to 
why positive self-concept, self-esteem and self-enhancement are such powerful 
motivators. Put simply, the developmental epoch within which they are formed, and 
(hence) the relative permeability of the self at this time (see Chapters 4 and 5), means 
that acquired self-concept goals come to figure prominently in the motivational 
structure of self. In some ways these goals could be thought of as constituting a 
phenomenal index or 'sociometer' (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995, cited in 
Kirkpatrick & Ellis, in press8) designed to monitor the success of (and motivate 
adaptive efforts toward) adaptive goals. Given their phenomenological salience, these 
goals possess the capacity to effect monumental behavioural and emotional change. 
As will be expanded upon later in the dissertation, emotions arise in respect of goals, 
positive emotions following goal 'attainment,' negative emotions following failure or 
delay. In this sense, goals about how we wish to see ourselves are no different from 
any other motives, except that their domain of operation tends to be social, and their 
instantiation may be different9. 
Improving Organisation - self-knowledge, self-development and actualisation 
The final section on innate organisational motives will briefly consider a range of 
concepts under the rubric of 'improving organisation.' Considered under this heading 
8 Parenthetically it can be noted that their notions regarding the domain specificity of self-esteem while 
explained from a different perspective are conceptually consistent with the ideas of the current author. 
9 This statement is of course somewhat oversimplified. As will be expanded in Chapter 9, goals of an 
intrapersonal nature may well differ in their 'ability' to provide ongoing/immediate feedback and also 
in their relative importance. The general point nonetheless remains - goals are simply goals. 
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are humanistic theories of actualisation (e.g. Rogers, 1961; Maslow, 1970), as well as 
more recent research from the self literature on motives for self-knowledge and 
improvement. In discussing this literature, the current section will seek to make two 
final points. 
Firstly, it will suggest that a large proportion of the innate 'actualisation or growth 
type' motives add little more than a 'humanistic gloss' to the general notion of 
purpose. Secondly, it will argue that while one could construct plausible reasons as to 
why self-development or self-knowledge motives might be innate, doing so would 
involve the poorest of retrospective theorising. Overall, the current section will argue 
that homo sapiens does not possess innate motives regarding an 'improvement' of 
their organisation, except insofar as organisational motivations (above) lead to the 
increasing complexity of the organisation itself. 
In the late 1930s, partially in reaction to the pessimism of Freudian theory (Ewen, 
1993), a new school of personality theory emerged. Writers like Karen Homey, Erich 
Fromm, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow eschewed the Freudian emphasis on the 
presence of 'dysfunctional' motives, instead choosing to emphasise the positive side 
of innateness. They introduced a new range of concepts including those of 
individuation (lung, 1919), self-realisation (Homey, 1950), 'being in the world' or 
daesin (May, 195811967), and self-actualisation (Rogers, 1961, 1980; Maslow, 1968, 
1970, 1971). Broadly speaking, these theorists emphasised the psychological rather 
than the physiological nature of innateness for humans, and moreover ascribed an 
innate constructive or growth motive to humanity. 
A recent addition to the list of self-motives is the need for self-improvement. This has 
been defined as the desire to bring oneself closer to what one should or would ideally 
like to be. It is presumably rooted in more basic needs such as the need for control 
(Markus & Ruvolo, 1989) or achievement (e.g. Atkinson, 1964). Similarly, the 
concept of self-knowledge has been defined as the desire for accurate and certain 
evidence of one's traits and abilities that confirms one's self-assessments (Banaji & 
Prentice, 1994). In a manner similar to that outlined above, the authors suggest that 
such a need is rooted in a more basic need, variously called consistency, uncertainty 
reduction, or the need to predict and control the environment. 
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Although disagreement may forever rest on a matter of emphasis, it is the opinion of 
the current writer that proposing quasi-innate motives such as those presented above 
add nothing to the simple notion of purpose itself. Recast beneath the (admittedly) 
stark light cast by the preceding discussion on the self as a motivational structure (see 
Chapter 2), the assertion that people are innately motivated to self-actualise or 
improve can be seen to say nothing more than that they are motivated to organise and 
act upon the goals that constitute the self, including its experiential components. 
Moreover, the current theory explicitly disavows the plausibility of innate 
benevolence. While acknowledging that the therapeutic advantages of such 
conceptualisations may be considerable, positing 'goodness' or 'constructiveness' at 
the core of humanity is itself problematic. Not only do we have to wonder exactly 
what thoughts, feelings or actions constitute such, but one is left with the unhappy 
feeling that socio-historical context will determine our criterion. As such, the 
inclusion of innate growth motives adds little more than unbridled idealism, and 
contributes nothing to a functional understanding of innateness. 
Finally, while one could consider knowledge and/or improvement of the self-structure 
to be potentially functional motives there is little evidence supporting such a 
proposition. It may well be true that increased knowledge of one's own self-structure 
is both functional and adaptive. lO Increased knowledge of the self might (for 
example) enable considerably more direct action to be taken in respect of 
progressively more fundamental goals. However, there is altogether too much 
evidence to suggest that people do not unequivocally want to know their self. So 
while the transition to representational goals (and hence the departure from 
innateness) may forever prevent a definitive answer to these issues, the current model 
suggests that innate motives regarding the knowledge or experience of the self do not 
exist. 
10 The current theory in fact explicitly upholds this notion, suggesting that increased consciousness 
(self-knowledge) constitutes a functional personality development. However, consciousness and 
motives regarding conscious experiences are complex topics. As such, they are fully discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. For now, it is only important that the reader consider the poor likelihood that such 
motives are innate. 
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Summary. 
Overall the needs to create, maintain, and improve an internal organisation of the 
world and oneself appears as a fundamental innate motive. Such a conceptualisation 
is consistent with concepts from systems theory, from developmental and cognitive 
theory (e.g. schema, internal working model), and with the implicit ideas of many 
personality and self theorists. Moreover, an explicitly functional consideration shows 
that many motivations can be usefully conceptualised as belonging to this motive 
grouping. The current model considers a wide range of motivational concepts to be 
the age-appropriate experiential manifestation of an innate need to create and 
maintain an effective internal organisation of the world and oneself. 
Chapter 3.7 - EmotionslFeedback 
The current model assumes that the emotions constitute innate motivations for homo 
sapiens (see e.g. Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971, 1993). Further, in line with differential 
emotions theory (e.g. Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1971, 1993; Izard & Malatesta, 
1987), the current model assumes that each discrete emotion serves and motivates 
unique adaptive functions, coping (see also Plutchik, 1962, 1980, 1991, 1993) and 
behaviour. Although full conceptual consideration of emotions will be delayed until 
the chapters on regulation/process of the personality or self-system (Chapters 7 and 
8), adequate contemplation of innateness in motivation behoves some consideration of 
emotions. The following section will thus consider innateness in the emotion-
motivation relationship, introduce theory on the necessity for a living system to 
possess innate regulatory or feedback mechanisms, and briefly describe a 
conceptualisation of emotion and its relationships with motivation and behaviour. 
As will become clear, many psychological theories of emotion have tended to 
anthropocentric ally imply that emotions are motivational at the level of experience. 11 
In contrast, the current theory suggests that emotions per se act as an innate systemic 
11 Solomon (1993) has recently criticised the tendency to treat experience as necessary to emotion as 
'subjective essentialism" linking it to a Cartesian view of the world. See also Buck (1985, p. 396), 
LeDoux (1989, p. 269) and Averill (1994a). 
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motivator, in addition to this experiential component. As such, the current model 
argues that emotions are motivating at all levels of functioning,12 and that our ability 
to consciously experience emotions as motivating is sufficient but not necessary for 
them to operate as such. 
Support for this approach can be found in general systems theory. One of the most 
fundamental premises of any systems or cybernetic approach is that every system is 
regulated in a way such that its goals can be realised (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998). 
Feedback is a basic strategy which allows a system to compensate for disturbances, 
and can be defined as "the transmission of a signal from a later to an earlier stage" 
(Skyttner, 1996; p. 49). While different species (living systems) have differing innate 
mechanisms for regulation of their goal operations, it is a basic assumption of the 
current model that homo sapiens exhibits and experiences such regulation as emotion. 
Historically, different theorists have emphasised comparatively imprecise aspects of 
the relationships between emotion, motivation and behaviour. McDougall (1908) for 
example, organised his original description of instincts in terms of their relationships 
with emotions (see also Plutchik, 1980 for a similar pairing of emotions with 'survival 
issues'). He suggested that there were seven core instincts (flight, repulsion, 
curiosity, pugnacity (see also Cattell, 1950), self-abasement, self-assertion, and 
parental), each of which was thought to be closely associated with a particular 
(primary) emotion. Subsequent personality theorists have been even less systematic 
or precise in their consideration of emotions, typically introducing concepts that 
described a class of behaviours linked to emotions rather than a class of motive. 
Motives like that for aggression or destructiveness (Freud, 1923/1961; Murray, 1938; 
Erikson, 1968) are of this type. Historically then, the consideration of innateness in 
emotions within personality theory has occurred at a level that blends instinct, drive, 
and emotion concepts with a consequence that they are lesser utility!3. 
12 Panksepp (1993) has recently suggested that the basic emotions have widely distributed effects 
wherein many behavioural, physiological and psychological processes are coherently brought to bear 
on important life events. Conspicuously missing in this formulation is the necessity for experience. 
13 There are some exceptions to this statement. Recent work, particularly by Carol Magai has gone a 
long way towards addressing this deficit. Magai's theory is discussed below (see Chapter 5). 
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In emotion theory, Arnold (1960a, 1960b) initially defined emotions as 'felt action 
tendencies' while Frijda (1986) has suggested that emotions are, first and foremost, 
states of readiness to engage or not engage with the environment. In Frijda's theory, 
particular patterns of appraisal lead to particular changes in action readiness and to 
concomitant changes in physiology which form the core of the emotional responses. 
For him, emotions are the experience of action readiness (see Chapter 6). They signal 
the relevance of events in respect of one's concerns to cognitive apparatus and the 
action system. Basically, emotions are phenomena of readiness or unreadiness for 
interaction (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). 
A second (although smaller) proportion of contemporary emotion theorists suggest 
that emotions per se constitute innate motivations for homo sapiens (see e.g. 
Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1971, 1993; Buck, 1985). Although these theorists have 
tended to be less componential in their approach to emotions, instead proposing more 
integrative constructs such as affective-cognitive structures (Izard, 1991, 1993) or 
primes (Buck, 1985, 1991), the emotion-motivation-action relationship is 
illustratively central in their models. 
For example within Buck's (1985) theory, motivation is a potential inherent in the 
structure of the primes. 14 According to Buck, primes have evolved to respond to 
stimuli and events that have proved challenging over the course of evolution. 
Similarly, although Izard (1993) considers the relationship between emotional 
experience and behaviour to be a learned phenomenon (to a degree unlike the current 
theory), a central premise of differential emotions theory is that "each of the emotions 
organises and motivates perception, cognition, and actions (behaviour) in particular 
ways" (Izard, 1993, p. 639 italics added). 
Following Arnold (1960a, 1960b), more recent cognitive theories again argued that it 
is the subjective feeling state that motivates a person to behave (e.g. Smith & Pope, 
1992). More distressingly however, they have also suggested that the motivational 
impulse associated with emotions results in a subjectively or functionally equivalent 
14 Although Buck (1985) does not conceptualise of primes as only emotion, his theory of biologically 
based motivation/emotion systems shares some commonality with the current theory, notably in a 
shared emphasis on the motivational consideration of emotions. 
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course of action. Such a position suggests that "There are few, if any, fixed linkages 
between emotion and overt behaviour and, depending on context, the experience of 
just about any emotion can result in just about any behaviour" (Smith & Pope, 1992; 
p.34). 
Prima facie, such a statement seems quite reasonable and indisputable, at least insofar 
as there is no one-to-one correspondence between a given emotion and a given 
behaviour. Yet the making of such remarks has a number of far-flung theoretical 
consequences. In the first instance, they make the potentially important investigation 
of emotion-behaviour links singularly unappealing. The simple reason for this is that 
the position implicitly creates its own theoretical straw man in arguing that emotion-
behaviour links should be measurable to some unspecified, yet almost certainly 
unobtainable degree, of specificity. 
The one-to-one criterion thus implied can of course never be reached, and thus the 
straw man is contemptuously dismissed. Upon inspection however, it can be noted 
that the criterion is of a nature that would not be expected in any other domain of 
inquiry. We do not expect a perfect concordance between emotions and the content 
of appraisal, rather we expect particular types of thought (appraisals). Similarly, we 
do not insist on marked relationships between certain stimuli and the emotional 
response. Why then should we do so in the case of emotion and behaviour? 
. It seems clear to the 'man on the street' that people behave in a manner indicative of 
the way they feel more often than not. This hypothetical fellow does not expect a 
perfect correspondence, nor does he often receive one. Nonetheless, on average, the 
inferences he is able to make regarding another's feeling state based on the way that 
other behaves are typically of at least some assistance to him. Likewise, information 
he receives about another's feeling states are typically of use in predicting the way 
they will behave. If there are no links, why does this man continue using his 
heuristics? 
Finally, in considering emotion-behaviour links, most accounts have placed an 
unneeded emphasis on feZt tendency in emotion, thus obscuring the functional 
consideration of emotion per se as motivating. By contrast the current theory 
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suggests that while all emotions are motivating in their conscious experience, that a 
proportion of emotions (primaries) constitute an phylogenetically more primitive 
'prompt' that, experienced or not, motivates a recognisable type of instrumental 
response. As is demonstrated in Chapter 8, this relationship can be empirically 
demonstrated to an adequate level of specificity through an examination of the links 
between emotions and the associated behavioural prototypes. 
At this point, the reader may be aware that the thrust of the discussion above could 
lead to a prolonged philosophical discussion about what emotions really are, whether 
other species have emotions,15 and whether experience is necessary to emotion. Rest 
assured, this will not happen, at least not yet (see Chapter 6). The functional 
consideration of emotions as an innate motivator is only being introduced in order to 
adequately contextualise the innate motives that emotions are (Izard, 1991), the 
behaviours that they engender (see Chapter 8), and to distinguish emotional states 
from experience (e.g. Lewis & Michalson, 1983; LeDoux, 1989; M. Lewis, 1993). 
That said, a brief example may help clarify the distinctions offered. 
Few theorists would argue that a dog has the capacities needed to experience 
emotions as we do. Nonetheless, as those of us who have delivered newspapers are 
conspicuously aware, dogs sometimes behave 'emotionally' or 'as if' they were 
emotional. Although the presence of a snarling hound (and the activation of motives 
concerning self-preservation) tends to preclude in situ consideration of emotion in the 
dog, a posteriori reflection is illustrative (and to a degree safer). 
Put simply, the current theory argues that the emotions are not limited to homo 
sapiens (McDougall, 1908). Historically, many species (living systems) have faced 
challenges similar to those we face, and some have responded with a similar means of 
regulating their relationship(s) with the environment. Being 'thwarted' then, produces 
a state of anger in dog or an infant just as it does in an adult. Anger, or its functional 
equivalent, is clearly present in the behaviour, even though the dog is unlikely to 
experience as we do. 
15 For an interesting perspective on emotions in other species, readers are referred to a recent chapter by 
McGuire (1993). 
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Nor however do we possess a monopoly on experience. While the dog may not 
experience· emotions as we do, something is clearly occurring inside the animal. To 
say that the dog does not experience emotions at all is not unlike suggesting that the 
pre-conscious infant does not experience sadness, rage, happiness or contentment. 
Given the degree of non-reflexivity we can observe in the dog, accepting such a 
doctrine leads to the vexatious question as to why the dog barked and growled at all. 
The dog is clearly perceiving something, and this same 'something' appears 
consistently associated with a certain pattern of behavioural response. 
The above accepted, dogs are nonetheless not the same as people. In considering any 
difference, the current theory suggests that the primary difference between homo 
sapiens and a dog, and between an infant and an adult, is a matter of consciousness 
(see Chapter 4 for a discussion of consciousness in the current model). The dog and 
the pre-conscious infant cannot consciously experience emotions as motivating (see 
Chapter 7) because they have no representational awareness of 'their' motive 
hierarchy or 'their' self. "I" and "me" do not yet exist, hence emotions cannot be 
experienced in this regard. 
Yet even this important difference does not change what primary emotions are or 
what they are about. In this context, the emergence of consciousness IS 
predominantly relevant only in respect of the ability to experience emotions as 
motivating. Given the ontogenesis of consciousness (see Chapter 7), the current 
theory expects a high degree of learning to influence the experience of emotions as 
motivating. Different people can be seen to experience an emotion (such as anger) 
more or less negatively, and as associated with a variety of behavioural urges (see 
Chapter 6 for an application of this theory). However, changes in the way emotions 
are experienced do not necessarily always change the behaviour that results from 
them. 
Summary 
Above it has been argued that all living systems possess innate feedback mechanisms. 
It has been proposed that the emotions comprise this feedback system for homo 
sapiens as well as for other species. In line with differential emotions theory, it has 
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been suggested that each discrete emotion serves and motivates umque adaptive 
functions and in some instances behaviour. More contentiously, it has also been 
suggested that the experience of emotions as motivating is not entirely necessary for 
them to operate as motivating or to engender behaviour. Rather, it has been argued 
that a experience is only a part of what is needed for an understanding of emotion and 
motivation. 
In addition, it has been suggested that five primary emotions (anger, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and disgust) are, of themselves, innately motivating notwithstanding an 
experience of them as motivating. Moreover, each is connected to an innate 
behavioural prototype that both predisposes and represents a biological likelihood of 
behaving in a manner appropriate to the function each emotion fulfils. Because the 
function of these emotions is not necessarily linked to social functioning or to the 
conscious awareness of self (secondary emotions), these 'types' are innate, universal, 
and (operationally) recognisable as such. 
Chapter 3.8 - Concluding Remarks on Innateness in Motivation 
In this discussion, innateness in motivation has been considered under five 
interrelated, function-derived headings (Physical Integrity, Reproduction, Social, 
Organisation, and EmotionslFeedback). Motives representing each of these groupings 
are believed to be present in all living organisms, with only the degree of 
sophistication and the precise nature of each motive's operation varymg across 
species. While the discussion in the chapters to follow will consider both how 
consciousness might influence our conceptualisations of innateness, and how innate 
motives are elaborated within the representational structure of the adult self, each of 
the five motive groups above are believed to be innately motivating, universal, and 
inescapable. They are structurally present (if not experienced) from the moment of 
birth, and must form the initial motivational units for the study of personality. 
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Chapter 4: The transfonnation of biological to representational goals and 
the ontogeny of consciousness. 
Chapter 4.1 - Introduction 
An understanding of innateness in motivation appears critical to the understanding of 
the adult personality. It seems obvious that the complex hierarchy of goals, which I 
have argued comprises the core of personality, can only emerge in respect of a value 
or standard that already exists. As will become clear however, the process by which 
innate motives or needs come to be represented within an adult personality is poorly 
understood. Historically, this issue has received vague treatment in personality theory 
(e.g. McDougall 1908; Maslow, 1970) and the emergence of non-specific 
interactionist perspectives appear as much a pacifier for the oral academic as they do a 
genuine attempt at describing an important phenomenon. 
Recent personality theory has more (Dweck, 1996) or less (Magai, 1996) alluded to a 
relationship between innate motives and the goals of the adult, although little specific 
theory has been generated regarding the causal or structural relationships between 
these concerns, or the processes by which such changes and transformations occur. 
We know little about how innate motives relate to, or eventually become, the 
representational adult personality, and even less about why the change from innate to 
representational motives occurs. It has however been noted that this is a domain well 
suited to future research (Dweck, 1996). 
In considering the 'how' component of these issues, Chapter 4 will present a 
preliminary theory outlining the transformation of innate motives to the 
representational goals. Briefly stated, the theory suggests that innate motive 
structures are pre-programmed to redescribe themselves in representational form, an 
endogenous process Karmiloff-Smith (1991) has termed 'representational 
redescription' . 
Consideration of the 'why' aspects of motive representation and the adult personality 
will begin through considering what can be seen as the major consequence of the 
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representational process - conSCIOusness. Consciousness is a phenomenon 
infrequently considered in contemporary personality theory, although it was of central 
concern to the so-called 'grand theorists' earlier this century (Tomkins, 1981; Maddi, 
1993). While the developmental correlation of self-representational and conscious 
processes does not presuppose a causal link between the two, a functionalist 
interpretation of them suggests that there may in fact be one. Below, it is suggested 
that the phenomenal awareness or experience of the motivational hierarchy (self) is 
the function of consciousness, enabling an additional source of goal-relevant 
motivation and an expanded emotional repertoire. It is further hypothesised that the 
ability to represent and experience the self (consciousness) is a direct result of the 
representational redescription of innate motivations. 
Chapter 4.2 - The transition from biological to representational goals 
Introduction 
It should be reiterated at this point, that the current thesis is not a general model of 
infant development, except insofar as general developmental considerations bear on 
the acquisition, representation and operation of motives and goals, and the 
development of consciousness. As such, the discussion will attempt to avoid a 
number of 'core' developmental and conceptual issues even though they can be taken 
as relevant. 
Included in this wholesale caveat are the relative avoidance of issues regarding the 
domain general versus domain specific nature of development and learning (e.g. 
Gallistel, Brown, Carey, Gelman, & Keil, 1991; Karmiloff-Smith, 1991), the 
development of a theory of mind (e.g. Carruthers & Smith, 1996), and continuity 
versus stage development issues (Fisher & Bidell, 1991; Carey, 1991). Put simply, 
the topic of infant development is an extremely complicated field, and some limits to 
the current discussion must be imposed1. 
1 Some of these topics are briefly addressed in Chapter 6. 
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In Chapter 3 a working typology of innate motives was outlined. It was suggested 
that motives representing each of the five groupings were manifest in all living 
organisms, with only the degree of sophistication and the precise nature of each 
motive's operation and experience varying across organisms. Finally, it was proposed 
that each motive grouping was structurally present (if not experienced) from the 
moment of birth, and (as such) must constitute the initial motivational units for 
personality. 
Yet nowhere in the dissertation to date has there been any consideration of precisely 
how innate motives become representational goals. Certainly it seems likely that 
innate motives are the basis upon which representational goals are formed. But how? 
What happens? Why? Is the transformation part of some congenital development 
subroutine (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1991; Spelke, 1991)? What must the organism be 
capable of to develop representational motives and how does this process unfold in 
development? 
"Representational Redescription" and the transformation of the state space 
In considering the representation of motives, the current theory takes it as a starting 
point that the most obvious necessity involves the ability to represent per se. While 
we know next to nothing about the place of representation ability in motivation, the 
development of representation ability has been (e.g. Piaget, 1962) and continues to be 
extensively researched (see e.g. Spelke, 1991; Karmiloff-Smith, 1991). It thus 
provides a rich source of descriptive information, and a basis upon which to begin 
theorising. Although the manner in innate and acquired motives are represented could 
conceivably differ from representations of knowledge or belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995), findings from representation research nonetheless shed light on a plausible 
process underlying the transformation to representational goals. 
In describing the processes of motive representation and the transformation of innate 
to representational goals, the current model proposes a developmental process similar 
to that articulated recently in Karmiloff-Smith (1991). Her theory of representational 
development suggests that all species have innate knowledge structures in their 
systems. In some areas this knowledge is very detailed, for others skeletal aspects 
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exist to be filled in by experience. According to Kanniloff-Smith, this innate 
knowledge is procedurally encoded, and activated as a response to external stimuli 
(hence the conceptualisation of the human infant as relatively reflexive pre-
representation). 
In Kanniloff-Smith's (1991) theory, newly acquired knowledge is also represented 
procedurally (apart from knowledge directly encoded linguistically), and initially 
knowledge is not available as data to other parts of the system. However, innate 
knowledge in the human mind subsequently becomes available to other parts of the 
system. Kanniloff-Smith suggests that this 'availability' is a determined occurrence, 
orchestrated by the innate processes that drive knowledge acquisition, constraining 
the content, form, and timing of what ultimately comes to be representational 
knowledge. 
The hypothesised process underlying this transformation is called representational 
redescription. In this process, lower (innate) levels of knowledge are left intact, while 
copies are redescribed. According to Kamiloff-Smith, a major part of development 
involves the transforming of special-purpose procedurally encoded knowledge into 
data structures which then become available to other parts of the mind (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1991). The transformation is guided by an endogenous process whereby the 
mind exploits the knowledge it has stored (both innate and acquired), by representing 
recursively its own internal representations. In her view, this process can be triggered 
externally (see below), but may be self-generating. 
The current theory suggests that a similar process underlies the transformation of 
innate motives. Innate motives are initially embedded within the system as 
procedural structures. As such, motives as well as the associated motive satisfying 
behaviours, are reflexively activated in response to internal or external stimuli, the 
perception of which may constitute part of that same structure2. During this time, 
lasting until around 18 months or two years, the infant behaves predominantly as an 
2 As will become evident upon reading Chapter 5.5 (see "Motives as unifying developmental 
trajectories") the current model explicitly predicts that the timetabling of representational redescription 
will vary as a function of the motive domain. For example (and notwithstanding the predilections of 
Freud), the redescription of innate reproductive motives probably does not occur until adolescence. 
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instinctual creature (see below). However, in accordance with the dictates of innate 
and emergent control parameters, innate motives are gradually transformed or 
representationally redescribed3• 
Conclusions and Implications 
The current model suggests that the ability to represent innate motives develops 
universally. While the process underlying this motive transformation mayor may not 
occur in a manner similar to the representational redescription of other knowledge, a 
working theory has been offered. Alternative explanatory possibilities for this process 
are of course possible. 
For example, it is thinkable that the representation of motives occurs as a function of 
domain-neutral developments (i.e. through a more general program regarding 
representation per se), although this would seem unlikely. Similarly, the emergence 
of certain characteristics (control parameters) is almost certainly necessary for the 
initialisation of the representational process. While the details of any such theory are 
beyond the interests of this discussion, procedurally encoded innate motive structures 
may provide an important source of developmental variable. 
To this point, the current theory has said little about how different forms of the same 
motive may be reconciled with one another. In Karmiloff-Smith's (1991) theory, 
several forms of the same knowledge may be retained simultaneously. Similarly, in 
Lewis' (1990b) discussion of the ontogeny of consciousness and intentionality, he 
suggests that once emerged, that all levels exist at once. He suggests that "what 
occurs earlier is not destroyed by transformations .. (rather) .. biological primitives 
interact with experience to elaborate themselves" (p. 282; see Chapter 7). 
Essentially, the current theory concurs with the authors above, although it has 
suggested that other or earlier 'versions' of an ultimately representational motive 
This can be taken to suggest that the processes. underlying their conscious acquisition remain dormant 
until triggered by the relevant internal or external control parameters. 
3 It is acknowledged that this is a strongly nativist position on development: For a different perspective 
and critique on nativist assumptions, readers are referred to discussions by Fisher & Bidell (1991) and 
Carey (1991). 
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become subordinate to their placement in the representation of the motivational state 
space (see below). The simple reason underlying this theoretical decision was noted 
in Chapter 2, where it was suggested that possessing multiple motive hierarchies 
creates an endemic conflict within the motive system that could not be reconciled. 
However, the current theory does acknowledge that motives may re-emerge in a more 
primitive form when the organism is placed under extreme microdevelopmental (real-
time) duress (e.g. an immediately life threatening situation). Whether this alteration 
in relative goal priorities represents the activation of more primitive forms of a 
representational motive, or whether it simply reflects the extreme dynamism of the 
adult goal hierarchy is however unclear. 
Of more immediate interest to the current context however are the implications 
stemming from the developmental status of the infant at the time of goal acquisition. 
In the current theory, motives and goals are continuously elaborated via the process 
described in Chapter 6. Given that representational redescription is thought to occur' 
around 18 months, the infant has already acquired a great number of derived or 
learned motivations, even though they are non-representational. The current theory 
assumes that the developmental status of the infant at the time of acquisition is a key 
factor in the operation, accessibility, and mutability of a particular goal, and (hence) 
the personality in question. On the basis of the above discussion, it is thus proposed 
that there exist four possible classes of motive or goa14• 
Type 1 - Innate motives (more or less precise, and well detailed) 
Type 2 - Motives acquired in relation to existing motives (see Chapter 5), 
pre-consciously and pre-linguistically 
Type 3 - Motives acquired in relation to existing motives pre-consciously, 
but stored as linguistic information 
Type 4 - Full representational goals acquired post-consciousness and 
linguistically 
4 Of course, a given motive may exist at one, some, or all levels simultaneously. 
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While a full discussion of each class is beyond the interests of the current discussion, 
a brief example may help illustrate the importance of this issue. The goals regarding 
the experience of a particular emotion (see Chapter 7), which are hypothesised to arise 
during attachment dynamics, are likely to have been acquired pre-consciously, and 
non-linguistically. As such not only do they constitute an important part of the 
personality structure (see Chapters 6 and 7), but they are difficult to consciously 
access in later life, despite their conspicuous influences. 
Hence, not only are these goals pre-conscious in the sense that subsequent self-
examination of their ontogeny is difficult, but they are represented in a non-linguistic 
form. As can be imagined this makes this type of goal extremely difficult to 
consciously and verbally examine in self-regulatory and developmental processes (see 
below) and thence to change. A person may be aware (via their affective response) 
that they do not like a certain thing, but cannot explain precisely what it is that they do 
not like, or why it is that they do not like it. Overall, the current theory considers 
issues relating to goal acquisition as usefully conceptualised in terms of the 
availability of goals to conscious examination. 
Chapter 4.3 The consequence of representing a goal space: 
Consciousness 
Introduction 
One of the most important consequences of the representation of motives is the 
development of the abilities to be aware and (thus) experience the self, for it is in this 
process that we see the development of conscious self-awareness. The theory 
presented here suggests that when a hierarchy of motives become available as 
representational data to other parts of the system the organism can be thought of as 
possessing both consciousness and a conscious awareness of the motivational state 
space that is experienced as self5. 
5 At this point, the reader should be made aware that the current theory is not considering all the 
contents of consciousness (qualia) which may include self, perceptual and sensory data as well as 
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To this point however, the concept of consciousness has only been broadly discussed. 
Earlier, consciousness was briefly conceptualised as emerging via organisational 
complexity (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 'Organisation' Section). Above, the process 
underlying the transformation of innate motives to representational goals has been 
considered from a representational standpoint. Below, the consequences of this 
representational transformation (to consciousness) are considered as relevant to the 
goal and personality processes of self. The phenomenon of consciousness is 
considered, a working definition is presented, and implications for the model are 
briefly discussed. 
Background to contemporary consciousness research 
Today, the problem of consciousness marks the very limit of human striving for 
understanding (Denton, 1993). It appears to many the last great puzzle and the 
greatest theoretical challenge of our time (e.g. Metzinger, 1995; Chalmers, 1995; 
Cairns-Smith, 1996). Unsurprisingly then, consciousness appears a phenomenon of 
unsurpassed complexity (Revonsuo, 1994). Perhaps as a consequence of this 
complexity, dozens of philosophical and psychological perspectives have been 
utilised (see Wilber, 1997 for a recent summary), although few from personality 
theory. 
The phylogeny of consciousness has been tied to the use of fire, to bipedalism and 
handedness (Corballis, 1997), to language, agriculture and tool use (Oakley, cited in 
Denton, 1993), and to art (Campbell, 1976). Consciousness has further been 
considered in relation to evolved asymmetries in the configuration of the brain 
(Sperry, 1980), and to the size of the prefrontal cortex (Deacon, 1997, cited in 
Corballis & Lea, 1999). Consciousness has also been linked to both morality 
(Dawkins, 1993), and its appreciation (Premack, 1978, cited in Corballis & Lea, 
1999), and to intentionality (e.g. Searle, 1991) or volition (e.g. Bieri, 1995), 
Perhaps as a result of the complexity evident above, some theorists have gone so far 
as to argue that the phenomenon of consciousness is systematically resistant to 
feelings. While important, contents of consciousness which do not bear immediately on the 
representation and goal operations of self are not being considered at this point. 
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explanation (e.g. Nagel, 1974). Jackson for example (1982) joins Nagel (1974) in 
stating that an explanation of how it is that consciousness fits into the great scheme of 
things may forever elude us. A similar comment is also made by Fodor (1983, cited 
in Davies & Humphreys, 1993) who suggests that the mind is 'epistemically bounded' 
(see also McGinn, 1989) with an understanding of consciousness likely to be forever 
denied us. 
From the above, it appears fair to say that there is not yet any genuine paradigm of 
consciousness research (Robinson, 1996; although see Wilber, 1997 for a recent 
attempt). There are no universally accepted core assumptions on which a general 
theory of consciousness could be built (Revonsuo, 1994), and we remain divided as to 
whether the phenomenon of consciousness is open to investigation at all. Expressed 
somewhat more optimistically, "one (still) has to admit that consciousness research is 
still in its infancy" (Metzinger, 1995; p. 7). 
Yet despite the immaturity of consciousness theory, consciousness remains an 
important phenomenon, and must be considered in any model of personality (e.g. 
Dweck, 1996; McClelland, 1996; Hogan, 1998) or emotion (Zajonc, 1984; Lazarus, 
1984). Below, the phenomenon of consciousness is considered within the motive and 
personality framework being developed. 
Functionalism and consciousness 
The current model considers consciousness (among other phenomena) from a 
functionalist perspective. Functionalism being the general view that mental states and 
processes (including consciousness) are best characterised and explained in functional 
terms (e.g. James, 1890; Dennett, 1991c; Dawkins, 1993; Niiniluoto, 1994). As such 
it is argued that consciousness must confer an adaptive advantage such that members 
of a species possessing consciousness are reproductively advantaged over those 
conspecifics that do not. Although functionalist approaches to consciousness have 
seen a high degree of critical attack (e.g. Rudd, 1997; Hamad, 1998), functionalism 
nonetheless remains the closest thing there is to a mainline view in contemporary 
ideas about the mind (Niiniluoto, 1994; Van Gulick, 1995). 
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Implicitly included in this particular theoretical orientation is a minor subscription to 
an approach that is variously tenned physicalism, materialism, or physical 
materialism (e.g. McGinn, 1989; Searle, 1991; Graham, 1993; Strawson, 1997). This 
position assumes that mind and conscious mind are nothing more than matter, or at 
least can be understood at a physical level (Graham, 1993; Revonsuo, 1994; Corballis, 
1999). McGinn (1989) for example, suggests that "There just has to be some 
explanation for how brains subserve minds . . . Consciousness, in short, must be a 
natural phenomenon, naturally arising from certain organisations of matter (p. 353; 
see also Panksepp, 1994a). 
Searle (1992) advocates a similarly realistic interpretation of mental states. His 
theory emphasises the central importance, reality, and causal efficacy of 
consciousness. His so-called 'biological naturalism' takes conscious mental processes 
to be a causally relevant part of neurophysiological processes in the brain. In 1990 he 
claimed that "brains cause minds", and has recently interpreted the mind-brain 
relationship in terms of bottom-up causality from neurophysiological causes to 
mentalistic effects (Searle, 1992; p. 125). 
Overall then, the current theory suggests that conSCIOusness must be considered 
within a functional framework, insofar as consciousness bequeaths an adaptive 
advantage not found in non-conscious equivalents. However, accepting this premise 
is not as straightforward a matter as it first appears. If consciousness is indeed a 
structurally represented advantageous adaptation, what exactly does it add (over and 
above) non-conscious processes of the same type (Revonsuo, 1994; Chalmers, 1995; 
Hamad, 1998; Ellis, 1998)? Explaining the relationship between phenomenal 
experience and the function of consciousness is a primary concern for consciousness-
research (Metzinger, 1995), and is currently referred to as the explanatory gap 
problem. 
The 'Explanatory Gap' problem 
"There's something that it's like to be a conscious thing" 
Thomas Nagel (1974) 
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The consideration of consciousness from a functional perspective exposes a theory to 
a long-lived family of arguments. Currently referred to as the 'explanatory gap 
problem' (cf. Levine, 1983), the essential line of thought in such argument is as 
follows: Even if we gave an ideally complete physical description of a living human 
being - whether on the levels of overt behaviour, of neurophysiology or of abstract 
functional organisation - we would still have left something out; that person's 
subjective conscious experience, what it was like to be that person (Rudd, 1997)6. 
This 'gap' is clearly a problem for function-based accounts of consciousness. 
According to one critic, phenomenal experience adds nothing within a functionalist 
framework (Hamad, 1998). Hamad (1998) suggests that if we look at any alleged 
advantage more closely, it will tum out to be a functional advantage only. He further 
argues that the exact same functional advantage will remain intact even if one 
subtracts the conscious experience from it. Overall, he cynically concludes that the 
'real' reason we are so adaptationistic about consciousness has to do with our 
experience with and intuitions about free will (Harnad, 1998). 
Put simply, I do not agree. While the phenomenal consciousness must be 
acknowledged as a phenomenon of unsurpassed complexity, the mere fact that we do 
not understand exactly what advantage it gives, does not mean that the phenomenal 
consciousness itself occasions nothing functional. Certainly, it is possible that 
conscious awareness of self is nothing more than an epiphenomenal consequence of 
organisational complexity (e.g. James, 1890; Churchland, 1988, see below), yet this 
seems unlikely. More plausible is that phenomenal consciousness is functionally 
adaptive, but that we simply do not yet understand precisely how. In 'developing this 
assumption, the discussion below will outline a tentative theory of phenomenal 
motivation and meta-goal-management, thereby illustrating the functional advantages 
of phenomenal consciousness itself. 
6 Readers familiar with the consciousness literature will recognise the essence of the ongoing debate 
about Mary's experience of 'redness' here. 
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Chapter 7.5 Reconciling functionalism with expenence: An 
emotivational perspective 
Before the theory is outlined, it must immediately be acknowledged that the current 
thesis is not primarily a model of consciousness, but rather of personality and 
emotions. As such, the ideas presented here are noted only briefly, and are intended 
as an introduction to the place of consciousness in personality development and 
functioning rather than as a treatise on consciousness per se. Nonetheless, given the 
importance the current theory attaches to consciousness and conscious experience in 
goal operations, some attempt must be made to operationalise consciousness within 
the functionalist framework being developed. 
In developing the current position, the reader's attention is briefly returned to the 
central theses of Chapters 1 and 2. In Chapter 1, it was argued that an adequate model 
of personality or self must centrally attend to the importance of motives, while 
Chapter 3 considered the universality of goal-related feedback (emotions) in living 
systems. Chapter 2 outlined a similar ubiquity in respect of the organisational 
demands a life form faces. To this point then, the theory has outlined three relevant 
premises (as follows). 
1. Every organism is motivated 
2. Every organism has a means of organising its own motives (variously 
termed a personality (Chapter 1), a self (Chapter 2), or a motivational state 
space (Chapters 5, 6, & 7» 
3. Every organism has a means of ascertaining motive status (feedback or 
emotions) 
Given the overwhelming importance of these three concerns, it seems reasonable to 
initially suppose that phenomenal consciousness is somehow functional through its 
impact on motive-organisational systems. But what might this impact be? What does 
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phenomenal consciousness add to our fitness that establishes phenomenal experiences 
at the cutting edge of our phylogenetic development? 
Ironically, a possible answer to this question IS unearthed through more fully 
considering the relationship between the theoretical difficulties of consciousness 
research outlined above (the explanatory gap problem), and the effective organisation 
and operation upon motives. In essence, I argue that consciousness research has been 
hampered somewhat through pessimistic consideration of phenomenal experience as a 
problem 7 to be explained. In contrast the current theory suggests that rather than a 
problem, that phenomenal experience is in fact a clear clue as to the likely function of 
consciousness. 
Put simply, as conSCIOusness we inherit or develop the capacity to phenomenally 
experience8 our own goal structure, state space, or self. Phenomenal experience is 
thus conceptualised as functional for it announces goals and changes in goal status 
(emotion) with an immediacy, saliency and flexibility that is simply not achievable in 
the absence of phenomenal experience. Direct, goal-related experience of self is the 
function of consciousness, an adaptive function that simply cannot be achieved in a 
non-phenomenal system9• 
Acceptance of this idea of course depends on what we think consciousness does. If 
consciousness is no more than a meta-cognitive attention, allocation, novelty, or 
analogy/prediction tool (e.g. Crook, 1980; Denton, 1993; Shanon, 1998; Calvin, 
1998), then experience becomes little more than a theoretical nuisance lO• Moreover, 
in adopting a strict cognitive science or information processing view as to the nature 
of consciousness, one is opened up to the objections above - why have experience at 
all? 
7 Within the most recent literature (e.g. Chalmers, 1995; Libet, 1996; Rosenberg, 1996; Hodgeson, 
1996; Shear, 1996) the explanation of experience is in fact the 'hard problem' (Chalmers, 1995) of 
consciousness research. 
8 In some ways the argument here is similar to that offered by Cairns-Smith (1996) when he suggests 
that feeling is the 'stuff of consciousness. 
9 Nielsen (1998) has recently made a similar suggestion when she argues that emotional experience is 
one of the key means through which our conception of a unified self and our understanding of others as 
mental and experiencing agents develops. 
10 In a different context, dynamic systems theorists like Camras (1991), have argued that any form of 
meta-processor would quickly be paralysed by the sheer number of calculations it would be continually 
making (see Chapter 5.3). 
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It is the contention of the current theory that while consciousness is evidently 
associated with higher brain functioning and is usefully thought of as being built on 
the development of representational abilities (see below), these abilities in themselves 
do not constitute the function of consciousness. Rather, the function of consciousness 
is found rather in the consequences of the ability to phenomenally experience (as 
emotions) the dynamic status of one's own goal structure or self. 
Damasio (1994) has recently provided some indirect evidence towards the importance 
of affect in a functional consideration of consciousness. He describes a patient who 
suffered a stroke affecting the anterior cingulate. For months after the stroke, this 
patient lay motionless and speechless in bed, with a full absence of facial expression. 
Damasio writes: 
"She never became upset with my insistent questioning, never 
showed a flicker of worry about herself or anything else. Months 
later, as she gradually emerged from this state of mutism and 
akinesia (lack of movement), and began to answer questions, she 
would clarify the mystery of her state of mind. Contrary to what one 
might have thought, her mind had not been imprisoned in the jail of 
her immobility . . . Rather, as she recalled "I really had nothing to 
say." ... It appears she had had no feelings . . . In short, there was a 
pervasive impairment of the drive with which mental images and 
movements can be generated and of the means by which they can be 
enhanced." (p. 73, italics added). 
Prima facie, this anecdotal data supports the idea that while consciousness can occur 
without emotions (despite her 'flatness' she was aware and could later reflect on her 
experience), such 'versions' appear comparatively maladaptive in their absence. Such 
clinical data suggests that any functional conceptualisation of consciousness should 
consider the relationships between consciousness and emotion/motivation. 
Specifically, it can be seen that when an organism becomes conscious a whole new 
form of goal regulation is acquired. Firstly, multiple goals are now available as 
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representational data to the system. They can be managed in relation to one another 
more effectivelyll and an "1" can emerge (Marcel, 1988, cited in Van Gulick, 1993)12. 
More importantly, goal status changes (phenomenally experienced as emotions) are 
detected and corrected for in an immediately continuous, salient and flexible fashion. 
Emotions can operate as phenomenally motivating in addition to their operating as 
motivational impetus to the system per se (see Chapter 3, "Emotion" and Chapters 7 
and 8). This new realm of motivation is self-evidently impossible in a non-
phenomenal system. 
Most importantly, the ability to phenomenally expenence emotions and the self 
enable the phylogenetic and ontogenetic emergence of an expanded emotional 
repertoire. Emotions that directly bear upon the phenomenal experience of self such 
as pride, guilt, and shame are thus enabled.13 As will be expanded upon in Chapter 8, 
the increased emotional repertoire made possible through the development of 
phenomenal consciousness has some substantial benefits to the fitness of homo 
sapiens, particularly given the social nature of homo sapiens. Although this 
conceptualisation does not directly address the problem of phenomenal experience, 
emotions bearing directly upon the experience of self (self-evidently) cannot exist in a 
system lacking a phenomenal consciousness of self. 
Overall, the current theory considers the ability to phenomenally experience the status 
and structure of self to be a functional adaptation imparting goal operation capabilities 
that cannot occur in a non-phenomenal system. Furthermore, the ability to 
phenomenally experience one's own motive hierarchy constitutes an operational 
definition of consciousness. Earlier (see Chapter 2) the self was defined as 
"constituting the totality of an individual's hierarchical goal organisation or 
structure". In line with this definition, consciousness is initially defined as the ability 
to represent (and thus phenomenally experience) one's own motive hierarchy and its 
11 Killeen (1991) suggests that human adaptive flexibility is "based on their unparalleled knack for 
modifying the local character" (of their state space) "though mentation" (p. 96). 
12 Of course at this point a non-phenomenal meta-goal management system would probably do as well. 
13 At this point it can be inferred that the current theory considers the development of consciousness 
and the representational state space to subserve these emotions. As such, their development is being 
conceptually linked to the development of consciousness rather than to cognitive development per se 
(e.g. Ellsworth, 1991). As will be expanded on in Chapter 8, this notion is directly in line with 
differential emotions theory (e.g. Izard, 1993; Izard et. aI., in press) as well as the theory of Michael 
Lewis (e.g. Lewis & Michalson, 1983). 
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operations 14. As noted above, this ability represents a biological likelihood for homo 
sapiens, emerging as a function of innate representational developments. 
The phylogeny and ontogeny of consciousness 
The section above has outlined a functional account of consciousness in which 
phenomenal experience of self is considered the crowning achievement of human 
adaptive fitness. While consciousness has been broadly conceptualised as resulting 
from the innate process of representational redescription, there has been 
comparatively little discussion regarding why representation is so central to 
consciousness. The following section will briefly consider both the phylogeny and 
ontogeny of consciousness, examining the developmental path of phenomenal 
expenence. 
The section is broadly divided into three interrelated parts. The first of these further 
considers the cognitive building blocks of phenomenal consciousness. Literature 
examining the self-concept in primates is briefly considered as bearing on the 
cognitive prerequisites of consciousness. Theory regarding the organisation and 
representation of motives is reintroduced, a distinction between representational 
abilities and the representation of motives or a motive hierarchy is introduced, and the 
phylogeny of consciousness is discussed. Finally, the utility of a 'consciousness 
level' concept is briefly considered, as is the place of the unconscious. 
Organisational complexity and consciousness 
More than a century ago, James (1890) suggested that "the distribution of 
consciousness shows it to be exactly as we might expect in an organ added for the 
sake of steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself' (p. 141). In 
this statement, he unwittingly augured an entire family of explanation regarding the 
development of consciousness and its relationship to self. 
14 Once present, consciousness can also be usefully be considered a matter of degree. This notion is 
expanded upon below. 
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The dynamical systems principle of emergence considers mental states like 
consciousness to be inevitable properties of sufficiently complex systems (Skyttner, 
1996; see Chapter 5). Within system-based accounts, consciousness can be thought of 
a causally emergent feature of complexity. Moreover, some accounts argue that 
consciousness "cannot be derived from the composition of the elements, but must be 
explained in terms of the causal interactions between the elements" (Searle, 1991; p. 
111) - their arrangement or organisation. 
In a slightly more experiential vein, Marcel (1988, cited in Van Gulick, 1993) 
suggests that the absence of phenomenal perception (consciousness) would result in 
the loss of the ability to form an integrated self-concept. Johnson-Laird (1983) 
likewise suggests that both planning and plan execution require knowledge of goals, 
their relative priority, as well as knowledge of mental capacities. All of which 
involves having a model of one's self. 
While appealing in their parsimony, and indeed perhaps explanatory to a degree, 
accounts of consciousness that blithely link the phylogeny of consciousness to 
organisational complexity appear to fall prey to explanatory gap predation. Overall, 
there does not appear to be a good reason why a representational model of oneself 
should require phenomenal awareness or experience. The very same processes (and 
functional benefits) of meta-cognitive processing could be accomplished without 
phenomenal awareness of them (e.g. Hamad, 1998), though the evolution of non-
conscious prioritising cognitions. Hence, while the current model acknowledges a 
correlational link between a system's organisational complexity and representational 
ability, complexity need not inevitably lead to or cause consciousness. Rather, the 
current model suggests that representations must be of a particular nature before 
consciousness is enabled. 
All representations are not created equal ... 
In a preceding section, a brief theory was outlined regarding the process through 
which innate motives may become representational goals. During the discussion it 
was noted that developmental research has typically not concerned itself with the 
representation of motives or goals, although an argument regarding representational 
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redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991) was extended by analogy to describe the 
representation of motives. 
The consciousness research literature shows a similar emphasis on broad 
representational abilities, rather than on the representation of motive structures (goals) 
or the state spacelS • Crook (1980) for example suggests that consciousness is best 
thought of as a fonn of processing that combines the senses to create an analogue of 
the exterior (representation). Denton (1993) suggests that consciousness has arisen 
because it confers spectacular benefits, namely the ability to make the present 
congruent with the past, and to imagine the future. With this ability, notions can then 
be tested in the mind, not in nature (see also Shanon, 1998; Calvin, 1998 for similar 
conceptualisations of consciousness). 
Yet many species display behaviours indicative of a capacity to represent the world or 
exhibit mirror self-recognition (Taylor-Parker & Mitchell, 1994), while failing to 
exhibit consciousness or a representation of their own state space (self) in a way that 
we can discern. To clarify this issue, the current theory advocates that a clear 
distinction be maintained between representational abilities per se, and the 
representation of an organism's entire motive hierarchy. 
Numerous species exhibit behaviours that would appear to require the representation 
of the external world in some fonn (Dawkins, 1993). The behaviour of a group of 
lionesses hunting corralled cattle for example suggests that each lion must at the very 
least be able to represent the physical composition of the hunting site. More 
realistically, they must likewise hold some representation of their 'plan' 
(motivations), the likely behaviour of both their accomplices and their prey, and the 
combinations thereof. 
While it may forever remain a matter for debate, explaining the behaviour of a lion in 
this situation is achieved more realistically through ascription of representational 
ability than through instinct. It can of course be argued such behaviour is no more 
than an instinct. However, the tenn instinct becomes considerably less useful when 
15 Within the current theory this is a critical (if somewhat speculative) issue. As such, it would benefit 
from considerable developmental and comparative investigation. 
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used to describe behaviours that exhibit this degree of flexibility. So let us assume for 
the moment that the lion (along with a number of other species) represents the world 
in some form16. 
It is however my contention that not all representations are created equal. As has 
been noted above, both the exterior world and aspects of the system could 
theoretically be (and are) represented without conscious awareness or experience of 
the organisation itself (an explanatory gap). Moreover, not all organisms that are 
capable of representation display consciousness in a form that we can discern. 
Consequently, there would appear to be something that differentiates among 
representations, and as a result among species. 
As has been intimated above, the current theory holds that the difference between a 
conscious and non-conscious system lies in the content of the representations, in 
exactly what is being represented. While many species evidently represent the world, 
and may even be able manipulate symbols,17 evidence that species other than ours 
represent their own motive structure is less forthcoming. 
One possible exception to this claim is the work examining the development of the 
self-concept in species other than our own. If it could be indisputably shown that 
animals possess a concept analogous to that of '1,' we could (depending on what we 
consider 'I' to be - see above) reasonably suppose that they were conscious (Lewis et. 
aI., 1989). Unfortunately, evidence from this area remains equivocal (Taylor-Parker 
& Mitchell, 1994). 
Most animals treat an image (in a mirror) as one of a conspecific (Corballis & Lea, 
1999). However, Gallup's (e.g. 1975, 1977) classic work with chimps has been 
16 It must be acknowledged that Dawkins (1993) using a similar reasoning suggests that it is simpler 
and more plausible to think that many other species do have conscious experiences, than it is to think 
that they do not. 
17 The relationships between language, mind and consciousness are inevitably complex, and 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this discussion. In a recent review, Byrne (1999) has suggested that 
the great apes (but not monkeys) are capable of symbolic representation. On this basis, Niiniluoto 
(1994) has suggested that they may be able to think of themselves as an individual extended in time. 
Unfortunately, even supposing that symbolic language exists in the great apes (see Bickerton, 1995, 
cited in Corballis & Lea, 1999 for a differing interpretation of the same evidence) does not necessarily 
answer the question as to whether they are conscious of themselves. 
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interpreted as showing the awareness of self (e.g. Byrne, 1999). Using a self-
recognition paradigm, Gallup (1975) found that chimps could recognise 'themselves' 
in a mirror with some training. mterestingly, wild chimps (without training) 
continued to treat the image as one of a conspecific. Macaque and rhesus monkeys, 
as well as gibbons fail to show awareness even with training. 
Taken together these results may indicate something of a learned element in the 
consciousness awareness of the system's motive hierarchy, a point that will be 
returned to below. Moreover, the evidence may suggest that humanity does not have 
a monopoly on consciousness or the representation of self. However, prior to the 
discovery of less contentious evidence (and presumably the development of new 
experimental paradigms), it seems reasonable to propose that homo sapiens and 
perhaps our nearest relatives the great apes (Taylor-Parker & Mitchell, 1994) are 
alone in fully representing a motive structure to the point where it is capable of being 
phenomenally experienced or manipulated. More importantly in terms of the current 
discussion, where there exists the suggestion of consciousness in other species, that 
same species shows not only representational ability, but moreover, exhibits the 
ability to represent (or operationally to recognise) some form of self. 
Implication 1: Distinguishing between pre and post-self selves? 
As was mentioned previously, the current model suggests that the motivational state 
space we term personality or self emerges inevitably, its form dictated by biologically 
and emergent constraints. The semi-fluid nature of an individual self is thus derived 
incrementally through the interactions between ongoing socialisation processes and 
inherited biological constraints (reflexes, innate motives, and temperament). It is a 
basic assumption of this model that a primitive organising construct (self) exists prior 
to language, to the experience of that construct (Stem, 1985), and perhaps even to 
birth. 
The current model has also suggested that most human infants will develop an 
awareness of self - become conscious. Cognisance of the 'organising construct occurs 
in a manner as inevitable as the presence of the construct itself, no matter how 
unpleasant, unfortunate, or dysfunctional the experience and process of organisation 
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may be. Like other species, homo sapiens are predisposed to organise, and the 
transition to consciousness occurs as the motivational hierarchy is represented. 
In addition to affirming the biological nature of self, the model presented here further 
advocates that a clear distinction be maintained in our conceptualisations of the 
motivational state space that is self before and after phenomenal awareness of that 
same space emerges. Such a distinction is useful for a number of interrelated 
theoretical and methodological reasons that are briefly discussed below. Overall, the 
distinction underscores the current author's belief that the transition to self-awareness 
represents a critical juncture in the development of personality. More specifically, it 
is suggested that the orderly development of consciousness is both a parallel and a 
consequence of a profound developmental transformation in the manner in which the 
contents of personality (motives or goals) are acquired, represented, organised, 
experienced and acted upon. 
The first reason that we might distinguish between pre and post-self selves is 
theoretical, and initially involves simply reminding ourselves as to the distal origins 
of the expressly human self (Dennett, 1991a). According to British biologist D' Arcy 
Thompson, "everything is what it is because it got that way" (1917, cited in Dennett, 
1991a). Dennett (1991a) himself further argues that logic must dictates the presence 
of a process underlying the phylogenetic history of selves - one that eventually yields 
a being with the self of homo sapiens. The ontogeny of the human self appears to 
recapitulate the phylogeny of self-like structures in other organisms (see also 
McDougal, 1908). That is, development gradually transforms the human self from a 
simple reflexive perceiver, organiser and responder that we might see in any number 
of other species, to the breathtakingly flexible, representational construct that we can 
observe in the human adult. 
Consideration of the evidence from developmental psychology supports a similar 
distinction. Prior to the emergence of self-awareness, the self of a newborn appears to 
function much like that of any other (non-conscious) organism. In the early months of 
development, primitive organisational goal'-directedness is hard-wired, and operates 
directly through the perceptual and reflexive response systems (Piaget, 1962; Eibl-
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Eibesfeldt, 1989) that are built into the self. Certain conditions and certain associated 
responses are hard-wired into the motive hierarchy (see Chapter 3). 
Recent writers in the area of cognitive development (e.g. Diamond, 1991) have 
argued that the presence of reflexive behaviours may in fact interfere with the infant's 
ability to behave both as they desire, and in a way that would be taken as indicating 
certain representational developments. Nonetheless, prior to the emergence of he 
conscious self, both the goals and the responses (including emotional responses) of 
the newborn are best conceptualised as comparatively reflexive. The very young 
infant reveals that it is hungry, cold, discomforted and so forth via the emotionally-
ascertained connections between a given stimuli and existing motivations. 
An additional rationale for the distinction relates to the overarching concern of the 
current theory to separate function from experience(s). It is not a developmental 
model about experiences of the self, except insofar as changes in experience relate to 
the manner in which the system functions. So while changes in the experience of self 
are important, the current model seeks to underscore the utility of a functional 
transformation - that between pre and post self selves. 
A final rationale supporting the proposed division is of a methodological nature, and 
relates to the means by which we might ascertain changes in goal representation 
(self). Although it may always remain a matter of debate, to discuss whether the 
newborn experiences or is aware of goals in its state space is unnecessarily 
speculative. Few scientists would argue that an infant is fully conscious at birth, 
helplessly awaiting the acquisition of the linguistic capacities it needs to communicate 
its cognisance. Expressed most forthrightly, we may never have a way to inquire 
directly about the experiences of a pre-verballifeI8 • 
Drawing upon the inferences that are possible from the way infants behave, and 
guided by theories about infant cognitive development (Piaget, 1962) and 
consciousness (e.g. Jaynes, 1991; Dennett, 1991b), it seems more useful to suggest 
18 Eccles (1989) suggests that this is no reason to presuppose that pre-verbal infants are also pre-
conscious. In as far as this argument goes, I agree. However, the manner in which infants behave, as 
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that behaviours occurring before the presence of self-consciousness are non-reflective 
and frequently reflexive. That is, infant behaviours occur reflexively in response to 
the perception of particular stimuli, and according to emotionally-determined 
connections between stimuli and behaviour. In response to most stimuli, there are no 
'decisions' to be made, rather the organism simply 'does.' Pain and discomfort are 
avoided, food and water are sought, as are warmth and support (see Chapter 5.4 and 
the discussion on emotion-behaviour links in Chapter 8). 
Exactly when the transition between pre and post-self selves occurs will inevitably be 
a definitional concern. The changes in the self structure that occur across the first two 
years of life are likely to occur along a continuum, involving the· interrelated 
development of linguistic, emotional, cognitive, and memory control parameters. 
Nonetheless, the division proffered, and the particular status or nature of the state 
space during the acquisition of goals has profound implications both for personality 
and for adult personality change. As noted, it is possible that the goals acquired 
before the emergence of a self-aware-self are represented in a non-verbal form that 
persists beyond the transition to representational self-awareness. Consequently, these 
goals are likely to be retained in a different form, and are likely to be very difficult to 
identify or change. 
Implication 2: A dimensional definition of consciousness? 
In the sections above, consciousness has been discussed as a qualitative matter. 
However, consciousness is also fruitfully conceptualised as a quantitative 
consideration. According to the current theory, goals and goal processes are not 
limited to a conscious level (Klinger, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1990; Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996, see Chapters 7 and 8). Rather, the 'consciousness' of a goal and 
any goal processes is left open as a dimension of both the goal and the personality 
structure. Austin and Vancouver (1996) for example, suggest that the level of 
consciousness may be static for some goals while for others it may be dynamic. 
Following this, a similar suggestion is readily made at a slightly more global level in 
order to differentiate between individuals. People vary considerably in the extent to 
well as phylogenetic and ontogenetic theories of representational development, suggest both validity 
and utility in considering the infant as possessing a pre-conscious (and comparatively reflexive) self. 
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which they are conscious of their own goal structure (self), and in the degree to which 
they consciously self-regulate goal-related processes (Locke & Latham, 1990). 
The current theory thus conceptualises consciousness in three different ways. Firstly, 
there is the iriitial qualitative distinction outlined above, separating conscious from 
non-conscious systems. The operation of consciousness in individual life is then 
separated by two further distinctions - one relatively static, and one highly labile. 
Firstly, individuals appear to differ substantially in the degree to which they are 
conscious of their own goal hierarchy. Within the current theory, this represents the 
comparatively static aspect of individual consciousness, and is hypothesised to arise 
developmentally as a motivated 'decision' in a manner similar to that suggested by 
Adler (1927, 1931). The degree to which people are able to consciously represent 
motivations in their personality hierarchy (see Chapter 6) has important implications 
for health, therapy, and personality change. 19 
The final conceptualisation of daily consciousness (micro development) is more labile, 
and arises from an application of dynamic systems principles (see Chapters 5 & 6). 
While individuals are expected to show relatively stable 'degrees' of consciousness, 
the contents of consciousness and the consciousness of particular areas in the state 
space also fluctuate rapidly as a function of a number of other factors. As dynamic 
systems approaches explain, these factors (control parameters in microdevelopment) 
need not be endogenous, but can exist within the task, the situation, or through the 
interventions of other peop1e20. 
Imagine for a moment that you are speaking to a friend who has just suffered a major 
setback in their vocational pursuits. They describe the circumstances surrounding this 
setback and then wait for your response. In one possible scenario, you empathic ally 
touch them on the shoulder, and speak to them, acknowledging the major 
19 Emmons (1992) for example has shown that people who typically describe their goals at more 
abstract levels suffer a greater amount of psychological, but less physical, distress (cf. Pennebaker) 
during goal pursuit (see also McGregor & Little, 1998). Although his approach does not directly 
examine the concept of a consciousness level and its implications for emotions and health, it does 
suggest that consciousness may be a personality variable. 
20 There is insufficient time for a full discussion of how various factors might lead to changes in the 
microdevelopment of consciousness regarding particular motives, although the role of emotions in this 
process is covered in Chapter 8. 
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disappointment that (you think) they must feel. In response to your intervention, the 
friend agrees with you and becomes fully aware of their disappointment. 
In another possible response, you suggest to them that such an outcome is probably 
for the best, as it will enable them to undertake a number of projects that they have 
been interested in for some time. In response to your comments the friend is 
enlivened and exhilarated, and proceeds to excitedly discuss how these new projects 
might best be undertaken. 
Within the current theory, the difference in the friend's response lies in the particular 
area of their personality that your intervention directs them towards. In dynamic 
terms, your intervention acts as a control parameter for the micro developmental (real-
time) reconfiguration of their state space. In the first case you have (perhaps 
unwittingly) provided an external control parameter for the microdevelopmental 
emergence of motivations regarding failure, self-esteem, and the like. Your 
intervention has made these goal groupings considerably more salient for them, with a 
consequence that their emotional reactions now occur in respect of this goal grouping 
rather than another. In the second instance, your intervention has been influential in 
creating a completely different configuration. 
Overall, there are likely to be strong interactions between a number of factors in 
determining the felt response to goal related change. This list includes (but is not 
limited to) the friend's general level of consciousness, the relative importance of each 
motive grouping within their personality system, the relationship between your 
response and each motive grouping, your relationship with the friend and so forth. 
Taken as a whole however, the brief discussion above is indicative of the advantages 
of considering consciousness from a multiplicity perspectives. 
Concluding remarks 
The current theory has suggested that it is the ability to represent and consequently 
experience the entire motive structure (self) that initially characterises or defines a 
conscious (or phenomenal) system. More specifically, the theory above has argued 
that the ability to represent one's own motive structure is a qualitatively different 
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concern from representational ability per se. Given the current state of our 
knowledge, it is understandably difficult to make claims regarding consciousness in 
species other than our own. The multiplicity of perspectives regarding the nature of 
consciousness, mind, and self, coupled with the methodological limitations inherent in 
investigating a non-language using organisms mean that it may be some time before 
consensus is reached. As noted above, new developmental and comparative 
paradigms will ultimately be needed to resolve this question. Notwithstanding such 
adversity, the current theory suggests that consciousness be initially defined as the 
ability to represent the entire motivational state space or personality. Perhaps 
unfortunately, this definition necessarily involves an unspoken operational criterion, 
namely the ability to communicate such representation to researchers. 
Developmentally, the ability to represent motives appears to emerge sometime 
between 18 months and two years of age in homo sapiens (Lewis & Michalson, 1983; 
Lewis, 1990a, 1990b, 1992, 1993, 1998b). While developmental research that 
explicitly considers motive representation as opposed to representation or an 
understanding of the motive concept is lacking, the data and theory that are available 
supports the current emphasis on motive representational ability as critical in the 
ontogeny of consciousness. 
Following Karmiloff-Smith (1991), it has been suggested that that the self-
representation of a motive structure is an innately determined event for homo sapiens, 
guided by endogenous processes which systematically transform innate motives to a 
representational form. While there are almost certain to be many environmental 
influences on the unfolding of the representational self and consciousness, the theory 
above has argued that the representation of the motivational state space that we 
experience as self and consciousness are inevitable and critical developments for the 
human infant 
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Chapter 5: The process of infant motive and personality development: 
Dynamic systems, control parameters, and innate constraints 
Chapter 5.1 - Introduction 
Thus far, Section 2 has outlined five broad areas in which innate motives are thought 
to exist. Although the exact listing offered is specific to homo sapiens, it has been 
argued that motives representing each of these areas are shared by all living 
organisms. It has further been suggested that the manner in which these motives 
operate and are experienced vary as a function of both phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
capacities, but that innate motives must nonetheless constitute the elemental starting 
. point for the development of representational goals and personality. 
Moving from this basis, Chapter 5 will provide the beginnings of a dynamic systems 
(DS) framework within which to consider the post-natal development of 
personality/motive development. It will begin by offering a brief critique of 
centralised models of infant development and then outline the basic tenets of 
dynamical systems theory. DS approaches are then evaluated in terms of their 
potential applications to motive development, and a 'motivational rinse' is applied to 
the basic precepts. There will be a broad examination of the domains in which infant 
development occurs, specifically examining the ways in which motive concerns are 
relevant to, influence, and constrain developmental trajectories. 
Chapter 5.2 - The Rise of Systems Theory in the context of 'black boxes' 
and linearity in traditional models of development 
Introduction 
The current section will briefly consider infant motive development through 
discussion of recent developments in dynamic systems theory. Within current 
developmental frameworks, infant development appears almost unimaginably 
complex (Thelen & Smith, 1994). This complexity, coupled with the rise of 
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information processing as a framework has led to the creation of numerous 'black 
box' theories of infant development, that consider development as principally directed 
by centralised developmental processes. 
Below, it is suggested that linear, centrist models of infant development were not 
intended, and are not well suited, to explaining the complexity and indeterminism 
inherent in the process of development. Assumptions of centrism, linearity and 
teleology inherent in such models are briefly critiqued in order to indicate the 
limitations of these frameworks. Following this the basic assertions of dynamic 
systems approaches to development are presented as a viable alternative. 
Attention is drawn to the way in which developmental continuity and discontinuity 
can be seen to emerge from non-linear interactions between the components of living 
systems. Concepts from a moderate systems view are presented in the context of 
infant motive development, and motives themselves are offered as a key endogenous 
control parameters and phylogenetic constraints in infant development. 
It is then argued that the infant personality system or self is highly permeable or 
sensitive to initial conditions. As such, constrained inputs to the developing system of 
the very young infant have a profound effect upon the eventual form of their 
personality, while latter inputs must contend with the increasing inertia of the 
personality system for influence. Overall, the section will suggest that while 
underdeveloped, that dynamic systems principles can nonetheless be powerfully 
applied to infant motive and personality development (M. D. Lewis, 1997). 
The Rise of Dynamic Systems theories 
While dynamical systems (DS) approaches were first applied in the psychological 
sciences to overcome problems with traditional accounts of motor behaviours and 
development (Camras, 1992), dynamic systems principles are currently being applied 
in a much larger number of psychological domains (see Thelen & Smith, 1994; M. D. 
Lewis, 1996; Vallacher & Nowak, 1997; M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999, for recent 
overviews). 
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Most pertinently, DS concepts are currently being applied to a large number of areas 
in the study of human development. Beginning with Piaget's and Vygotsky's 
systemic ideas, dynamic approaches have recently been elaborated in attachment (M. 
D. Lewis, 1995), motor (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994), communicative (e.g. Fogel, 1990), self-regulatory (Fogel, 1985, cited in 
Fogel, 1990), cognitive (M. D. Lewis, 1994, 1996; van Geert, 1998), emotional 
(Camras, 1991, 1992, 1994; Messinger, Fogel, & Dickson, 1997; M. D. Lewis & 
Douglas, 1998), neuronal (Schore, in press), and personality (Magai & Nusbaum, 
1996; M. D. Lewis, in press b) development. 
Dynamic systems approaches, especially in their more moderate formulations (see 
e.g. M. D. Lewis, 1995, 1996, 1997; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998) present a 
powerful challenge to current developmental frameworks, particularly those operating 
from an information processing perspective. Overall, the challenge mounted is made 
at so many levels as to be near-paradigmatic, and has occurred for a number of 
interrelated reasons. These are briefly described below. 
Firstly, DS approaches (e.g. Fogel & Thelen, 1987; M. D. Lewis, 1994; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994) suggest that many of the major developmental frameworks 
(maturationist, neurological, nativist, and information processing) are weakened 
through adherence to a 'centrist dogma' (Camras, 1992) or 'top-down bias' (Camras, 
1994). Essentially, this criticism is levelled at assumptions regarding the supposed 
presence of unobservable executive mechanisms that direct development. While the 
generation of unobservable constructs is inherent in much theorising, the use of 
centralised and deterministic developmental mechanisms creates a number of 
problems. 
The major difficulty engendered is to explain how the degrees of freedom in human 
development appear so very, very large (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Explaining the large 
amount of same-age diversity between and within subjects is problematical for central 
models at both macro and micro levels of development (see below). In each instance 
of activity (microdevelopmental context), it has been' argued that a centralised 
command system would be overwhelmed by the vast number of computations 
required for adjustment in task demands and action context (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; 
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Camras, 1992, 1994; M. D. Lewis, 1994; de Ribaupierre, 1994). So for example, the 
coordination of an activity as simple as reaching to take a pen involves the 
organisation of a large set of muscles that (in theory) can be combined in a virtually 
limitless number of ways. Yet at the same time as patterns are enacted with almost 
infinite minor variations (involving compensation to features of the task and action 
context), patterns and recognisable commonalities are clearly discernible. 
It has typically been argued that development is a sequence of small progressions, that 
it has "pre-wired" directionality, and therefore an endpoint (Thelen & Smith, 1994; 
M. D. Lewis & Granic in press). Prima facie, this appears a common-sense position. 
Infants typically learn to crawl, toddle and walk in the same order, at approximately 
the same time (although see above). Likewise, the recognition and expression of 
particular emotions appear at very nearly the same time and sequence l . 
However the mere presence of description-level parallels does not, in itself, support 
the explanatory mechanisms of the centrist position. According to Thelen and Smith 
(1994), developmental theory began as a descriptive catalogue of development, that 
has subsequently been reified to the point of becoming explanatory. As is expanded 
in the following sections (see Chapters 5.4 and 5.5), the ultimate 'why' questions of 
development are obscured or ignored, rather than explained, in centralised 
developmental models. 
Methodologically, the adherence to centrist models has led to an emphasis on skill!> 
and task performance rather than on capacities (Fischer & Biddell, 1991). This 
confound, between demonstrable performance and inferred capacity, occurs in 
circumstances where there exists no practical justification for doing so. Thelen and 
Smith (1994) for example suggest that the young child might possess considerable 
cognitive competence, but because of immature memory, attention, or linguistic skills 
can only rarely manifest these competencies in a performance (see also Camras, 
1991). 
1 The distinction between sequencing and timing in development is important within the current model, 
and will be returned to below (see Chapter 5.4). Given the overall emphasis of the current dissertation 
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Overall, the introductory discussion above provides some interesting food for thought, 
if not an outright challenge to our most fundamental assumptions about development. 
Centrist models of development appear problematic in many respects, and it appears 
doubtful whether these shortcomings are surmountable through continued theoretical 
developments of the same genre. Below, concepts from dynamic systems are offered 
as an alternative framework better suited to describing and explaining stability and 
change in personality and motive development. 
Chapter 5.3 - Concepts from Dynamic Systems Theory 
Emergence, self-organisation and non-linear complexity 
" ... life is process, not substance. " 
Weiss (1969, cited in Fogel, 1990) 
In seeking to solve some of the problems above, dynamical systems approaches (e.g. 
Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Thelen, 1990; Fogel, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994) invoke 
principles of great generality. These are principles of non-linear dynamic systems, 
and concern problems of emergent order and complexity, or how structure and pattern 
emerge from the interactions of many parts (Thelen & Smith, 1994; van Geert, 1998). 
Dynamical systems approaches are an attempt to account for the organised 
coordination of complex systems involving a nearly infinite number of possible 
actions or states (Camras, 1991). Dynamic systems approaches trace the emergence 
and stabilisation of novel, coherent structures out of non-linear interactions among 
lower order components. In information-processing terms, DS models could be 
described as predominantly "bottom-up." When sufficient energy is applied to an 
open system (living or not), new, ordered structures spontaneously appear. More 
importantly, these new developments may not have been apparent previously and in 
any case could not have been predicted solely from the characteristics of the 
individual elements (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
and the current state of theorising in DS, it is believed that sequencing provides a clearer window to 
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A central tenet of dynamic systems models then is that "order, discontinuities, and 
new forms emerge precisely from the complex interactions of many heterogeneous 
forces" (Thelen & Smith, 1994; p. 37). According to DS theorists, all complex 
systems are inherently 'noisy' (Thelen, 1990; Killeen, 1992), and thus their behaviour 
cannot be predicted linearly. In a related vein, Krantz (1998) and Michael Lewis (M. 
Lewis, 1997, 1998a) among others2, have recently discussed a notion of similar 
indeterminacy in theories of infant development. They suggest that chance plays a 
critical role in the developmental process and contrast the traditional view (above) 
with the idea that developmental changes may be the result of complex emerging 
connections that are often random, and certainly unpredictable. 
In DS approaches to development, this non-linear, emergent creation of new 
structures is called self-organisation, and can be witnessed in molecular change, 
chemical reactions, biological evolution, morphogenesis, ecology and population 
dynamics (M. D. Lewis, 1996, 1997). Importantly, dynamic systems theorists like 
van Geert (1998) have suggested that systemic arrangements can construct higher 
levels of complexity without being issued new resources or contents by an external 
source. According to DS, increasing complexity through self-organisation is of 
central importance in any general model of development (M. D. Lewis, 1996; van 
Geert, 1998). 
From a selectionist VIew, the inherent variability of any system provides the 
population of movements or states from which categories are pruned. Contextual 
sensitivity is the means by which pruning is accomplished (Thelen, 1990). There is 
increasing evidence that constrained variability - mathematically known as chaos - is 
a major source of adaptive flexibility in biological systems (Killeen, 1992; Skyttner, 
1996). Functionally speaking, chaotic activity endows the system with some 
deterministic patterning, but with sufficient background or inherent variability to be 
able to instantly reorganise in the face of new demands. 
macro developmental processes than do more labile "timing'~ measures. 
2 See Psychological Bulletin (1998), vol. 9 for a special issue considering chance in the social sciences. 
Although the volume tends to consider 'environmental' chance or 'fortuitous' events rather than 
inherent chance elements within living systems, the volume's emphasis on indeterminism underscores 
the emergent nature of the DS framework within the social sciences. 
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Marc Lewis has recently suggested that self-organisational processes may be thought 
of as occurring across either two (M. D. Lewis, 1997) or, more recently, three (M. D. 
Lewis, in press b) distinct time scales. Firstly, systems self-organise in 
microdevelopment, responding uniquely to the contextual demands of task, 
environment, and their current state. Secondly, systems organise across periods of 
moderate duration (mesodevelopment), as in the emergence of a mood3. Most 
importantly in terms of the current theory however, systems self-organise across what 
Lewis refers to as 'developmental time' (M. D. Lewis, 1997, in press b). According 
to Lewis, the systemic configurations that repeatedly emerge in micro development 
become progressively more stable across developmental time (macrodevelopment). 
As is discussed below (see Chapters 5.4 and 6), the manner in which developments 
build upon one another or cascade across timeframes is central to an understanding of 
personality. 
Sensitivity to initial conditions axiom 
In dynamical systems, non-linearity is strongly reflected in what is called sensitivity to 
initial conditions (e.g. Thelen, 1990; Fogel, 1990; M. D. Lewis, 1994). Although 
some interpretations of systems ideas (e.g. Fogel, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994) 
suggest that initial conditions can be defined at any point in the developmental 
trajectory4, the current discussion will focus predominantly on heritable initial 
conditions. Nonetheless, rather than define an endpoint, initial conditions merely set 
the stage for emergent properties that self-organise under certain conditions. 
Within dynamic systems, idiosyncratic pathways and individual differences are 
thought to derive from the amplification of small differences that cascade and 
consolidate over time (M. D. Lewis, 1997). Small variations in context, interpretative 
bias, mood, and other factors affect the initial conditions of self-organising appraisals, 
such variation being enhanced by feedback (M. D. Lewis, 1996; Skyttner, 1996). 
3 For the purposes of this discussion, time scale considerations are only considered in terms of micro 
versus macrodevelopment. 
4 Within strong versions of dynamic systems approaches, initial conditions can be defined at any 
moment. As such, heritable factors constitute initial conditions only at one juncture. The current 
theory makes no claims about this matter, accepting that the concept of initial conditions may include 
genetics and phylogenetic history, intra-uterine environments and experience, and early experiences 
depending on the phenomena of interest. 
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Thus a great variety of subsequent self-organising processes can emerge from the 
same (objectively defined) situation, simply on the basis of prior sensitivities. 
Such differences can then initiate exponential transformations of the entire system, 
what is termed a phase shift5 or transformation of state space. The most commonly 
used example of this sort of systemic change is global weather. This is a system 
characterised by deterministic chaos, wherein the system's sensitivity for initial data 
eludes prediction (Skyttner, 1996). The so-called "butterfly effect" where the flutters 
of the wings of a butterfly start air movements which end up as a hurricane has 
fascinated many and captures something of the unpredictability of complex systems 
and the magnitude of the changes possible. 
Given the importance attached to initial conditions, the next step becomes to identify 
likely candidates. What are the factors that constitute these critical 'initial conditions' 
for the human infant? Genetics are one evident factor, although recent theory has 
suggested that genetic influences cannot be understood apart from the environment 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). Additionally, strong positions within dynamic systems 
theory suggest that genetic information does not contain any a priori information as to 
the precise succeeding patterns. Rather it merely sets the stage for emergent 
properties that naturally organise under particular conditions (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
In Marc Lewis' (M. D. Lewis, 1996, 1997) recent theory, substantial attention is given 
to heritable uniformities in behaviour, thought, and emotion. According to Lewis, the 
potential for intra-system linkages or couples (see below) is facilitated by the capacity 
for elements to communicate with one another. This capacity is determined by the 
interactive sum of the system's phylogenetic and ontogenetic history. Biological, 
cultural, and experiential factors may all playa part in that history. 
A final implication of the initial conditions axiom is that a system (personality) will 
become more stable over time, as the structures and arrangements that emerge are 
stabilised through feedback (M. D. Lewis, 1994, 1996; see also McCrae & Costa, 
5 See Vallacher & Nowak (1997) for a more detailed discussion oftypes of phase shift. 
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1995 for a trait-based theory of similar slant) and cascading emergent constraints (M. 
D. Lewis, 1997). This point is returned to below. 
The Emergence of Order 
For the scientist, the picture of development painted to this point is bleak, if 
interesting. Yet despite the complexity of development alluded to above, there is a 
remarkable orderliness to the process of human development (Thelen, 1990; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994). Perhaps moreover, development is also progressive in nature. Rarely 
does an organism revert to earlier forms once new structures or abilities emerge6. 
Given the basic assumption of dynamic systems models that the end state of the 
organism is not instantiated at the beginning (see above), a primary task for a systems 
approach to development is to explain how global trajectories can emerge from 
diverse, heterogeneous and dynamic local effects (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
According to dynamic systems writers, the first part of the answer lies in the same 
processes that lead to change (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Killeen, 1989). Fogel and 
Thelen (1987) for example suggest that stability and change are both fundamental 
characteristics of biological systems. Fogel (1990) argues that patterned regularities 
emerge in the dynamic process, not because there is a higher control centre, but 
because the parts submit to the restraints exerted upon them by the activity of the 
whole. The self-organising process creates regularities or patterns rather than random 
associations. 
In Thelen's (1990) theory, any stable configuration of a system can be thought of as a 
preferred or attractor state. The concept of a preferred state means that although the 
system contains no prescriptions ahead of time for that form, it nonetheless settles into 
it under certain conditions. Put another way, the system selects or is attracted to 
preferred configurations (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Consequently, systems are thought 
to remain dynamically stable, not fixed, but preferring and strongly attracted to 
particular configurations. 
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In DS approaches, the limitations that govern the potential form of the system at a 
given time are referred to as constraints. The notion of constraint used in this sense is 
not merely genetic, environmental or a linear interaction between the two. Rather, 
constraints can exist at any and all levels. So for example, the nature of the nuclear 
and cytoplasmic chemical composition of humans, their growing anatomical 
structures, their prenatal milieu, and the nature of their physical and social world after 
birth can interactively define (or constrain) the state space in which the developing 
system can assemble (Thelen, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994; M. D. Lewis, 1997). Put 
more simply, variability must have its limits (Thelen, 1990). While systems retain a 
good deal of 'noise,' there are genetic, chemical, and physical constraints on 
development (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Dynamic systems approaches acknowledge the presence of pre-existing, evolutionary 
constraints such as survival and reproduction (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; M. D. Lewis, 
1994). However, they have tended to be imprecise in their consideration of what 
these might be, and to unnecessarily emphasise the organism's inherent need to 
compromise between the specific constrq.ints laid down by phylogeny and those that 
emerge during development. Moreover, some exponents of DS (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 
1997) have recently suggested that pre-existing constraints only exert their impact 
through emergent (derived) constraints. This notion is more fully considered in the 
following section. 
According to systems theorists (e.g. Thelen, 1990; M. D. Lewis, 1994, 1996) a second 
source of stability in living systems is found in the hypothesised process of coupling. 
The concept of coupling is essentially similar to the assimilative process originally 
envisioned by Piaget. According to Piaget, repeated experience of a particular type of 
activity leads, via assimilation, to an increase in the efficiency in the operation. In 
dynamic terms, the iterations involved in feedback stabilise over time, and orderliness 
emerges due to repeated association or coupling among the elements of the system 
(M. D. Lewis, 1994, in press b). 
6 This is of course an oversimplification. As will be discussed later in the chapter, there are occasions 
(usually those involving profound stress to the organism) where a developmentally more primitive 
functioning may re-emerge. 
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Within strong versions of DS (e.g. Thelen, 1990) elements simply organise on the 
basis of their frequent association. No a priori executive mechanisms are necessary to 
explain regularity, rather categories of the mind emerge because they represent the 
dynamic association of perceptual invariants and often performed actions (Thelen, 
1990) 7• As noted above, this process constitutes an important element in personality 
development, as initial biases and beliefs become increasingly articulated and 
crystallised over a lifetime (M. D. Lewis, 1996, 1997). Recurrent couplings create 
attractors in the system's state space, which then develop in a manner similar to 
cascading constraints outlined above. 
However, more 'moderate' versions of DS approaches to development (e.g. M. D. 
Lewis, 1997) accept that certain configurations or couplings (say between a certain 
class of goal relationship with an emotion) may be pre-specified at birth (see e.g. 
Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). Although the precise nature of this 'pre-existing 
couple' remains unelaborated in M. D. Lewis' (1997) chapter, it seems a more 
reasonable position than that of Thelen (1990), especially given the evidence derived 
within nativist approaches to emotions (e.g. Izard, 1971, 1991; Magai & McFadden, 
1995). As such, the notion that the relationships between elements in a system like an 
emotion can be more or less constrained will be returned to below (see Chapter 5.4), 
in Chapter 6, and again when emotions are fully considered (Chapter 8). 
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, dynamic systems theory is a ripe and fruitful area of theoretical development, 
highly suited to capturing both stability and change in human development (Killeen, 
1989). Through the application of the concepts of non-linearity, self-organisation, 
and emergence, it neatly sidesteps some of the problematic issues inherent in 
traditional centrist models of development. The sensitivity to initial conditions 
hypothesis is almost ideally suited to describing data from both personality and 
motive development, while the notion that development may proceed asynchronously, 
as the system simply recruits elements from within itself in order to function in 
context is almost subterranean in its profundity. 
7 The frequent association between elements in a system has important implications for the 
conceptualisation of emotions, hence will be the topic of considerable discussion in Chapter 8.7). 
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Although the gap between the tenets of DS and their translation to empirical studies of 
the developmental process (Thelen & Smith, 1994) is unfortunate, the breadth of the 
theory creates the possibility of enlightening experimental work. In widening the 
concept of control parameters to include other than neural, cognitive, or even 
intrasystemic development, to include peripheral, contextual or task factors, a 
framework more amenable to ethical experimental manipulation of these same 
parameters is created. 
And yet there is a sense in which extreme dynamic systems theorists (e.g. Fogel & 
Thelen, 1987; Thelen, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994) appear unnecessarily reactionary. 
The near complete denial of innateness or pre-specified connections (or at least the 
equating of 'innate' or 'heritable' with end state instantiation) is ultimately unhelpful 
(see Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 33). Perhaps moreover, such a position does not mesh 
well with either theory or data from emotion and functionalist-motivational 
approaches to human development or functioning (e.g. Malatesta & Wilson, 1988), 
especially that of a cross cultural nature (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1997 
for recent reviews). 
Similarly, substantial theoretical and empirical work is needed to clarify the concepts 
of control parameter and constraint. While the tenets of DS are very useful, the 
applications to date have been particularly inexact in discussing exactly what might 
constitute the important constraints or control parameters in development. Although 
such vagueness is no doubt partly a function of the asynchronous conceptualisation of 
development within DS (suggesting that such constraints and parameters vary 
considerably and may be highly specific or transitory), careful theorising is 
nonetheless needed to illuminate potential candidates. 
In sum, the current shortcomings of DS approaches are nowhere more evident than 
when we consider motive and personality development. As discussed above (see 
Chapter 3), some form of motivations must be pre-specified, else we conceptualise of 
an inanimate, improbable and fitness-impoverished creature. However, a moderate 
systems approach in which DS concepts are placed alongside conceptually well-
developed innate constraints, particularly those imposed by innate motivational 
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necessity, appears well suited to the exploration of personality and motive 
development. Some of these possibilities are briefly explored in the sections below. 
Chapter 5.4 - Dynamic Systems revisited: Increasing resolution through 
the application of a 'motivational rinse' 
Introduction: The rationale 
As has been intimated above, it appears fair to say that the more extreme formulations 
of dynamic systems (Thelen, 1990; Fogel, 1990, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994) 
flounder somewhat in their application of constraints, phase shifts, coupling, and 
control parameters. Overall, the concepts are discussed at a highly abstract level, with 
relatively few attempts to clarify exactly what factors might constitute each at 
particular developmental junctures, in particular developmental domains. Partially, 
this lack of exactitude appears attributable to the relatively unseasoned status of DS 
concepts in psychology (Burlingame & Hope, 1997; Tesser, McMillen, & Collins, 
1997), and yet (less favourably) it also appears a reaction to the prescriptions of 
traditional models of development. 
Moreover, gIven the importance of constraints in DS, its proponents have been 
distressingly imprecise in denoting any innate or pre-existing constraints (although 
see Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992). Although this vagary appears to be part of a general 
reaction to the notion of centralised deterministic constraints (see above), and a 
consequent broadening of the constraint concept within DS approaches, theoretical 
derivation of precise, heritable constraints could be of considerable benefit. As is 
expanded below, innate motivational and emotional constraints provide a theoretically 
rich and well-researched source of constraint candidates. 
This censure becomes all the more pressing when recalling the importance of initial 
conditions in DS models of development. Although initial conditions can be 
described at any single point in time, heritable initial conditions are likely to exert a 
proportionally greater influence upon later systemic developments, including an effect 
120 
upon the nature of subsequent (emergent) conditions themselves (M. D. Lewis, 1997). 
Given the plausibility of this 'cascading' constraint approach advocated by M. D. 
Lewis (1997), attention to heritable conditions becomes all the more pressing. As 
above, the current theory suggests that innate motives and emotional predispositions 
or biases (temperament) constitute a well-researched source of potential initial 
conditions and constraints. 
Charges similar to those above (and a similar, albeit inferred, motivation) can be 
levelled at current DS applications of phase shift, coupling and control parameter 
concepts. As above and with some small exceptions (e.g. Fogel & Thelen, 1987), DS 
approaches have been exceptionally imprecise in defining precise manifestations of 
these phenomena. Rather, they have preferred to emphasise the general applicability 
of the principles (although see M. D. Lewis, 1997). While further demonstration of 
the need for specificity would serve little further purpose, the overall point 
nonetheless remains. The current theory thus envisages the mutually profitable fruits 
to be derived from the careful union of DST concepts with well-developed theory 
from emotion and motivational literatures. 
The final concern expressed here is of a slightly different nature. DS approaches 
exhibit what appears a theoretically premature emphasis on developmental timing as 
opposed to developmental sequencing. Compared to other approaches in psychology, 
DS is only just beginning to accumulate supportive theory and data (e.g. Fogel & 
Thelen, 1987; Camras, Sullivan, & Michel, 1993; Camras, Lambrecht, & Michel, 
1996). As such, the emphasis on the minutiae of development (timing) as opposed to 
the patterns of emergence (sequencing) seems ambitious. Moreover, developmental 
timings are addressed in a consistently inexact manner, through reference to as yet 
unspecified individual 'noise' and self-organisational processes. Once more, this 
emphasis seems as much motivated by a desire to undermine traditional models 
through drawing attention to their inadequacies, as it does to explain developmental 
timings. Given the relative immaturity of DS approaches to human development 
(Burlingame & Hope, 1997), a precise application of systems concepts to sequencing 
would appear a prerequisite for more detailed theorising about developmental timings. 
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To summarise the above critique, the current author suggests that DS approaches to 
development need to be more precise in the application of their concepts to human 
development, and to realise the limitations of the current knowledge base within the 
discipline. As is expanded below, the current theory suggests that developmental DS 
models would benefit considerably from the incorporation of data and theory from 
emotion and motivational research. The converse is of course also true, and is the 
topic of considerable discussion in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
Heritable motivations as initial constraints 
Even strong versions of DS (e.g. Thelen, 1990) acknowledge that the ontogenetic 
pathway of a given species is globally similar. They suggest that 'certain' factors 
. (called constraints) limit the state space of the system, a given state space 
representing the complete range of possible states or configurations in the system at a 
particular juncture (Thelen & Smith, 1994). While DS acknowledges that constraints 
may be of virtually any nature - chemical, physical, social or psychological (see M. 
D. Lewis, 1997), and need not exist by design (Thelen & Smith, 1994) - only rarely 
do DS approaches make any exact statements about the form or nature of particular 
constraints. 
In consideration of consistent developmental uniformities, Thelen and Smith (1994) 
have perplexingly suggested that because some "attractor states are so stable they look 
like they are inevitable ... it is easy to believe that they are generated by hard-wired 
structures or programs within the system" (p. 61, their italics). My contrary 
suggestion is that when certain attractor states in the system of homo sapiens look 'as 
if' they are innate, it is precisely because they ares. 
More precisely, it is suggested that motivations provide a fundamental source of 
initial constraint upon human personality development. Innate motivations such as 
those offered in Chapter 3, and particularly those regarding emotions (see Chapters 3, 
7, and 8), categorically and inescapably limit the initial topography of the system's 
8 The term 'innate' is used in the current dissertation to denote heritable rather than necessarily fixed or 
reflexive in operation. 
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state space. Put somewhat differently, innate motivations circumscribe the initial 
nature and functioning of any living system. 
In addition, certain aspects of emotion and motivation constitute a group of inherently 
(innately) preferred and stable attractor states. In fact to equate attractor states with 
goals might help ameliorate the problems evident in current formulations of DS as 
applied to human development and functioning (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997; Carver, 
1997)9. 
A system's development is thus constrained by innate motivations in at least two 
ways. For one, an infant (at least initially) cannot be attracted to certain classes of 
state or stimuli. In dynamic terms the current theory would suggest that the human 
state space can not possess certain attractors, and must possess certain repellors. 
Loud noises, dampness, pain and negative affect are innately aversive, and the infant 
must inevitably behave in order to avoid them. Conversely, the infant is unstoppably 
and inevitably attracted to other areas of the state space (e.g. those representing being 
well fed, warm, happy, and so forth), and will behave in such a way as to attain such 
states. In this way, innate motivations operate as a broad initial limit to the potential 
activities and development of the organism, restricting attention, behaviour and 
development to certain classes that facilitate the meeting of innate motivations. 
This is not to say that a particular response must occur in the presence of a certain 
stimulus, or that behaviours (and the state space) are not quickly modified by learning 
and emergent development. After all, living systems seek viability rather than 
optimality, and a developing system may develop any conceptual structure or motive 
that enables it to function within a particular domain (M. D. Lewis, 1994, although see 
Killeen, 1992 for a discussion of 'noise' and behavioural trajectory optimality). 
However, this 'choice' is a factor of the contingencies that are most immediately 
compelling and the limits of the-system's present structure (see Chapter 6). Within 
the current theory, both situation and structure must initially be construed within the 
9 This is a singularly important consideration and will form the core of discussion in Chapter 6. 
Similarly, as will be expanded upon in Chapters 6 and 8, the current theory suggests that emotions 
(arising in respect of goals) constitute a major source of attractor in human state space functioning. 
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limits imposed by innate motivations, for there is little else available to the system at 
this early point. 
Upon addition of the 'initial conditions' axiom 
The essence of the argument to this point becomes all the more salient when we recall 
the tremendous potential for the effects of initial conditions in the development of a 
system. The reasonable notion that a system is hypersensitive to initial conditions 
suggests that the nature of these conditions, which the argument above has suggested 
must include innate motivations, is likely to be critical in progressively constraining 
later forms of the system. Given the overall focus of this dissertation, commentary on 
such conditions will be restricted to the inheritance of motivations (per Chapter 3), 
although it is assumed that other heritable influences on system topography (e.g. 
temperament) operate in much the same manner. 
Simply stated, the current theory suggests that innate motivations constitute a major 
source of initial condition in personality development. As was noted in Chapter 3, 
motivations (irrespective of their precise operation) must exist in every living 
organism for it to survive and reproduce. At the very beginning there can be no other 
means through which to ascertain the value of stimuli and hence to behave or develop. 
This point has not escaped systems theorists, although they are unclear in their 
discussion of the manner in which motivations might constitute initial conditions (e.g. 
Thelen & Smith, 1994), and no theorist has yet attempted to apply dynamic systems 
theory to infant motive development. 
However, it is a relatively simple matter to argue that innate motivations comprise a 
conglomeration of fundamental proclivities in perception, attention and action that 
form a key initial condition for personality as a motive structure. Moreover, not only 
do innate motivational constraints help delimit the initial state space of the system, but 
they are fundamental in the further development and elaboration underlying the adult 
personality system. Within the current theory, this issue is most fully addressed in 
consideration . of the relationships between biological motives and derived 
representational goals. This topic has been discussed in Chapter 4 and is revisited in 
Chapter 6. 
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Marc Lewis (M. D. Lewis, 1994, 1996, 1997) is the theorist who most directly 
addresses the way in which constraints build upon one another. He argues that self-
organising systems are individual (precisely) because they evolve in response to the 
accumulation of specific individual constraints. So while each system obeys general 
constraints, such as those imposed by maturation and culture, each outcome in the 
individual history also constrains subsequent development, and each interacts with the 
general constraints imposed by phylogeny in unpredictable ways. 
In a more recent discussion, Lewis (M. D. Lewis, 1997) refers to this process as one 
of 'cascading constraints.' Within his theory, "emergent constraints cascade down 
the developmental stream, each influencing the formation of the next (constraint), 
guiding and narrowing the flow through increasingly refined outcomes" (1997; p. 
195). Each constraint then is both the product and the source of individual 
development. A theory outlining a similar progression is found in the work of Killeen 
(1989, 1991, 1992). According to Killeen, new attractor states (which have been 
described above as motive-satisfying states) form within old ones or grow up next to 
them, increasing their specificity as the state space becomes increasingly articulated 
(Killeen, 1989). 
Interestingly, the process of motivational constraint development as described here 
bears a striking likeness to the hypothesised process underlying motive elaboration 
presented in detail in Chapter 6. However, for now it is only important that the reader 
appreciate the likelihood that innate motivations (including affectual states) operate as 
a ongoing factor in constraining the changing state space of the human system. The 
importance of innate valuing mechanisms cannot logically be denied, nor can the 
likelihood that such motivational constraints build upon themselves to ever more 
precisely define the global topography of the motivational state space or personality. 
There is little direct evidence sustaining this supposition although the notion is 
evident in the work of early personality theorists (e.g. Freud, Jung, and Adler), in 
Bowlby and Ainsworth's work on attachment (see Chapter 7), as well as in the 
discussion of goals presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 it was argued that goals were 
more than simple endpoints, and that they could constitute states or processes (Austin 
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& Vancouver, 1996). Moreover, it was noted that an individual's goals direct 
attention, are influential in memory, and in emotional responding and regulation. As 
such, the early presence of particular goals is likely to engender a cascading influence 
throughout the system, progressively influencing all aspects of functioning, including 
the acquisition of later goals. 
Overall, the notion that innate motivations (as initial conditions, attractors or 
constraints) are expressed, elaborated and increasingly consolidated via personality 
transactions across a life span seems plausible (see Chapter 5.5). As such, the current 
model suggests that innate motivations (be they emergent or not), temperament and 
early childhood experiences relevant to such motives are of fundamental importance 
to an understanding of the adult personality. The analysis above suggests that DS 
approaches to development would benefit considerably from a more careful analysis 
of the constraint concept, especially the plausible role of innate motivations in 
providing a source of initial and cascading constraints. 
Motives as control parameters and their role in phase shifts 
In dynamical systems theory, the components of an organised pattern (such as an 
emotion), may exist prior to their functioning as a part of the coordinated system 
(Camras, 1991, 1992, 1994; Fogel, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994). In DS approaches, 
the absence of a coherent syndrome (while aspects of that syndrome may be -in place) 
is assumed to be the norm, rather than the exception, in development. According to 
the DS approach, most development proceeds asynchronously or heterochronically 
(Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Camras, 1991). This means that not all structures, capacities, 
and functions develop apace or as a whole, and elements of a behaviour may be 
present but not yet available as part of a concerted syndrome. 
However, systems periodically exhibit comprehensive reorganisations of their state 
space topography when new capacities and ways of functioning emerge (Thelen & 
Smith, 1994; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998). In DS terms such qualitative changes 
constitute a phase shift. In macrodevelopment, the reshuffling of emotional habits or 
the emergence of new emotions at developmental junctures (e.g. the defiance of the 
two year old) appear as qualitative changes of this sort (M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 
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1998). Similarly in microdevelopment, the 'moment of indeterminacy' preceding a 
response (for example, a child who falls and responds depending on the observable 
presence of a caregiver) may qualify (M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998, see Chapter 4 on 
this issue in the context of consciousness). 
One way in which to conceptualise of phase shifts (at either mIcro or 
macrodevelopmentallevels) is to suggest that there has been a marked change in the 
nature and positioning of attractor states within the state space. In DS, the 
comparatively stable state of the system immediately preceding a shift is explained in 
the heterochronic nature of development. Critical elements of the system have not 
emerged yet, or have not yet reached the values necessary to catalyse the system's re-
organisation and functioning (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Fogel, 1990; Camras, 1994). 
In dynamic systems terms, this missing 'fifth element' is usually described as the 
absence of the needed control parameter (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Fogel, 1990). A 
control parameter is the element that drives the system through a qualitative phase 
shift10 (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Because the resultant change is holistic, a small 
change in the control parameter can reverberate and result in major consequences for 
the entire system!! (Fogel & Thelen, 1987). These major reorganisations need not be 
regulated by centrist directive mechanisms, but occur only when all the necessary 
components become available and when the task recruits and coalesces those 
components (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
At one level, the concept of a control parameter sounds similar to that of a genetic 
blueprint. However, given the emergent nature of systemic functioning, all that is 
needed for recognisable forms to emerge is the specification of components linked 
preferentially (Fogel & Thelen, 1987), rather than deterministically. Moreover, the 
particular control parameters may exist within the organism or within the task context, 
10 The systems concept of a phase shift is most readily thought of as akin to more traditional stages in 
. developmental theory, and can also be described in mathematical terms as a 'bifurcation' or 
'catastrophe' (Molenaar & van der Maas, 1994). 
11 In some ways the emergence of control parameters and the consequent reorganisation or the system 
constitutes a "resetting" of the systems initial conditions. Within the current model such a revision 
only occurs within the limits prescribed by the current totality of innate and emergent constraints. 
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as dynamic systems -theory does not posit a formal difference between endogenous 
and exogenous sources12. 
Dynamic systems approaches further suggest that the control parameter underlying a 
specific aspect of functioning may well shift as the components of a system grow and 
differentiate (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Carnras, 1994). Through development, new 
components may emerge and change, or themselves assume, the role of control 
parameters (perhaps in the manner suggested by M. D. Lewis, 1997 above). As Fogel 
and Thelen (1987) note, the striking changes in the first few years of a human life 
suggest that different structures and processes drive the behaviour of the system at 
different times. 
Even a particular behaviour (for example stepping in infants) may appear and 
disappear as the result of changing control parameters. In the early months the 
control parameter for stepping appears to be a muscle/fat ratio, while later in the first 
year a combination of strength and balance. More generally, a cognitive development 
may control developmental reorganisations at one time,13 while at another age 
reorganisations may be controlled by a motor advance, a social interactive skill, or the 
learning of a display rule (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Overall, it is probably likely that 
no single control parameter orchestrates behaviours, but that a number of core and 
peripheral parameters change their inputs and influence over time (Fogel & Thelen, 
1987). 
Despite the intuitive appeal and potential utility of such theorising, it is extremely 
difficult to actually identify control parameters14 (Fogel & Thelen, 1987), and they 
have predominantly been identified in (relatively) more simple areas of functioning 
like motor development (Thelen, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994). In many ways then, 
the lack of specificity in the application of the control parameter concept is no 
12 In DS approaches, the notion of an exogenous control parameter is similar to the Vygotskian zone of 
proximal development (Vygotsky, 1962; van Geert, 1998) and may exist in the task or in the 
environment in which the task is enacted. So parents can enhance performance beyond a level that the 
child is capable of alone through framing 
13 As in the case of consciousness (see Chapter 4). 
14 This is acknowledged as part of a more general weakness in dynamical systems theory (e.g. Fogel & 
Thelen, 1987), although they suggest that this is an empirical issue, and eschew resort to black box 
explanation. 
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different from that described in the context of initial conditions and constraints above. 
Consequently, my criticisms are similar, as is my suggested remedy. 
Most bluntly, the current discussion suggests that innate motives (and eventually 
goals) may operate as key control parameters in coordinating microdevelopmental 
phase shifts. Although a given motive may conceivably emerge only following the 
ongoing emergence of still other control parameters (see below), motives appear a 
plausible candidate for this organisational role in development. 
At a macro developmental level, we can see parallels between the phase shifts that 
characterise adolescence and the emergence of sexuality as a motivation. Similarly, 
the birth of a child (and the contextual activation of accompanying innate 
motivations) is likely to lead to comprehensive changes throughout the system of the 
new parent. At a micodevelopmentallevel, the activation of a particular goal (say, to 
enjoy the esteem of an attractive new colleague) may prompt a reorganisation of the 
state space, such that a number of changes occur. Particular affective routines may 
become increasingly active or likely, thoughts may change, and particular behavioural 
responses to eventual success or failure may become more likely. 
The current theory is not suggesting that motives or goals constitute the only source of 
control parameter. Clearly, other sources of systemic change are equally important. 
Certain physical developments must occur before the infant can walk, certain 
cognitive faculties must develop prior to consciousness (see Chapter 4) and so on. 
Nor is it being claimed that motivational control parameters are not themselves 
dependent on the prior emergence of other control parameters. For example, one can 
hardly hold motivations regarding the self, prior to ability to experience the self. 
Finally, no claims are being made about the specificity of motivations as a control 
parameter to particular domains of development. 
Yet despite the complexity, lability, and asynchronously interactive nature of control 
parameters, the current theory maintains that both innate and derived motives operate 
as key control parameters in human development. While the influence of motivations 
is particularly notable in microdevelopment (the moment to moment functioning of 
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the personality system), there is good reason to suspect that motivations are similarly 
important in more global aspects of development. 
Concluding remarks on the motivational rinse 
Overall, the above argument has suggested that dynamic systems approaches would 
benefit from a careful consideration of motives and goals in both macro and 
microdevelopmental personality processes. While the concept of motivational control 
parameters appears predominantly useful in microdevelopment (see Chapter 8), innate 
motives offer a powerful explanatory basis at a macro developmental level. 
Additionally, innate motivations are likely to operate as a key initial 
condition/constraint upon personality development, systematically limiting the system 
topography or state space. As is briefly expanded in the following section, innate 
motivations may well elaborate in a cascading manner, progressively limiting 
(constraining) the system's state space in an increasingly specific manner, broadly 
commensurate with the primary abilities and developmental tasks of the infant. 
Chapter 5.5 - The cascading nature of motive constraints and the 
sequencing of emotional development: A possible synthesis? 
Introduction 
To date, both traditional and dynamic systems models of development have been 
criticised. The former model has been criticised predominantly on the basis of its 
implausible centrist doctrines, while the latter has been reprimanded for its lack of 
conceptual specificity. Ironically, these latter criticisms themselves have been offered 
at a predominantly non-specific level. Consequently, the following section will offer 
a domain-specific synthesis of the above criticisms through an application of the 
cascading constraint and control parameter concepts to the sequencing of emotional 
development. 
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Briefly stated, the section will argue that innate motivations emerge and develop as 
constraints and control parameters in the cascading manner suggested by Marc Lewis 
(M. D. Lewis, 1997). More specifically, it will be suggested that innate and emergent 
motives progressively limit and unify the macro development of personality in this 
cascading fashion. The section begins with a broad critique of maturational models, 
expanding on the manner in which motivational function unifies (both explanatorily 
and intra-systemically) the changes observable across the various domains of infant 
development. Following this, attention will tum to the importance of sequencing in 
infant development, and it will be argued that innate and emergent motive patterns act 
as key constraints in emotional development. 
Motives as unifying developmental trajectories: A tentative explanation 
Typically the maturational processes of infancy are considered within models that 
examine only one or a few areas of development. Moreover, such models have 
tended to restrict themselves to descriptive or proximate explanatory analyses of these 
changes. Overall the first part of the section will expand on the above suggestion that 
the many facets of infant development can be powerfully explained both proximally 
and distally through their bearing upon infant motive concerns. Brief examples of 
how infant development might be considered as bearing on motive concerns are 
given. 
As noted above, theories of infant development both historically (e.g. Piaget, 1962), 
and more recently (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1991) have tended to avoid the why of infant 
development. Why is the infant developing in this way? Why do certain 
developments occur at a particular time? To be sure, infants develop x, y, and z 
capacities along relatively consistent timetables. But to what end? Why are they 
developing? IS As is expanded below, the current theory suggests that developments 
occur in a pattern linked to the emergent operations, constraints, and influences of 
motive systems. 
15 Thelen & Smith (1994) have made a similar point regarding information processing approaches to 
development. They suggest that the information-processing perspective is "rich in detail but lacking in 
illumination of the bigger picture" (p. 38). Interestingly, their implicit solution to this involves the 
belief that deVelopment is characterised by the search for information "in order to make a functional 
match between what the environment affords and what the actor .. wants to do" (p. xxi). 
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Contemporary developmental theory does not typically concern itself with motive or 
goal development (Lazarus, 1994b), except indirectly through the apperception (see 
e.g. Harris, 1996) or linguistic expression (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) of 
intentionality (Bartsch, 1999, personal communication). This is surprising given the 
contemporary emphasis on motivational constructs in personality research (e.g. 
Emmons, 1986, 1993, 1996, 1997). Even where relevant to motive development, 
research has tended to focus on the ability of the child to represent (and demonstrably 
understand) another person's motives, and (even here) has somewhat confounded the 
representation of desire in another with the representation of knowledge or belief in 
that same other (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
It is notable however that the research conducted thus far within theory of mind 
frameworks has shown that young children find desires· easier to understand than 
beliefs. They talk about desires earlier than beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) and 
may understand desires with little or no understanding of beliefs throughout the third 
year (e.g. Harris, 1996). 
More relevant to the development of an infant's own representational motives, Smiley 
and Hutten10cher (1989, cited in Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) have suggested that an 
understanding of internal states is evident for self considerably in advance of any 
attribution of such states to others. They propose a sequence of representational 
development "where instances at first involve internal states of the self, then the 
perceptually available aspects of others' experiences, and finally internal states of 
other people" (Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989, p. 44, cited in Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995). 
Nonetheless, when taken as a whole, the data and theory from theory of mind research 
are of questionable utility in considering the representation and development of an 
infant's own motives. Yet while the apparent absence of a theoretical interest in 
infant motive (as opposed to motive-concept understanding) development is 
frustrating, the sequencing of development as applied to motive-related, 
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representational concepts indicates something of the primacy of motivational 
concerns to the infant16. 
It is the initial contention of the current theory that the ultimate reason for all infant 
developments is to enable an increasingly complex, precise, and effective goal 
system. As such, it is being argued that not only are personalities and self inherently 
about motives (see Chapters 1 and 2), but that the changes occurring in infant 
development can be seen to occur in a pattern constrained by innate and emergent 
motive concerns. Put another way, the current theory suggests that the cognitive, 
emotional, linguistic and physical developments that appear in maturation can be 
usefully thought of as functionally-interrelated components or control parameters in 
the ongoing development of an increasingly comprehensive and precise motive 
system (e.g. Gibson, 1969). 
More specifically the current model suggests that infants develop skills, 
competencies, capacities or abilities (including consciousness and the ability to 
phenomenally experience themselves) at a rate and pattern commensurate with the 
primary developmental tasks, motives, and abilities of the infant. While full 
explication of these ideas is beyond the scope of the current dissertation, a brief 
example of how examining the cascading nature of motive development might add to 
our understanding is given below. 
Motives as unifying developmental trajectories: The sequencing of emotional 
development 
Although it remains debated whether infant experiences can be considered analogous 
to adult emotions (Camras, 1991, 1994; Lazarus, 1994b; Izard, 1997; see Malatesta-
Magai & Izard, 1991 for an extensive discussion of this issue), the sequence in which 
emotions (or at least expressive behaviours indicative of emotions) develop can be 
readily interpreted within the motive-constraint framework being offered. 
16 I am not (at this point) making any claims about the infant's experience of being motivated. Within 
the current model the distinction between a motive and its experience (see Chapter 1) is being 
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While a final "sequence of emergence of emotions" has yet to be fully articulated 
(Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989), it seems that the ability to recognise basic 
or primary emotions (fear, sadness, happiness, and anger) appear very early in life17. 
Haviland and Lelwika (1987, cited in Magai, 1996) for example, have shown that 
infants as young as 10 weeks are capable of differentiating sad, angry, and happy 
affect in the mother. This ability suggests some "prewiring," at least for these 
emotions (Nelson & De Haan, 1997). Overall, the ability to recognise facial 
expressions of emotion is reasonably sophisticated within the first year, although the 
ability continues to develop through childhood (Nelson & De Haan, 1997). 
However, infants do not only manifest the ability to recognise emotions in others. 
Michael Lewis and colleagues (e.g. Alessandri, Sullivan, & Lewis, 1990) have also 
shown that infants between two and eight months of age display a facial configuration 
(joy, sadness, anger) similar to that of the adult, in a theoretically predictable 
circumstance (see Magai & McFadden, 1995 Chapter 5, for a recent review). 
Similarly, Izard, Fantauzzo, Castle, Haynes, and Slomine (1995) found that full-face 
expressions of interest, joy, sadness, and anger were present at 2.5 months. 
Additional within-subject analyses showed no developmental trends across the next 
half-year. Describing this type of data, Izard (1994a) suggests that no postnatal 
developments are necessary for the expression of these emotions. 
Given the relatively early and predestined emergence of the primaries, it appears 
interesting that it is not until the middle of the second year that secondary emotions 
(such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, or pride) are observed (Lewis et. al., 1989; 
Dunn, 1994). Why should this be so? Why this particular division or sequence? Is 
this sequence itself also pre-wired? (cf. Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1994a) Unfortunately, 
not only are the psychological sciences lacking in agreement as to whether the human 
infant displays represent 'true' emotions, but moreover, we are sadly lacking in 
adequate speculation as to why the emotions emerge in this consistently particular 
order. 
conceptualised as dependent upon the development of a representational motive hierarchy (self) and 
consciousness (see Chapter 7). 
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Some theories explain emotional sequencing through reference to the cognitive 
prerequisites of the particular emotion. Cognitive capacities either are necessary for 
(e.g. Scherer, 1984; Ellsworth, 1991; Lazarus, 1994a18; M. Lewis, 1995), or at least 
occur prior to (M. Lewis et. aI., 1989), the emergence of secondary emotions. Shame 
for example, necessarily follows the apperception of inadequacies in the self (Izard, 
1993; Izard, Ackerman, Schoff, & Fine, in press; Einstein & Lanning, 1998). In this 
type of theory, the emergence of secondary emotions is thus tied to the ontogenesis of 
self-referential behaviour (Kagan, 1984, cited in Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991), and 
consequently to cognitive developments. 
Certainly we can take it as gIven that the human infant (in ethological terms) is 
altricial or born in a highly underdeveloped state (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Corballis, 
1999)19. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suppose that certain cognitive 
capacities must be acquired before certain emotions can follow (see Chapter 8 for a 
fuller discussion of this relationship). Alternatively, a referential self must develop 
before emotions can be experienced in respect of it (M. Lewis, 1992). 
My contention then is not that such theorising is incorrect per se, but rather, that it is 
misleadingly complete in that it obscures additional explanatory issues. Concerns 
regarding this 'blinkering' can be summarised as follows. Firstly, there is something 
of a conceptual restriction in the reasoning supporting the cognitive conceptualisation. 
For example, the proof that secondary emotions are more complex than primary 
emotions is found in the cognitive prerequisites. These prerequisites (in tum) are tied 
to sequential developments which, arising later, are a priori considered more 
complex. In this consideration then, complexity and sequencing become virtually one 
and the same phenomena, each 'explaining' the other. It is my contention that centrist 
frameworks lead to premature explanatory satisfaction (theoretically speaking). We 
simply stop explaining or attempting to explain before we have truly started asking. 
17 See Nelson & De Haan (1997) for a recent theoretical and methodological review of infant emotion-
recognition literature. 
18 While tying emotional experience to cognitive development, Lazarus (1994b) does suggest that we 
may be forced to consider infant and adult "anger" as slightly different (albeit related) phenomena. 
19 Interestingly, the relative underdeveloped nature of the human neonate is highly pronounced in the 
brain. The infant brain is only 24% of its ultimate weight compared to 60% in the chimpanzee 
(Corballis, 1999). This suggests a disproportionate degree of post-natal cerebral (and mind) 
development in the human infant, a fact that has important implications for consciousness (see Chapter 
7). 
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This comment is not intended to dispute the idea that certain cognitive developments 
do not act as a control parameter for emotional sequencing. Rather, it is to suggest 
that the relationship between cognitive and emotional developments thus far outlined 
is indicative of nothing more than the relationship itself2o. Put most simply, even if 
cognitive maturation can explain or predict the sequencing of emotional development, 
the theory does nothing to elucidate the reasons underlying the emergence of the 
cognitive capacities themselves. Do we become progressively capable of particular 
thoughts in order to enable particular emotions? If so, why? Alternately, are 
cognitive developments part of a domain neutral developmental path, and emotional 
sequencing simply a consequence? Again, if so, why? Overall, nobody seems to be 
interested in asking why particular cognitions (or any other developments) emerge at 
a particular time? 
The theory offered here suggests that while infant emotional sequencing can be 
conceptualised as dependent on either cognitive developments (Ellsworth, 1991; 
Scherer, 1984; Lazarus, 1994a) or as a function of unspecified intersystem 
connections (e.g. Camras, 1991; Izard, 1991, 1994a; Izard et. al., in press) that an 
examination of the relationship between emotional sequencing and the infant's current 
motives would nonetheless be of considerable benefit. Considering all infant 
development as bearing on the infant's current motive concerns and abilities would 
enable us to begin answering some questions that we are not even asking at the 
moment. 
Most bluntly, the current model assumes that sequential patterns in infant emotional 
development occur for a reason. The pattern of infant development is not simply, "the 
way it is" as seems to be implied in 'black box' cognitive and extreme DS 
considerations of emotional sequencing. Nor is the pattern only a function of the 
complexity of cognition required for each subsequent emotion, although this provides 
one explanatory framework. Rather, later emotions and thought capacities do not 
appear earlier precisely because they are irrelevant to the challenges, motives and 
capacities of the infant at this time. In DS terms, the innate and emergent motivations 
20 As will be expanded upon in Chapter 7, the application of systems principles to development 
suggests that "infant emotional development should not be wedded to anyone factor" (Camras, 1988; 
p.21). 
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of the infant interactively constrain the processes and experiences that are possible 
within the developing system at each point in time. 
In their classic DS treatise, Fogel and Thelen (1987) note that developing organisms 
are faced with conflicting demands. On the one hand they must grow and 
differentiate, while on the other, they must have adaptations sufficient to ensure their 
survival at every point in development. Their discussion of this conflict uses infant 
temperature regulation as an example of how motive concerns may act as systemic 
control parameters and constraints. 
At birth, the infant can survive within a limited range of temperatures, yet has poor 
ability to self-therrnoregulate. Fur or feathers might help, but these are not available. 
Hence compromise must be reached within the limits of phylogeny and the finite 
energy resources of the infant. To achieve this end some systems are plausibly 
developmentally retarded while others are accelerated. In the case of 
thermoregulation, the deposition of subcutaneous body fat takes precedence over the 
development of muscle tissue. Thermoregulation in this case is a more important 
motivational consideration than strength (and presumably movement). As Fogel and 
Thelen (1987) succinctly state it "Ontogeny is organised so that the infant can (only) 
be engaged in necessary adaptive tasks of the moment" (p. 759). 
As noted above however, these authors are singularly inexplicit in their consideration 
of how this 'organisation' might occur or what these tasks might be. Similarly, it 
appears that dynamic systems theory is weakened somewhat through an emphasis on 
timing rather than on sequencing. While the emergence of particular capacities may 
vary considerably across individuals (timing), such capacities still tend to occur in a 
very particular pattern or sequence. To my mind, this indicates something of the 
cascading manner in which infant developments build upon one another, perhaps to 
the point of each successive development acting as a control parameters and 
constraints for the emergence of still other developments21 . 
21 In some senses the argument I am making here is similar to that advocated by Maslow (1968, 1970, 
1971) who suggested that phylogenetic ally lower level motivations must be satisfied before higher 
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The current theory thus suggests that secondary emotions do not emerge until 18 
months because the control parameters needed for the consolidation of certain intra-
systemic arrangements (i.e. the secondary emotion) are not yet present. Given the 
current relative immaturity of dynamic systems approaches to development and the 
absence of theory regarding infant motive development, the precise nature of such 
parameters can only be a matter for conjecture. Moreover, the emergence of each 
parameter is likely to depend on the emergence of prior parameters in the manner 
suggested by M. D. Lewis (1997). 
Nonetheless, it is plausible to suggest that motives and goals constitute a fundamental 
source of control parameter in infant development. Consider the case of 
embarrassment. Embarrassment follows transgressions of conventions that govern 
social interactions (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996), and does not appear 
until at least 18 months (Lewis et. aI., 1989; Lewis, 1995). Why should this be so? 
Cognitive theory such as that above suggests that the answer lies in the development 
of certain representational capacities, such as the ability to represent or remember said 
social norm, or to experience the self. 
Yet, surely transgressions would be best prevented through a more precocious 
internalisation of social norms. Why then is the infant not born capable of these 
representational comparisons, conscious, or with a self? While the example chosen is 
less than perfect, I nonetheless suggest that such a development, rather than advantage 
the infant, might actually inteifere with the infant's ability to deal with more pressing 
environmental challenges. 
The young human cares nothing (and consequently can care nothing) for social-norm 
related emotions precisely because they are otherwise occupied securing food and 
shelter, maintaining bodily integrity, forming attachment relationships and so forth. 
Experiencing motivations or holding cognitions regarding self at this time, rather than 
benefit the infant, could plausibly interfere with the innate motivations (and 
responses) that the infant needs to survive and develop at this time (Fogel & Thelen, 
1987; see also Sroufe, 1984). Indirectly then, the current theory is suggesting that 
level motives can emerge. However, I am suggesting that this is only relevant insofar as we consider 
the sequencing of development, not their operation or final state (which is considerably more fluid). 
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innate and emergent motives act as both constraints and control parameters in 
emotional development. If the emergence of a conscious self requires the ability to 
cognise in certain ways, then the emergence of these cognitions is in tum constrained 
or controlled for by current motive operations22• 
A number of authors have noted that the stimulus conditions that elicit emotions 
change substantially across infant development (Davidson & Ekman, 1994). The 
elicitors of early infant expression of emotions are more likely to involve physical 
than psychological stimuli (e.g. Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, & Sternberg, 
1983). They suggest that primary emotions are "evoked in relationship to biological 
goals, although they eventually are evoked in relationship to socialised goals as well" 
(p. 820; see also Izard & Malatesta, 1987). Prima facie, this can be taken as indicative 
of the types of motives infants are, and are attending to. 
Similarly, Camras, Oster, Campos, Miyake, and Bradshaw (1992, cited in Carnras, 
1994) have found that older infants became upset more quickly than young infants 
when restrained. Perhaps more importantly, these authors interpreted their finding 
_ though an analysis of how much value the infant places on arm control at different 
ages. In some senses, it appears that the authors allude to the age-differentiated 
presence of a particular motivational control parameter in the precursors to anger. 
Concluding Remarks 
Dunn (1994) has suggested that when asking the question "what develops in 
emotional development?" that one answer must be the circumstances that elicit the 
emotions. Although implied (or perhaps inferred), the author appears to be addressing 
an issue of goal development. Finally, Richard Lazarus (1994b) has recently become 
singularly explicit on this issue. He writes: "It seems to me that the task of 
understanding emotional development is best served by examining the acquisition .. 
of the key individual difference variables that antecede the generation of emotions ... 
22 For example, the current theory would predict that the ability to represent the self (consciousness) is 
likely to be constrained by the satisfaction of innate motivations. As such, it is expected that children 
from deprived environments in which current motive satisfaction is low will develop a representational 
self at a later time than children for whom current innate motives are being consistently satisfied. 
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The antecedents of greatest importance are goal commitments and how they are 
organised in the person" (p. 366, his italics). 
Interestingly, advocates of the extreme systems position have recently begun 
attending to the importance of motives in their models. In the final chapter of their 
comprehensive systems text, Thelen and Smith (1994) write "We have tried hard to 
do away with the ghosts in the machine" (p. 312). However, developmental processes 
"cannot take place without some value on behaviour" (pp. 312 - 3, their italics). 
Ultimately, they concede that a 'successful' dynamic systems account will need to 
pay more attention to the questions of needs, drives, and the values of the system. 
Without belabouring the point then, the current theory is broadly suggesting that the 
dynamic organisation of development can be powerfully explained with reference to 
innate and emergent motivational considerations as well as in relation to proximate 
cognitive developments. It is not suggesting that the emergence of particular motives, 
concepts, emotions, and so forth are not interdependent on other developments, but 
rather that we could consider all such developments as part of a bigger picture (e.g. 
Izard, 1991, 1994a). My argument is that this portrayal should be one in which infant 
capacities develop multi-factorially across domains in a manner commensurate with 
the current tasks/needs, motives and abilities of the infant. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the current theory is not suggesting that there is not 
considerable variation in motive acquisition. It is however suggesting that there are 
sufficient constraint and control parameter commonalities, made manifest in 
normative developmental sequencing, that relatively powerful frameworks can be 
constructed. 
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Chapter 6: The Elaboration of biological motives: Emotions In the 
development of the personality state space. 
Chapter 6.1 - Introduction 
To this point, it has been broadly argued that the motivational state space of the infant 
personality develops multifactorially through the emergent operation of cascading 
constraints and control parameters. It has also been suggested that the innate motives 
discussed in Chapter 3 constitute critical starting elements in this dynamic process. 
Overall, the dynamics of infant development have been conceptualised as inherently 
related to innate and emergent (derived) motivational concerns. 
However, little has been said that might explain the wealth of differences that 
characterise individual personalities. Most pointedly, it could be claimed that the 
dissertation thus far has done little more than discuss the likelihood that restrictions 
(constraints) on the motivational state space cascade from innate motivational 
restrictions. Consequently, the theory thus far introduced is better suited to describing 
the ontogeny of what a person is not and cannot be, than it is to describing how they 
come to be the way they are 1. 
Chapter 6 will build on the ideas thus far outlined, introducing further theory 
regarding the process by which biological motives (initial attractors) are built upon or 
elaborated. Initially, the role of the innate motivational structures outlined in Chapter 
3 and discussed as constraints in Chapter 5 will be reiterated and reconceptualised. It 
will be suggested that in addjtion to constraining the shape of the developing state 
space, innate motives provide the initial values or attractors for a system's 
functioning. As such, they must provide the basis for the development of all 
subsequent attractors in the motivational state space. 
Following this assertion, the chapter will describe a mechanism that may advance our 
understanding of how this process of motive elaboration and differentiation occurs. 
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In doing so it will offer a theory regarding the role of emotions in the process of 
motive elaboration. Put most simply, the chapter suggests that emotions serve two 
purposes in state space development. Firstly, they act as an inbuilt means to ascertain 
the relationship between 'new' stimuli, and existing attractors/motives. In addition, 
the emotional response leads directly to the development of new attractors and the 
elaboration of the state space. In some ways, the newly developed motives are 
'designed' to accommodate or represent the relationships between these new stimuli 
and existing attractors. 
In support of this notion, Chapter 6 will draw from three major theoretical bodies. 
Initially, it will discuss something of the ubiquity of affective processes in infant 
development. Consistent with several contemporary theories of development (e.g. 
Magai & McFadden, 1995; Magai & Nusbaum, 1996; M. D. Lewis, 1996, 1997, in 
press b; Lewis & Douglas, 1998; Lewis & Granic, 1999), it will suggest that the 
emotions enact a role of singular importance in the organisation and development of a 
personality/state space. 
Secondly, the chapter will introduce theory from a recent behavioural-dynamic 
systems approach to development that purports to explain the macrodevelopmental 
elaboration and rarefaction of state space attractors (Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992) and 
the development of acquired attractors or goal-states. Finally, the chapter will 
consider something of the known roles played by emotions in neurological models of 
learning and development (e.g. LeDoux, 1989, 1993; Schore, in press). 
In combining these theoretical bodies, the first half of the chapter will argue that 
emotions act as an innate means through which to ascertain the relationship between a 
'new' stimulus and existing attractors. Following this, the chapter argues that a key 
part of the function that emotions serve in personality development involves the 
reflexive generation of a new attractor or goal representing the emotionally-indicated 
relationship. As such, emotions are heavily implicated in the process through which 
1 Marc Lewis (M. D. Lewis, in press a) has recently argued that most DS developmentalists have 
'restricted' themselves to examining normative development. The current chapter seeks to go some 
way towards redressing this inadequacy. 
142 
innate motives are elaborated within the state space, and III developing the 
relationships between goals/attractors within that space. 
Chapter 6.2 - Setting the scene for personality development: Considering 
the relationship between goal and attractor concepts 
It was noted in Chapter 5 that DS approaches make extensive use of the concepts of 
state space, attractors, and repellors in discussing development. While the potential 
macro development of the state space is increasingly limited by the operation of innate 
and emergent (cascading) constraints (see Chapter 5), personality development is also 
usefully conceptualised as resulting from the development of new attractors in the 
state space (M. D. Lewis, in press b). However, to this point in the dissertation there 
has been little comment on exactly what an attractor is or (more problematically) how 
attractors relate to goals2• 
In its most dispassionate applications, an attractor is simply a region of the state space 
that is preferred by the system (Thelen, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994l As such, an 
attractor can represent virtually any aspect of functioning from physiological states, to 
emotions, to precise patterns of thought or behaviour4. In the gravitational metaphor 
favoured by DS theorists, an attractor is portrayed as a well or valley upon a surface 
(the state space). The region surrounding the attractor (the basin) includes the set of 
states from which the system can or tends to gravitate towards the specific attractor. 
The depth of the attractor represents its strength, whereas its breadth can represent an 
attractor's comprehensiveness. Attractors are also gainfully considered as more or 
less fixed (static) or periodic (cyclical), while the link between two attractors is 
usefully thought of as a saddle. In addition to attractors, systems also possess 
2 The inconsistent use of terms within dynamic systems approaches remains a widespread problem for 
the approach (M. D. Lewis, in press a). This variation appears equally a function of the immaturity of 
the field and the breadth of its concepts, and can be expected to improve with time. Where possible the 
current dissertation will reference definitions and/or use the most widely accepted versions. 
3 It is the view of the current author that the notion of 'preferred' regions is unnecessarily (although 
unintentionally) agentic, volitional, and experiential in its connotations., Consequently, attractors will ' 
be considered as areas of the state space that the system is 'drawn to.' 
4 Some writers such as Schore (in press) have suggested that attractors represent homeostatic areas 
particularly in respect of affect. The current author eschews this interpretation of 'attractor,' the 
reasons for which will be explained in the latter half this chapter, and again in Chapter 7. 
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repeilors, which can be portrayed as a hill rising off a surface. As one might expect, 
repellors are areas within the state space that the system veers from or avoids (Carver, 
1997), and like attractors may have complex relationships with other attractors or 
repellors. 
As is frequently the case with the domain neutral language of DS (M. D. Lewis, in 
press a), the vocabulary outlined above could as well be used to describe the manner 
in which a carrot's nutritional needs interacts with soil content and the nutritional 
demands of its fellows. Within this framework, a carrot's root growth pattern could 
be described as emerging in accordance with existing constraints and attractors. That 
said, personality is not the same thing as a carrot. In Chapter 1 it was extensively 
argued that personality must initially and primarily be viewed as a motive or goal 
system. Consequently, it is necessary to recast the concepts above in motivational 
terms. 
The current author considers the concept of goal to be equivalent to the terms of 
attractor and repellor in the conceptualisation of personality. Goals may be to attain 
(approach) or avoid a certain event, state, experience, or process. As such, they 
translate readily to DS concepts of attractor (approach goals) and repellor (avoidance 
goals). Like both attractors and repellors, goals may be more or less precise or 
diffuse, corresponding to the DS description of basins (see below). Similarly, the 
depth or height of an attractor or repellor can be readily taken as equivalent to the 
importance of a particular goal. Finally, goals (like attractors and repellors) can be 
cyclical or static in their influence or operation. 
Additionally, the manner in which some DS theorists (e.g. Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992) 
have conceptualised the relationships between attractors and repellors is consistent 
with the traditional hierarchical manner of describing goal relationships (see Chapter 
2). As is discussed more fully below, Killeen (1989) has described a coordinated 
hierarchy of attractors, in which the state space topography is dimpled with many 
large basins. Each basin is in tum composed of more precise basins corresponding to 
more precise attractors, and so on. This conceptualisation is virtually identical to 
conventional consideration of goal hierarchies. Overall, goal and attractor concepts 
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bear a striking resemblance to each other. As such, the two terminologies can 
usefully be combined in describing personality as a motivational state space. 
Perhaps unfortunately, an in-depth consideration of goal-attractor equivalence cannot 
cease at this point. If goals are to be considered literally synonymous with attractors 
in personality theory, we must be able to account for both theory and experiences that 
suggest that a system's functioning is more literally drawn to states that satisfy goals 
rather than to the goals (attractors) themselves. Below an example is outlined to 
explicate the difficulty here. 
Assume for the moment that the attractor at the bottom of the 'valley' representing 
motivations affiliated with eating behaviours is nutrition. By this I mean that 
ultimately most 'eating' behaviours are motivated by a need for nutritionS. Given this 
however, one wonders whether it is true to say that the system's functioning is drawn 
to nutrition, or whether it is more valid to suggest that the system is attracted to 
regions of its state space representing either food, eating, or satiation? While one 
response to this potential distinction is to argue that it is little more than an 
unnecessary semantic quibble, consideration of the issue does ultimately lead to some 
useful theoretical developments. 
For the purposes of illustration, imagine that the term 'system' represents the physical 
body, while the term 'functioning' represents actual behaviours. Bearing this 
distinction in mind, we can then conclude that the system (body) is indeed drawn to or 
attracted to nutrition, but that its behaviour (functioning) is made manifest in food 
seeking, eating and the like. Importantly, these more precise attractors can only hold 
value for the system via their connection with other attractors, perhaps in the 
hierarchical manner described by Killeen (1989). 
In some senses then, the distinction offered here runs along two lines. The first of 
these relates to a distinction between distal and proximate goals or attractors. 
Ultimately, most eating behaviours and experiences draw their motivational impetus 
5 This is of course an oversimplification. As will be discussed below, a system's functioning is 
frequently an overdetermined phenomenon, representing the influence of multiple goals or attractors. 
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from a need for nutrition (attractor). However, while the proximate motivational 
manifestation of this attractor may be the need for food, food seeking behaviours, or 
the like, the distal (ultimate) motivation will always remain that of nutrition. As will 
be expanded upon below, attractors in the motivational state space are frequently 
nested in complex hierarchies. 
The example used here also provides a useful opportunity to reinforce a second 
distinction that has previously been mentioned - that between motives (attractors) and 
the experience of being motivated (feeling attracted). In several of the previous 
chapters, the current dissertation has extensively argued that structural/functional 
aspects of the human system must initially be considered distinct from the experience 
of that structure or function, even though the two concerns overlap on occasion. More 
specifically, it has been suggested that social scientists should distinguish between 
motives and the experience of being motivated (Chapter 1), between the self and the 
many experiences of the self (Chapter 2), and between emotions and the experience of 
emotions (Chapter 3, see also Chapters 7 and 8). 
Overall, it seems reasonable to consider attractors to be synonymous with goals so 
long as we remember both caveats above. Firstly, we should remind ourselves that 
function and experience do not always meet. As such, the fact that a particular goal or 
attractor is not experienced as motivating does not, prima facie, mean that it is not. 
Secondly, we should remember that attractors-as-goals exist within complex 
hierarchical networks of relationships with other attractors and repellors. Thus, we 
must also remember the difference between proximate and distal attractors in the state 
space. 
In DS terms, one would say that the human state space is characterised by multistability. Nonetheless, 
the point will serve for the purposes of illustration. 
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Chapter 6.3 - Recasting the role of innate motives: Motivational state 
space development as inescapably stemming from 'innate attractors' 
Having described the relationship between goals and attractors, it is time to begin the 
more interesting task of outlining a theory of motive development. In Chapter 3 a 
working typology of innate motives was outlined. During the discussion, it was 
suggested that motives representing each of the five groupings were manifest in all 
living organisms, with only the degree of sophistication and the precise nature of each 
motive's operation and experience varying across organisms. Finally, it was proposed 
that each motive grouping was structurally present (if not experienced) from the 
moment of birth, and (as such) must constitute the initial attractors in the personality 
state space. 
In Chapter 5, it was briefly suggested that certain heritable aspects of emotion and 
motivation could be thought of as constituting a group of inherent and stable 
constraints. The current chapter further suggests that the state space of the infant 
personality is similarly possessed of certain innate attractors and repellors, and that 
together, these factors operate as a broad limit or influence on the future development 
of the system state space (see below). As noted, the simple reason underlying this 
particular conceptualisation of development is that without innateness in motivations 
(innate attractors), there is no place to begin the valuing process. 
To my mind this is not a contentious claim but, irrespective, is readily supported 
through argument. One can logically argue that there must be some innate attractors 
that create or exist as a basis against which new stimuli can be valued. A life form 
must 'know' which things are good/to be strived for and which things are bad/to be 
avoided (Thelen & Smith, 1994). To have no way of knowing 'what to do' would 
leave this impossible organism frozen in a short-lived primordial funk. 
The creature will not move, for there is no reason to. It will not breathe, and thus 
simply suffocate within minutes of birth. Stimuli (or mating partners) that happen 
across its evanescent path (or are fortuitously delivered directly in its lap) mayor may 
not be perceived, and in any case the creature will not do anything in respect of them. 
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Ever. Bearing this maladaptive absurdity in mind, I think it can be safely assumed 
that innate motivational attractors exist, in all creatures, including ourselves. 
To this point however, the reader may be struggling to imagine why the paragraphs 
above have been presented. Do they actually exemplify anything useful? In answer, I 
believe that a similar, if less melodramatic, reasoning can be provided as to why 
structuralised, innate attractors must (in tum) provide the initial evaluative yardstick 
for the elaborated representational goals that characterise the motivational state space 
for homo sapiens. Prima facie there appears no good reason why the processes 
underlying the acquisition of derived, learned, or emergent representational goals or 
attractors should not similarly require a basis against which to compute value. 
Imagine for a moment a scenario wherein this claim is not true. An organism (albeit 
possessed of certain innate attractors), moves into the world. Perhaps it is a baby 
human. Time passes. Later in its development it informs you that 'conceptualising of 
itself as a generous person' is very important to it. We cannot realistically deny that 
this is in fact motivating the organism, for both scientific observation and our own 
experiences tell us that such motivations occur. We can however wonder where such 
a motive could come from. What function does it serve? How was it derived? Was it 
acquired post-natally, and if so, on what basis? As above, the current theory contends 
that this basis is initially provided through reference to innate attractors. Nothing else 
initially holds value for the organism, and no other scientific conceptualisation makes 
sense. Hence, in line with the theory implicit in both the personality theory of Dweck 
(1996) and the behavioural theory of Killeen (1989, 1991, 1992), I suggest that innate 
attractors must be thought of as providing the initial basis for valuing. 
In a recent application of DS principles, the noted behaviourist Peter Killeen (e.g. 
Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992) has recently suggested that contingencies that do not 
respect pre-existing action tendencies will be ineffective or (at best) diversely 
effective. According to Killeen (1991) behavioural shaping must respect the order of 
activation energies of the organism in the context of the relevant incentives. He also 
notes a strong tendency for motor patterns 'invented' by a trainer to drift towards 
more innate forms, a tendency described by him as 'instinctive drift'. While the 
details of Killeen's (1989, 1991, 1992) theory are beyond the interests of the 
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immediate discussion (see below), his papers illustrate the importance of innateness in 
motivations and development. 
Additional support for the premise offered above comes from within other DS theory. 
As Thelen and Smith (1994) have recently noted, one issue that must be considered in 
future DS research is to establish how specific or general the motivational component 
must be in order to set the system on the trajectory of learning. In a preliminary 
answer to their own question, Thelen & Smith (1994) propound that infants come into 
the world with a small set of adaptive biases. According to these authors, such biases 
include the motivation to suck and seek nourishment, motivations for contact and 
warmth, preferences for certain levels of stimulation and so on. 
In their theory, certain internal states and external stimuli are endowed with a 
particular hedonic tone, thus constituting the infant's motivational primitives 
(attractors). Taken together these biases dispose the infant to pay particular attention 
to certain aspects of the environment and their interactions with it. Overall however, 
Thelen & Smith (1994) appear to suggest that what is needed is an (apparently 
unmotivated) sensory system with some relatively unspecific tuning parameters and a 
'value wash' that keeps the organism preferring certain stimulus configurations over 
other values. 
It is at this particular juncture that the current theory and that of Thelen and Smith 
(1994) part ways. While they have advocated a general adaptive system containing 
little in the way of specific motivational attractors, the current theory suggests that the 
attractors innate to the human motivational state space are far more comprehensively 
and specifically developed at birth. More specifically, it has been argued that the five 
motive groupings (physical integrity, reproduction, social, organisational, and 
affect/feedback) outlined in Chapter 3 represent a more probable description of our 
innate motivational attractors. 
Suggesting that innate attractors in general, and the innate aspects of emotions in 
particular, constitute the starting point in the developmental process is not intended to 
suggest that a particular response must occur in the presence of a certain stimulus. 
Nor is it meant to indicate that behaviours (and the state space) are not quickly 
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modified by learning and emergent development. After all, living systems appear to 
seek viability rather than optimality, and a developing system may develop any 
conceptual structure or motive that enables it to function within a particular domain 
(M. D. Lewis, 1994, although see Killeen, 1992 for a discussion of 'noise' and 
'behavioural trajectory' optimality or geodesics). 
Nonetheless, developments within the motivational state space must be a function of 
the contingencies that are most immediately compelling and the limits of the system's 
present constraint and attractor structure (see below). Within the current theory, both 
situation and structure must initially be construed within the precinct of innate 
motivations, for there is little else available to the system at this preliminary point. 
Chapter 6.4 - Previous theories of state space attractor development 
Introduction 
As is discussed below, while unpredictability and sensitivity characterise self-
organisation early in ontogeny (Thelen, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994), the recursive 
(M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999; M. D. Lewis, in press b) or autocatalytic (Killeen, 
1989) nature of developmental processes eventually leads to increasing coherency and 
consistency within the state space (see also Vallacher & Nowak, 1997; Izard et. aI., in 
press). As Lewis and Granic (1999) note, all the potential states comprise the 
system's state space, yet some states are more probable than others. Moreover, 
development sees the system become increasingly, and more precisely, attracted to 
ever-more specific attractors within its state space. 
Yet thus far, the current chapter has done little more than stress the importance of 
innate attractors as the starting element in motivational state space development. If 
the discussion were to be left at this point the reader could be forgiven for asking what 
the current theory adds, other than some criticisms of highly worthwhile theory. 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to consider how innate motives are elaborated. 
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Previous explanations for the development of attractors 
Although there have not yet been any attempts to describe the development of 
personality as a motivational state space, several other theorists have described 
mechanisms that purport to explain the development of attractors in state space (see 
e.g. Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992; Fogel, 1993; M. D. Lewis, 1997, 1998, in press a, in 
press b; Lewis & Douglas, 1998; Lewis & Granic, 1999). Each approach to attractor 
development is briefly described below, although considerably more attention is 
devoted to the theory of Marc Lewis and colleagues, it being both the most relevant to 
personality and the most highly developed. 
Fogel (1993) suggests that developmental changes in the infant's state space occur 
through the communication and co-regulation of individuals (see also Stern, 1985; 
Schore, in press). In Fogel's (1993) theory, attractors are called consensual frames, 
and are created within the reciprocal adjustment dynamics between the preverbal 
infant and the caregiver. According to Fogel's (1993) theory, all self-organisational 
processes are thus inherently relational6. The interpersonal attractors are the states 
towards which participant's cognitive-emotional systems jointly gravitate. 
A second theoretical body on personality development is found in the recent work by 
Carol Magai and colleagues (see e.g. Magai & Hunziker, 1993; Magai & Nusbaum, 
1996). Their earlier work (Magai & Hunziker, 1993) is comparatively 
underdeveloped, quite simply suggesting that "emotions are the critical force behind 
life course personality individuation" (p. 258). However, Magai's later work (e.g. 
Magai & Nusbaum, 1996) has become both more highly developed, and more explicit 
in its incorporation of DS principles. 
In discussing the ideas presented by Magai and Nusbaum (1996) it is important to 
note that their model is primarily a model of personality change rather than of 
personality development. However from a DS perspective, the terms 'change' and 
'development' represent essentially the same phenomenon, hence can be used 
6 Fogel's more recent writings (e.g. Fogel, 1993) have similarly stressed the relational dynamics 
underlying the self-organisation of the self. While the details of his theory are beyond the interests of 
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interchangeably. Perhaps moreover, their theory is one of the few theories available 
that considers the place of emotions in personality change/development processes. 
The essential thesis outlined in Magai & Nusbaum (1996) is that highly charged 
episodes of emotion characterise episodes of both precipitous and gradual personality 
change. More specifically, they argue that strong affects and the emotion of surprise 
are invariably present at phase shifts in both emotional and personality development 
(see also Stein & Levine, 1990, p. 51 for a similar conceptualisation). In explicating 
their 'mechanism,' they note that surprise has a channel-clearing effect (cf. Tomkins, 
1962), and that it is associated with sudden increases in stimulation, particularly with 
the sudden awareness of a connection between previously unlinked internal events of 
concepts. According to these authors, "the emotion of surprise may be pivotal in the 
change process, precipitating the breakdown of defence, the ungating of negative 
emotion, and the kind of surge of energy that appears essential to change" (p. 410)7. 
However as seems common in DS approaches (see Chapter 5), the mechanisms 
through which developmental forms organise and stabilise in the theories of Fogel 
(1993) and Magai and Nusbaum (1996) are not clearly spelled out (M. D. Lewis & 
Granic, 1999). Lewis and Granic (1999) suggest that part of the difficulty evident in 
Fogel's (1993) account is a reluctance to acknowledge any distinctiveness amongst 
sub-systems. As these authors note "A complex systems account should be able to 
accommodate parts and wholes without ignoring process" (p. 17; see also Izard et. aI., 
in press). 
A more comprehensive (and less problematic) theory of state space development is 
found in the recent work of Peter Killeen (Killeen, 1989, 1991, 1992)8. In Killeen's 
'behavioural state space' theory, unconditioned attractors are innate (i.e. are 
reinforcing and attract behaviour in their own right). Killeen (1991) further suggests 
the current discussion, his emphasis on development as emerging from relational dynamics is again 
underscored. 
7 It is acknowledged that the theory in Magai and Nusbaum (1996) is not being done justice here. As is 
discussed below, their theory also devotes considerable attention to the importance of more stable 
personality characteristics and social networks in personality change. 
8 Killeen's (1989, 1991, 1992) theory is strikingly comprehensive and cannot be fully explicated here. 
Additionally, his emphasis on behaviour (rather than functioning) is slightly at odds with the interests 
of the current dissertation. Nonetheless, the mechanism he has proposed regarding the development of 
attractors within state space is directly relevant, hence will be briefly described. 
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that these reflexive or innate attractors are limited in number, and that they cannot be 
increased. 
However, a few reflexes - in particular movement away from noxious stimuli 
(repellors) or toward pleasant stimuli (attractors) - are subject to extensive 
elaboration. According to Killeen (1991), this process of elaboration can be usefully 
described within the framework of behavioural conditioning. While unconditioned 
attractors influence (attract) behaviour in their own right, conditioned attractors can 
only exert influence through their place in the trajectory leading to an unconditioned 
attractor. According to Killeen (1992) then, classical conditioning establishes a 
previously neutral stimulus as a new behavioural attractor. In a combination of DST 
and classic behavioural terms, the process of conferring attraction (and thence 
development) is termed conditioning. While the details of Killeen's (1992) 
description of this developmental process (see also Killeen & Bizo, 1998) are beyond 
the interests of the current discussion, three further comments seem pertinent. 
Firstly, the reader should note the similarity between Killeen's (1991) 
conceptualisation of the relationship between innate and conditioned attractors and 
that of the current theory. Both models suggest that the attractors that emerge post-
natally can only hold value (or attract behaviour) through their relationship to innate 
attractors. Moreover, Killeen's description of the macrodevelopment of attractors is 
very similar to that undertaken here. As was mentioned above, Killeen's (1989, 1991) 
theory of state space conditioned development conceptualises of the state space 
becoming increasingly dimpled with ever more precise attractor basins. In a similar 
vein, the current theory sees the innate motivational state space topography become 
ever more precisely delineated in multiple attractors as described below. 
Secondly, Killeen (1992) goes some considerable distance towards describing the 
conditions under which attractor developments of this type are likely to occur. 
According to him, the greatest opportunity for the process of conditioning (conferring 
attraction) is where (a) target behaviours are proximate in the activation spectrum, (b) 
where stimuli are proximate in similarity, and (c) where innate and conditioned 
stimuli occur in temporal proximity. Importantly, Killeen's discussions of state space 
development place a key emphasis on the subjectivity of state space. By this he 
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means (for example) that stimuli can only be considered 'similar' in a subjective, 
psychological sense. Again, this idea will be returned to below. 
Finally, Killeen (1992) devotes considerable discussion to the notion that multiple 
attractors may exert an influence upon behaviour simultaneously in the same context 
(see also Hull, 1943 and his second postulate, that of 'interaction'). This concept 
equates nicely with the current theory's notion that human behaviour and emotion are 
frequently a response to multiple attractors. Killeen (1992) suggests that trajectories 
through the state space are highly flexible. More specifically, he describes an 
experiment by Catania (1975, cited in Killeen, 1992) in which it was shown that 
organisms prefer behavioural trajectories that provide multiple subsequent paths to an 
attractor, a preference for 'keeping their options open' (p. 457). Although the 
implications of both these points will not be considered until later (see below), 
Killeen's (1992) paper helps illustrate the dynamism and overdetermination inherent 
to human behavioural, motivational, and personality functioning. 
Overall however, it is the theory of Marc Lewis and colleagues (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 
1997, in press a, in press b; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. D. Lewis & Granic, 
1999) that has most precisely outlined a mechanism describing the development of 
personality state space attractors. Their theory begins by offering the concept of self-
organising emotional interpretations (Els) as representing attractors in the personality 
state space. Importantly, they suggest that "an individual's overall repertoire of 
attractors defines his or her personality as a set of coherences" (M. D. Lewis & 
Granic, 1999; pp. 139, see also pp. 21 & Magai & Nusbaum, 1996). 
Lewis and colleagues have also gone a considerable distance towards outlining a 
comprehensive description of how this hypothetical process might occur (M. D. 
Lewis, in press a, in press b; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. D. Lewis & Granic, 
1999, in press). In a manner similar to Magai et. al. (Magai & Hunziker, 1993; Magai 
& Nusbaum, 1996), and drawing heavily on work from emotions theory (e.g. Oatley 
& Johnson-Laird, 1987; Izard, 1991), these authors argue that emotions lie at the core 
9 The page reference for this quote may not be strictly accurate as the book has ~ot yet gone to press, 
and the copy read is a pre-publication draft. The same apology holds for all other quotes from this 
particular source. 
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of state space development (see also Izard et. aI., in press). In brief, what Lewis et. 
al. suggest is that emotions serve to promote couplingJO among diverse conceptual 
structures, acting as a catalyst or control parameter for the emergence of larger 
organisational units (M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. D. Lewis, in press b). 
Emotions achieve this end by favouring particular combinations of elements that fit a 
general class of situations related to that emotion (M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998) or 
by influencing the coupling of cognitive elements with one another as it reciprocally 
selects their totality (M. D. Lewis, 1997). It follows from this premise that self-
organisational processes cannot proceed without low levels of emotion (M. D. Lewis 
& Granic, 1999). 
Coherence over time amongst elements derives from recursive or iterative 
adjustments, in which the discrepancies among mutually co-activated elements are 
gradually eliminated (M. D. Lewis, in press b; Izard et. aI., in press). Over several 
iterations (cycles) a stable state of self-consistency emerges as the resultant 
organisations (Els) become progressively consolidated in personality through self-
consistency and emotion-related selectivity. Additionally, Marc Lewis (M. D. Lewis, 
in press b) suggests that the specific characteristics that emerge in self-organisation 
influence the nature of subsequent self-organisations - they cascade (see also M. D. 
Lewis & Douglas, 1998). 
Macrodevelopmentally, each transition in the emotionally-driven coupling process 
further constrains the ways in which elements can fit together on subsequent 
occaSIOns. Particular concepts, images, and connections become increasingly 
congruent with one another in the form of motivational concepts such as scripts, 
plans, and goals (M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999). Thus in both normative and 
individual development, the increasing refinement of cognitive connections and the 
real-time coupling of cognitive constituents and emotions allow for a crystallisation in 
the personality state space (see below). As attractors become more refined, they also 
emerge more frequently, emerge with fewer contextual cues, and extend further 
across the state space. 
10 Coupling can be described as the reciprocal selection among elements (M. D. Lewis, in press b), and 
can be either cooperative or competitive. 
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A quick critique 
Broadly speaking, the approach to the development of personality advocated by 
theorists writing from a DS perspective (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 1996, 1997, 1998; in press 
a, b; Lewis & Granic, 1999; Magai & Nusbaum, 1996) is consistent with the broader 
DS theories of Thelen (e.g. 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994) and Killeen (1989, 1991, 
1992). All of these theorists suggest that elements in a system self-organise on the 
basis of their frequent associations (see Chapter 4.3), with some pre-existing couples 
or associations specified in some theories. Overall, such theorising has underscored 
the importance of mutual activation and recursion within DS models of development. 
While the mechanisms involved in the theories of Thelen and Killeen are perhaps less 
relevant to theories of personality development, the underlying processes described by 
Lewis and Magai have been constructed with personality in mind. Although the 
theory of Lewis and colleagues is considerably more comprehensive and developed, 
both 'schools' nonetheless share the belief that personality development occurs 
through a wedding of cognitive elements with emotions. 
Moreover, both theorists have stressed the importance of a discrete approach to 
emotions (see below, and Chapter 8), and have begun to delineate the manner in 
which different levels of the personality system may be more or less flexible (e.g. 
Lewis, 1997; Magai & Nusbaum, 1996; Izard et. aI., in press). In sum, the DS 
approach to personality development, particularly that exemplified by Marc Lewis 
and colleagues (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 1997; Lewis & Douglas, 1998; Lewis & Granic, 
1999) represents a novel, comprehensive, and formidable theory describing the 
development of attractors within the personality state space. 
And yet the approaches taken are not without their weaknesses. Hence, while it is 
beyond the interests of the current dissertation to engage in a prolonged critique of 
these ambitious and important theories, some brief commentary and criticism will 
occur. The reader should note that the criticisms outlined below are directed 
predominantly at the theory of Lewis and colleagues. This is perhaps a little unfair 
given the importance of their theory, but occurs for the simple reason that their work 
provides the only framework sufficiently developed to enable precise evaluation. 
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Initially, it seems problematic that little or no attempt is made to acknowledge or 
discuss the topic of personality or its operationalisation. Although the limits of space 
are no more apparent than within the immediate dissertation, Lewis and colleagues 
appear uninterested in debating the nature of personality. Rather, they have tended to 
suggest (in passing) that their chosen 'personality variables' "are similar to Izard's 
affective-cognitive structures and Tomkins' ideoaffective structures" (Lewis and 
Douglas, 1998, p. 162), or Magai's (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Magai & McFadden, 
1995) notion of emotion traits (Lewis & Granic, 1999). With the basis for their 
theory and mechanism implicitly assumed, one is left wondering about the face 
validity of this particular approach to the study of personality. 
Secondly, it is possible that some of the 'cognitive constituents' that are purported to 
form part of an EI might not yet exist in very early development. In discussing 
"images, associations, propositional forms, script elements, and concepts" Lewis and 
Granic (M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999, p. 12), the authors have introduced scientific 
concepts which presuppose certain capacities in the newborn organism, an assumption 
that appears unverifiable at best. As such, the cognitive constituents of an EI appear 
somewhat unsuited to accounting for the development of the cognitively simple 
newborn, or to describing how development of a personality state space might occur 
in organisms lacking such (see Chapter 1). Overall, the mechanism for personality 
state space development offered does not appear basic enough, requiring as it does, a 
contentiously high degree of cognitive sophistication in order to operate. 
Notably in terms of the current theory, the mechanism of Lewis and colleagues fails 
to discuss or differentiate the elaborative processes involved in personality 
development prior to and following the emergence of a representational (conscious) 
selfll. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the emergence of a conscious self (at around 
18-24months) necessitates some substantial revisions in our conceptualisation of 
human functioning and development. More generally then, their mechanism pays 
little attention to the manner in which post-natal developments may act as control 
parameters for the mechanism itself, and (thus) implies that the elaborative 
11 Although it is not discussed in their writings, the model as currently advocated by Lewis and Granic 
(1999) appears implicitly experientialist. They suggest for example, that we learn to "make sense of 
157 
mechanism underlying personality development operates equally across 
macrodevelopment. This omission appears ironic given the substantial attention 
devoted to time scale considerations in Lewis' work (see e.g. M. D. Lewis, in press 
b). 
Most salient however among the difficulties with the theories of state space attractor 
development outlined thus far is the absence of an adequate consideration as to why 
any of these real time developmental events occur at all. Most DS theorists who 
examine personality, as well as the preponderance of cognitive theorists accept the 
functionalist premise that emotions arise in respect of goals (although they will argue 
the degree and nature of cognitive involvement and the precise motivational, 
cognitive, and behavioural consequences of emotions). Yet in describing a 
mechanism for development, writers like Lewis, Magai, and Izard have focussed on 
cognition-emotion self-organisation without an explicit discussion or examination of 
these goals that the emotions or cognitions are arising or organising in respect of. 
Goals are simply treated as one of a number of cognitive variables. 
Consequently, there appears somewhat of an inconsistency between the 
developmental mechanism they offer and the manner in which they conceptualise 
emotions. More generally, is that despite adopting a functionalist approach to 
emotions, these writers appear to have forgotten what the whole business is about. 
The current writer respectfully submits that emotions, development, personality, and 
indeed life itself, coalesce and occur first and foremost around motives and goals (see 
Chapter 1). As such, not only do I suggest that personality must be considered a 
motivational concern, but that in real time development, cognitive elements occur and 
are relevant only in respect of existing innate motives. Stated more fully, cognitive 
and emotional constituents must all occur in respect of innate motivational concerns 
else there is no reason for them to occur at all. 
Overall, the current theory suggests that the same initial degrees of emergent 
flexibility and development are enabled in a system in which the only cognitive 
elements to operate are those that occur in respect of or are already innately wedded 
situations in particular ways" (p. 19). It may be that they mean 'interpret' situations, yet commentary 
on consciousness in personality development is altogether absent. 
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to emotions and goals12. This is not to say that other cognitive elements do not 
become part of the mechanism underlying personality state space development, but 
rather that these elements are incorporated at later developmental junctures. 
Chapter 6.5 - Explicating the mechanism for state space attractor 
development: Emotions recast as innate elaborators 
Emotions appear to constitute fractals in the stream of life experience 
Magai and Nusbaum (1996, p. 418) 
Introduction 
Having outlined and critiqued the major frameworks that describe attractor 
development in dynamic systems, the following section will outline a model of 
attractor development consistent with the current conceptualisation of personality and 
emotion. The section will draw ideas from the section above and from three 
additional sources. Evidence will be drawn from theories of infant development and 
organisation, from emotion theory, and from learning theory to support the proposed 
mechanism. Taken together, this literature will be used to suggest that emotions <lrC 
usefully conceptualised as an innate means to ascertain the relationship betwecn 
existing attractors and novel stimuli. Additional neuroanatomical evidence suggesting 
that that emotions, but not cognitions, are responsible for early personality 
development will be presented. Overall, it is argued that early state space elaboration 
proceeds via the emotion system alone, with cognitive elements being 'recruited' into 
the elaborative mechanism as they emerge. 
12 It is acknowledged here that some substantial assumptions are being made regarding the degree of 
fixedness in the subsystems within emotions. Although this topic will not be discussed until Chapter 8, 
the reader should be aware that the current writer views the links between primary emotions and 
associated cognitions as highly fixed (see M. D. Lewis, 1997; Izard et. aI., in press). 
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Laying the foundations I: Affect as organiser in infant development 
The current theory takes as its starting point the observation that infants are 
ubiquitously affectual creatures. Notwithstanding issues of whether infant 
experiences and expressions are analogous to their adult counterparts (see Chapters 4 
and 8), the idea that emotions are pivotal in development is central to an enormous 
number of developmental models (e.g. Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Tomkins, 1962, 1963; 
Izard, 1971, 1991, 1993, 1997; Lewis & Michalson, 1983; Sroufe, 1984; Stern, 1985; 
Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Magai, 1996; Magai & Hunziker, 1993; Magai & 
McFadden, 1995; Magai & Nusbaum, 1996; M. D. Lewis, 1997; M. D. Lewis & 
Douglas, 1998). As shall be demonstrated however, while recent writings have 
stressed the functions of emotions in personality organisation, they have 
predominantly done so at a broad and descriptive level. 
Izard and colleagues (e.g. Izard, 1971; 1993, 1997; Izard et. aI, in press) for example, 
have long suggested that infants are primarily affective beings, being particularly 
sensitive to, and dependent on, emotional information, notably vocal and facial (see 
also Nelson & DeHaan, 1997). More importantly, several recent theories derived 
from within the differential emotions 'school' have suggested that a major function of 
the emotions and emotion systems is the organisation of traits and dimensions of 
personality (e.g. Izard, 1991; Magai & McFadden, 1995; Magai, 1996). 
Izard (1993) himself has argued that emotions are organisational in that they organise 
and motivate perception, cognition, and action. It follows from this premise that 
emotions and heritable differences (see below) should affect the characteristic ways in 
which an individual thinks and acts, and thus, his or her personality. Differential 
emotions theory generally suggests that specific emotions shape particular traits, and 
the particular patterns of emotions help shape broad areas of personality (Izard, 1993). 
However, like many of the DS approaches outlined above, the precise manner in 
which this organisation occurs is (self-admittedly) unclear (Izard, 1993), although see 
Izard et. al. (in press) for a recent attempt. 
However, while Izard et. al.'s (in press) description of state space (personality) 
development suffers from a lack of precision, their theory has gone a considerable 
160 
distance towards outlining how heritable differences in emotions (as initial 
conditions) may influence the functioning of emotion in self-organisational processes 
(see also Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). Izard (1993) initially suggested that 
personality is influenced by genetic thresholds in the activation and stability of 
emotionality, while Izard et. aI. (in press) more comprehensively argue that "a 
person's profile of emotion thresholds sets the stage for the self-organisation of a 
particular pattern of emotions" (p. 15)13. 
Izard et. aI. (in press) also suggest that individual differences are rooted in 
neurohormonal, sensorimotor, affective, and cognitive differences regarding the 
activation of discrete emotions (see also Izard, 1993). According to these authors 
each emotion system constitutes a source of individual differences in the patterns of 
self-organisation of emotion-cognition relations. While these ideas will be more fully 
discussed below, the immediate discussion only seeks to underscore the idea that 
small heritable differences in arousal, reactivity, and proneness to particular emotions 
(e.g. Izard, 1994a) are likely to have important consequences for the organisation of 
personality systems around particular emotions (Magai & McFadden, 1995; Izard, et. 
al., in press). 
Overall, Izard (1993) suggests that individual differences in emotion activation 
thresholds lead to differences in the frequency of emotional experiences. These in 
tum lead to emergent self-organisations around particular patterns of cognition, 
emotion and action, leading towards characteristic manners of responding and the 
individual personality (Izard et. aI., in press). 
While further discussion would serve little further benefit, the twofold thrust of the 
section above nonetheless remains. While the precise manner in which emotions 
contribute to the development of personality appears a little unclear in the theories 
above, the involvement of emotions in personality development per se seems 
indisputable. Additionally, it also seems plausible to suggest that heritable aspects of 
13 It should be noted that while recent papers examining the personality-affect interface (e.g. Gross, 
Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998) have provided theoretical support for the notion that elements of both tonic 
affect and emotional reactivity may be heritable, extension of these ideas to specific emotions has not 
yet been forthcoming. 
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emotionality (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998) or emotional proclivities (Izard et. aI., 
in press) are likely to produce highly recursive and cascading effects in personality 
self-organisation. 
Determining exactly what such propensities represent in terms of the initial form of 
the personality state space is a key issue for future research in this area. If we 
consider discrete emotions as heritable attractors in the personality state space, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that individuals may inherit marked differences in the 
arrangement and strength of the attractors for particular emotions. Furthermore, 
differences in these critical initial conditions are likely to be consolidated through the 
iterative nature of human state space development (Killeen, 1989, 1991; M. D. Lewis, 
1997; Izard et. aI., in press). 
Laying the foundations II: The importance of innate feedback mechanisms 
The trick is to know the good from the bad 
(Pugh, 1977, cited in Brown, 1990) 
The second premise from which the current chapter draws its impetus from is a 
broader conceptualisation of emotion in personality processes and development (see 
Chapter 8 for details). Earlier, it was suggested that every living system possesses 
feedback mechanisms for regulating its behaviour in respect of goals (see Chapter 
3.7). More specifically, it was argued that every living system possesses a means by 
which to detect goal-significant events/stimuli, and to promote adjustments in respect 
of them (Skyttner, 1996). In line with differential emotions theory (e.g. Izard, 1971, 
1991), it was also suggested that the emotion systems can be thought of as 
representing this mechanism for homo sapiens14 (see also Rolls, 1990, 1995 for a 
learning approach). As such, the current theory views primary emotions as innate 
motivational processes through which the system is initially able to ascertain the 
14 There are of course other source~ of feedback in human development and functioning, although most 
of these tend to disappear within the first few months of life. So while human infants are born with 
upwards of 20 reflexes (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989), the data likewise suggests that most of these reflexes 
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'meaning' or goal-relevance of new events and stimuli (e.g. LeDoux, 1989, 1993, 
1994c). 
Aside from its palpable heuristic value, there is some support for the notion being 
developed here. Panksepp (1994a) suggested that conscious human feelings are the 
sUbjective aspect of evaluative activities, while Brown (1990) has argued that feelings 
constitute heuristic devices for reducing the search space when formulating action. In 
fact, Brown (1990) begins his chapter 'The Biological Significance of Affectivity,' by 
arguing that living systems can only maintain their organisation through 
compensations, and that ultimately such compensations must be affectual or value-
driven in nature (see also Zajonc, 1980, 198415). According to him, theories of habit 
formation or behaviour (e.g. Skinner and Thorndike), as well artificial decision 
systems must ultimately converge upon a value-driven account (Brown, 1990). 
Lewis, Sullivan, and Michalson (1984) have previously suggested that affect may 
serve both to energise performance - to direct the infant's attention to the contingency 
and motivate their focus - and to insure that they learn and remember the contingency 
through positive reinforcement (see below). While agreeing with this 
conceptualisation, the current theory also suggests that there is no good reason to 
assume that the manner in which a particular emotion functions to indicate goal 
relevance is qualitatively different at different stages of development. 
Anger for example, is innately indicative of thwart, whether the organism be an 
infant, a child, or an adult (Campos & Barrett, 1984). Certainly, the classes of stimuli 
that come to elicit an anger response will change dramatically across development 
(see below), and similarly the organism's awareness, experience, and response to this 
process will vary (see Chapters 7 and 8). However, the basic function served by 
anger and the other primary emotions in any instance, conscious or not, remains the 
same. The emotional response indicates to the system that something of significance 
is occurring, more precisely describes the organism-goal relationship, and motivates 
behavioural and cognitive adjustments in respect of such changes. 
attenuate over time. Overall, instinctive behaviours/reflexes strike the current author as a source of 
feedback insufficiently flexible to account for the immensity of developmental variance. 
15 The now-famous Zajonc-Lazarus debate will be more fully discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Laying the foundations III: The role of emotions in neurological models of learning 
The final leg on the tripod supporting the current mechanism for state space attractor 
development is found in theory and data from neurobiological models of learning. 
Although the interests of writers in this field are typically somewhat removed from 
that of the current author, theory regarding the bases of learning16 is singularly 
consistent with both the model being advocated here and the criticisms outlined 
above. The current section argues that personality development can usefully be 
thought of as the process in which new motives regarding different classes of internal 
and external stimuli and response are acquired. As such, it suggests that state space 
development can be considered a learning process in which emotions figure centrally. 
The section above suggested that organisms require an innate means to ascertain the 
implications that novel stimuli have for the organism's goals. This idea is consistent 
with many theories in the literature on animal learning. Hammer (1997) for example, 
suggests that animals must learn which stimuli are predictive of biologically 
(innately) meaningful stimuli, while Gray (1995) similarly argues that the organism 
must have some inbuilt means of establishing a 'goal gradient'. In Gray's (1995) 
theory, establishing a goal gradient necessitates ascertaining the relationships between 
unconditioned and conditioned stimuli, and responses. 
In implicating emotions in this evaluative process, LeDoux (1989) has argued that 
"regardless of whether one favours a cognitive, feedback, or central theory of 
emotions, the core of the emotional system is . . a mechanism for computing the 
affective value of stimuli17" (p. 271, see also Panksepp, 1994a). As such, he 
considers the emotion systems to fulfill this vital evaluative role. In a comprehensive 
model of stimulus perception, evaluation, planning and action, Halgren and 
Marinkovic (1995) call this evaluation component of learning 'event encoding.' Like 
LeDoux (1989, 1992, 1993, 1994c), they suggest that event encoding represents a 
16 The astute reader will notice that the current dissertation discusses 'learning' from a classical 
(associative) perspective. There have however been some recent indications that this approach may not 
accurately represent the manner in which species learn. Evolutionary biology for example has recently . 
advocated a more domain specific, problem solving approach to learning (see e.g. Gallistel, 1995). 
17 LeDoux (1989) suggests that a stimulus may include events occurring in the environment 
(exteroceptive), within the body (interoceptive), or within the brain (thoughts and memories). 
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primitive affective evaluation of an event in terms of its significance for well being 
(see also Rolls, 1990 on this issue). 
In 1937, Kluver & Bucy (cited in LeDoux, 1989) reported that large temporal lobe 
lesions in the monkey produced a 'psychic blindness.' While the animal was not blind 
to the sensory properties of a stimulus, they could not ascertain its affective 
significance, and hence did not know how to behave in respect of it. Research since 
this time has consistently shown that it is damage to the amygdaloid complex that was 
associated with impairments to this affective-evaluative system (LeDoux, 1989, 1992, 
1993, 1995; Gallagher & Chiba, 1996). 
In support of this premise, researchers have shown that amygdaloid cells respond 
preferentially to affective rather than neutral stimuli (Rolls, 1995), that stimulation of 
the central nucleus of the amygdala produces 'emotion-like' behaviour in rats (Kapp, 
Pascoe, & Bixler, 1984; LeDoux, 1992; Davis, Walker & Lee, 1997, Davis, 1997), 
that lesions to the amygdala render the animal incapable of guiding behaviour through 
affective information (LeDoux, 1989), and that damage to the amygdala impairs 
associative learning (Good & Westbrook, 1995). 
These animal research findings are paralleled by clinical data. For example, the 
amygdala is implicated with recognition deficits in facial expressions of fear and 
anger (Heilman & Gilmore, 1998) and perhaps disgust (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1994, 1995; Broks, Young, Maratos, Coffey, Calder, Isaac, Mayes, Hodges, 
Montaldi, Cezayirli, Roberts, & Hadley, 1998), as well as with general learning 
deficits (Clark, 1995; LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995). Additionally, fMRI 
research with non-brain-damaged subjects has also indicated a heightened activation 
in the amygdala during associative learning (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & 
Phelps, 1998). 
More importantly, several researchers have interpreted these findings in terms of 
affect-evaluation or affect-learning relationships. Kapp, Pascoe, and Bixler (1984) for 
example, suggest that damage to the central nucleus of the amygdala (CNA) 
attenuates emotional responses and thus produces learning deficits, particularly in 
aversive learning (see below). LeDoux (1993) suggests that lesions to the amygdala 
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interfere with the ability to learn the associations between rewards/punishment and 
stimuli (see also Weiskrantz, cited in Rolls, 1990), while Rolls (1995) interprets the 
changes associated with amygdalic lesions as a "deficit in learning stimulus-
reinforcement associations" (p. 1097). Although there are difficulties with this type 
of research (see below), evidence from animal studies does suggest that emotional 
responding/evaluation in the amygdala is necessary for associative learning to occur 
(Phillips, Blaha, Pfaus, & Blackburn, 1992; Lee & Kim, 1998). 
It must be acknowledged that the theorising of writers like LeDoux (1989, 1992, 
1993, 1995) represents an ambitious interpretation of the data given the state of 
knowledge about neural circuitries in emotion. Most importantly, it must be acceded 
that the role he assigns to the amygdala has only been comprehensively demonstrated 
In respect of the emotion of fear (LeDoux, 1995), although it has been less 
convincingly implicated in anger (Heilman & Gilmore, 1998) or disgust (Adolphs, 
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994, 1995). Similarly, research has also shown that 
amygdalic damage interferes more consistently with avoidant than appetitive 
behaviour learning (Halgren & Marinkovic, 1995), and that lesions to the CNA 
interferes with the learning of associations between neutral and primary stimuli, but 
not between two secondary reinforcers (Rolls, 1995). Nonetheless, when taken as a 
whole the pattern of activations and deficits associated with the amygdala are 
consistent with the idea that the amygdala is a general center for emotions (LeDoux, 
1995; Clark, 1995), and that emotions are fundamental to learning. 
Yet even if we accept that the amygdala is centrally involved in learning for the 
reasons suggested above, this would not in itself support a model of state space 
attractor development that emphasised the primacy of affective over cognitive 
processes. It is known for example, that the amygdala receives huge afferents from 
the hippocampus, one of the most important cognitive structures in the brain 
(LeDoux, 1989). Such a pattern of connections might thus be taken as supportive of 
cognition-emotion mechanisms for personality development (cf. M. D. Lewis, 1997; 
M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998). However, additional support for the primacy of 
affective mechanisms in the elaboration of personality is found in an examination of 
the relative ontogenies of the two brain structures. 
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LeDoux (1989) notes that the hippocampus receives modality integrated information 
from the association cortex. He then suggests that while this information is more 
comprehensive than that stemming from the amygdala, that it is also considerably 
slower (see also Moreland & Zajonc, 1977, 1979, 1982). More specifically, he argues 
that thalamo-amygdala connections are monosynaptic and several synapses shorter 
than information based on cortically mediated information (LeDoux, 1989). When 
one considers the importance of initial conditions in the micro developmental 
emergence of a response, it seems reasonable to suggest that very quick (albeit 
unelaborated) affective information from the amygdala will have some powerful 
effects through neural networks. In some senses then, affective information may be 
more primary than hippocampal data in the cycle of perception, evaluation and 
response. 
Phylogenetic analyses of these brain areas suggest that the subcortical thalamo-
amygdala projections are a more primitive system that has been embellished with the 
evolution of the neocortex and cortico-amygdala projections (LeDoux, 1989). 
Research also indicates that phylogenetic ally more simple animals, and possibly 
young humans, use slightly different neural circuitries than adult humans. While 
adults appear to use cortico-amygdala and thalamic circuits, primitive vertebrates and 
young infants rely exclusively upon subcortical processors (see Rolls, 1995). 
In considering a possible distinction between affective and cognitive information (cf. 
Zajonc, 1980, 1984; LeDoux, 1989), developmental evidence suggests that the 
hippocampus matures more slowly. In the rat, the amygdala is possessed of most of 
its neurons by embryonic day 15 or 16, and no further neurons are added beyond day 
17 (Ten Donkelaar, Lammers, & Gribnau, 1979, cited in LeDoux, 1989). By contrast 
the hippocampal neurons do not even appear until embryonic day 14 and only a small 
proportions of hippocampal neurons are present at birth (Cowan et. al., 1981, cited in 
LeDoux, 1989). While the preponderance appear within the first week, neurogenesis 
continues up until 3 months (LeDoux, 1989). In humans, it has been suggested that 
the hippocampus is likewise immature at birth (Jacobs & Nadel, 1985). 
Paranthetically, they suggest that this late development explains infant amnesia, in 
that declarative memory is not available for the period (18 - 36 months) in which the 
hippocampus is maturing. 
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Overall, the literature outlined above can be taken as consistent with the idea that 
emotional responding is central to any associative mechanism purporting to explain 
personality state space individuation through learning. Specifically, the establishment 
of contingency, particularly with regard to avoidant behaviours, seems to require the 
functioning of an amygdala-based, hence emotional, evaluation system. Importantly, 
the amygdala is fully developed at birth, and is thus ready to begin evaluating the 
significance of stimuli from this time. 
Moreover, developmental aspects of the animal learning literature are consistent with 
human research in suggesting that the cognitive aspects of stimulus information may 
well not be available either solely or for integration in the first two years of a human 
life (Jacobs & Nagel, 1985). This finding casts some doubt on the assumption that 
state space elaboration mechanisms must initially include cognition. Instead, it 
indicates that infant state space development may be completely affectively driven in 
the first two years of life. 
By the same token however, the growth of connections between the amygdala and the 
hippocampus, as well as the gradual incorporation of cortical links to stimulus 
evaluation activations, suggest that stimulus evaluation mechanisms may themselves 
change across development. Initially, there seems to be a predominantly affective 
evaluation and elaboration mechanism, predominantly sited in the amygdala. This 
mechanism may then couple with more cognitive aspects of stimulus evaluation (in 
the hippocampus), perhaps producing a mechanism like that offered by Lewis and 
colleagues (M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998). Finally, this evolving mechanism may 
continue to interact with later cognitive capacities as they become available. 
Ultimately, the developing system is possessed of a mechanism in which complex 
cognitive capacities such as declarative memory, planning and self-representational 
capabilities (cortical), interact with other cognitive and affective information about 
stimuli to elaborate the state space. 
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I + II + III = An emergent mechanism for state space attractor development 
The current theory thus proposes that the mechanism underlying the development of 
personality state space attractors18 evolves over time. Initially, this mechanism 
appears to involve a relatively primitive stimulus evaluation that might be described 
as the emotionally-driven establishment of contingencies between existing attractors 
and new classes of stimuli l9 • However, progressive developments in cognitive skills 
and capacities may well be recruited into the elaborative mechanism. More 
specifically, recognition, classification, and representational abilities gradually couple 
with the basic mechanism to produce an ever-more complex elaborative mechanism. 
Consistent with a number of literature sources and data it has been suggested that this 
elaborative mechanism is initially affective. As such, it is argued that the innate 
components of five primary emotion systems (those for anger, sadness, happiness, 
fear, and disgust) are both sufficient and necessary conditions for the evaluative and 
elaborative processes of personality development. Equally, it does not appear that 
cognitive elements beyond those that are part of the appraisal system are necessary for 
this initial form of the mechanism to operate. As was noted in the section above, 
developmental animal research suggests that the hippocampus is relatively unformed 
at birth, hence is unlikely to be substantially contributing to stimulus evaluation or 
learning. 
The current theory thus suggests that the emergence of an innate emotional respon~e 
serves two functions. Initially, the emotional response informs the system that 
something relevant to an existing attractor is occurring (see Chapter 8.5). In some 
senses, an emotional response is a means of prioritising among the multiple 
evaluations occurring in respect of multiple attractors/goals. In line with differential 
emotions theory, it is argued that emotions are an innate means by which to precisely 
evaluate the relationship between an existing attractor and new stimuli. The intensity 
18 The discussion to follow discusses personality state space development as occurring through the 
emergence of attractors. The same reasoning follows regarding the development of repellors and is 
only omitted in the interests of brevity. 
19 The term 'stimuli' is used at its broadest, most SUbjective sense here. As such, it may be used to 
describe either internal or external stimuli (per LeDoux, 1989). The reason for this is simply that for 
the evaluative/elaborative mechanism almost anything can constitute subjective stimulation, as long as 
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of the response indicates something of the importance of the attractor20, while the type 
of emotional response innately and of itself describes the fundamental nature of the 
relationship between the most salient attractor and the stimulus. 
Following this, the emotion system then proceeds to reflexively generate a new 
attractor or repellor, proximate to the 'active' attractor in the state space. This 
attractor can be taken as representing the relationship between the existing attractors 
and the new stimuli. As such, we might consider new attractors as emerging as part 
of innate organisational motivations (see Chapter 3), for they serve to internalise the 
relationships between aspects of the world and behaviour (new stimuli) with existing 
attractors or motivations. This fundamental process leads to a cascading rarefaction 
of the state space and to the development of conceptually distinguishable areas within 
it. 
Initially, new attractors are likely to be comprehensively less stable than innate 
attractors. They may (for example) emerge only once before other (more powerful) 
attractors emerge in proximity and thus attract systemic behaviour in this area of the 
state space. Additionally, the inability of the young infant to make fine temporal 
discriminations between stimuli and consequence21 may lead to the simultaneous 
development of multiple attractors for different areas of the state space. For example, 
attractors or repellors may develop regarding avoidance of a certain class of external 
stimuli as well as regarding particular emotional, cognitive or behavioural responses 
(see Chapter 7.7). Finally, in addition to being relatively 'shallow,' the boundaries of 
the new attractor may be comparatively unclear. 
While later developments may reveal the emergence of contradictory or competing 
attractors, future attractors can only ever be acquired in respect of the current form of 
the state space - the totality of existing attractors (M. D. Lewis, 1997). More 
typically, it is expected that development will lead to ever more precise 'variants' or 
'derivatives' of the attractors that already exist. As such, it is argued that, like 
it impacts upon current attractors. As such, the term 'stimuli' is used to include actions, states, 
experiences, perceptions, cognitions of either the organism or in another. 
20 According to Clore (1 994a), intensity is a key part of emotion and emotional experience and is 
predominantly a function of goal importance (see the discussions of 'importance' in Chapters 7 and 8). 
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constraints (see Chapter 5), that attractors cascade. Finally, while we cannot predict 
the manner in which this developmental process will occur, person-environment 
transactions and their intemalisation appears to be a recursive process in which early 
attractors operate more frequently, hence become ever-more precise and more 
powerful. 
So despite their immaturity, these early attractors will typically be progressively 
consolidated through organism-environment transactions, thus constituting key initial 
attractors in the ontogeny of the individual personality and the generation of 
individual differences. 
It is also important that we remember how chance events and timing may play an 
important part in the development of new attractors (M. Lewis, 1997, 1998a). Most 
immediately, it should be remembered that the salience of a particular attractor in a 
microdevelopmental context (its emergent importance) strongly influences the areas 
of a state space in which new attractors are likely to develop. For example, the 
attractors for nutrition and eating behaviours probably exist as cyclical attractors in 
which the attractors deepen as a function of the system's need for nutrition. At a time 
when the need for nutrition is high, emotional responses will typically occur in respect 
of this attractor, hence new attractors are more likely to develop in this area of the 
state space, even where the stimuli or behaviour bear little objective relationship to 
h .. 22 t e eXIstmg attractor . 
Finally, the nature of the emotional response is a key influence on the precise form of 
the attractor or repellor. More specifically, it must be remembered that attractors are 
in no way neutral. Rather, they are 'forged' in the immediate presence of a particular 
primary affect. Consequently, their form must inevitably reflect something of the 
nature of this affect in their form. At the most simple level, this difference may be 
reflected in the relative dominance of attractors (approach motivations) and repellors 
(avoidance motivations) in the state space. However, attractors or repellors that 
emerge in an 'angry' context are also like to differ qualitatively from those that form 
21 As noted above, the hippocampus is comparatively underdeveloped at this stage. As such, the infant 
is likely to struggle to establish fine-grained temporal contingencies. 
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in a context of fear, sadness, disgust or happiness. Consequently, personality state 
spaces may indeed become organised around particular emotions as suggested by 
differential emotions theory (e.g. Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1971, 1972, 1991, 
1994a, 1997; Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991; Magai & Hunziker, 1993; Magai, 
1996), and heritable differences in the propensity to respond with particular emotions 
will typically be compounded across development. 
In addition, the current theory suggests that new cognitive capacities are incorporated 
within this basic elaborative mechanism as they emerge. As new capabilities emerge, 
the reciprocal activation of cognitive and affectual evaluations may see them become 
progressively coupled, ultimately producing a new level of elaborative mechanism. 
Cognitive abilities, particularly declarative memory, classification (see Chapter 3), 
and representational skills increase the scope for state space elaboration by enabling 
the evaluation of less proximate and/or representational stimuli. Throughout this type 
of development the elaborative process nonetheless remains inherently affectual. 
Most importantly in terms of the current theory, the emergence of consciousness or 
the representation of one's own state space (see Chapter 4) has some profound 
consequences for the manner in which the personality state space development 
progresses. While the core of the developmental process remains that of an affective 
evaluation, the system's ability to represent its own attractors and repellors greatly 
increases the ways in which the state space can develop. 
More specifically, meta-cognitive awareness of the state space or personality enables 
the deliberate comparison and evaluation of individual attractors (see Chapter 8), and 
the representational comparison and evaluation of the relationship between stimuli 
and attractors. This approach is consistent with that of Killeen (1989, 1991) who 
suggests that what separates humans from many other species is the ability to modify 
the local character of the state space through mentation, thus bringing other attractors 
that are not immediately present to bear upon behaviour23 • Consciousness also 
enables the emergence of attractors and repellors regarding the phenomenal 
22 Underscoring the complex interactions between existing attractor activities and micro developmental 
responses can help explain phenomena such the emergence of 'superstitious' eating behaviours. 
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experience of both the state space and the emotions as well as the deliberate increase 
or decrease in the salience of particular attractors. 
A few further comments 
Although full explication of the ideas outlined above is not possible in the current 
dissertation, a preliminary working picture of the model can be described under four 
headings. The reader should be aware that this conceptual separation only occurs in 
order that major issues can be highlighted. As such, the organisation of the text 
should not be taken as indicating any literal separation between comments. 
The view from afar: DS and macrodevelopmental prediction 
Until recently, the DS approach to development has suggested that there will be real 
limits on our ability to predict long range developmental outcomes (Thelen, 1990). In 
this particular view, knowledge about precursor variables (initial attractors or 
constraints) are not a reliable source of predictor in macrodevelopment due to the 
variability inherent in complex systems (Thelen, 1990). Perhaps as a consequence of 
this premise, DS accounts have primarily considered self-organisational processes 
through the emergence of behaviour in 'real' or microdevelopmental time (e.g. Fogel 
& Thelen, 1987; Fogel, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Recently however, other DS developmentalists have explicitly (e.g. M. D. Lewis, in 
press b) or implicitly (e.g. Killeen, 1989) suggested that self-organising dynamic 
systems (such as personality) become more coherent and stable, despite their 
increasing complexity. Moreover, one of these same theorists has suggested that it is 
precisely the increasing orderliness of the system that enables an increasing 
'intricacy' to emerge across macrodevelopment (M. D. Lewis, in press b). According 
to him, while intrasystemic variability remains endemic to the system across short 
periods of time, major transformations diminish over time as coherent couples or 
23 Of course, attractors that are not immediately present can only bear on the behaviour insofar as the 
totality of the state space permits. 
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relationships crystallise and recur24 (see also Izard, et. aI., in press). The ongoing 
result of developmental processes then is an emergent system that becomes 
increasingly stable across macrodevelopmental time (M. D. Lewis, in press b; Mischel 
& Shoda, 1995). 
Perhaps most relevant to the current discussion however, is the suggestion by Lewis 
(M. D. Lewis, in press b) that personality development can be usefully thought of as a 
series of relatively permanent changes in the structure of the state space. The position 
adopted by Lewis (and the current author) in respect of decreasing 
macrodevelopmental variance in personality systems is consistent with a growing 
body of empirical work that denotes the manner in which personality variables 
become increasingly stable across time (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1988, 1997). It is 
likewise consistent with the ideas of behavioural theorists (e.g. Killeen, 1989, 1991, 
1992), as well as with lay notions regarding the manner in which people become 
progressively more 'set in their ways.' 
According to Marc Lewis (and the current author), a major consequence of the 
increasing stability within a system is that the more order that has accumulated over 
time, the greater the energy required to shift the system's trajectory (M. D. Lewis, in 
press b). More specifically, it has been suggested that the form of new attractors or 
goals within the state space is increasingly constrained by the developmental history 
(manifest in the current pattern of attractors and repellors) of the organism. As noted 
by Izard and colleagues (Izard et. aI., in press), as well as in Marc Lewis' theory (M. 
D. Lewis, 1997, in press b; M. D. Lewis & Granic 1999), attractors in the 
motivational state space have a tendency to deepen via recursive feedback. 
Additionally, the argument above has suggested that the macrodevelopment of 
repellors (e.g. Carver, 1997; Lewis & Douglas, 1998) occurs in much the same 
fashion. 
In sum, while few DS authors would wish to dispute the notion that complex systems 
remain inherently variable across all time frames, the implication that we should not 
theorise about permanent macrodevelopmental change within dynamic systems, for 
24 Interestingly Lewis (in press b) suggests that couples occur more frequently and more powerfully 
when in the presence of emotions, particularly intense emotions. 
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this reason, strikes the current author as a poorly premised and pessimistic 
implication. Rather than apply a useful axiom ad nauseam and beyond necessity or 
reason, we should first remind ourselves of both the potential and the limits of our 
current knowledge. 
In the immediate context, such a caution initially means we must remind ourselves 
that personalities do not set like some 'gradually desiccating jelly-on-a-timer' in the 
refrigerator of development. The system always contains the potential for emergent 
growth and transformation (Magai & Nusbaum, 1996), although the tendency for 
major transformations to occur does decrease across developmental time (see above). 
Nonetheless, variation remains endemic to dynamic systems like personality, at all 
levels, and across all timeframes, thus constituting the 'real limits' of DS theorising. 
Because the system is continually evolving, but evolving without directions or 
endpoint (e.g. M. Lewis, 1997), it is never finished or unvarying (Magai & Nusbaum, 
1996). 
Additionally, the development of a system is unlikely to proceed in a smooth fashion 
(M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999). Emergence at each developmental phase shift may 
lead to new attractors that are broadly consistent with other attractors in the system or 
with those of other infants. They may likewise be variants of these forms, or 
completely idiosyncratic. So while the changing patterns of variance in personality 
systems do not suggest that we will ever be able to invariably predict long-range 
developmental outcomes, they do indicate the presence of certain fundamental 
processes in the development and operation of the personality state space. While 
explication and framing of these core processes is a complex matter, the processes 
appear likely to involve a combination of cascading constraint (see Chapter 5) and 
emergent attractor which also cascade. The profoundly interactive influences of these 
two processes appear to progressively define and limit a given personality, enabling 
the creation of normative theories describing (if not always predicting) the 
macrodevelopment of the personality state space and its constituents. 
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Time-scale considerations in state space development 
Although implicit in the discussions above, the dissertation has not clearly separated 
the emergent development of the personality state space across different time scales. 
Although unfortunate, it is hoped that this omission has not been taken as indicative 
of the fundamental importance of considering interactions at different time scales. 
Lewis and colleagues pay particular attention to these relationships, recently 
suggesting that while self-organisational developments occur across distinct time 
scales (e.g. M. D. Lewis, in press b), that developments at each level almost certainly 
interact with developmental processes at each of the others (Lewis & Granic, 1999; 
see also Vallacher & Nowak, 1997). The current thesis agrees with the position 
adopted by Lewis (M. D. Lewis, in press b) who suggests that there are two broad 
directions of influence between scales of self-organisation. Firstly, 
microdevelopmental self-organising processes, described above in terms of innate 
affectual evaluations and elaborations, repeated through microdevelopment, influence 
macrodevelopmental self-organisation. 
According to Lewis, the more intense an emotional response, the longer (and perhaps 
more comprehensively) a particular configuration resonates in microdevelopment, 
thus increasing its capacity to adjust and stabilise associated attractor developments 
over longer time scales (M. D. Lewis, in press b). He likewise suggests that these 
relationships may be even stronger for interpretations forged/embedded in moods. 
More importantly, this directional relationship (micro or meso to macro self-
organisation) is especially powerful in early childhood, where the plasticity in the 
developing system creates a situation in which microdevelopments may be 
structuralised as relatively permanently in relatively few iterations. As such, 
emotionally-driven state space elaborations in early interactions constitute critical 
initial conditions for the eventual form of the personality state space. 
Conversely, macrodevelopmental self-organisations exert a profound influence upon 
microdevelopmental emergence. According to Lewis (M. D. Lewis, in press b) the 
complementarities laid down III macro development . (through repeated 
microdeve1opmental coupling) come to constrain the possibilities for thinking, feeling 
and acting in subsequent moments. As he notes, each state space only has so many 
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possibilities for making sense of and feeling about the world. The personality thus 
defines and constrains the possible impact of emotions and moods. 
Additionally, logic likewise suggests that macro to microdevelopmental influences are 
likely to vary proportionally with the 'age' or fixedness within the system. As such, 
this type of influence is likely to be comparatively small in early development with 
the notable exception of heritable personality predispositions to manifest particular 
emotions (Izard et. aI., in press). However, as micro developmental interactions rarefy 
and concretise the state space, macro to micro developmental influences increase25 • 
Most notably in terms of the current discussion, it is expected that the emergence of 
attractors regarding emotional experience (goals about emotions) will act to regulate 
microdevelopmental states, and thence micro and future macrodevelopmental 
emergence26. 
Additional Control Parameters in state space development 
The discussion above has predominantly discussed the macrodevelopment of a 
personality system as occurring through the iterative consolidation of emotionally 
forged attractors in microdevelopment. It has also included some brief consideration 
of cognitive developments and their influence on personality development. However, 
the development of attractors in the personality state space is likely to be influenced 
by numerous other control parameters in a system's development. While such 
parameters cannot all be discussed here, the current writer would like to draw the 
reader's attention to the importance of motor and behavioural control parameters in 
state space development. 
25 Magai and Nusbaum (1996) have recently made an interesting suggestion regarding the 
macrodevelopmental stability of personality. Citing a study by Miller and CdeBaca (1994, cited in 
Magai & Nusbaum, 1996) they suggest that personality variables (individual attractors) are an 
important mediator of personality change (macro developmental lability). More specifically, they argue 
that some individuals appear to have a self-reflective capacity that makes them more open to change. 
Exactly which attractors are important in this regard remains unclear, but the implications are 
interesting and will be discussed below. 
26 This argument is somewhat similar to that made by Magai & Hunziker (1993) who suggest that an 
individual's unique emotional organisation is recruited during moments of crisis and transition. 
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For example, it is reasonable to suggest that the emergence of new motor skills like 
that of learning to walk, may act as cascading control parameters for emergence of 
attractors in the personality state space. Learning to walk could be expected to act 
enable the emergence of more precise motivational attractors relating to agency and 
the ability to act on the environment. Although the infant's capacity to influence the 
environment may be made evident to their system somewhat earlier, for example in 
the responses to non-ambulatory behaviours, it may be that capacities like walking 
directly enable the emergence of more precise attractors in their personality state 
space through coupling and feedback. 
Additionally, some attractors that emerge within the state space rely on a combination 
of innate and cascading control parameters from beyond the personality state space. 
Sexual motivations for example, typically emerge with the onset of puberty. 
Hormone levels, the development of secondary sex characteristics, exposure to sexual 
materials, as well as esteem and norm based factors (to name but a few) may 
interactively determine the emergence of sexual motivations in the personality state 
space, even though they themselves need not be represented within it. 
As with other attractors, the precise form and experience of the attractors representing 
sexual motivations will vary as a function of the totality of the state space (see above). 
However, notwithstanding issues of awareness and inter-individual variability in 
manifestation, the current model argues that the emergence of sexual attractors in the 
state space per se is near inevitable27 . Although they do not constitute a part of the 
personality state space prior to puberty, they are fated to emerge through the 
redescriptive process outlined in Chapter 4 once the necessary control parameters 
have themselves emerged. In this way, systemic developments from beyond the 
personality state space influence, and are made manifest within it. 
27 This is of course an oversimplification. While sexual or reproductive motivations are innate 
motivations within the current theory (see Chapter 3), their emergence is likely to depend on the 
cascading influences of numerou,s control parameters. Hence developmental misfortunes at a number 
of levels may interfere with the emergence of state space attractors at puberty. Nonetheless, the 
relative infrequency of complete interference is testament to the manner in which innateness places 
limits upon (constrains) development. 
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The affective nature of the developmental mechanism 
Yet despite the nonlinear complexity and highly interactive nature of cross-domain 
developments depicted above, the discussion above has argued that personality state 
space development is consistent across individuals insofar as the development of 
personality is primarily a function of innate emotional systems. As will be more 
comprehensively argued in Chapter 8, the primary systems of anger, fear, sadness, 
happiness and disgust are innate and universal in their function, if not in their 
experience. So even where the emergence of particular attractors depends on control 
parameters that exist beyond the state space it is only through emotional responding 
that they are elaborated within it. At no stage then does the progressive coupling of 
cognitive capacities with this core evaluative process change the basic action of the 
elaborative mechanism. 
Chapter 6.6 - Concluding remarks on the development of the personality 
state space 
Overall, the current theory views the macrodevelopment of the state space in a 
manner similar to Killeen (1989, 1991, 1992) and Lewis (M. D. Lewis, 1997, M. D. 
Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999). In this view, a comparatively 
barren state space topography becomes progressively more detailed as the organism 
develops attractors commensurate with the affectively indicated relationship between 
existing attractors and new stimuli and behaviours. As noted, these 'existing' 
attractors must initially be innate, but they are quickly elaborated. 
While the state space always retains the potential for change, the overall form of the 
personality state space and its major attractors becomes increasingly regular across 
macrodevelopmental time, as attractors become developmentally embedded (Izard et. 
aI., in press). As has been argued above, new attractors can only emerge in relation to 
the to~ality of the state space. 
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The discussion above has suggested that the mechanism underlying the elaboration of . 
the personality state space is initially and fundamentally affective in nature. In its 
initial microdevelopmental operations, the elaborative mechanism does not have 
access to (nor does it need) cognitive capacities other than those that constitute part of 
each primary emotion system to operate. Across developmental time however, 
emergent cognitive abilities are progressively coupled with the basic mechanism 
engendering a more powerful, flexible and complex elaborative mechanism. 
Taken together, the affectively-indicated associations between new stimuli and 
existing attractors, as well as emergent changes in the mechanism itself and the 
emergence of consciousness, lead to an ever more comprehensive and elaborate 
personality state space. In this dynamic topography attractors and repellors can exist 
in respect of any and all stimuli, up to and including the conscious experience of the 
personality state space itself. 
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Chapter 7 - Goals about Emotions: A motivational approach to 
understanding conscious emotional experience. 
Introduction and Overview 
In several of the preceding chapters, this dissertation has gone to some lengths to 
stress the importance of conceptually separating emotional states from emotional 
experience (cf. Lewis & Michalson, 1983; M. Lewis, 1993, 1998b). The reasons for 
separating these phenomena in our theories are many, but for the purposes of the 
chapter will be discussed only as relevant to the concept being developed herein. 
The chapter seeks to establish the viability of a particular goal concept in the 
motivational study of emotion and personality, a concept that is termed 'goals about 
emotions.' Typically when we study emotions we conceptualise of them as having an 
implicit goal. In anger this goal is usually thought to involve the removal of thwart, in 
fear a distancing from threat, and so on. Rarely however, have we explicitly 
considered the possibility that experiences of emotions are themselves motivated at 
the level of the individual. 
In some theories, the 'experience' of some emotions constitutes 'part of the package,' 
hence is innately wedded to the emotional state (e.g. Izard, 1991, 1994a). In other 
theories, emotional experience and indeed emotions themselves are socially 
constructed (e.g. Harre, 1986), and are innate only in the most limited of senses. As 
has been implied in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 6, the current dissertation occupies an 
intermediate position on this issue. As such, it is suggested that emotional 
experiences, but not emotional states are subject to socialisation influences!. More 
importantly however, state and experience thought to represent distinct phenomena 
I This statement is intended to describe the basic relationship between primary emotions and the 
experience of primary emotions. In line with LeDoux (1994a), it is suggested that experience is 
initially an output of emotional processing, not an integral part of the system that activates and 
processes emotional information. It is however acknowledged that once conscious experiences occur 
that they influence subsequent processing and the state. Additionally, as is expanded in Chapter 8, 
there is good reason to suppose that secondary emotions are different in that they may require some 
intemalisation of 'social values' prior to both the state and experience. 
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(Lewis, 1993, 1998b), and the two mayor may not co-occur (Averill, 1994a) in a 
given instance. 
Extending this reasoning, the argument below suggests that the experiences of 
emotions are as highly motivated as are other aspects of human functioning. In the 
terms of dynamic systems, the chapter argues that a conscious system inevitably 
develops attractors within what could be termed the 'experiential state space' 
delineating many aspects of emotional experience. In slightly less abstract terms, the 
current chapter argues that each of us wants and is motivated to experience variants of 
the different basic emotions at different frequencies, intensities, and so on (Mascolo & 
Griffin, 1998). 
In explicating this premise the current chapter will describe the individual 
macrodevelopment of goals about conscious emotional experience. It will begin by 
discussing and defining the complicated concept of experience, and will then provide 
a brief rationale for the study of motivations regarding conscious experience. Data 
from an exploratory study into the motivated dynamics of experience are then 
presented, and implications for the development of personality and conceptualisations 
of emotion and emotional experience are discussed. 
Chapter 7.1 - What is an emotional experience, are experiences necessary 
for emotions, and (either way) what are the prerequisites for experience? 
As Averill (1994a) notes, scientists (not to mention laypeople) often use the terms 
'feeling' and 'emotion' interchangeably. This unfortunate usage he argues, has led 
some theorists to think that emotions are really feelings, or at least that feelings are 
the essential feature of emotions (see also Solomon, 1993). More broadly, it seems as 
though our theories and methodologies frequently, albeit implicitly, treat emotional 
experiences as the defining characteristic of emotions2• 
2 See Ruch (1997) for a recent discussion on how methodological considerations may affect the 
relationship between expression and experience. 
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In some ways the adoption of such a position could be taken as due emphasis on the 
most salient aspect of emotional phenomena. After all, most people, including 
emotion theorists 'live' in their experiences, irrespective of what they are experiences 
of or about (see below), and notwithstanding whether they are in any objectifiable 
sense 'real'. In some very important ways, experience and feeling comprise the most 
immediate content of our sUbjective existences. Additionally, some theorists have 
suggested that "the presence or absence of detection of internal changes is of extreme 
importance for the subsequent emotional state" (Kagan, 1984, p. 41, see below), as 
are interpretative labels. 
And yet at the same time, most emotion theorists conceptualise of emotions as 
possessing or induding a far greater number of constituents than experience alone. At 
the very least, emotions involve physiological conditions and brain states, cognitive 
evaluations, and action impulses or instrumental behaviours (Panksepp, 1993), as well 
as experience. As Frijda and Mesquita (1998) note, emotional experience is just one 
of the emotion components among others3. More directly, the current dissertation has 
previously argued (see Chapter 3) that emotions may or may not involve the 
conscious experience of them (cf. Lewis & Michalson, 1983; M. Lewis, 1998b; 
Averill, 1994a). Instead, it has suggested that emotional states, the experience of 
emotions, and the conscious experience of emotions as pertaining or belonging to 
'me' are conceptually distinct and distinguishable phenomena. 
For ease of organisation, the discussion below has separated views on emotional 
experience as they pertain to the necessity for consciousness. While this approach 
does tend to obscure the details of each theoretical position, it has the advantage of 
enabling us to discuss the concept of experience within approximately the same 
terminology or at least 'pretend' that we are discussing the same topic. 
While theorists differ considerably in their views (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998), a 
division on the basis of consciousness illuminates two basic theoretical positions in 
the description of emotional experience and the relationships between experience and 
3 Solomon (1993), Buck (1985), and LeDoux (1989) have similarly criticised the tendency to treat 
experiences as necessary to emotion. Solomon (1993) describes such approaches as encapsulating a 
'subjective essentialism,' and links them to a Cartesian view of the world. 
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emotion. As is common when theorising about matters of such complexity, especially 
where the constituents of each theory seem inaccessible to direct measurement, the 
differences between the two camps frequently appear a matter of definition (Izard, 
1994a) and philosophical preference. 
Position 1: Experiences do not require consciousness 
The first position suggests that the experience of emotion is not limited to conscious 
organisms. Rather, internal experiences are thought to operate as a useful means to 
ascertain the status of goals (Stein & Levine, 1990), or to represent the self as a 
competitor in the world (Panksepp, 1994a). Stein and Levine (1990) for example, 
suggest that the critical dimension in defining and describing emotional experience 
involves "representing and evaluating change with respect to how valued goals have 
been affected" (p. 45, see also Stein & Trabasso, 1992). Panksepp (1994a) similarly 
argues that the evolution of internal awareness is a relatively efficient means to index 
biological relevance. 
In this view then, other species as well as pre-conscious infants, can have emotional 
experiences. Both Panksepp (1994a) and Averill (1994a) suggest that species other 
than our own are aware of both events in their environment and their responses to 
those events. On a similar basis, Stein and Levine (1990) have suggested that 
emotional experience directly results from attending to changes in goal status. Their 
discussion suggests that because young infants appear motivated to remove 
themselves from negative states that they must therefore be able to represent some 
other (more desirable) state, and thus experience (Stein & Levine, 1990). 
From a slightly different position, Izard (1994a) has likewise argued that emotional 
experiences (apart from those that require a self-referential element) do not require 
cognition, hence do not change with development (see also Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 
1998). Differential emotions theorists like Izard and Malatesta (1987) define emotion 
as "a particular set of neural processes that lead to a specific expression and a 
corresponding specific feeling" (p. 496, see also Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). 
Overall, the differential emotions school (e.g. Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Izard, 1990, 
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1994a) suggests that the basic motivational/feeling state of an emotion (the 
experience) is invariant4 and context independent. 
In Izard's theory then, the internal or external emotion-eliciting event triggers neural 
processes of evaluation that lead directly to the expression and a congruent or perhaps 
concurrent experience or feeling state (Izard, 1990), that mayor may not be available 
for self report (Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). This elementary approach to the 
concept of experience appears similar to aspects of that advocated by Frijda and 
colleagues (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998) who suggest that an emotional 
experience can be entirely unreflective and consist of nothing but the experience of an 
event as appraised, with affect as its perceived attractiveness or aversiveness. 
Reflectiveness is not part of the definition of experience (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998)5. 
While it is not explicitly discussed by most of the authors above, their consideration 
of experience appears to define the concept of experience as either an innate part of 
emotion (e.g. Campos & Barrett, 1984; Izard, 1990, 1994a), or as being equal to the 
awareness of goal-relevant change (e.g. Stein & Levine, 1990; Panksepp, 1994a, 
Averill, 1994a; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). Although the current dissertation does not 
limit the capacity for experience to conscious organisms (see below), it strongly 
eschews a stark equation of 'awareness' or emotion with experience. Not only does 
such a position invite unhelpful comparisons between homo sapiens and any 
'organism' (e.g. a tree, a thermostat, or a computer program) that attends to and 
responds to the environment or input, but it begs the question as to what function non-
conscious experiences could possibly serve (see below). 
For these authors, the difference between other species, and ourselves and between 
infants and adult humans appears to lie not in awareness per se, but in the 'awareness 
of being aware.' In Averill's (l994a) discussion, other species do not self-reference 
(see also Clore, 1994a; Harris, 1996, and M. Lewis, 1998b, for similar 
conceptualisations involving attention and a reflective self), while Frijda and Frijda 
4 Izard (1990) actually notes that while feelings are invariant over time, affective-cognitive structures 
(see Chapter 5) change with age. Additionally, Ackerman, Abe, and Izard (1998) have more recently 
suggested that experience may involve cognition, but thatfeeling does not. 
S According to these authors, "the only qualia are those of affect: the experience of pleasure and pain" 
(p. 290). This point is returned to below. 
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and Mesquita (1998) distinguish between reflexive and reflective types of experience. 
Harris (1996) has similarly suggested that young child feels and expresses emotions, 
but lacks the ability to conceptualise this experience. Using this type of criterion, 
most other species appear to lack a reflective awareness of self and thus the capacity 
to consciously reflect on 'their' experiences, even though 'they' have them. In briefly 
explaining this difference, Panksepp (1994a) has suggested that it is probably a 
function of linguistic or symbolic thought capacities (see also Averill, 1994a and 
below). 
Position II: Experiences require consciousness 
The leading proponent of the alternate position is Michael Lewis (e.g. Lewis & 
Michalson, 1983; Lewis, 1993, 1998b). Lewis is particularly explicit in his 
discrimination of emotional experiences from emotional states (Mascolo & Griffin, 
1998, see also Jaynes, 1991a). Unlike Izard (1994a), Lewis (1998b) defines an 
emotional experience as involving turning attention on the self in order to interpret 
and evaluate perceived emotional states and expressions. As such, his 
conceptualisation explicitly links experience to the self, to consciousness, and (thus) 
to cognitive development. He writes, "Emotional experience is very much like 
consciousness" (Lewis, 1998b, p. 42). 
More broadly, Lewis (1998b) suggests that emotional experiences are the 
interpretation and evaluation of the emotional state, its expression, the situation in 
which they occur, and beliefs about what 'ought' to be happening (Lewis, 1993). 
based on perceptual, memory, and elaboration processes (Lewis, 1998b). As such, the 
content of emotional experience is explicitly linked to socialisation processes (see 
below). His view is similar to that outlined in Salzen's (1991) TASS (Thwarted 
Action State Signalling) theory of emotions which suggests that self-awareness is not 
a requirement for emotion. According to him, 'the experience of emotion .. implies 
awareness ofthat emotional state" (Salzen, 1991, p. 76, italics added). 
In contrast to the position outlined above, Lewis' conceptualisation suggests that 
emotional experiences do not necessarily occur in conjunction with a state (Lewis, 
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1998b, see also Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992)6. Experiences may, for example, not 
occur because attention is captured by competing stimuli (Lewis, 1993, 1998b). So 
when a patient at the dentist is distracted from the pain through attending to loud 
music, they may not experience pain. This is not to say that pain does not exist at 
some level, simply that it is not experienced as pain. 
This particular approach to experience is similar to that outlined by emotion theorists 
operating from a constructivist position. Mascolo and Harkin (1998) for example, 
define emotional experience as consisting of the subjective awareness of feedback 
from the activity of the various component systems implicated in an emotional 
episode. Similarly, the theory of Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988) suggests that 
emotional experiences do not rely on an internal state per se. Rather, the experience 
of an emotion is a cognitive construction that, in their theory, needs no internal (state) 
referent. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) similarly suggest that when an emotion 
signal impinges on consciousness it does not represent an emotional state, rather "it is 
the experience of an emotional signal" (p. 214)7. 
In discussing emotional development, Lewis (1998b) suggests that the development 
of experiences may continue long after the development and emergence of states. In 
his theory, the capacity to experience emotions emerges around 15 months and 
changes the nature of earlier emotional states (1998b, p. 46), to the point where "the 
development of experience .. is likely to exert the most powerful force in the 
development of emotional life" (1998b, p. 47). Emotional experiences depend on 
how the world responds to emotional states, and could be considered the consequence 
of how other people interpret and respond to the infant's states and expressions 
(Lewis & Michalson, 1983). 
6 As a matter of definition, theorists from the former position would presumably argue that the 
experience exists, but that it is not necessarily a reflective or conscious experience. On this basis one 
wonders if there is ever a disjunction between experiences and states, if they are not in fact the same 
thing, and where unconscious emotions fit their schemes. 
7 As is discussed below, Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) continue to argue that the intensity of an 
experience increases the likelihood that the experience will represent the state. 
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Critiquing the conscious and non-conscious positions 
In considering any conceptualisation of 'experience' it becomes clear that there are 
currently no 'good' answers. Although the notion of a non-conscious experience 
seems problematic (Salzen, 1991), it is ,perhaps no more so than the notion that a non-
conscious organism 'experiences' nothing. Any position is inevitably complex 
(Mascolo & Griffin, 1998), must be built on assumption, and frequently denotes 
issues of definition (Izard, 1994a), the placing of the concept 'experience' in a 
broader theory, and philosophical preference. 
Mascolo and Griffin (1998) have recently suggested that some of the disagreements 
outlined above may concern the meanings of the terms each theorist uses. As noted, 
Lewis (1993, 1998b) separates the emotional state from its conscious experience, 
while Kagan (l984a) describes any undetected changes in emotion as internal 
changes and the detected ones feeling states8• Functionalists (e.g. Frijda & Mesquita, 
1998) in tum, assert that the experience of emotion changes across development, 
while differential theorists maintain the feeling state is invariant (Ackerman et. aI., 
1998). As a consequence of these terminological differences, it becomes difficult to 
decide whether each 'camp' is discussing the same issues. Such complexities are 
exponentially compounded when incorporating a distinction between reflexive and 
pre-reflexive (Averill, 1994a9) or reflexive and reflective (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998) 
experiential SUbtypes. 
Bearing the discussion above in mind, it appears most parsimonious to simply link 
experience to the ontogeny of consciousness in the manner advocated by Lewis (e.g. 
1993, 1998b). Through defining experience as dependent upon consciousness we can 
obviate much of the complexity and disagreement apparent above. Irrespective of 
what feelings or emotions actually are, they can only be experienced by conscious 
organisms. In this view, non-conscious organisms do not experience events, stimuli 
or emotions at all. Rather, they simply perceive and respond as if they had 
8 Kagan (1984) also suggests that motivational changes are absent without feeling, an interpretation 
eschewed by the current theory (see Chapter 3.7). 
9 Averill (1982) has previously noted that the notion of "completely prereflective experience is a myth" 
(p. 21), as all experience is given form in the rules and categories of reflective thought. 
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experiences. So while a state can exist III any system, the state can only be 
experienced by a system that is conscious. 
Yet despite its utility, this particular position is not acceptable to the bulk of emotion 
theorists (e.g. Izard, 1993, 1994a; Panksepp, 1994a, Averill, 1994a; Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1998). On balance, most appear unwilling to accept that other species and 
pre-conscious infants do not experience emotions. Exactly why this should be so 
remains unclear and inadequately reasoned in most theories, although my suspicion is 
that a major basis for this 'theoretical' decision lies in the implications stemming from 
the position of Lewis. Most immediately, the consciousness position on experience 
inevitably leads to a number of unsavoury inferences regarding the 'moral' 
conceptualisation of pre-conscious infants and other animals. lfthesecreatures do not 
actually experience loss, sadness, pain or joy, does the manner in which they are 
treated actually matter? 
Of greater difficulty however is the problem inherent in reconciling non-conscious 
experience with function. Accepting the possibility of non-conscious experience 
exposes a theory to a long-lived family of arguments from within the literature on 
consciousness (see Chapter 4.3). The 'explanatory gap' argument suggests that many 
of the same functional benefits imparted by phenomena like emotions can be attained 
without the experience of them. Within the functionalist approach advocated by most 
of the above authors, one is forced to wonder why non-conscious experience would 
have evolved at all lO (Hamad, 1998; see also Ortony et. al., 1988, p. 176), or what it 
adds. While Panksepp (1994a) has offered some explanation for this 'gap,' both 
Frijda's (1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998) and Izard's (e.g. Izard & Malatesta, 1987; 
Izard, 1994a) conceptualisations appear to implicitly treat experience (as defined by 
them) as almost epiphenomenal to emotion itself, simply stating that experience 
occurs with emotions without explaining whyll. 
10 As was noted in Chapter 4, the current dissertation assumes that consciousness evolved for a reason, 
and is not simply an epiphenomenal property that emerged from the complexity of the human psyche. 
11 Panksepp (e.g. 1991, 1992, 1994a) is one of the few emotion theorists who have provided a 
functional conceptualisation of non-conscious experience that goes some way toward addressing these 
problems. The current author is in agreement with Panksepp's ideas insofar as it is believed that the 
'answers' to these issues will be found in neuroscience rather than philosophy. 
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While the conceptualisations of experience as used by Izard and Frijda serve a useful 
purpose within their general frameworks (see Chapter 8), they, along with other 
emotion theorists do not seem interested in explicating the function served by non-
conscious experience. In theories about emotions, this important 'issue' is neither 
seen nor considered, but rather is left to philosophers (see Chapter 4) by default. 
Perhaps unfortunately, the emphasis of the immediate chapter precludes an attempt to 
explain the functions of non-conscious experience, although a functionalist account of 
conscious experience was offered earlier (see Chapter 4). It is important however that 
we remember that for the functionalist, a phenomenon like experience must serve 
purpose. As such, it is imperative that we couple views on non-conscious experience 
with the development of explanations for why they might occur and what function 
they serve. 
Position III: Experiences and conscious experiences are not the same 
While complex, the situation is not as hopeless as it first appears. While the 
conceptualisation of experience remains a problem, there does appear to be an 
implicit agreement among many theorists that there may exist more than one form of 
emotional experience. The current dissertation suggests that both conscious and non-
conscious experiences occur, but that the two are different, although highly related, 
phenomena. On this basis the following characterisations12 are proposed: 
(a). non-conscious experiences are the reflexive motivational 
expenences of an event as appraised, with affect as the event's perceived 
pleasantness or unpleasantness (innate qualia of valence). Non-conscious 
experiences are invariant, comprising part of the innate system for each 
primary emotion, must co-occur with the emergence of a primary emotional 
state, and can only occur in respect of primary emotions13. 
12 See Chapter 8 for a brief discussion of the difference between a 'definition' and a 'characterisation.' 
13 It would seem somewhat of an oxymoron to suggest that emotions that require a conscious of self to 
exist at all (e.g. shame, guilt, and pride), are capable of producing non-conscious experiences. 
However as clinical data suggest, this is not to say that a state of a secondary emotion like shame 
cannot occur without conscious awareness. 
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(b). conscious experiences - are the reflective motivational 
experiences of any or all the components of emotions (Frijda & Mesquita, 
1998) including bodily reactions, cognitive appraisals, action and regulation 
tendencies (enacted or not) as well as situational knowledge and beliefs, as 
pertaining to a conscious self. Unlike non-conscious experiences, conscious 
experiences are highly varied, differing between and within people, situations 
and emotions (Averill, 1994a). They may arise in respect of any primary or 
secondary emotions, or sequential combination thereof. 
The conceptual consideration of conscious and non-conscious experiences outlined 
here is in no way considered a finished product, but rather serves a purpose within the 
current framework (cf. Lazarus, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1991). As was noted 
earlier, there currently appear no unproblematic positions on the relationships 
between consciousness and experience. However, the definitions above do enable us 
to discuss the macro and micro developmental emergence of conscious emotional 
experience motivations (the focus of this chapter) as distinct from non-conscious 
experience. 
Making time scales explicit in the consideration of conscious emotional experiences 
Averill (1994a) suggests that a complete sketch of emotional experience necessitates 
the incorporation of a temporal dimension (see also Stein & Levine, 1990; Stein & 
Trabasso, 1992). Although his argument is not couched in dynamic terms, it is 
essentially similar to the developmental model of Marc Lewis (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 
1996, 1997, in press a) described in Chapter 6. Lewis suggests that we should 
consider emotional experience an emergent form that represents the interactions of 
real or microdevelopmental time events with and within macrodevelopmentally 
imposed attractors and constraints (M. D. Lewis, in press a). 
Microdevelopment 
ill describing the microdevelopmental or 'real time' emergence of emotional· 
experience, Averill (1994a) makes clever use of Dennett's (1991c) "Multiple Drafts" 
model. ill this approach, there is never a 'finished product' or output that is then 
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passed to consciousness as the experience. Rather, what constitutes experience 
depends on when, and presumably how (Ruch, 1997) we access it, both as scientists 
or phenomenal beings. As Averill notes, "an emotional experience is not the mere 
sum of its parts" (1994a, p. 382), but is rather a complex phenomenology that is being 
perpetUally updated as an emergent narrative ties the elements of emotions, 
knowledge and situations together (see also Lazarus, 1984; Ellsworth, 1991; Mancuso 
.. & Sarbin, 1998). 
Frijda and Mesquita (1998) likewise note that the role and structure of emotional 
experience may change across microdevelopment (see also Carnras, 1988; Epstein, 
1991). In their theory, experiences can begin as a nonreflective (non-conscious) 
experience of an event as appraised and as affect that merely influences action 
readiness and physiology, and eventuate as an articulate and reflective (conscious) 
awareness of the various components and their being "one's own" (p. 292). As with 
Averill's (1994a) conceptualisation, this type of description fits well with dynamic 
models of self-organisation in real-time (e.g. M. D. Lewis, in press b), and there is 
good reason to expect that the microdevelopmental self-organisation of conscious 
experience can be usefully described within the same framework. 
Complex emotional experiences like that of an all-consuming hate may well begin as 
relatively undifferentiated and non-conscious experiences of something 'bad' 
happening (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). As further appraisals are made, a more 
complex experience emerges as the valenced state couples in real time with cognitive 
perceptions and the apperception of physiological states to unfold as a conscious 
experience of irritation or frustration. Such experiences might in tum then couple 
with further perceptions and appraisals, as well as with beliefs, memories about this 
'sort' of event, the people present, coping capacities, and behavioural feedback to 
produce an emotional experience of hatred. Importantly, these dynamic events may 
take place within microseconds, the· patterns of emergence constrained as well as 
influenced by a large number of situational, intra systemic and interactional properties. 
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Macrodevelopment 
While microdevelopmental experiences appear infinitely varied and highly labile, the 
current theory also suggests that the individual is not free in microdevelopment to 
construct or have absolutely any conscious experience. According to Averill (l994a), 
experiential scripts are created as a function of past experiences, present 
circumstances and future aspirations. Lewis (M. D. Lewis, in press b) likewise 
suggests that the complementarities laid down across macrodevelopment, herein 
termed 'goals about emotions,' come to constrain the possibilities for thinking, feeling 
and acting in subsequent moments (see Chapters 4 and 5 for a broader discussion of 
the relationship between time-frames). More specifically, the dissertation suggests 
that the emergent experiences of the adult in microdevelopment are likely to represent 
historically repeated macrodevelopmental events in the form of attractors, repellors 
and constraints for experience. 
As noted, the current dissertation describes these macro developmental or personality 
variables that impact upon emotional experience as goals about emotions. As is 
expanded upon later in this chapter, the essential argument underlying this concept is 
that repeated microdevelopmental couplings, say that of an angry state with negative 
consequences, leads to the macrodevelopmental emergence of major attractors and 
repellors for the experience of anger and other emotions. Usually these will relate to 
the experience of anger, but may be created regarding other emotions. Over time, 
repeated couplings between states, experiences, and consequences lead to the 
development of comparatively stable constraints or limits upon later experience. 
It is thus to be expected that goals about emotions may first develop as attractors and 
constraints regarding emotional states or non-conscious experiences. However, it is 
also suggested that when consciousness emerges that these previous state space 
characteristics must constitute the initial conditions for goals about the conscious 
experience of emotions. At the time that consciousness emerges there should 
typically be a high correspondence between the attractors representing emotional 
states and the conscious experiences of these states14. It seems reasonable to suppose 
14 Michael Lewis (1993) has recently suggested that there may initially exist little in the way of 
relationship between the state and conscious experience of emotions (see also Ortony, et. aI.. 1988). 
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that if a given emotional state is represented in the state space as a repellor, then the 
first conscious experiences of this region will typically be negative. This point will be 
expanded upon following presentation of an exploratory study. 
Chapter 7.2 - A tripartite rationale: Why should we exaIll1ne the 
development of motivations regarding the conscious experience of 
emotions? 
Although some reasoning for studying the motivational aspects of conscious 
emotional experience is evident above, there are several other excellent reasons for 
investigating this type of phenomenon. Firstly, goal theories have long argued that 
goals can exist at many levels, being outcome events, broad modes of conduct, or 
emotional states (Hyland, 1987; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Parrott, 1993; Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Carver, 1997). More directly, Parrott (1993) has recently argued 
that "there is a greater number of motives for emotional self-control than is usually 
supposed, including some that can appear quite irrational or self-destructive" (p. 278). 
A basic assumption of several theories of emotion is that people prefer certain states 
to others (Stein & Levine, 1990), and some theorists have gone so far as to argue that 
"all people have conceptions about positive states .. about what these states should be 
and how they should feel" (Stein & Trabasso, 1992, p. 236). In a similar vein, Frijda 
and Mesquita (1994) note that emotions derive through concerns (goals) which 
involve the preference of or for particular states of the world and the self. They 
suggest that "the implications of having a particular emotion at a particular moment is 
itself an emotional event" (1994, p. 59), "having both social and individual origin" (p. 
60). Overall then, the notion that emotional experiences may be motivated at an 
individual level, if not explicit, is at least consistent with several leading theories of 
emotions (see also Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992). 
According to him, correspondence emerges along with the 'competing' ability to dissociate state from 
experience. In contrast, the current theory suggests that while emotional experiences may be some 
time in development, that they will tend to exemplify the state space dimensions relevant to the 
emotional state. 
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More directly, the current chapter extends a premise stipulated earlier in the 
dissertation to include the conscious experience of emotions. In Chapter 1 it was 
argued that all aspects of human functioning are motivational insofar as they cannot 
help but in some way represent the motives (manifest as attractors and repellors) held 
by the individual. Additionally, it was suggested in Chapter 6 that consciousness may 
act as a control parameter for the emergence of state space attractors regarding the 
conscious (frequently emotional) experience of that same space. Most simply, there is 
no reason to suspect that experiences in general and conscious emotional experiences 
in particular are any less motivated than other aspects of human functioning. 
This complex approach to emotional experience is consistent with the ideas of 
Tomkins (1962). Tomkins describes what he terms the 'neurotic paradox,' in which 
individuals become distressed (emotionally react) when experiencing their own 
emotional reactions. In particular he suggests that in many cases, the negative 
emotions become organised in such a manner that particular experiences within the 
affect system tend to activate other negative affect systems (see also Izard, 1991). 
A second reason why we might consider investigating a concept like goals about 
emotions is to a degree less grandiose than that above, and can be found in a brief 
examination of the literature on infant emotional development. In addition to the 
general dearth of research into infant motive development noted in Chapter 4, 
research into infant emotions has thus far not seriously examined the development or 
structure of infant (or adult) emotional experience (Lewis, 1998b). The topic has 
traditionally defied scientific analysis (Lang, 1994). 
To date, most developmental research in the emotions can be broadly classed as 
focussing on one of three major research areas. Research has typically examined 
either (a) the development of emotional expression (e.g. Lewis & Michalson, 1983; 
Lewis et. at, 1990; Alessandri et. aI., 1990; Izard, Huebner, et. al, 1980; Izard, 
Fantauzzo, et. al., 1995; Izard, 1997; Camras, 1992, 1994) and recognition (e.g. 
Haviland & Lelwicka, 1987, cited in Magai, 1996; Nelson & DeHaan, 1997) of 
emotions; (b) the development of the elicitors of emotions (Dunn, 1994; see Chapter 
5), or (c) the macrodevelopmental emotional sequelae of early interactions in 
attachment (e.g. Magai & McFadden, 1995; Mikulincer, 1996, 1998), self-regulation 
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(e.g. Thompson, 1990), or socialisation (e.g. Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 
1998a, b) frameworks. 
As such, an understanding of emotional experience and the development of 
experience stands as an important (Ortony et. al., 1988), yet poorly researched, 
domain (Linville, 1982; Flett, Boase, McAndrews, Pliner, and Blankstein, 1986; 
Lewis, 1998b). This gentle censure becomes all the more pressing when we 
reconsider the importance of conscious emotional experience both in our daily lives as 
phenomenal beings, and in the motivational model of personality state space 
development outlined in Chapter 6. Although conscious emotional experience is only 
one part of emotion, it is nonetheless the part that is most salient to each of us (Oatley, 
1992), and the aspect of emotion through which we 'interface' with, and consciously 
change our personality state spaces. 
Emotion-related phenomena constitute a key aspect of some personality theories (e.g. 
Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971, 1991, 1997; Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Magai & 
McFadden, 1995; Magai, 1996), an assertion supported by research (e.g. Gross et. aI., 
1998). Aspects of emotions, their experience and regulation are thought to be highly 
heritable (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Gross et. aI., 1998) and are conceptualised as 
being critical in the development of personality (Thompson, 1990; Fox & Collins. 
1993; Eder & Mangelsdorf, 1997). Although this body of research has not always 
focussed on emotional experience, its totality nonetheless once more underscores the 
likely importance of emotional experiences in personality development. 
Finally, a conceptualisation of emotional experience as motivated, rather than as a 
simple readout (e.g. Buck, 1999), may indirectly help alleviate one of the most 
prominent difficulties threatening the face validity of discrete approaches to emotions 
like that advocated here. Research indicates that people frequently report their 
affective experience as being highly complex, a blend of moods, emotions, and affects 
(e.g. Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Oatley & Duncan, 1992). Yet from a structurally 
discrete perspective, blended emotions do not occur (Izard et. aI., in press). Rather, 
the discrete position argues that multiple discrete emotions self-organise to form new 
structures, but that each discrete emotion retains its unique motivational properties 
(Izard et. aI., in press; see Chapter 8). Given this difficulty, a motivational approach 
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that distinguishes conscious experiences from the underlying emotional state could be 
of some benefit. More specifically, it may help explain why and how the same basic 
states are experienced differently across individuals and situations. 
Chapter 7.3 - Assessing Goals about Emotions: An exploratory study 
Overall, the combined thrust of the rationale above suggests that an understanding of 
emotional experience and its development could be of considerable benefit. Emotions 
and emotional experience appear central to personality functioning, experience and 
development. Despite the lack of conceptual and empirical work on the development 
of emotional experience noted above, this dissertation argues that emotional 
experiences are highly motivated phenomena that have numerous implications for our 
theories about human development and functioning. 
Hypotheses 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, there were relatively few explicit 
hypotheses prior to the initiation of the study. Rather, it was intended that the study 
would serve as a pilot in the development of a tool that would enable the assessment 
of goals about emotions. Consequently, numerous post-hoc analyses are presented in 
order to suggest directions for future research. The general hypotheses that were 
stipulated prior to the collection of data are given below. 
1. That the major dimensions describing the experience of emotions (liking, 
intensity and duration) will vary (a) between emotions, (b) between 
individuals for the same emotion, and (c) within individuals across 
emotions. 
2. That variations in emotional experience will be highly associated with the 
indirect measure of emotional experience motivation (How much do you 
like feeling emotion x?). 
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3. That the measure of emotional experience motivation will be predictive of 
both the frequency and recency of emotional episodes. 
4. That measures of emotional experience will be associated with (a) 
measures of child expressive style and parental socialisation practices 
(Child Emotions Scale), and (b) a measure of adult attachment (Collins & 
Read, 1990). 
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen female and 18 male students (mean age = 24.1 years) from the University of 
Canterbury (New Zealand) took part in the study. Participants were recruited during 
their summer break through advertisement at the local student job agency, and were 
paid NZ$10 for completing the questionnaires15 . Of 41 questionnaires passed out, 37 
were returned within three days. The remaining four subjects could not be contacted 
for the return of the questionnaires. 
Measures 
Given the exploratory nature of the research, the goals about emotions questionnaire 
(see Appendix 1) contained a large number of nine-point Likert items measuring 
several aspects of emotions and emotional experience. A number of the items were 
designed to measure dimensions of conscious emotional experience (Items 1, 2, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10), others to assess frequencies of experience (Items 3 & 4), and others to 
measure beliefs about the consequences of emotions (Items 5, 11, & 12). The 12 
questions were repeated for each of six emotions (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
shame, and pride) and the questions relating to one emotion were given together in 
order to maximise the participants' awareness and orientation towards their 
15 Subjects completed a number of questionnaires at this time. In addition to completing the goals 
about emotions form, they also completed a further questionnaire related to an appraisal study 
(presented in Chapter 8), as well as a questionnaire assessing perceptions of the Internet that is not 
presented here. 
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experience of each emotion in tum. Each question and its abbreviated description are 
provided below. 
Item 1 (Liking): Please indicate how much you like or dislike feeling X? 
Item 2 (Intensity): Is your experience of X typically more or less intense that your experience of other emotions? 
Item 3 (Recency): When did you most recently feel X? 
Item 4 (Frequency): How frequently do you feel X? 
Item 5 (Following): Which of the following emotions do you typically feel immediately following your experience of 
X? 
Item 6 (Immediate self-perception): How do you feel about yourself when you have just been X? 
Item 7 (Ease): How easily do you become X? 
Item 8 (General self-perception): How do you feel about yourself as a person who gets X? 
Item 9 (Duration): How long does an experience of X usually last for you? 
Item 10 (Onset Speed): How quickly ~o you become X? 
Item 11 (Consequences): Are the consequences that follow feeling X usually good or bad for you? 
Item 12 (Goal Assistance): Does feeling X help you attain your goals? 
While a full discussion of each item is not possible at this juncture, some discussion 
will be given to the design of the major 'predictor' item. Item 1 asked the participants 
to indicate how much they liked or disliked feeling each emotion. This item was 
intended to provide an indirect motivational measure regarding the experience of each 
emotion. Given the likely ontogeny of goals about emotions (see below), and the 
relatively inaccessibility of them to awareness and verbal articulation, it was thought 
that directly asking participants about an abstract concept like goals about emotions, 
would elicit data more representative of conscious beliefs about emotions, experience, 
and the self, than experience per se. 
Consequently, it was felt that an indirect experiential measure provided the best 
opportunity to measure motivational aspects of emotional experience without eliciting 
199 
concordant or constructed confounds in conscious belief16. Overall, it was reasoned 
that the differential extent to which a person liked or disliked feeling a particular 
emotion could be taken as broadly indicative of the likely presence of goals regarding 
its experience. So for example, ratings in which people indicated strongly disliking 
feeling a particular emotion are taken as indicative of goals regarding its relative 
avoidance, and vice versa. 
Two measures that relate to the fourth hypothesis were included. The first of these 
was the Emotion as a Child Scale (EAC II), an exploratory measure developed by 
Carol Magai and colleagues (see Appendix 2). The EAC II measures two important 
components of emotional development. Firstly, it provides data describing the 
subject's recollections of their childhood coping/expressive styles for anger, sadness, 
fear, and shame (withdrawing, expressing, distracting) for the emotions of anger, fear, 
sadness, and shame. Secondly, it offers a self-reported estimate of the level of each 
parental socialisation 'type' (neglectful, rewarding, punitive, overriding, magnifying) 
for these same emotions. Although the scale has not yet been published, studies by 
Magai and colleagues (in preparation) show that it has adequate internal and test-
retest reliability for both child expressive and maternal socialisation measures (Magai, 
personal communication 7th July, 1999). 
The final measure used was a dimensional measure of adult attachment adapted from 
Collins and Read (1990). Unlike the discrete measure of attachment style typically 
used in studies of children and its adult counterpart (cf. Hazan & Shaver, 1987), the 
Adult Attachment Scale (see Appendix 3) measures three dimensions of attachment-
dependability, anxiety, and closeness. The advantage of this measure is that it enables 
a more finegrained picture of attachment styles, enabling us to assess the degree to 
which a particular style characterises each subject, and avoiding the problem inherent 
in assuming that discrete attachment styles are necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The first dimension of the scale (Items 1,4, 7, 10, 13, and 15) assesses the degree to 
which each subject feels or believes that other people are dependable. Data from this 
16 Although her work focussed on mood terms rather than emotions, Feldman-Barrett (1996) has noted 
that while the hedonic tone of an affective state is not identical to the social desirability of that same 
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dimension have been coded (summed across items) so that a high score represents a 
high belief or feeling that other people will be available when needed. The second 
dimension (Items 2, 5, 8, 11, 16) measures the extent of abandonment anxiety, again 
with higher scores representing greater anxiety. Finally, the third dimension (Items 3, 
6, 9, 12, 15, 17) measures the degree to which a subject felt comfortable being close 
to other people, with higher scores representing greater comfort with interpersonal 
closeness. 
Results 
The first hypothesis suggested that the dimensions of conscious emotional experience 
would vary (a) between and within emotions, (b) between individuals for the same 
emotion, and (c) within individuals between emotions. Overall, support for the first 
hypotheses was intended to establish the need for more comprehensive theorising 
about the dimensions and origins of emotional experiences. Overleaf, the results as 
they bear on the initial hypotheses are presented as grouped around different means of 
examining variation in the experience of emotions. The reader should be aware that 
not all aspects of this large data set are described, but are included (see Table 7.1) for 
completeness alone. Rather, attention is initially focussed on the proximate 
experiential variables of Liking, Intensity, and Duration. 
state, social desirability has a substantial relationship with self-report ratings of experience. It was felt 
that this influence could be minimised by approaching the topic in the manner described. 
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Emotion 
Anger Sadness Happiness Fear Shame Pride 
~ 
u Liking M=3.19 M=2.32 M=8.65 M=2.49 M=1.51 M=6.84 ~ 
~ (Item 1) sd=l.73 sd=l.23 sd=O.63 sd=l.55 sd=O.77 sd=2.40 ..... I-< 
~ Intensity M=5.16 M=5.57 M=6.95 M=5.21 M=5.46 M=5.46 0.. 
l>< (Item 2) sd=2.23 sd=2.13 sd=1.51 sd=2.04 sd=2.16 sd=l.89 I:il 
........ Immediate self- M=3.57 M=3.68 M=8.41 M=4.03 M=2.37 M=7.24 ro 
~ perception (Item 6) sd=l.66 sd=1.49 sd=O.96 sd=1.32 sd=O.98 sd=l.99 0 
..... General self- M=4.57 M=5.51 M=8.08 M=4.35 M=3.41 M=6.05 ....... 0 perception (Item 8) sd=l.83 sd=2.12 sd=1.41 sd=1.40 sd=1.76 sd=2.05 S 
I:il Ease M=3.89 M=5.16 M=6.73 M=4.49 M=4.68 M=4.57 
4-< (Item 7) sd=2.17 sd=2.15 sd=l.95 sd=1.69 sd=2.15 sd=2.23 0 
~ Duration M=3.19 M=4.62 M=6.38 M=2.97 M=4.22 M=4.29 0 
..... (Item 9) sd=l.68 sd=2.18 sd=2.22 sd=l.64 sd=l.97 sd=1.88 en ~ Onset Speed ~ M=5.54 M=4.76 M=3.65 M=5.03 M=5.1l M=5.54 S (Item 10) sd=2.26 sd=1.90 sd=2.21 sd=2.03 sd=l.97 sd=1.91 ..... Q Consequences M=4.94 M=5.08 M=7.84 M=5.35 M=3.68 M=7.22 
(Item 11) sd=1.94 sd=1.94 sd=1.40 sd=1.39 sd=1.81 sd=l.75 
Goal Assistance M=3.94 M=2.97 M=7.65 M=4.35 M=2.92 M=6.68 
(Item 12) sd=2.37 sd=l.98 sd=1.69 sd=2.24 sd=1.96 sd=2.24 
Table 7.1 - Showing the mean and standard deviation for nine aspects of conscious 
emotional experience for Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Fear, Shame and Pride. 
Across Subject-Between Emotion analyses 
Table 7.1 shows that there is considerable variation III the degree to which the 
experience of different emotions were liked. A one-way, repeated-measures 
MANOV A on liking, duration and intensity showed a significant main effect for 
emotion on the liking scores (F(5, 180) = 145.47, p < 0.01). It should .however be 
noted that the MANOV A assumption of sphericity has been violated in this analysis 
(X2 (14) = 48.83, P < 0.01), necessitating some further analysis17. 
Post hoc testingl8 showed that experiences of happiness were liked significantly more 
than experiences of all other emotions (all P's < 0.0001). Similarly, experiences of 
pride were liked significantly more than experiences of anger, sadness, fear, and 
shame (all P's < 0.000001). fu addition, experiences of shame were liked 
significantly less than experiences of anger (p < 0.001). 
17 The MANOVA sphericity test is most readily thought of as analogous to a Levene homogeneity test 
for MANOV A or repeated measures ANOV A. 
18 All post-hoc testing completed using Scheffe tests. 
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Figure 7.1 - Categorised histogram showing the distribution of ' liking' (Item 1) 
ratings for the experience of Anger, Sadness, Fear, Shame, Pride, and Happiness. 
Anger (MLiking = 3.19, sd = 1.73), Fear (MLiking = 2.49, sd = 1.55), Pride (MLiking = 
6.84, sd = 2.40), and to a lesser extent Sadness (MLiking = 2.32, sd = 1.22) statistics 
also shovv large variations in the extent to which an experience of each emotion was 
liked by individual subjects. Put simply, the degree to which a discrete emotional 
experience was liked varied considerably between subjects. Additionally, post-hoc 
Levene tests revealed that the liking ratings for experiences of Pride were more varied 
than all other emotions (p < 0.01), while the liking for experiences of Happiness 
( M Liking == 8.65, sd = 0.63) and Shame (MLiking = 1.51 , sd = 0.77) were less varied 
between subjects than the liking ratings for anger, sadness, and fear (all p ' s < 0.01). 
In addition to helping explain the sphericity trouble noted above, this normative 
difference in between-emotion liking variance has some important implications for 
the conceptualisation of function in emotion that will be addressed below. 
Table 7.1 also shows marked differences in the average intensity of the experiences 
for the six different emotions. A one-way, repeated-measures MANOVA showed a 
significant main effect for emotion on the intensity of emotional experiences (F(5, 
180) = 4.13, p < 0.01). As above however, there were also considerable between 
emotion differences in the amount of variability within the intensity ratings. Taken as 
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a whole, the variability 'within Anger (Mlntensity = 5.16, sd = 2.23), Sadness (Mlntensity = 
5.57, sd = 2.13), Fear (Mlntensit:, = 5.21 , sd = 2.04), and Shame (Mlntensity = 5.46, sd = 
2.16) ratings was greater than that among intensity ratings for positive affects of 
Happiness (Mlntensity= 8.65, sd = 1.51) and Pride (Mlnlensity= 5.46, sd = 1.89), although 
non-significantly (X2 (14) = 15.92, n.s.) . 
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Figure 7.2 - Categorised histogram showing the distributions for duration of 
emotional experience estimates for anger (M=3 .19, sd = 1.68), sadness (M=4.62, sd = 
2.l8), happiness (M=6.38, sd = 2.22), fear (M=2.97, sd = 1.64), shame (M=4.22, sd = 
1.97) and pride (M=4.29, sd = 1.88). 
Both Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show that the duration of emotional experiences varied 
between the emotions. A one-way repeated measures MAN 0 V A showed a 
significant main effect for emotion on duration (F(5 , 180) = 14.09, P < 0.01). 
Figure 7.2 shows that happiness is typically experienced as being longer than 
experiences of all other emotions. It also raises the possibility that experiences of 
sadness, shame, and pride are often longer than experiences of anger and fear. 
However given the lack of a priori predictions, post-hoc testing showed that while 
experiences of Happiness (MDuration = 6.38, sd = 2.22) were reported as being 
significantly longer than experiences of all other emotions (all p-values < 0.01), the 
only other significant difference was that between experiences of Fear (MDuration = 
2.97, sd = 1.64) and experiences of Sadness (MDuration = 4.62, sd = 2.l8, p< 0.01). 
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Within Subject Analyses 
In addition to the results reported above, the first hypothesis also predicted high 
degrees of variation within subjects on the three major dimensions of emotional 
experien e (liking, intensity, and duration) . Although the current data do not permit 
any definitive statement as to what constitutes ' high variation,' inferences are 
nonethel ss possible through an examination of within subject-across emotion reports. 
For the following figure (see Figure 7.3 below), within-subject ranges have been 
created for each experiential variable (Liking, Intensity, and Duration) across the six 
emotions (anger, sadness, happiness, fear, shame, and pride). 
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Figure 7.3 - Histograms showing the distributions of within-subject ranges in self-
reported Intensity (Figure 7.3a), Liking (Figure 7.3b), and Duration (Figure 7.3c) of 
experience across six emotions . 
As can be clearly seen in Figure 7.3b (above), most subjects demonstrated a large 
range in the degree to which they liked experiencing the different emotions (MRange 
Liking = 7.32, sd = 0.94), on average each subject using 8.32 points on the 9-point scale 
provided. Equally, most subject also showed a relatively high range in the duration of 
different emotional experiences (MRange Duration = 5.62, sd = 1.36). Finally, subjects 
also reported a large range in the intensity of different emotional experiences (MRange 
Intensit) = 4. 86, sd = 1.87). As is discussed below, this latter finding (of high within-
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subject intensity variance across emotions) is particularly important. Diener et. al. 
(1985, 1986) have suggested that each individual has a 'preferred' intensity for all 
emotional experiences, while the current data suggest that the intensity of experiences 
may vary per emotion. Consequently, the 'chronic' position of individual affective 
intensity may be incorrect or at least require substantial elaboration. 
Relationships between 'liking' and other dimensions of emotional experience 
It was predicted that variations in the dimensions of emotional experience would be 
associated with the measure of emotional experience motivation (Item 1). The results 
relevant to this hypothesis were mixed, and varied considerably across both emotions 
and measures. 
Relationship between variables (Pearson's r) 
Emotion Liking x Intensity Liking x Duration Intensity x Duration 
Anger 0.38a -0.14 0.12 
Sadness -0.46c -0.37a 0.55d 
Happiness 0.27 0.28 0.58d 
Fear 0.20 0.05 0.07 
Shame 0.16 0.02 0.43b 
Pride 0.48c 0.49c 0.60d 
Table 7.2 - Correlations between Liking, Intensity, and Duration ratings for anger, 
sadness, happiness, fear, shame, and pride. (a p < 0.05, b P < 0.01, c p < 0.005, d P < 
0.001). 
Table 7.2 shows that Intensity of experience is positively related to the Liking of the 
experience for five emotions, but only significantly for the emotions of anger 
(r=O.38), and pride (r=0.48). In contrast, the Intensity of sadness experiences was 
negatively related to the Liking of them (r= -0.46), with individuals liking sadness 
more indicating that experiences were typically less intense. Liking was largely 
unrelated to Duration ratings, with the exception of the relationships for sadness (r= -
0.37) and pride (r=0.49). Finally, Intensity and Duration ratings are themselves 
positively related, as in the case of sadness (r = 0.55), happiness (r=0.58), shame (r= 
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0.43) and pride (r= 0.60) in which more intense experiences also tend to be reported 
as lasting relatively longer. 
Dimensions of Emotional Experience 
Emotion Immediate self- General self- Ease of Speed of Consequences Goal perception perception Onset Onset Assistance 
Liking for 0.63d 0.38a 0.38a -0.33a 0.27 0.37a Anger 
Liking for 0.44b 0.14 -0.15 0.11 0.34a 0.36a Sadness 
Liking for 0.52c 0.38a 0.30 -0.37a 0.59d 0.09 Happiness 
Liking for 0.34a 0.33a -0.14 0.08 -0.04 0.26 Fear 
Liking for 0.33a 0.36a -0.03 0.27 0.26 0.21 Shame 
Liking for 0.74d 0.70d -0.51c -0.36a 0.59d 0.47c Pride 
Table 7.3 - Post-hoc correlations between Liking (Item 1) ratings and other aspects of 
emotional experience (a p < 0.05, b P < 0.01, C P < 0.005, d P < 0.001). 
Additional post-hoc correlations (see Table 7.3) show that the liking of an emotional 
experience was positively related to subjects' responses to the immediate self-
perception question (Item 6) for all emotions. People reported themselves as liking an 
emotional experience more when they reported feeling more positive about 
themselves immediately following the experience. The liking of a particular 
emotional experience was similarly (although more weakly) related to the general 
self-perception item (Item 8), for all emotions except sadness. For most emotions, 
subjects tended to report themselves as liking an emotional experience more when 
they felt more positive about themselves as a person who feels that emotion. 
The question measuring how easy subjects found it to become emotional (Item 7) was 
erratically associated with the liking of that experience. People who found it easier to 
get angry also reported liking it more (r= 0.38), while people who reported a high 
liking for feeling proud tended to report that they became proud with more difficulty 
(r= -0.51). However, ratings regarding the experience of sadness, happiness, fear, and 
shame showed no relationship between liking and ease of onset. 
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Interestingly, people who reported liking an emotion frequently tended to report it as 
having a lower onset time (Item 10). The correlation between liking and onset time 
(while varied) was significant in the cases of anger (r= -0.33), happiness (r= -0.37) 
and pride (r= -0.36). In each of these three cases, a higher rating for liking an emotion 
was associated with a quicker onset for the experience. 
The liking of an emotion was infrequently associated with beliefs as to whether the 
consequences of that emotion were generally positive (Item 11). Significant positive 
correlations were observed in the case of sadness (r= 0.34) and happiness (r=0.59), in 
which greater liking for the experience was associated with the belief that the 
consequences of this emotion were typically positive. No significant relationships 
were observed for reports on the experience of anger, fear, shame or pride. 
Finally, the liking of emotional experiences was positively related to the belief that 
feeling such emotions helped the subject attain goals (Item 12). Ratings regarding 
experiences of Anger (r= 0.37), sadness (r= 0.36), and pride (r=0.47) all showed a 
significant positive relationship between the liking of the experience and the belief 
that the experience helped, while ratings for happiness (r=0.09), fear (r=0.26), and 
shame (r=0.26) all showed a nonsignificant trend in this same direction. 
Overall, the liking of an emotion appears to bear a complex relationship with other 
facets of the experience. Although the extent to which an emotion is liked is 
frequently predictive of other aspects of emotional experience, the predictive utility of 
the liking measure varies considerably as a function of both the emotion and the 
experiential variable in question. As is discussed below, the findings discussed thus 
far underscore the complexity of emotional experience as much as they do highlight 
the utility of a motivational orientation when considering the experience of emotions. 
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Predicting the frequency of emotional experiences 
The third hypothesis suggested that the measure of emotional experience motivation 
(liking) would be predictive of both the frequency and the recency of experiences of 
that type. Both the frequency (Item 4) and the recency (Item 3) questions used a non-
Likert scale, simply asking subjects to indicate the two measures in terms of the 
number of episodes per hour, day, week, or month (see Appendix 1). Upon collation, 
these data were standardised so that each figure represented (a) the frequency of 
experiences/day or (b) the most recent experience (again in days) . While it was felt 
that asking these questions in this manner would more validly access people 's 
estimates of what constituted an experience of each emotion for them, such framing 
had the unfortunate side effect of producing highly skewed distributions. As can be 
seen in Figures 7.4a and c below, the raw self-report data were highly skewed. 
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Fig 7.4 - Categorised histograms showing the raw (Figs 7.4a and 7.4c) and 
transforn1.ed (Figs 7.4b and 7.4d) distributions of for self-reported Frequency and 
Recency ratings summed across six emotions. 
Given the form of these distributions it was possible to treat the extreme ratings on 
each variable as outliers and exclude them from analysis_ However, given both the 
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number and the nature of these 'outlying' estimates, it was felt that a log (10) 
transformation provided a better trade-off between retaining some measure of 
subjective validity and ensuring a data set amenable to further linear analyses. 
Variables being correlated 
Emotion Liking x Recency Liking x Frequency Frequency x Recency 
Anger (N=36) -OA6d OAlb -0.68e 
Sadness (N=36) 0.08 -0.17 -0.68e 
Happiness (N=33) -0.29 OAOb -O.64e 
Fear (N=36) 0.03 0.33a _O.64e 
Shame (N=36) 0.21 -0.23 -0.72e 
Pride (N=37) -0.27 O.Sld -0.73e 
All Emotions 
-OA7e 0.S4d -0.7ge (N= 214) 
Table 704 - Correlations between Liking (Item 1) ratings and self-reported measures 
of Frequency (Item 4) and Recency (Item 3) of emotional experiences for six 
emotions (a p < O.OS, b P < 0.01, C P < O.OOS, d P < 0.001, e p < 0.0001). Note that 
Recency and Frequency ratings have been transformed (log(lO)) as described above. 
Table 7 A shows that the extent to which an emotion was reported as being liked is 
correlated with the days since the most recent experience of that emotion only in the 
case of anger (r= -0.46) and across all emotions (r= -0047). Generally, the more 
emotions were liked, the fewer the number of days since the last occurrence of them. 
The specific relationships between liking and recency also approached significance 
for the emotions of happiness (r= -0.29, p = 0.08) and pride (r= -0.27, p = 0.10). 
The frequency with which emotions were reported as being experienced was often 
associated with the liking rating for that emotion. Anger (r=OA1), happiness 
(r=OAO), fear (r=0.33), pride (r=O.Sl), and overall (r=0.S4) ratings, all suggest that an 
increased liking for an emotion is associated with more frequent experiences of it. 
Importantly this relationship is evident for both positive (happiness, pride) and 
negative (anger, fear) emotions. Ratings for the emotions of sadness (r= -0.17) and 
shame (r= -0.23) both showed a non-significant trend in the opposite direction, 
indicating that a greater liking for the emotional experience was associated with less 
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frequent experiences of that type. As above (see results in Table and Figure 7.1), such 
results indicate something about the experiential nature of function served by these 
two emotions. 
Overall, the results in Table 7.4 once more underscore the complexity of emotional 
experience and the specificity of the relationships between variables to particular 
emotions. Nonetheless, when viewed as a whole, the relationships between 
behavioural reports of frequency and recency with the relative liking for a particular 
experience support hypothesis three as outlined above. Although recency reports are 
erratically related to liking ratings, the degree of liking for a particular experience is 
predictive of the frequency of that experience for four of six emotions. The fact that 
liking ratings for sadness and shame experiences were not predictive of the frequency 
of them should not distract from the overall impact of this finding. Rather, it should 
be taken as indicating the need for more careful examination of the relationships 
between experience and function for the different emotions. 
The developmental timeframe for goals about emotions 
The final hypothesis noted above suggested that measures of emotional experience 
would be associated with (a) measures of child expressive and coping styles and with 
parental socialisation practices for emotions (EAC II Scale), and (b) with a measure of 
adult attachment. Below, a series of post-hoc analyses that bear on these hypotheses 
are presented. 
The first analysis involved examining the relationships between the parental subscales 
of the EAC II and the major aspects of emotional experience. As noted above, the 
EAC II generates five subscales for each emotion (neglectful, rewarding, punitive, 
overriding, and magnifying). Each subscale represents the extent or level of each 
parental style for the particular emotion. A full analysis of the relationships between 
each subscale and all the dependent measures is not possible here, so analysis has 
been restricted to an analysis of the relationships between levels of parental 
socialisation styles and four measures of emotional experience (liking, intensity, 
duration, and frequency) for the four emotions (anger, fear, sadness and shame) 
measured by the CES II. 
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Parental Socialisation Style (per CES II) 
Emotion Neglectful Rewarding Punitive Overriding Magnifying 
Anger 
- Liking 0.07 -0.11 0.03 0.02 -0.17 
- Intensity 0.31 a 0.06 0.28 0.22 0.06 
- Duration 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.10 
- Frequency 0.38 a -0.31 a 0.09 -0.21 0.29 
Fear 
- Liking 0.01 -0.22 0.18 0.06 -0.02 
- Intensity -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 
- Duration 0.04 -0.21 0.26 -0.20 -0.09 
- Frequency 0.03 -0.06 0.24 0.20 0.21 
Sadness 
- Liking -0.17 -0.13 0.18 -0.06 0.42 a 
- Intensity 0.01 -0.02 -0.41 a -0.31 a 
-0.33 a 
- Duration -0.08 -0.29 
-0.14 -0.51 b 
-0.20 
- Frequency 0.23 -0.47 b 0.01 
-0.54 b 0.01 
Shame 
- Liking -0.17 0.00 -0.14 0.17 -0.15 
- Intensity 0.01 -0.23 -0.01 -0.17 0.05 
- Duration -0.08 0.03 0.32 a 0.21 0.05 
- Frequency 0.23 -0.19 0.28 0.17 0.23 
Table 7.5 - Correlations between levels of five parental socialisation styles for each 
emotion and four dimensions of conscious emotional experience for experiences of 
Anger, Fear, Sadness, and Shame (a p < 0.05, b P < 0.01). 
In contrast to the hypothesis above, the data presented in Table 7.5 show that there are 
no systematic relationships between parental socialisation styles and the four 
dimensions of emotional experience. Neglectful parental styles are associated with 
increased intensity (r=0.31) and more frequent episodes of anger (r=0.38) while a 
highly rewarding parental style was associated with less frequent experiences of both 
anger (r= -0.31) and sadness (r= -0.47). Punitive parental styles are associated with 
less intense experiences of sadness (r= -0.41) and longer episodes of shame (r=0.32). 
Highly overriding parental styles are associated with less intense experiences of 
sadness (r= -0.31) and these experiences tended to be shorter (r= -0.51) and to occur 
less frequently (r= -0.54). Finally, highly magnifying parental styles are associated 
with an increased liking for sadness (r=0.42), although such experiences tended to be 
less intense (r= -0.33). 
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Although a full discussion of the general failure of this hypothesis will follow below, 
a few brief comments will be made here. One possible problem with the between-
subjects analysis above may lie in the manner in which different subjects used each of 
the two scales. To attenuate this possible complication, a second analysis was run in 
which all subject variables were standardised within that subject across the four 
emotions. A z-transformation of this sort yields an internally relative estimate of the 
dimensions in question. Nonetheless, the results of this secondary analysis mirror 
those of the between subjects analysis above, indicating few relationships between the 
goals about emotion and child socialisation measures. 
A further reason for the failure of the goals about emotions (GAB) measures to 
systematically correlate with the measures of parental socialisation styles (the CBS II) 
may lie in what each of the two scales are measuring. As has been discussed above, 
the GAB scale was intended to measure the relationships between motivations 
regarding experience and other aspects of conscious emotional experience. In 
contrast, the CBS II appears more suited to describing the relationship between 
socialisation variables and child coping/expressive styles19. While experiences of 
emotions are likely to be related to both coping and expressive style variables (see 
above), these measures do not constitute basic experiential dimensions. Given this 
disparity as well as the emotion-specific complexity of experience, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the relationships between the two measures are so highly 
inconsistent. 
A second analysis examining the macrodevelopmental timeframe for goals about 
emotions was run by correlating experiential variables with the three major 
dimensions of attachment in adults (per Collins & Read, 1990). While the number of 
experiential (GAB) variables presented here is again limited, this analysis has the 
advantage of allowing an examination of attachment dimensions and their 
relationships to all six emotions considered within the GAB scale. 
19 Analyses not presented here do in fact demonstrate significant relationships between parental 
socialisation variables and child coping/expressive styles, underscoring the internal reliability of the 
CES II Scale. 
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Dimension of Adult Attachment 
Emotion Dependability Anxiety Closeness 
Anger 
- Liking 0.12 -0.45b -0.13 
- Intensity 0.15 -0.403 -0.03 
- Duration -0.10 0.02 -0.13 
- Frequency -0.19 -0.15 -0.23 
Sadness 
- Liking 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
- Intensity -0.353 0.23 -0.01 
- Duration -0.353 -0.12 -0.27 
- Frequency -0.47b 0.18 -0.17 
Happiness 
- Liking 0.22 0.25 0.14 
- Intensity 0.46b 0.363 0.50b 
- Duration 0.62c 0.12 0.398 
- Frequency 0.50b 0.18 0.30 
Fear 
- . Liking 0.02 0.15 0.27 
- Intensity -0.13 0.05 0.10 
- Duration -0.02 -0.418 0.05 
- Frequency -0.02 0.17 0.12 
Shame 
- Liking -0.03 -0.328 0.00 
- Intensity -0.18 0.05 -0.l0 
- Duration -0.12 -0.03 0.07 
- Frequency -0.18 0.383 0.00 
Pride 
- Liking 0.26 0.24 -0.09 
- Intensity 0.25 0.03 0.00 
- Duration 0.378 0.14 0.12 
- Frequency 0.25 0.49b 0.23 
Table 7.6 - Correlations between attachment dimension scores on the Adult 
Attachment Scale and four dimensions of conscious emotional experience (a p < 0.05, 
b P < 0.01, C P < 0.001) for Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Fear, Shame, and Pride. 
Table 7.6 shows that particular profiles of attachment dimensions were associated 
with differentially complex patterns of emotional experience and frequency. 
However, the predictive utility of the three subscales varied considerably. Scores on 
the closeness dimension were infrequently associated with measures from the GAB 
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scale, the only relationships observed being between closeness scores and the 
intensity (r=0.50) and duration (r=0.39) of happiness experiences. No other 
significant relationships were evident for scores on this subscale, suggesting that it 
may be of limited utility for researchers interested in developmental issues in 
emotional experience. 
By contrast scores on the dependability and anxiety subscales showed several (if 
complex) relationships with measures of emotional experience. Individuals who had 
a high dependability score (a high score indicating a high belief that other people will 
be available when needed) reported significantly less frequent experiences of sadness 
(r=0.47). In addition, these experiences tended to be lower in intensity (r= -0.35) and 
to be of shorter duration (r= -0.35). As with the closeness scores, individuals with a 
higher dependability score also tended to report more frequent experiences of 
happiness (r=0.50), which again tended to be comparatively longer (r=0.62) and more 
intense (r=0.46). Additionally, higher dependability scores were associated with 
longer experiences of pride (r=0.37), along with non-significant trends towards a 
greater liking for pride (r=0.26, p=O.l1) as well as more frequent and more intense 
experiences (both r s = 0.25, p=O.13). 
The most complex pattern of relationships was found in an examination of the anxiety 
subsca1e. Anxiety scores were the only attachment dimension to be associated with 
any measures for the experience of anger, fear or shame. Compared to low anxiety 
subjects, individuals who reported a high level of attachment anxiety also reported a 
significantly lower liking for experiences of anger (r= -0045) and experiences of anger 
tended to be of a significantly lower intensity (r= -0040). Individuals with a high 
anxiety score also reported experiencing significantly shorter episodes of fear (r= -
0041), perhaps indicating an acquired ability to reduce fear quickly or a higher 
motivation to do so. These individuals also reported more strongly disliking the 
experience of shame (r= -0.32), and experiencing this emotion more frequently 
(r=0.38) than low anxiety individuals. On a more positive note, when compared to 
low anxiety subjects, individuals with high anxiety scores also reported more frequent 
experiences of pride (r=0.49) and greater intensity of happiness experiences (r=0.36). 
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Chapter 7.4 - Tying it back together? Data from the GAE Scale, 
emotional experience, and the creation of more questions than answers 
Overall, the data from the study presented above provide some interesting material for 
the continued development of motivational theories of emotional experience. While 
the data supporting each hypothesis were complex, substantial support was obtained 
for all four of the a priori hypotheses. 
Before considering the broadest implications of the data presented above, it is worth 
noting that the current study underscores the incredible complexity of emotional 
experiences described by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) and Ellsworth (1991). 
Moreover, the worms one discovers upon opening even the smallest can of experience 
are not only descriptive, but are both phenomenological and conceptual in nature. 
Experiences occur as complexity (if holistically), and conceptual consideration of 
experience is thus undeniably complicated. Nonetheless, complexity itself must not 
prove a barrier to the consideration of a vital topic distressingly understudied by 
emotion theorists. 
More importantly, when viewed optimistically the data presented above provide some 
small light at the end of a long, dark, and convoluted tunnel. As shall become clearer 
(sic), while the dimensions of experience vary considerably both within and between 
individuals (ideographically), the extent of such variation appears to vary normatively 
as a function of both the emotion and the experiential dimension in question. This 
latter finding, and its implications for the relationships between function and 
experience, seem to limit experiential complexity within certain emotions and certain 
dimensions. Experience is not limitless in its variation, and consequently there is yet 
hope for normative theory. 
Within each subject, the experiential dimensions of liking, intensity, and duration20 
varied considerably across the six emotions rated. Of note is the failure to find a trait-
20 Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) have recently suggested that duration is a component of intensity. 
While space constraints limit the consideration of this idea it can be noted that the current data (see 
Table 7.2) did not wholly uphold this conceptualisation. Consequently, I will discuss the two as if they 
are related rather than as component and parent concepts. 
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like relationship across emotions for the experiential dimension of intensity. Previous 
work by Larsen and colleagues (e.g. Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985) has 
suggested that individuals vary chronically in the intensity of the affects they prefer 
and experience (see also Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995). In support of this premise, Flett 
et. al. (1986) reported that individuals with a high Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) 
score also tended to report significantly more intense experiences of happiness (r = 
0.69), pride (r = 0.62), anxiety (r = 0.72) and hate (r = 0.66). While the current study 
did not employ the AIM measure, no relationships between the intensity ratings for 
each emotion were found. 
In considering the discrepancy between these data, it can be noted that the intensity of 
emotional experience is not typically considered a singularly trait-like characteristic 
by either emotion (see e.g. Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994, 1995) or motivational theorists 
(e.g. Brehm, 1999). Some writers, like Lazarus (1991b) and Oatley (Oatley, 1992; 
Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1992) briefly suggest that emotional intensity usually reflects 
the extent of the relevant goal commitment (see also Brehm, 1999), while a more 
comprehensive treatment of intensity and emotion is found in the work of Sonnemans 
and Frijda (1994, 1995, see also Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). 
According to Sonnemans and Frijda (1995), the intensity of an emotional experience 
is a complex function of the individual's concerns (goals), further appraisals 
(particularly anticipated effort), regulatory processes, and individual propensities. 
Their 1995 discussion of 'individual propensities' suggests that the differences can be 
thought of as differences in appraisals, or as thresholds and preferences for particular 
modes of action readiness (see Frijda, 1996 for a revised, but essentially similar 
version of this model). Overall, the available data suggest that felt emotional intensity 
is not simple or unitary (Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995), and may in fact be non-linear 
(Brehm, 199921 , see Chapter 8). Most importantly however, the data from the current 
study suggest that intensity is non-chronic, but rather may exist at numerous levels of 
21 Paranthetically, it can be noted that Brehm (1999) more fully suggests that while intensity will 
typically occur in proportion to the importance of the motive, that it will be minimised to whatever 
extent is compatible with carrying out its function. For Brehm, the ultimate determinant of emotional 
intensity is a quadratic relationship between the perceived magnitude of deterrence (either competing 
emotions or distraction) to attaining the goal of the emotion. While Brehm's (1999) discussion of 
intensity is somewhat beyond the scope of the current work, both his theory and data are compatible 
with a view that suggests that multiple influences determine felt intensity. 
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specificity with the relationships between experience and intensity varying per person, 
per emotion, and per dimension. 
In addition to the ideographic variation discussed above, the current study also found 
that some ratings, such as that for 'liking', varied differentially at a normative level 
depending on the emotion under scrutiny. For example, there was a significantly 
higher degree of variation in the potentially bimodal liking distribution for the liking 
of pride compared to all other emotions, and liking ratings for the emotions of anger, 
sadness, and fear varied considerably more than did liking for shame or happiness. 
Most subjects reported strongly disliking the experience of shame and strongly liking 
the experience of happiness, while liking ratings were more wide-ranging for all other 
emotions. It thus appears that happiness itself is never experienced as unpleasant, 
presumably because both the emotional state and (it appears) the experience of that 
state constitute an irreducibly 'liked' state of affairs (see Chapter 6). This 
conceptualisation of happiness seems to underlie Freud's pleasure principle, and is 
evident in Arnold's (1960a) discussion of infant motivation. Although experiences 
probably become more complex as we age, it seems as if we simply cannot help but 
like being happy at each juncture22• 
As is more fully discussed below, normative variations in dimensions of emotional 
experience can be taken as indicating something of the relationship between function 
and experience for the different emotions. While, cross-cultural data (within the same 
terminological framework or language) would be needed to more fully support this 
hypothesis, the data are consistent with the idea that experiences while varied are not 
infinitely so, but are constrained at both normative and ideographic levels. 
22 As shall be expanded on below, it is of course possible to describe an experience of happiness as 
being unpleasant, say when we immediately feel guilty following our happiness over the misfortune of 
others. However, such microdevelopmental transitions do not however mean that happiness itself can 
ever be unpleasant. Rather, they indicate that experience changes incredibly rapidly as the system 
incorporates new information, up to and including previous, current, or anticipated emotional responses 
themselves. Nonetheless, it is only at the point that we become guilty (and cease being happy) that we 
may experience unpleasantness. 
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Experiences are complex: So what? 
While the complexity of emotional experience outlined thus far may be pleasing to 
the phenomenological essentialists among us, the data discussed do little to explain 
variations in emotional experience. Rather, it can be seen that they beg a number of 
'why' questions. Why do people differ so greatly across so many dimensions of 
experience? Why do they vary across some dimensions, and some emotions, more so 
than for others. Most broadly, why are emotional experiences so complex, and what 
function (if any) does such complexity and differentiation achieve? 
In beginning to answer these types of questions, the discussion below will outline a 
motivational-constructivist model of conscious emotional experience. It will begin by 
discussing the importance of conceptually separating experience of emotions from 
emotional states. Following this, it will suggest that a useful way to consider 
variations in emotional experience is through reference to the early emergence of 
experiential motivations that come to subsequently constrain each individual's 
emotional experiences. While these motivations may exist at any number of levels, it 
will also be suggested that each individual is not free to develop any motivations 
regarding their experience. Rather, the emergence of experiential motivations and the 
dimensions that they regard are constrained through the dynamic interactions of 
phylogenetic developmentally acquired constraints, attractors and repellors. 
Chapter 7.5 - A motivational theory of conscious emotional experience 
and its development: Experiences as motivationally constructed (within 
limits) 
Taken as a whole, the data described above can be seen as providing further evidence 
support for the contention that emotional experiences are a different phenomenon 
from emotional states (Lewis & Michalson, 1983; Lewis, 1993, 1998b; Johnson-Laird 
& Oatley, 1992). With some exceptions, the data outlined as relevant to the first 
hypothesis sustain the idea that liking, intensity and duration dimensions of 
experience vary considerably between people for the 'common' emotions of anger, 
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happiness, shame, fear, sadness, and pride. In addition, these three measures of 
emotional experience were shown to vary considerably within each individual across 
the six emotions studied. If, as discrete approaches to emotion suggest, we accept that 
the basic state of a primary emotion is initially similar across individuals (see 
Chapters 3 and 8), the fact that self-reported experiences of these same few basic 
states vary so greatly is important in a number of ways described below. 
Taken together, the separation of states from experience and the evident complexity 
of experience illuminate an initial compromise position regarding one of the greatest 
validity threats to discrete approaches to emotions such as that undertaken here23. 
Along with Tomkins (1962, 1963), Izard (1971, 1991), and Ekman (1994a), the 
current conceptualisation of emotions (see Chapter 8) suggests that there is a limited 
set of discrete emotional states that are qualitatively, hence fundamentally, different 
from one another. As such, emotional states are not primarily distinguished by (a) 
their pleasantness and engagement (e.g. Watson & Tellegen, 1985), (b) their valence 
and arousal characteristics, the so-called circumplex (e.g. Russell, 1980, cited in 
Ellsworth, 1991; Feldman-Barrett, 1996; Russell & Feldman-Barrett, 1999), or by (c) 
any number of appraisal dimensions (e.g. Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Antoniou, & 
Jose, 1996)24. 
Despite this assertion, the discrete position is not without its weaknesses (see e.g. 
Ellsworth, 1991; Lazarus, 1991b). Most salient in the current context is the trouble 
engendered by the fact that subjective experiences do not always slot neatly into the 
categories that emotion theorists typically provide (see Chapter 8). Although this 
problem has been treated by stating that the reported experience is not in fact an 
emotion (e.g. Ekman, 1984, cited in Ellsworth, 1991), or by assuming that 
uncategorised experiences represent a blend of basics (e.g. Plutchik, 1980, 1984, 
1991), it seems likely that a reconciliation of the discrete approach with the cross-
cultural diversity (Harre, 1986; Markus & Kitayama, 1994, 1996) and complexity of 
23 As Smith (1998) notes virtually any collection of entities can be described either dimensionally (in 
terms of how they relate to one another along underlying properties) or reified categorically. As is 
expanded upon in Chapter 8, the current dissertation agrees with this assertion but will nonetheless 
adopt a discrete position. 
24 As shall be expanded upon in Chapter 8, it is the position of the current writer that appraisal 
dimensions are better thought of as describing the structure of appraisal space or the dimensions of 
emotional experience, not (as is claimed by some) ofthe emotion per se. 
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emotional experience (Harre, 1986; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992) will always be 
problematic for biologically discrete theories. There seems to be little additional 
function served by conscious experience within the discrete framework. 
As such, it is initially tempting to promote a working settlement of this issue through 
arguing that experiences represent a form of epiphenomenal melange, a 
phenomenologically and temporally undiscriminating conglomeration of discrete 
states that serve no particular purpose. It could thus be argued that self-reported 
experiential variations within the basic categories are nothing more than an 
exasperating socio-linguistic artifact in which differential descriptions (of the same 
basic state) arise through culturally derived interpretations of the eliciting situation 
(Harrison, 1986; Dunn, 1994), or through linguistic custom (Armon-Jones, 1986; 
Harre, 1986; Lutz, 1982, 1986) and construction (Averill, 1982, 1994a). Although 
this paragraph may strike the reader (as it does the writer) as overly pompous and 
melodramatic, its substance nonetheless captures the implicit sentiment of several 
discrete theories. 
The difficulty is that such an argument would undermine any functional approach to 
emotional experience (see above), in that it would imply that there is little reason for 
experience to occur at a1l25 . If variations in experience were simply constructed 
variants of one or several basic states, why should they occur and what function 
would they serve? The current dissertation eschews a (dys)functional interpretation 
of emotional experience, instead suggesting that the complexity of experience 
describes the function of it. Experiences are thought to be highly complex for good 
reasons. As such, the mere fact that we have yet to determine what these may be is 
not argument against functionalism, but rather against theoretical complacency and 
disregard. 
As intimated previously then, the current author suggests that emotional experiences, 
particularly in the adult, represent more than a 'readout' of emotional states. 
Emotional states can only exist sequentially, one at a time, while experiences 
represent a temporally less discriminating integration of multiple evaluations and 
25 As noted above, and more extensively in the following chapter (see Chapter 7), this failure to 
consider possible functions for experience is part of a more general weakness in emotion theory. 
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influences. More specifically, experiences are conceptualised as being motivationally 
constructed in each moment by the individual as a function of shared phylogenetic 
constraints and ideographically acquired (macro) and emergent (micro) motivational 
influences. 
For clarity the following explication of this idea will consider different aspects of the 
concept separately. However, the reader should be aware that no literal separations 
are intended, as each component in the process is heavily and non-linearly interactive 
with the others. Overall, the current approach to emotional experience may be 
broadly summed within the following three postulates. 
1. Conscious emotional experiences are distinct from emotional states, being 
motivated and constructed26• 
2. Experiential constructions emerge 'afresh' at each microdevelopmental 
juncture, hence are only 'the same' insofar as they may represent a 
phenomenologically consistent emotional narrative or pattern of discrete 
states27 • 
3. In most instances, emergent experiences are based on the emotional state, the 
experience being ever more precisely 'constrained' across microdevelopment by 
three cascading types of factor. 
a. Phylogenetic or functional influences - Initially, experiences are 
directed and constrained by the heritable nature of the emotional 
state itself, most immediately through the relative importance of 
expressive and experiential dimensions to the function of the 
emotion. 
h. Macrodevelopmental influences - Emotional expenences are 
further directed and constrained by the importance of the 
26 Experiences typically parallel the emotional state, particularly as the intensity of the state-level 
response increases. As is expanded upon in Chapter 8, state intensity is considered to operate as a 
function of state and emergent goal importance and the degree of relevance between stimuli and goals. 
activating motive, as well as through the individual 
macrodevelopment of attractors and repellors for emotional 
states and the many dimensions of conscious experience - goals 
about emotions, operating within the limits imposed by 3a. 
c. Microdevelopmental influences - Lastly, experiences are 
directed and constrained by emergent microdevelopmental 
factors. Specifically they are influenced by the emergent 
importance of the activating motive28 and the intensity of the 
initial response at the level of the state (cf. Brehm, 1999). In 
addition, conscious experiences are also influenced by the 
individual's perceptions regarding the situation including 
secondary appraisal, their ability to label it, and the emergent 
salience of other relevant motivations and beliefs. 
Experience as motivated 
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The data from the study presented above are consistent with the first aspect of the 
thesis presented insofar as it was demonstrated that the indirect motivational measure 
(the 'liking' question) was related to numerous aspects of experience and to the 
relative frequency of different experiences. In the first instance, the liking of an 
emotion was predictive of its typical intensity for anger, sadness, and pride. In the 
cases of anger and pride, greater liking was associated with increased intensity, while 
the relatively higher liking for sadness experiences was associated with a reduced 
intensity. Similarly, liking for an emotion was substantially correlated with both the 
immediate and general self-perception items. Finally, liking was associated with 
reduced onset speed for the emotions of anger, happiness, and pride. 
27 This premise is in no way addressed by the current data, hence will not be commented on. 
28 The reader should be aware that trait and emergent motive importance are thought to be conceptually 
distinguishable phenomena. As implied in the dissertation thus far, trait importance represents the 
macrodevelopmentally stable placement of particular goals relative to others in the personality state 
space. However, the emergent importance of a particular goal or attractor may also change 
dramatically in micro development as a function of context specific and context-person interactional 
variables (see e.g. Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). 
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Given the importance attached to emotions in the model of state space elaboration 
presented in chapter five, it is perhaps most important that the motivational variable 
was strongly predictive of the self-reported frequency of particular experiences. This 
prediction was upheld for the emotions of anger, happiness, fear, and pride as well as 
the overall measure. In each case, greater liking for the experience was associated 
with significantly more frequent experiences of it. Interestingly, neither sadness nor 
shame reflected this trend, each revealing a slight trend in the opposite direction. 
It is likewise important that we note that the relationships between liking, experience, 
and frequency emerge in consideration of both positive and negative emotions and 
experiences, as well as across a number of experiential dimensions. As such, these 
data reflect the probability that goals about emotional experiences are acquired in a 
highly complex, ideographic, and perhaps culturally-specific (Markus & Kitayama, 
1994, 1996) manner. Although the interpretative framework these authors use differs 
markedly from that undertaken here, they do note that there are marked experiential 
and expressive differences between cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1996). 
Hence, despite the fact that the current study was not designed to enable an analysis 
describing precisely which aspects of particular emotional experiences are 
motivationally flexible, it seems reasonable to suppose that goals about emotions may 
operate at multiple levels of greater or lesser discrimination. Most immediately. they 
appear to restrict or enhance the relative probability of particular types of experiences. 
and may also limit or enhance the likelihood of particular intensities (cf. Diener et. al .. 
1985), even for particular emotions. At their most rarefied, goals about emotions may 
even help delineate the precise situations or people (Matsumoto et. aI, 1988, cited in 
Markus & Kitayama, 1996; Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999) associated with a 
particular experience or class of experiences29. 
To this point, the reader could be forgiven for inferring a discrepancy between the 
biologically discrete conceptualisation of emotions running throughout the 
dissertation and the 'near-constructivist' dogma evident in the paragraphs above. As 
29 It is acknowledged that the data described by Markus and Kitayama (1996) are predominantly 
relevant to expression. However, they do state that "not only the expression but the experience of ... 
anger is effectively averted" (p. 237), underscoring their idea that experiences are constructed. 
224 
mentioned however, emergent emotional experiences are directed and constrained by 
a number of factors. So while emotional experiences need never comprise a discrete 
emotional state (see below), the motivated construction of emotional experience does 
emerge within multiple and cascading limits that can be described, predicted and 
measured. 
Chapter 7.6 - Fonn follows function: Abduction and the consideration of 
experience-function relationships 
Despite the difference between experience and state, certain aspects of emotional 
experience nonetheless appear to be constrained or predisposed by the heritable 
evolutionary functions of the discrete emotional states. Although the focus of the 
current dissertation precludes a full analysis of what experiential data might enable us 
to infer (abduct) about function, a few examples will be provided to underscore the 
potential utility of the abductive approach. Below, the relationships between 
experiential valence and the functions of happiness and shame, as well as those 
between function and the duration of emotional experiences are examined in this 
regard. 
Function and Experiential Valence 
Within the current data, normative relationships between function and experience are 
most obvious in noting that some emotional experiences appear limited in the degree 
to which their liking, pleasantness or experiential valence30 dimension may vary. 
Most notably, there is little variation along this dimension for experiences of shame 
and happiness. Happiness and shame experiences were consistently positive or 
negative, pleasant or unpleasant, and liked or disliked across the entire sample, while 
the emotions of fear, anger, sadness and pride varied considerably along this 
dimension. 
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These differences could of course represent little more than a methodological 
artifact,31 although it seems more likely that the comparative lack of variance in the 
liking of shame and happiness experiences is indicating something of function in the 
different emotions. Specifically, these data could be taken as supporting an argument 
suggesting that the functions served by the emotions of shame and happiness may be 
more closely linked to the valence of their phenomenological experiences than is the 
case for the other four emotions studied. 
Previous considerations of shame have typically stressed the cognitive-experiential 
antecedents of the emotion in respect of a conscious self (e.g. Tangney, 1991, 1992, 
1999; Frijda, 1993a; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1998). Moreover, recent 
discussions regarding the function of shame appear to have emphasised what could be 
termed the communicative, social (e.g. Frijda, 1993a; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; 
Einstein & Lanning, 1998) or appeasement (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996) 
aspects of shame and its expression. 
In the current study, all but one of the 37 subjects rated their liking of shame within 
the first three points at the negative end of the scale, indicating that all strongly 
disliked feeling ashamed (ct. Tangney, 1999). That this pattern holds across a sample 
displaying considerable variation in the liking for most other emotions can be taken as 
reinforcing a functional interpretation of shame that emphasises, or at least includes, 
the experiential and motivational nature of shame as a major part of its function. As 
Frijda and Mesquita (1994) have noted, "the emotion is most powerful through one's 
efforts to prevent it from occurring" (p. 77). 
The adoption of such a position is not intended to suggest that shame does not have 
important social functions, but rather that we cannot blandly accept that it is via 
communication or expression alone that a 'social-moral' emotion (Keltner & Buswell, 
30 As with the term 'function,' the term 'valence' is used irregularly by emotion theorists. For the 
purposes of the current discussion, valance refers to the innate and fixed nature of the person-
environment relationship. When discussing experiences, the term 'experiential valence' will be used. 
31 For example, it seems likely that the Item 1 anchors "very strongly dislike" and "very strongly like" 
are not extreme enough for shame and happiness ratings, producing a floor and a ceiling effect 
respectively. As such, differences in variance may simply reflect a bias in measurement. Nonetheless, 
the fact that such 'artifact' only occurred for these two emotions can itself be taken as an indication of 
experiential-functional links for these two emotions that may not exist for others. 
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1996) like shame functions. After all, anecdotal data suggest that shame experiences 
are infrequently expressed in contemporary Western culture. 
On the basis of the data presented here it is suggested that while shame expressions 
may function as an indicator to social others that we have erred, that the motivational 
experience of shame likewise serves a crucial function. While there is little direct 
evidence supporting this assertion (Tangney, 1999), it appears reasonable to suggest 
that shame experiences (a) motivate the avoidance of situations, elicitors, and acts 
associated with them, and (b) motivate the acquisition of skills or abilities necessary 
to remedy the perceived deficit either immediately or in future. In this manner, it is 
through expression and experiential motivation that shame assists the maintenance of 
the social order and prevents rejection (Frijda, 1993a), rather than through expression 
alone as seems to be implied above. 
In some ways it could be argued that such a position is noting nothing new in emotion 
theory. Theorists like Tangney (1991, 1992, 1999) have been admirably explicit in 
their consideration of the motivational function of shame (see also Nathanson, 1993). 
Tangney (1999) for example, suggests that shame experience typically lead to 
attempts to deny, hide, or escape the situation. Nonetheless, the data above once more 
lend themselves to an interpretation of shame that stresses motivational (via 
experiential), rather than expressive function alone explicit in our theories. 
A similar comment can be made in respect of normative experiential valence for 
experiences of happiness. According to some theorists, happiness has been 
distressingly understudied and is probably the most problematic emotion of all 
(Averill & More, 1993). A brief examination of the literature on happiness as an 
emotion supports their concerns. There is little discussion, let alone consensus 
regarding happiness, with many theorists offering many different functions32 for this 
primary emotion. 
32 Making matters worse, the term 'function' is inconsistently or poorly employed by emotion theorists. 
Within the current chapter the term is intended to denote distal or evolutionary function, rather than 
describing the manner in which a particular emotion or adaptation functions within its current context. 
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Izard (1993) begins his discussion of the positive emotions by distinguishing 
joy/happiness from simple sensory pleasure (see also Averill & More, 1993). He 
suggests that joy (happiness) is predominantly functional in that it strengthens social 
bonds, particularly those between caregiver and infant. Consequently, a distinct 
function of joy is served through its expression, universally indicating a readiness to 
engage in friendly interaction. Izard (1991, 1993) has also proposed that happiness 
may serve as an antidote to stress (ct. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) suggesting that 
"during the experience of joy . . . both our mind and our body have time for 
recuperation or recovery" (p. 139). 
More broadly, Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) have suggested that all emotions 
operate to redistribute cognitive resources and manage goal priorities (see also Oatley, 
1992, p. 36). In discussing happiness, Oatley (1992) suggests that the same principles 
are usefully applied. Within his communicative theory, all emotions are engendered 
by "any substantive change in the evaluation or progress of any goal or plan" (p. 359). 
Consequently, the effect of positive change is to encourage continuation with that 
same plan, enabling the person to remain absorbed and confident. In terms of 
specificity, Oatley's (1992) position is similar to that of Michael Argyle who suggests 
that happiness experiences represent a personal reflection on satisfaction in various 
aspects oflife (Argyle, 1987). 
Perhaps due to the confound between function and the way a phenomenon functions, 
researchers investigating happiness have typically examined aspects of cognitive and 
action change as correlated with experiences of happiness, rather than focus on the 
function of the experience itself. Isen and colleagues for example (e.g. Isen, 1993, 
Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1998), have long argued that positive affect facilitates 
creative problem solving and cognitive change. More specifically, they argue that 
positive affect leads to more inclusive categorisation (Isen & Daubman, 1984, cited in 
Isen et. al., 1998), to better problem-solving or negotiation ability (Carnevale & Isen, 
1986), and to an increased capacity to savour and appreciate the world (Izard, 1991). 
More recent discussion has likewise suggested that the cognitive effects of positive 
affects are multiple and highly linked to task and personality factors (see Aspinwall, 
1998 for a recent review). 
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There is good reason to think that such cognitive change may well constitute an 
important part of the function of happiness. As Oatley (1992) notes, many emotions 
narrow the focus 'of attention, while happiness tends to widen the range of 
possibilities. Fredrickson (1998a) likewise suggests that positive emotions serve to 
broaden an individual's momentary thought-action repertoire, which in turn has the 
effect of building that individual's physical, intellectual, and social resources. A 
similar point is made by Trope and Pomerantz (1998) who argue that positive 
experiences boost an individual's ability to cope with negative self or goal feedback 
(see also Lazarus, et. aI., 1980). 
Overall, the functions of happiness as described thus far seem to fall within one of 
three categories. Firstly, there is clearly a social function, perhaps operating as 
envisaged by Izard, in which happiness indicates to social others a 'readiness to 
engage.' This function is implicitly reliant on expression rather than experience, 
although expression may well serve as a reliable indicator of state, and hence a 
predictor of behaviour. Secondly, there appears to be a function of happiness 
involving concomitant cognitive adjustments, that serve to enhance creativity and 
problem solving (Izard, 1991; Isen, 1993), and to broaden perceptual scope (Isen, et. 
aI., 1998). Finally, there may be a recuperative/rest or resource function described to 
by Trope and Pomerantz (1998), Izard (1991), and Fredrickson (1998a). 
In considering both function and happiness it is quickly apparent that the concepts are 
difficult to integrate. As Averill and More (1993) note, the basic term 'happiness' 
seems to denote a variety of experiences and a many-functioned adaptive system. In 
seeking to capture something of the complexity of the topic material, theorists seem to 
have offered as many 'functions' as appeared necessary to describe the different parts 
of the concept and the ways in which it is made manifest. As Aspinwall (1998) notes, 
the changes engendered by positive affect currently appear too complex to be 
subsumed within a single explanatory framework. 
Notwithstanding the complexity of happiness, the functions described thus far appear 
unnecessarily problematic. In isolation, there are difficulties with each 'function' too 
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numerous to be adequately addressed here, so commentary will be limited to two 
. bl 33 major pro ems . 
The first of these relates to what might be termed a 'thought experiment' that the 
reader has already been introduced to. Earlier in this chapter, it was briefly argued 
that several theories of emotional experience appear to fall prey to explanatory gap 
reasoning. At this point, it was suggested that many of the 'functions' ascribed to 
experience could be achieved without any conscious experience at all. Why do we 
need an experience in order to smile, to broaden our cognitive scope, or to recover? 
In seeking comprehensiveness, many conceptualisations do not seem to ultimately 
consider why happiness always feels so good. Consequently, I suggest, they miss the 
basic point of happiness and the function of its experience. 
A related difficulty lies in the lack of explicit motivational emphasis in the link 
between experience and function. Typically when theorists consider motivation and 
affect, particularly within self-regulatory frameworks, we see a return to hedonistic 
models of motivation and function which do little to elucidate the evolutionary 
function of a discrete state like happiness. As Aspinwall (1998) has recently noted, 
"most theories .. (assume that) .. the maintenance of positive affect is the primary 
goal of self-regulation" (p. 6). 
Within emotion theory, Oatley (1992) has described happiness as functioning to 
'encourage' continuation with (presumably) successful plans (see also Malatesta & 
Wilson, 1988; Smith, 1998), while Izard (1991) describes such effects as concomitant 
change. He does note that joy is associated with a sensed increase in vigour, strength, 
confidence and competency, but then goes on to suggest that we do not act in order to 
feel joy, but rather work to get the job done. As such, "joy follows as a byproduct of 
the successful doing" (Izard, 1991; p. 140, italics added). 
33 Further problems also exist. For example, it could be argued that much of the theorising is made less 
useful through confounding happiness with positive moods or affects. Following this criticism, it can 
be seen that most emotions are typically thought to arise in respect of a single goal or evaluation (albeit 
a very important one). As such, conceptualisations of happiness that link its function to global or 'life-
wide' evaluations (e.g. Averill & More, 1993) are somewhat out of step with.mainstream theories of 
discrete emotions. Finally, many of the frameworks in which function and happiness are described 
have considered aspects of systemic change in happiness that typically arise later in time than the 
experience itself. This sequencing tends to make one wonder why we have experience as an 
intermediate step, if the function is found temporally later than it. 
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By contrast the current theory of experience suggests that the motivational experience 
of happiness as pleasant is a critical component of its function. Within the 
functionalist framework being developed, all emotions arise where there is a 
significant change in the status of a goal or goals (see Chapter 8). In the case of 
happiness then, such circumstances are necessarily and by definition goal-congruent. 
When we are happy, the experience of the state (a) motivates us to continue or 
recreate the goal-congruent circumstances in which the experience arose3\ and (b) 
engenders cognitive changes that facilitate achievement. This is not to say that people 
experience their motivation in this manner (see Chapter 2), but rather that happiness is 
experienced as pleasant and motivating in order that we want to and are able to 
continue achieving goals35. 
In addition to indicating that we are achieving, and motivating behavioural 
continuance or repetition, happiness also appears to make us more able to do so, 
enhancing cognitive processing, creativity, and confidence, particularly where the 
information is useful to one's goals (Aspinwall, 1998). Exactly how these processes 
operate remains unclear (Aspinwall, 1998), although some authors have suggested 
that positive affect may operate as a general intrapsychic 'resource,' enabling the 
delaying of short-term gratification in favour of long-term motives (see e.g. Trope & 
Pomerantz, 1998). 
Emphasising the motivational function of experiential valence in happiness and shame 
is not intended to herald a return to conceptualisations of humanity as simple 
hedonists, motivated and acting in order to maximise experiential pleasure and 
minimise pam. Rather, it is intended to suggest that a truly functional 
conceptualisation of emotions should necessitate explicit consideration of the 
relationship between experiential dimensions and function. The conceptual removal 
of the necessity for the pleasantness and unpleasantness inherent in being variously 
happy and ashamed would appear to critically undermine their motivational functions, 
and (perhaps consequently) the manner in which they function. 
34 A similar position on the function of happiness was recently adopted by Craig Smith in his 
~resentation at ISRE 1998. 
5 People are also clearly motivated to maintain the state of happiness in and of itself. However, given 
the relationships between goals and happiness, happiness for its own sake will not last indefinitely in 
the face of contrary goal information and appraisal. 
Function and the Duration of Emotional Experiences 
Anger is a short madness 
Horace 
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A preliminary interpretation of similar slant can be made of the finding that 
experiences of the different emotions were systematic in their mean duration. As 
noted above, post-hoc analyses showed that experiences of happiness were 
considerably longer than all other experiences, while experiences of fear were 
typically shorter than experiences of sadness. The differences noted are consistent 
with those described by Malatesta-Magai and Culver (1991), Scherer, Wallbott, and 
Summerfield (1986) and Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, and van Goozen (1991). 
More importantly, normative differences in duration appear susceptible to an 
explanation that examines something of the basic relationships between the 
experiential dimension of duration and evolutionary function for the emotions36. 
Examining the small literature on emotional experience finds that it has typically 
concluded that while the physiological and facial perturbations accompanying 
emotions last a few minutes, that the experience or feeling component may last much 
longer (Oatley, 1992; Frijda, et.al., 1991). According to Oatley (1992), the data 
gathered for Oatley and Duncan (1992), showed that one third of happiness, sadness 
and anger episodes lasted five minutes or less, one third between five and 30 minutes, 
and one third longer than 30 minutes. 
Similarly, Sonnemans (1990, cited in Frijda, et. aI., 1991) found that both emotions 
and emotion episodes lasted anywhere between a minute or less and more than a 
week37. hnportantly, Frijda et. al. (1991) argue that these descriptions of experience 
and duration do not represent mere figures of speech. Acknowledging that little is 
known about the determinants of duration, Frijda et. al. (1991) nonetheless suggest 
that duration is a complex product of the eliciting motive's importance, the temporal 
36 In addition, the duration of experience is also likely to be influenced by personality variables and the 
general affective backdrop to a particular emotional response. However, such influences do not 
accurately address the issue of basic or prototype durations for discrete emotions, which are thought to 
exist notwithstanding such influence. 
37 The most prolonged episode reported in their study is particularly interesting. It is a report on an 
emotional episode involving an experience of fear lasting two months. 
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nature of the eliciting event, and the consequences of one's emotional reactions and 
the responses of others. 
The temporal structure (duration) of discrete emotions is not reported in the Oatley 
and Duncan (1992) study, yet as Malatesta-Magai and Culver (1991) note, discrete 
emotions are theoretically likely to vary considerably along this dimension. On the 
basis of a large cross-cultural study, Scherer, Wallbott, and Summerfield (1986) 
reported that fear typically lasted less than one hour, that anger lasted between a few 
minutes and an hour, and that happiness and sadness usually lasted for more than an 
hour and frequently more than one day. While the current study used relative rather 
than absolute measures of duration (see Appendix 1), the 'between-emotion' patterns 
of results mirror those reported by previous authors. 
In discussing such data, Frijda et. al. (1991) suggest that different emotions may well 
have different characteristic timeframes, although these may be explained through 
prototypical and shared antecedents, and are invariably confounded by self-regulatory 
processes (see also Aspinwall, 1998). Conspicuously missing from the discussions of 
duration to date is adequate consideration as to why experiences differ so greatly yet 
systematically along this dimension. An allusion to evolutionary function is implicit 
in the discussions of Frijda et. al. (1991) and Malatesta-Magai and Culver (1991), but 
once more few explanations have been offered. 
Below, the prototypical duration of happiness, sadness, and fear experiences are 
further discussed insofar as they permit inference about the function of each emotion. 
As above, the discussion is speculative insofar as the interpretation offered would 
require considerably more data to be wholly acceptable. Nonetheless, normative 
variance and lack of variance in duration ratings can inform us about function, as long 
as we remember that the constraints and experiential predispositions imposed by our 
phylogenetic past are probably relatively diffuse. 
In the current study, experiences of happiness were reported as lasting considerably 
longer than all other experiences. Given the functions of happiness described above, 
there are a number of possible reasons for this finding. Initially it must be 
acknowledged that the result may represent a reporting bias. Given the importance of 
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'being happy' in our societies and in our selves, it may be that people treat happiness 
as a type of default experience or report. If this were true, we could expect happiness 
experiences to be reported as occurring during periods of time when things were 
perhaps better described as being "OK," or as 'bridging' multiple and discrete 
episodes of happiness (see Ekman, 1994a; p. 16). As noted above, scientists 
frequently confound positive mood, affect, and discrete experiences like happiness, 
and there is no reason to expect lay people to do differently. 
While this type of concern cannot be denied, it strikes the current author as an 
impoverished explanation. If we begin compulsively dissecting the necessarily 
subjective reports describing conscious emotional experience in this manner, the 
scientific investigation of experience risks being irrevocably hamstrung. If an 
individual reports that their experience was of a certain quality or duration, who are 
we to argue? Similarly, one wonders why reports describing experiences of happiness 
should be any the less 'biased' in this manner than reports of other emotions. Finally, 
the relative nature of the duration estimate (see Appendix 1) and the skewed 
distribution depicted in Figure 7.2, suggest that happiness experiences probably do 
last longer than do experiences of most other emotions. 
If we accept the relative length of happiness experiences as 'real,' there are several 
further comments that bear note. Firstly, it would appear likely that experiences of 
happiness are consciously prolonged by most individuals, in most instances, due to 
normative regulatory strategies (Frijda et. aI., 1991; Aspinwall, 1998), and the 
intrinsically pleasant nature of the experience. Happiness experiences are irreducibly 
pleasant, hence we are probably motivated to maintain or prolong any experience of 
them. Additionally, the functions of happiness as described above suggest that people 
who are happy may be more capable of continuing to achieve goals. In this case then, 
happiness may endure not only because of measurement difficulties and because we 
like and want it to, but also because in being happy we are more capable of 
maintaining or creating the conditions that lead to or maintain happiness. 
Particularly in comparison to happiness, although also in respect of most other 
emotions, experiences of fear are typically brief (Scherer et. al., 1986; Frijda et. aI., 
1991), while experiences of sadness endure for an intermediate period. Although they 
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acknowledge the possibility of characteristic time courses for discrete emotions (cf. 
Malatesta-Magai & Culver, 1991), the analysis of Frijda et. al. (1991) offers several 
other possible determinants for temporal variations across different emotions. They 
initially consider the possibility that the intensity of an experience may be related to 
its duration, but then conclude that such relationships are weak. In contrast, the 
current study found that the intensity of an experience was significantly related to its 
duration for experiences of sadness, happiness, shame and pride (see Table 7.2). As is 
elaborated below, both the intensity and duration of emotional experiences are 
initially likely to be a function of the relative importance of the relevant or eliciting 
motive. Via this shared determinant, it is expected that the two experiential variables 
should be moderately related. 
Overall, the emphasis of Frijda et. al.'s (1991) analysis suggests that normative 
durations for discrete emotions are due to prototypical and shared antecedents. In this 
approach then, sadness lasts because it typically follows the permanent loss of 
something significant, while experiences of fear (following relatively brief and 
passing threats) are comparatively short. 
Prima facie, an explanation that links experiential duration to antecedent 
characteristics appears plausible (at least for these two emotions), yet the reasoning 
appears to falter upon extension and more thorough consideration. Initially, it is of 
note that their framework presupposes certain notions about the nature and timeframe 
of the antecedent events, suppositions that may not be upheld or valid in all or even 
most cases. Additionally, if the experiences of emotions like sadness and happiness 
follow relatively permanent changes in goal status, what then determines when the 
experience ends? 
More specifically, Frijda, et. al.'s (1991) 'explanation' of inter-emotion variation in 
duration struggles to posit a plausible function. While some normative durations for 
different experiences are adequately described through reference to prototypical 
antecedents, such an analysis does not fully enable an examination of why discrete 
emotions should vary along this dimension. Moreover, the analysis they offer is 
weakened in that it fundamentally confounds the concept of antecedent event with 
that of the emotional response. So for example, there appears to be no objective basis 
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upon which to argue that the events that elicit sadness last any longer than other sorts 
of antecedent event. Lacking such, they appear to argue that the events that elicit 
sadness last longer because the experience of sadness itself lasts longer. In this 
manner, 'events' are ultimately defined at the level of experience38, the two become 
one and the same, and any resultant 'explanation' becomes essentially tautological 
and unenlightening. 
In seeking to consider the relationship between the function of emotional states and 
experience, the current section suggests a different interpretation of duration. While 
the duration of discrete emotional experiences are likely to be part-function of the trait 
and emergent importance of the eliciting motive (see below), different emotions do 
nonetheless appear to have characteristic experiential timeframes commensurate with, 
and indicative of, the function of the emotion in question. 
While experiences of happiness may last longer than other experiences for a 
confounded group of reasons (see above), the duration of fear and sadness 
experiences can be taken as indicating something of the function of each emotion. 
Within the current theory, sadness is an emotion that follows the perception of loss. It 
tends to be associated with a cessation or reduction in the effort directed towards a 
particular goal or goal grouping, and is typified by multiple and complex changes in 
the relationships between the remaining personal goals. 
Given such a function, experiences of sadness may well last a comparatively long 
time in order that the individual be motivated for the necessary time period, during 
which their altered processing tendencies (cognitive set) can perform what may be 
highly complex adjustments to their affected goal commitments39. Put simply, 
experiences of sadness follow organism-environment relationships that, involving 
38 Such problems are perhaps un surprising given Frijda et. al.'s (1991) definition and emphasis on the 
nebulous concept of 'emotional episodes.' These are defined as "a continuous emotion sequence 
resulting from the more or less continuous impact of one given event or series of events" (1991; p. 201, 
italics added). Although this is clearly not intended to be a definition of event, the relationship 
between event and response is evidently conflated via use of the word 'impact'. 
39 Paranthetically, it can be noted that this type of reasoning would lead one to expect that experiences 
of emotions involving longitudinal cognitive alterations will typically become longer the more complex 
or older the goal system (and consequent adjustments required) is at the time of the loss. Indeed, 
researchers have noted that lability appears to diminish with age, particularly in children. Thompson 
(1990) for example notes that emotions increase in duration between 6 and 12 months of age. 
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loss, require longitudinal adjustments within the goal system. Goals that may have 
depended upon the lost goal must be re-evaluated or replaced, processes that take time 
and thought (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). The feeling component of sadness is 
necessary in that it precludes continued effort toward and promotes rumination on the 
place of the lost goal in the broader scheme of the system. Given the necessity for 
cognitive adjustments in the face of loss, both the state and experience of sadness tend 
to endure for comparatively longer periods than other emotions. 
Similarly, the fact that experiences of fear are typically shorter than are those of the 
other emotions tells us something about the function of fear. In its most simple forms, 
fear is elicited by a perceived threat to life or physical safety (Shaver, Collins, & 
Clark, 1996), although it can appear in response to less direct, more existential threats. 
Given their comparative brevity, experiences of fear appear to motivate a more urgent 
adjustment of the organism-environment relationship than other emotions, like 
sadness. Specifically, the experience seems to motivate an immediate consideration 
and response to both the eliciting stimulus and the fear itself. In most instances, the 
fearful response will involve an immediate physical or metaphorical distancing from 
the fearful event/stimulus. As such, the reason that the experiences are comparatively 
short is not because the eliciting stimuli are necessarily briefer, but because the fear 
system has evolved to promote immediate adjustment. The threatening event may in 
fact continue to endure. However, and as is likely, as long as the person has 
successfully removed themselves from the situation, the experience will end. Given 
the duration of fear experiences, we can reasonably infer that the motivation to do so 
is typically great. 
Concluding Remarks on Function and Emotional Experience 
From the above it is clear that emotional experience bears a highly complex 
relationship with function for discrete emotions. In considering something of these 
relationships, it has not been my intention to suggest that we can or should want to 
understand emotions through their experience components alone. Nor has it been 
intended that the criticisms above be taken as evidence that antecedent prototypes are 
unimportant in an understanding of emotions and emotional experience. 
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Rather, the argument above has been intended to illustrate two points. Firstly, the 
discussion makes it clear that emotion theorists need to more carefully consider the 
place of experience in any theory of emotions. Currently, description and analysis 
regarding the place of conscious emotional experience in emotions is very much in its 
infancy. While experience is not the only aspect of emotion, it is nonetheless critical, 
both practically and phenomenologically, as well as in theory. Moreover, questions 
regarding the possible functions of experience are scarcely being asked, much less 
answered in our field. Consequently, it is suggested that we need to be more explicit, 
systematic, and rigorous in our consideration of the relationships between conscious 
emotional experience and the functions of discrete emotions. 
Perhaps more importantly, and certainly of greater interest to the current writer, the 
analysis presented above has also suggested that emotional experiences can inform us 
about the general function in emotions. Given the criticisms offered earlier, it is 
ironic that that the manner in which an emotion functions and is experienced can 
nevertheless inform us about its evolutionary function. Although the discussion here 
has restricted itself to a relatively primitive analysis of experience-function 
relationships, the abductive or retroductive approach employed in the analysis seems 
to contain a great deal of promise. Valence and duration, two central components of 
emotional experience, vary, and do not vary, in ways that manifest and inform us 
about function. Consequently, there appears little reason why more systematic data 
gathering and theorising could not further extend the type of reasoning employed here 
to other emotions and other aspects of their conscious experience. 
Of particular note among the implications stemming from this approach to emotions, 
experience, and function, is a necessary reconsideration of the relative importance of 
expression (particularly social expression) and experiential motivation in fulfilling 
evolutionary functions for each emotion. While social expression may comprise a 
key part of function for some emotions, this would seem unlikely to be equally so for 
all emotions. As the data presented above indicate, emotional states, expression, and 
the dimensions of conscious experience of emotions bear complex relationships with 
one another, relationships that are usefully seen as initially more or less flexible 
depending on the functions of the emotion under scrutiny. 
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Tuning this approach would necessitate data gathering from several cultural groups 
and emotions, and the concomitant assessment of (a) the relevant dimensions of 
conscious emotional experience, (b) situations and events (at a level that differentiated 
them from experience), and (c) the degree to which the emotion was verbally, facially, 
and behaviourally expressed. The cross-cultural aspect of this design would enable 
the comparative elimination of socialisation explanations for variances within the 
measures, while the combined experiential and expressive measures would permit 
ever-more precise inferences to be made regarding the relative importance of 
expression and conscious experience and motivation to the function for each emotion. 
Chapter 7.7 - The macrodevelopment of emotional expenence: 
Motivation and construction in a dynamic system 
Introduction 
Within the broad class of limitations imposed by the function of the individual 
emotional states, the current dissertation suggests that emergent emotional 
experiences are further influenced by factors derived from within each individual's 
own macrodevelopmental history - made manifest in their goals about emotions. As 
should be clear from the discussion above, function seems to impress comparatively 
few limits upon the experience of emotions. The influences that are apparent appear 
very general, and are limited to where the relevant dimension of experience is 
important to the function of the particular emotion. 
Perhaps more importantly, functional limits are more useful when used to describe the 
general constraints on the manner in which some emotions are typically experienced, 
once they have emerged. As such, they do not help explain a number of situations, for 
example instances when a particular emotional state is not experienced at all. With 
some few exceptions, neither do they explain why different people vary so greatly in 
the frequency of different experiences, in their enjoyment of them, and in their 
subsequent responses to each experience. Certainly it is to be expected that emotional 
experiences will be influenced by the functions of the emotional state, yet a more 
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ideographic concept is needed to capture a greater part of the complexity of individual 
experience. As Malatesta et. al. (1989) note, emotions rarely occur in isolation, but 
rather in combinations or patterns. 
As noted, the current dissertation describes the macrodevelopmental or personality 
variables that impact upon emotional experience as 'goals about emotions'. The 
concept is similar to the notion of emotions about emotions (c.f. Cole, Michel, & 
O'Donnell Teti, 1994), in that it suggests that we often get emotional about the 
emotions we are experiencing - they occur in patterns (Diener, 1999). Consistent 
with contemporary emotions theory, the current chapter further argues that the 
consequences associated with discrete experiences, states, and behaviours are 
internalised as goals across development, such that emotional states or experiences 
themselves can be treated as goal-relevant stimuli, and thus become capable of 
eliciting 'secondary' emotional responses. So for example, in the individual 
possessing goals regarding not being angry, the initial changes characterising the early 
stages of the angry response will immediately be appraised as the information relevant 
to the status of goals about emotions. In instances where the importance of the goal 
regarding emotional experience outweighs that of the original motive, the earlier 
emotion may never consciously experienced by the individual. 
Developmentally, the essential argument underlying this concept is that repeated 
microdevelopmental couplings, for example that of an angry state with negative 
consequences, lead to the macrodevelopmental emergence of major attractors and 
repellors for both the state and experience of anger or other emotions. Most often 
these new attractors will relate to the state or experience of the relevant emotion, but 
may be created regarding this or other emotions, say by making alternative emotions 
more favourable. Over time, repeated couplings between states, experiences, and 
consequences lead to the development of comparatively stable constraints, attractors 
and repellors for later experiences. As is discussed below, goals about emotions are 
thought to simultaneously develop at multiple degrees of greater or lesser specificity, 
such that they may relate to particular emotions, to combinations of intensities and 
emotions, to the people present and so on. 
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A few caveats 
When considering how emotional experiences might develop across the life-span of 
the individual, it becomes abundantly clear that the scientific understanding of 
emotional experience, let alone its development or its relationship to personality, is 
still in its infancy (M. Lewis, 1993). Emotion theorists have traditionally bypassed 
the investigation of experience, tending to leave its consideration to philosophers. 
Exactly why this should be so remains unclear, but the omission appears to relate to 
the difficulty in examining experience within normative frameworks. 
More optimistically, there are however three major developmental literatures that 
have indirectly examined several types of individual factor that are likely to influence 
subsequent emotional experiences. The literature examining the development of self-
regulation, particularly in its most recent formulations (e.g. Cole et. aI., 1994), has 
begun the process of exploring the complex interplay between the heritable and social 
factors involved in the regulation of emotional experience. While the emphasis of 
such research differs somewhat from that of the current chapter, many of the 
developmental factors likely to be involved in the development of emotional 
experience (e.g. Thompson, 1990; Saarni, 1993) have been examined in relation to 
emotion regulation and are discussed below. 
Similarly, recent work in attachment theory has begun to delineate some of the 
affective sequelae associated with particular patterns of attachment. In a recent 
review, Magai and McFadden (1995) have noted that ambivalently attached children 
express more anger than securely attached children during reunion following the 
Strange Situation. Similarly, insecure children appear more angry, hostile, sad and 
fearful in their relationships than do securely attached children. In contrast, securely 
attached children are more affectively positive during play, and exhibit greater 
curiosity and more autonomy (see also Shaver, Collins, & Clark, 1996 for a recent 
review). 
Finally, research from within personality frameworks, particularly the Five-Factor 
Model has considered something of the relationship between personality variables and 
the experience of affect. It can be broadly noted that some individuals appear 
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particularly prone to either positive (PA) or negative affect (NA). More specifically, 
it has been found that extraversion is associated with positive affect, and neuroticism 
with negative affect (e.g. Emmons & Diener, 1985; Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998), 
although a recent meta-analysis has suggested that this represents a grossly over-
simplified interpretation of personality-affect links (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). 
Additionally, it also seems possible that individuals may consistently differ from one 
another in the intensity of affects they typically experience (Diener, et. al., 1985; Flett, 
et. aI., 1986). 
Despite the comparative maturity of each field, it is my contention that each of the 
frameworks briefly described is unsuited to examining the interface between 
emotional experience and personality. Initially, it can be seen that the three 
frameworks operate at a level of generality difficult to reconcile with a discrete 
approach to emotions. Emotion regulation theory has not been explicit in its 
consideration of discrete emotions, tending to adopt a broadly 'affective' and 
implicitly hedonic model of regulation. Rather than consider specific emotions, 
"developmental and clinical research associates emotion regulation with the reduction 
of intensity and duration of negative emotion" (Cole et. aI., 1994; p. 86). 
This criticism is also levelled at both the attachment and personality-based 
investigations of affect4o• While attachment may well be an affective bond (Magai. 
1996), data describing precise affective consequences for particular types of 
attachment have not been forthcoming (e.g. Cooper, Shaver, & Collins, 199X; 
although see Mikulincer, 1998). Even should such data emerge, one wonders how 
they would be explained within the simple descriptive framework offered by the 
attachment classifications. Within an attachment framework, the affective correlates 
of particular styles would seem to be equally well explained through reference to 
differential motivations and beliefs acquired regarding relationships, a key future 
source of emotions as they do to predicting or explaining variations in experience. As 
such, while they may predict experiential differences, particularly at the gross level of 
40 There are two notable exceptions to this trend, found in the work of Carol Magai and colleagues and 
Mikulincer (e.g. 1996, 1998). Being a 'devotee' of the differential school of emotions Magai has 
consistently conducted research into attachment-emotion relations at a much greater level of specificity 
than most researchers. Ironically however, she has recently concluded that attachment may not 
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affect, the framework makes it next to impossible to determine whether such 
differences relate specifically to experiential variables or to shared global differences 
regarding the relevant elicitors. 
A recent paper encapsulating a trait approach to personality-affect relations 
specifically acknowledges that its empirical findings are considerably more consistent 
at a global affective level, while being less so at the level of discrete emotions (Gross, 
et. aI., 1998). In itself, this finding suggests that the broad trait framework may be 
unsuited to the task of predicting and explaining variations in the complicated domain 
of emotional experience41 . Furthermore, because the measures of both personality 
and affect are so global within these frameworks (Pervin, 1993a), the power of the 
framework to create an ecologically valid descriptive theory of emotional experience 
is greatly weakened. Moreover, to note that extraverts are generally more positive 
people can scarcely be considered a descriptive, much less an explanatory theory, of 
emotional experience42 (Pervin, 1993a, 1993b). 
The correlational data that ensues from trait and attachment research typically 
considers only the differences between (rather than within) individuals. As such it is 
at greater risk of 'explaining' experiential differences via conjectured mechanisms 
that may in fact result from ideographic differences in reporting or some other third 
variable. While not eliminating this possibility, multiple and relative intra-individual 
measurements seem more likely to enable the generation of more precise descriptive 
and explanatory theory for emotional experience and personality. 
Finally, all three approaches are difficult to reconcile with a motivational approach to 
personality like that undertaken here, particularly one in which emotional experience 
itself is thought to represent an ideographically motivated phenomenon. Each of the 
constitute the optimal system for classifying and predicting behaviour (Magai & McFadden, 1995), or, 
by extension, emotional experience. 
41 DeNeve and Cooper (1998) for example, note that only 4% of the variance in subjective well-being 
is associated with trait-based personality variables, with as much variance being accounted for by 
demographic variables like health and socio-economic status. 
42 It is again of note that the meta-analysis (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998) described above suggests that 
extraversion is no better a predictor of positive affect than agreeableness or health indices (see also Eid 
& Diener, 1999). Furthermore, an examination of Tables 8-12 in DeNeve et. al.' s (1998) review lead 
one to suspect that the single best predictors of global affective measures are for personality measures 
that are inherently affectual themselves. 
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three frameworks implicitly conceptualises of emotional experience as a 'readout' of 
the underlying personality processes, rather than as a motivated and constructed 
variable in its own right. 
Additionally, each approach has tended to measure behavioural indices of emotion 
and emotional expression as if these were necessarily indicative of emotional 
experiences, rather than states (see below). Shaver et. al. (1996) for example describe 
a study in which differentially-attached children masked the facial display of sadness 
following the losing of a game. In discussing the results, these authors clearly 
consider the masking behaviour that was observed to represent a form of emotional 
regulation. While it cannot be denied that it may do so, it is also possible that the 
behavioural measure may represent little more than the regulation of a social display. 
In this manner, frameworks that confound behaviour and experience lose even more 
precision than is already lost in an emphasis on affect over emotion. 
Overall, the problems discussed above suggest that a new approach to the place of 
stable personality variables in conscious emotional experience may be of considerable 
benefit. Although several theories have noted that emotions can lead to other 
emotions or that some states are 'preferred' to others, the current theory is unique in 
asserting that emotional states are internalised as ideographic goals across 
macrodevelopment. Following this development, the influences of goals about 
emotions are thought to function no differently to those of any other goals (although 
their domain of effect clearly varies). The continued use of the goal concept means 
that the relationships between personality and emotional experience are more easily 
subsumed within a general theory of personality, emotion, and motivation. Lastly, the 
approach taken here is more precise than other approaches in its consideration of 
exactly which aspects of which emotions are being socialised. It pays particular 
attention to the importance of discrete emotions (see Chapter 8), clearly separates 
emotional states from the conscious experience of those states, and acknowledges that 
emotions, emotional experiences, and behaviour are simultaneously socialised at 
multiple levels of specificity. 
As has been noted previously, the current discussion is limited to the development of 
ideographic motivations about conscious emotional experience. While a more 
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comprehensive discussion of the relationships between language, representational 
ability, consciousness, and conscious experience is withheld until chapter seven, it is 
briefly noted that the conscious experience of emotions necessarily presupposes the 
presence of consciousness and'a conscious self (Lewis, 1993). 
Several writers III the field of emotion regulation have also suggested that the 
representation of emotional experiences is critical in their regulation (Cole et. al., 
1994; Thompson, 1990; Stein, et. al., 1993). As children become consciously aware 
of and able to judge their own inner life, it becomes possible to have emotional 
reactions about emotional reactions (Cole, et. aI., 1994). Thompson (1990) makes a 
similar comment when he notes that once a child acquires a representational 
knowledge of the consequences of an emotion, the emotions themselves can become 
the object of reflective analysis, regulatory capacities can be employed deliberately or 
strategically, and incorporated into a broader representational network of emotional 
understanding. Finally, Stein et. al. (1993) suggest that having preferences for 
emotional states necessitates the ability to represent, remember, and compare two 
different states. 
Additionally, it seems probable that linguistic capacities are a necessary component in 
the construction of more highly differentiated emotional experiences. While the 
causal contribution of language development to the development of emotional 
experience remains a matter for speculation, it seems reasonable to initially suggest 
that the ability to use verbal labels is important to the individual's ability to 
differentiate among diverse experiences. 
The place of temperament 
The most obvious place to begin a theory regarding the macrodevelopment of 
conscious emotional experiences is in consideration of temperament. Although 
temperament theory has its own complexities (see Derryberry & Rothbart, 1984), 
most approaches acknowledge that infant emotions are at the core of temperament 
(Thompson, 1990). Consequently, temperament is generally regarded as a heritable 
individual difference in behavioural-affective style, including both reactivity and 
regulatory aspects (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1984). While personality variables 
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probably differ in their macrodevelopmental stability (West & Graziano, 1989), 
longitudinal data suggests that measures of affect tend to be considerably more stable 
than do data continuities for other personality variables (Caspi & Silva, 1995; Eder & 
Mangelsdorf, 1997). Additionally, behavioural genetic work (e.g. Buss & Plornin, 
1984) suggests that there are sizable heritable components in levels of pleasant and 
unpleasant affect, while theorists such as Ormel and Wohlfarth (1991) have suggested 
that stable temperamental dispositions may in fact be more powerful than 
environmental factors in influencing subjective well being43. 
The concept of temperament is perhaps best seen as a biological basis for the 
development of personality (see Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Sullivan-Logan, 1998 
for a recent review), rather than as an initial condition for the development of 
emotional experience. However given that temperament is an inherently affective 
construct and highly stable over long periods of time (Caspi & Silva, 1995), there is 
good reason to suspect that temperamental differences may exert an indirect effect on 
later experience. 
Malatesta and Wilson (1988) have conceptualised of temperament as a heritable 
affective tendency to perceive and respond to the environment in systematically 
different ways, leading to either 'affect readiness' or 'affect blindness' (Izard, 
Hembree & Huebner, 1987; Izard, 1994a) effects (see also Campos, et. aI., 1983; 
Lazarus, 1991a). Within dynamic systems terms, one could say that attractors and 
repellors for discrete emotional states are pre-existent within the human infant44• As 
with all attractors, these may be more or less precise and may well include aspects of 
arousal or state intensity. If we accept this conceptualisation, it is readily seen that the 
relative frequency of differential emotional states will vary between individuals, at 
least on average. Furthermore, in coupling this view of temperament with the 
affective-developmental mechanism outlined in Chapter 6, possible relationships 
between temperament and subsequent experience emerge. 
43 There has been some suggestion that heritability coefficients may be higher for unpleasant than 
pleasant affect (TeIIegen, Lykken, Bouchard, Wilcox, Segal, & Rich, 1988) 
44 It is of note that Malatesta et. al. (1989) in the conclusion/response section of their seminal paper on 
expressive development directly compare emotional biases to attractors. 
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Chapter 5 suggested that attractors within the personality state space are elaborated 
within the presence of particular emotional states and experiences. On this basis, it 
was argued that the precise form of emergent attractors must necessarily represent 
something of the nature of the emotion present during their inception. Additionally, it 
was also suggested that a single developmental episode could result in the emergence 
of multiple attractors. Finally and most importantly, it was noted that these attractors 
could represent organism-environment relations for any 'stimuli,' up to and including 
new attractors for the emotional responses themselves. 
Following this approach, the current theory VIews temperament as exerting an 
influence on later emotional experiences in a number of ways. Firstly, if new 
attractors are 'born' within the influence of discrete emotional states then individuals 
with different temperamental styles should develop differential ratios of attractors and 
repellors of certain kinds (an emotional style). The 'grumpy' baby for example, could 
be expected to manifest a developing state space in which a greater proportion of 
developments occur as a result of angry states. Consequently, the particular form of 
the state space developments stemming from the angry state, coupled with attractors 
regarding the state itself, combine to maintain a process in which attractors are born 
in, and responded to, with anger45. So because temperament is the critical initial 
condition for the state space attractors relating to emotional states, goals are 
responded to and emerge in a cascading pattern characterised to some degree by 
individual temperament. 
Importantly, these processes may well be occurring from the very first moments of 
infant-environment interaction, with a consequence that key attractor patterns may be 
instantiated considerably prior to the infant's ability to examine, articulate or reflect 
upon them. The implications of this developmental timeframe are important and are 
returned to below. 
45 This type of pattern is consistent with the personality theory of Magai (1996) who suggests that 
personalities can come to be organised around a particular emotion (an anger-prone personality 
configuration). Such children have a lower threshold to anger arousal and report more anger in 
response to anger eliciting videos than non-aggressive children. 
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The socialisation of state space attractors for emotional states 
The innate developmental processes hypothesised here do not occur in a social 
vacuum. From the outset rather, many elements of emotion are heavily socialised 
(Thompson, 1990). Although the literature discussing the socialisation of emotion-
related phenomena has failed to consider the socialisation of emotional experience as 
distinct from expression (see e.g. Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998a), there is 
good reason to suspect that many of the same influences and processes are as relevant 
to the development of experience as they are to other aspects of emotion. 
Eisenberg, et. aI.'s (1998a) recent review on the socialisation of emotion captures 
something of the staggering complexity of the nature-nurture interactions involved in 
emotional development, as well as illustrating the general sentiments of the current 
literature. A heavily abridged list of factors relevant to the socialisation of emotional 
experience would include parental expressive style and the reinforcement practices for 
children's emotional expression (e.g. Thompson, 1990; Eisenberg, et. aI., 1998a), 
particularly as they relate to gender (e.g. Shields, 1990; 1991; Fivush, 1998), affective 
attunement (e.g. Stern, 1985), the development of representational ability (Stein et. 
aI., 1993), the composition of the family, the role of peers, the emergence of theories 
of emotions (Thompson, 1990), cultural rules (e.g. Ekman, 1972; Cole & Dennis, 
1998), exposure to television, the emergence of language (Fredrickson, 1998b), and 
familial discourse practices (Vygotsky, 1962). 
Given the importance of temperament (Graziano & Tobin, 1998) and the clear 
influence of socialisation variables, the current dissertation endorses a heavily 
interactive model of experiential socialisation. While personality research has 
suggested that temperament-affective continuity is comparatively high (e.g. Eder & 
Mangelsdorf, 1997; Caspi & Silva, 1995), developmental research and theory 
suggests that affective-personality variables are heavily socialised. Both Tomkins' 
(1962, 1963) and Izard's (1994a) developmental theories for example have suggested 
that the organisation of a child's emotional repertoire is acquired during the 
socialisation process. 
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In addition, a fair proportion of data denotes highly complex interactions between 
biological and social variables. For example, mothers report that their responses to 
negative emotions were more punitive or avoidant if they viewed the child as high in 
negative emotionality or low in the ability to regulate attention (Eisenberg, et. al., 
1998). Similarly, Malatesta, Culver, Tesman, and Shepard (1989) found that affective 
biases occur where punitive socialisation occurs, while a more balanced emotional 
repertoire appears under rewarding socialisation practices (see also Thompson, 1990). 
Overall, Magai (1996) has suggested that certain aspects of emotionality such as 
arousability or irritability might load genetically, but that styles of management (open 
versus controlled), parental modelling, and family climate may introduce a source of 
learned variance that may be etiologically significant. Thompson (1990) likewise 
suggests that more extreme (affective) genotypes may be less responsive to the press 
for 'fit,' or environmental demand. Overall, it is clear that more research is needed 
(see below), particularly that of a longitudinal nature (Fivush, 1998). 
Unfortunately, the dictates of space preclude a full discussion of these influences on 
the socialisation and development of emotional experience (for more information 
interested readers are referred to the excellent reviews by Eisenberg, et. aI., 1998 and 
Thompson, 1990). However, in respect of emotional experience a further three 
interrelated comments will be made. 
The relationship between state and experience 
The final comment to be made in respect of the development of conscious emotional 
experience speaks to the initial relationships between emotional states, expressions, 
and conscious emotional experience. Although few theorists have considered this 
issue, Michael Lewis has argued that the links between state and experience may be 
small or non-existent in early development (Lewis, 1993, see also Ortony, et. aI., 
1988; Fogel, 1990). Exactly why this should be so remains somewhat unclear in 
Lewis's (1993) paper, but appears to relate to consciousness and the general potential 
for dysjunctions between state and experience. 
To be blunt, this strikes the current author as a problematic standpoint to adopt on the 
issue of initial state-experience connections. Lewis (1993) notes that in a culture 
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where interpersonal expressions of anger are inappropriate, that while the individual 
may act in an angry manner and even be in a state of anger, that they will probably 
not have any experience of anger. While the current author categorically agrees with 
Lewis insofar as such occurrences may represent a demonstration of the potential 
dysjunction between states and experiences, it is my contention that this type of 
illustration does nothing to support the notion of an original dysjunction. 
As was demonstrated above, the conscious experiences of emotions are highly 
ideographic phenomena, varying within and between individuals on a number of 
dimensions. If we assume that even a minor proportion of such difference is existent 
in the very first experiences of a given emotion, we must consider where such 
differences came from. If the patterns of attractors regarding emotional states do not 
form the basis for attractors at the level of experience, on what basis are the 
ideographic characteristics of early conscious experiences determined? Not only does 
Lewis's conceptualisation fail to suggest a basis, but one cannot imagine a plausible 
explanation deriving from an initial dysjunction. 
On balance, an initial concordance between state and experience would seem more 
likely than not (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988). Although the potential for dysjunction is 
quite evident within the current conceptulisation of experience, initial experiences are 
likely to represent an approximate experiential 'readout' of the attractor pattern for the 
state, particularly since these will be active at the time. 
Specificity in the socialisation of discrete emotions 
As should be clear by this point (see also Figure 7.5 below), the current dissertation 
clearly separates emotional states from conscious emotional experience. Within the 
current context this means that much of the socialisation research is made less directly 
relevant to the socialisation of emotional experience, in that it has typically focussed 
on emotion generally rather than on conscious emotional experience (Graziano & 
Tobin, 1998). More specifically, research and reviews in socialisation have typically 
inferred the presence of both emotions and experiences in the infant through the 
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measurement of behaviour46• Although this methodological emphasis is part of a 
more general issue in developmental emotions research (see e.g. Carnras, 1988, 1992; 
Malatesta, et. aI., 1989) it becomes particularly salient when we want to know exactly 
how and which aspects of which emotions are being socialised. 
For example, it is debatable whether the contingencies existent in socialisation 
practices impact on emotions generally or more specifically on the expressive 
behaviours associated with them. Similarly, it is hard to know exactly how the 
socialisation of states or expressive behaviours in the pre-conscious infant impact on 
(or are reflected within) later conscious emotional experiences. 
The answering of such 'specificity' questions depends in part on how one 
conceptualises the relationships between socialisation and affect, and between the 
components of emotions. If a given theory considers certain classes of infant 
behaviour to be a reliable indicator of emotional state, then both behaviour and state 
are (for that emotion) simply socialised as one. Because emotional states themselves 
have implications for a number of other goals/attractors, it is likely that certain states 
come to be more and less favoured by the organism depending on the consequences 
that typically follow or co-occur. 
Moreover, while the possibility for state-behaviour dysjunction probably emerges 
comparatively early in development, the current theory suggests that the two 
components typically co-occur. Consequently, attractors can be instantiated in respect 
of both the behaviour and the state simultaneously but individually. In this sense then, 
the conceptual separation of emotional states from emotional experience and the 
emergence of consciousness does nothing more than increase the number of emotion-
related phenomena that might be affected in a given interaction, from two to three. 
The consequence of these separations IS that the environmental and intrapsychic 
consequences associated with particular behaviours, states and experiences are 
thought to lead to the development of attractors or repellors regarding one, two or all 
46 In addition, Fivush (1998) has recently suggested that the measurement of parental variables needs to 
be made more precise, avoiding a confusion between parental behaviour and reports about behaviour. 
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of the three components, at the same time47. Imagine for example that a toddler is in 
an angry state, is experiencing anger, and behaves accordingly. The parent, in 
seeking to eliminate such behaviours from the child's repertoire, punishes the child. 
Given a conceptual separation of states, experiences and behaviour, it is possible that 
(despite the parent's intentions vis-a-vis the behaviour alone) their intervention 
creates distinct repellors for the state, the experience, and the behaviour (see e.g. Izard 
& Malatesta, 1987). In future, the child will be unwittingly repelled from both angry 
states and behaviours. As will be expanded upon below, it is for this type of reason 
that language plays such an important role in increasing the specificity of socialisation 
influences. 
In addition, the current theory is explicit in suggesting that socialisation occurs in 
respect of discrete emotions. Most studies of emotion socialisation have examined 
positive versus negative affect, rather than discrete emotions (Fivush, 1998, although 
see Malatesta, et. al., 1989). However, common sense suggests that parents are likely 
to be considerably more discriminating in their values, desires and reinforcement for 
the expression of discrete emotions. Moreover, data suggests that infants are 
displaying discrete emotions very early in life. Izard, Fantauzzo, Castle, Haynes, and 
Slomine (1995) for example found that full-face expressions of interest, joy, sadness, 
and anger were present at 2.5 months. In some senses then, what parents believe they 
are socialising is only indirectly relevant to attractors and repellors for the discrete 
states and behaviours that are actually being established. 
In sum, it is clear that the socialisation of emotions is incredibly complex. Over time. 
the agents of socialisation appear to unwittingly (cf. Fivush, 1998) reinforce emotions. 
experience, and expression at a high level of specificity. Socialisation almost 
certainly occurs at the level of discrete emotions, and may involve the concurrent 
although discrete socialisation of both states and behaviour. Additionally, it is also 
likely that parents reinforce levels of intensity for particular emotions, as well as the 
expression/experience of emotions in particular contexts, in respect of particular 
people, and in response to particular classes of stimuli. Within the current theory, 
such complexity is accommodated by asserting that single· events can produce 
47 The link between states and experiences is discussed below. 
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multiple changes within the child's system of attractors, the products emerging at the 
levels of both behaviour and state. Over time, an ever more precise system of 
attractors and repellors relating to emotions, experiences and expressions is acquired. 
Language, construction, and more specificity 
Given the potential for specificity evident above, it is suggested that the emergence of 
verbal communication represents a critical juncture in the precise socialisation of 
emotional phenomena. While the relationships between language use, particularly in 
families, and later affective consequences is a poorly researched domain (Dunn, 
Brown, & B eards all , 1998), several theorists have emphasised the importance of 
language to emotion (see e.g. Thompson, 1990; Fredrickson, 1998b). According to 
Thompson (1990), the mastering of linguistic basics opens critical avenues for 
exogenous influences on emotions. During conversations about emotions children 
receive influential verbal messages regarding the values, appropriateness and 
justification of particular feelings. As Thompson (1990) notes, verbal knowledge 
transmission and socialisation can occur either through direct instruction, through 
disapproval upon communication of a state, or indirectly by informing children about 
the potential future consequences of a an experience. Furthermore, adults can suggest 
regulatory strategies, and provide the conduits through which emergent experience is 
linked to cultural meaning (Cole & Dennis, 1998). 
Within the current theory, the emergence of language has two critical effects in terms 
of emotion socialisation and emotional experience. Following the discussion above it 
can be seen that once the child is able to understand verbal labels and use language 
that the socialisation of the components of emotion are or can be made more precise. 
Moreover, the language-driven increase in the depth and specificity of meaning 
derived from interactions occurs for both the agents and the targets of explicit or 
implicit socialisation. 
For the parent, language provides a far more precise method of communicating values 
. regarding emotions and displays. With language, a parent can more precisely 
identify, communicate, and thence modify particular parts of a child's emotional 
reaction. In a recent paper, Gondoli and Braungart-Rieker (1998) describe an 
253 
example of a socialising interaction that clearly illustrates the potential for specificity 
imparted by language. They describe a situation in which a child becomes angry 
following their losing a toy to a peer and hits the other child. In response to these 
events the child's mother says, "I can understand why you're angry, I'd be angry too. 
It's not fair when someone else grabs your toy. But we don't hit other people even 
when we're angry." In this situation, the mother's use oflanguage has enabled her to 
be more specific in the targets of her socialisation. Through language, she has 
reinforced the legitimacy of the child's experience, while verbally informing the child 
that certain classes of behaviour are unacceptable. Obviously, not all parents are as 
discriminating in their interventions, an unhelpful practice that is likely to engender 
broad attractor patterns at levels ill-conducive to health (Cole, et. aI., 1994), produce 
emotional biases (Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Malatesta, et. aI., 1989) and/or tendencies to 
inhibit behaviour (Polivy, 1998). 
For the child's part, the information imparted through language should enable them to 
more accurately determine the aspects of the situation and their response that are 
acceptable to the parent (or other key figures) and those that are not. Over time, the 
child is able to develop an ever-more highly differentiated knowledge regarding 
which emotions, situations, expressions, and combinations thereof will likely lead to 
negative consequence and which will not. Interestingly, the socialisation of emotions 
through language also creates the possibility that the child may perceive dysjunctions 
within the parent, wherein (for example) the parent angrily tells the child that it is not 
alright to get angry. 
A second general consequence of language-based socialisation of emotions, is that 
that the use of verbal labels leads to the capacity for more precise differentiation 
among or between emotional experiences. As was noted earlier, conscious emotional 
experience is probably the most highly constructed component of emotions. To some 
extent, the ability of the young child (or the adult) to differentiate among emotional 
experiences, even those derived from the same basic state, is linked to their verbal 
capacities to describe them as different (see below). 
At the broadest level, language provides the conduit through which the emotions and 
their experience are linked to cultural (Cole & Dennis, 1998) or shared (Stem, 1985) 
254 
meaning (see also Averill, 1982, 1994a, 1996; Lazarus, 1984; Ellsworth, 1991; 
Mancuso & Sarbin, 1998). The relationships between emotions, experience, and 
culture are of particular interest to writers operating from a constructionist perspective 
(see e.g. Lutz, 1982, 1986; Harre, 1986; Armon-Jones, 1986). In Averill's (1982) 
analysis for example, "emotions may be defined as socially constituted syndromes" 
(p. 6), and the reflective experience of emotion involves an interpretation of one's 
own behaviour in relation to social rules and standards. 
Constructionists have been singularly vocal in stressing the need for an understanding 
of the relationships between emotions and language. According to Averill (1982), 
"language is the royal road to conscious experience" (p. 25) and the "proper unit of 
analysis is represented by the natural categories of emotion as reflected in our 
ordinary language" (p. 329). Although the extent to which culture provides 
conceptual tools for constructing experience is as yet unknown (Lutz, 1986), 
"emotion words do not simply serve to bring the private into the social realm" (Lutz, 
1986; p. 285). Rather, they are integral to it, shaping and giving meaning or 
contextualising what it is that is being experienced (see e.g. Malatesta & Haviland, 
1985; Heelas, 1996). 
While the interests of the current chapter prohibit an analysis of language-experience 
relationships, language is nonetheless likely to be important in the development and 
later emergence of emotional experiences. Although it is trying to avoid adopting a 
causal position on this issue, the current dissertation is certainly not taking a Whorfian 
(causal) perspective on this relationship48. The use of verbal labels does not in and of 
itself generate novel experiences. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that verbal 
labels are important in assisting an individual to differentiate among experiences. 
Because language is critical to the reflective consideration of one's own experiences, 
verbal labels may corne to constitute attractors for particular categories of experience. 
These may vary either qualitatively or in quantity depending on both the linguistic 
and social devices available. 
48Paranthetically, it can be noted that the current author is of the opinion that linguistic labels are more 
usefully thought of as encapsulating or representing a wide variety of social values and practices, rather 
than as directly causing differentiation within experience. As such, language does not directly cause 
differentiation, rather it is a way in which was can approximate a more abstract series of social and 
moral distinctions that permeate a given culture. 
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To illustrate, imagine a situation in which a young child is attempting to create a 
particular configuration of blocks. However unfortunate, the child's motor skills are 
such that they are unable to place the blocks with the sensitivity needed to create the 
structure, and the child begins to violently throw the blocks around. The parent 
intervenes, probably tidying the blocks, and asks the child what is wrong. The child 
states that they are angry. The parent considers this description and suggests to the 
child that they are in fact not feeling 'angry,' but rather are feeling 'frustrated.' 
Over time, such interactions create a learning situation in which the child begins to 
connect the combination of a particular state (in this case anger) and a certain class of 
event type (in this case, repeated and failed attempts) with an experience called 
'frustration'. So through repeated verbal interactions, the agents of socialisation help 
to 'create' attractors for experiences of 'frustration' within the infant's experiential 
state space. In this case frustration is not a state. Rather, it is an experience based in 
the state of anger coupled with the proximate occurrence of repeated failure/thwart. 
In making these claims, it becomes evident that the current writer endorses the weaker 
version of constructionism like that expoused by Averill (1982) and Armon-Jones 
(1986), at least insofar as applied to emotional experience. An experientially discrete 
model could of course argue that experiencing oneself as being 'angry,' 'frustrated,' 
'irritated,' 'annoyed,' 'exasperated,' 'infuriated,' 'enraged,' 'furious,' 'incensed,' 
'livid,' or 'outraged' is simply a socio-linguistic convention that allows us to indicate 
degrees of the same basic state, anger. Clearly such an explanation is possible in 
some cases, yet we cannot realistically deny that each experience feels different, and 
not only in degree. Furthermore, one cannot help but wonder whether 'contentment' 
is really the same as 'joy' or whether 'apprehension' and 'terror' are the same but for 
degree? Accepting that people experience more than one emotion simultaneously 
(e.g. Oatley & Duncan, 1992) simply compounds the difficulty inherent in 
experientially discrete or 'readout' models. 
While not seeking to create a definitive answer on this issue, the current author 
suggests that emotional experiences, particularly in the adult, represent more than a 
simple 'readout' of emotional states. Emotional states are a finite set of biological 
facts, and can only exist sequentially, one at a time (see Chapter 8). In contrast, 
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conscious experiences represent a temporally less discriminating integration of 
multiple evaluations and influences. Moreover, they are highly motivated 
phenomena, based in states but dependent on acquired values and variables for their 
discrimination. While experiences are not typically constrained by the absence of a 
suitable verbal label, the availability of them makes their emergence considerably 
more likely. 
Concluding remarks on macrodevelopment and emotional experience 
Although the socialisation of conscious emotional experience is a poorly researched 
domain, the current section has argued that both heritable and early childhood factors 
have critical influences on the conscious experience of emotions. Within the current 
theory, certain emotional states and the behaviours associated with them are initially 
made relatively more and less likely by the temperament of the child. As noted 
above, a heritable predisposition to appraise the environment and respond to it with 
certain emotional states and behaviours is one useful way to conceptualise of 
temperament. Since new attractors emerge within the influence of certain emotional 
states and retain something of their 'flavour,' temperament is seen to exert a 
cascading influence across development. 
Interacting with these initial and cascading proclivities are a large number of social 
and socialisation variables. Taken together then, a combination of temperamental and 
environmental factors shape the development of an ever-more highly differentiated 
field of motivational attractors and repellors for certain states, certain intensities, 
behaviours, situations, and combinations thereof. At the level of personality or 
motivational measurement, the current theory describes such factors as goals about 
emotions. 
Importantly, the section above has argued that states and behaviours are frequently, 
albeit unwittingly, socialised together and has further suggested that the patterns of 
attractors representing the developing system's preference for certain emotional states 
must be thought of as providing the initial basis for the attractors representing 
conscious emotional experience. 
257 
Once conscious experience is capacitated (see Chapter 4) and verbal communication 
emerges, conscious emotional experience is influenced in two further ways. Firstly, 
language enables the parent to be more specific in the component of emotion that their 
interventions target. For the child, language can be used to gain key information 
about emotions, their experiences, and the consequences associated with each. 
Secondly, the use of verbal labels may well play an unrecognised role in creating even 
more precise attractors within the experiential state space. 
Across development, these processes create a cascading tendency within the 
individual's state space development whereby certain types of experiences become 
progressively more or less likely. Although the influences of attractor fields are never 
fixed, repeated interactions do nonetheless tend to perpetuate differences, creating 
stable personality-affect relationships. While the processes discussed here have been 
framed as issues in early development, there is no reason why further developments in 
adulthood, for example those stemming from personal development/psychotherapy or 
the acquisition of another language could not further rarefy the experiential state 
space, increasing the possibilities for phenomenon ally different conscious emotional 
experiences. 
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Chapter 7.8 - Tidying up by example: Synthesising developmental and 
operational concerns III the emergence of conscious emotional 
expenences 
By this point in what is admittedly a very complex piece of theory, the reader could 
be forgiven for wondering exactly how the model being developed here describes and 
explains emotional experience (or even what it all means). Below, a diagrammatic 
representation and summation of the model is offered (see Figure 7.5), as is an 
extended example in which the various influences on the emergence of conscious 
emotional experience are described. 
The Macrodevelopment of Jack: A quick biography 
Jack seemed to have been born grumpy. He was an irritable baby, demanding and 
difficult to please. He was a second child, born two years after an older brother, and 
a year earlier than his sister. ill most ways his upbringing was commonplace, 
unexceptional and without the characteristics known to produce later difficulty. 
Intellectually, he was an average student, he played a few sports, and attended the 
local Catholic Church until his mid-teens. As with his siblings, he suffered no 
childhood 'abuse,' and was never involved in drug use beyond experimentation in 
college (he inhaled). Currently 25 years old, Jack lives with his partner (Jill). She is 
currently concluding a Masters degree at the local college while Jack works as a shift 
manager at the local convenience store. 
The Situation 
Upon arriving at work one day, the general manager takes Jack aside and explains that 
a fair amount of money is being lost through employees taking extra time on breaks. 
The manager asks him to pay particular attention to the amount of time employees are 
spending on such, reminding him that they are only entitled to 10 minutes. Bearing 
this in mind, Jack monitors the employees' breaking habits (sic), and keeps track of 
the time each takes. Later in his shift, he becomes aware that X has been absent from 
the shop floor for nearly half an hour. He discovers him, 'with his feet up,' reading 
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the paper in the staff room. He approaches X and explains the situation to him, only 
to be dismissively rebuffed. "Don't be so uptight!" X says. 
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The Demonstration 
For the purposes of illustration and simplification, imagine that "being a good 
employee" or "doing his job properly" is the most immediate general goal Jack brings 
to this situation. In the general arrangement of his personality, these are not 
particularly important goals for Jack (low trait importance), for he does not envisage a 
career as a manager and has no great interest in remaining within this particular 
company. However, he is financially dependent on his job and the general manager 
has recently spoken to him regarding the issue. Additionally, he is currently in the 
work setting, suggesting that this motive may operate as somewhat more important 
than it might in other situations (cf. Cantor, 1994). 
The comparatively simple description of Jack's functioning outlined above is useful 
in illustrating a number of points. Firstly, it offers a momentary glimpse of the 
complexity of personality and motivation, and the resultant overdetermination of 
behaviour. Although, the analysis here requires that we focus on the dynamics of 
experience as related to a single goal (the 'activating' motive), Jack's motivations are 
clearly complex and interactive (see Chapter 2) and his behaviour a compromise 
between the competing demands of multiple emergent motivations. Secondly, the 
example here demonstrates something of the ways in which other motives and 
situational variables interact with the trait importance of the activating motive to 
influence its emergent importance (see Clore, 1994a). In this example, the emergent 
importance of Jack's 'need to be a good employee' goal is probably somewhat higher 
than its trait level, due to the influences of the situation and other salient motives 
within his state space. 
Interactively, trait and emergent motive importance tell us how intense the emotional 
reaction is likely to be at the level of the state. They do not however tell us which 
emotion Jack will feel, or -how intense the experience will be for him. Within a 
general cognitive model, the emotion that arises depends on how Jack appraises the 
situation. In this situation (and without further information), the emotion and any 
emotional experiences that emerge could be nearly anything, their nature determined 
by the manner in which he thinks about the situation. 
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Yet given what we know about Jack's temperament, it is reasonable to assume that he 
might typically appraise such situations as being ones of 'thwart'. In dynamic terms, 
attractors representing the state of anger have been considerably larger than those for 
other emotional states since before the time of his birth. 
If we further assume that Jack's parents were comparatively reinforcing of his 
behaviour during the times that he was in an angry state, such initial state-level biases 
will have tended to cascade. The state of anger will have been reinforced (its attractor 
deepened and/or generalised), and a high proportion of acquired or derived goals will 
have been 'born' during microdevelopmental episodes of anger, thus representing 
something of it in their makeup. At a trait level, it is easier, preferable and more 
likely that Jack will develop an angry state. Jack wants to be a good employee, and 
this individual is deliberately creating a situation in which this cannot be. 
Currently then, Jack is in a state of moderate anger. Yet to this point, Jack has not 
had any conscious emotional experience. In most instances, and for most people, the 
conscious experience of emotion will reflect the emotional states present49. However, 
as is indicated in Figure 7.5 state-experience concordances do not necessarily occur. 
What and how Jack consciously experiences the state in this situation is a complex 
function of several more influences. More specifically, the type and intensity of any 
conscious experience involves the consideration of three other influence groupings 
(Processes 1,2, and 3a). 
Initially, the emotional state itself may be evaluated as the stimuli relevant to 
attractors and repellors existing at the level of the state (Process 1) before any 
experiences emerge: Given Jack's history, it is unlikely that he has repellors for the 
state of anger (see above). However, for an individual who (unlike Jack) had a 
history of punishment or negative consequence associated with angry states (and thus 
seeks to avoid them), the state would then be appraised as relevant to these motives. 
In such instances, the issue of whether the angry state is ever manifest in a conscious 
experience of anger is determined through a trade off between at least two goals. 
49 As was noted above, and is expanded upon below, conscious experiences tend to be a less 
discriminating temporal integration of multiple states. 
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In the most simple illustration, the intensity of the response of the level of the state 
(and by inference the importance of the activating motive) is 'compared' to the 
importance of anger-state avoidance goals/attractors. If the activating motive is more 
important, the state will be represented in experience, although this experience may be 
a particular 'variant,' more complex, or conflicted (see below). If however it is more 
important to them that they do not get angry, a completely different experience could 
potentially result. In such a case, the angry state would be appraised as the stimulus 
that 'threatens' the angry-state repellors (the new eliciting motive) and produce a new 
emotional state, say that of fear. As is made clear in this example, a particular 
emotional state need never be experienced by the individual, but can be changed 
through an ongoing process of re-evaluation. 
Following a less biased developmental history, an emotional state will typically be 
initially made manifest in a conscious emotional experience of a similar type. 
However, the current model also suggests that conscious emotional experiences 
themselves are 'up for grabs' as stimuli to be evaluated in respect of goals about 
emotions (Process 2). In some situations, or in general, an individual may want or not 
want to have particular emotional experiences. 
Consider for example a slight variant of our basic situation in which X is an attractive 
female. In such a situation, it is possible that Jack might initially begin to experience 
anger. However, he could quickly come to evaluate her (unfavourable) response to 
his anger in respect of his 'need to be attractive' type goals that emerge in the 
situation. As above, whether Jack is able to alter his emotional experience (and how 
quickly) depends on the relative importance of multiple emergent motive concerns. 
Specifically, his experience depends on the relative emergent importance of the 
motive that elicited the anger in the first place and his need to be attractive to her. If 
the latter is more important, his angry experience will be appraised as threatening his 
attractiveness goals, produce a new state, and a likely change in his experience. 
The notion of emergent importance is particularly important here, in that it can be 
used to explain why individuals experience themselves as wanting to be/do/feel 
differently, but declare that they are unable to do so. Within the current theory, it is 
not true that they cannot. Nor is it true to say that they do not want to experience 
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something different, or do not expenence themselves as unable to alter their 
experience. Rather, it is suggested that changing their experience is not important 
enough in the particular instance. In slightly more technical terms, the emergent 
importance of the motives producing the experience outweigh the importance of other 
motives. So while people may well make report on this type of 'undesired' 
experience, they do so retrospectively and at a trait level. For the man who becomes 
angry and beats his wife despite his desire to have a decent relationship with her and 
his knowledge that beating her threatens this goal, the emergent importance of 
whatever goals, emotions, and experiences are producing the violence by definition 
outweigh his desire to be with her in that moment50• 
Upon returning to our original example, we find Jack in a moderately angry state. 
Such a state, coupled with the absence of preclusive attractor and repellor patterns sets 
the stage for the emergence of a conscious experience of anger. However, how will 
this be experienced? Will the experience be pleasant for him? How long will the 
experience last? Will Jack become irritable? Will he become frustrated? Will he 
become so completely consumed with hatred that he has an apoplectic seizure? As 
noted above, Jack's conscious emotional experience is not simply a 
phenomenological readout of his angry state. Rather it is a motivationally constructed 
experiential variant that is usually based in a state, in this case of anger. 
As is evident in the figure, there are three general influences on the precise form an 
emotional experience takes. The most immediate constraints are those imposed by 
the function of the discrete emotional states (Process 3a). In the case of anger, these 
have not been discussed, predominantly because any that might exist were not evident 
in the data gathered above. In a more general sense however, it has already been 
noted that the conscious experiences of some discrete emotions are somewhat 
constrained by the function of the discrete emotional state. 
In the emergence of emotional experience, the second grouping of constraints and 
attractors are uniquely created during each individual's developmental history 
50 As is expanded upon later in the dissertation, the ability to alter an experience and motivation in this 
type of situation requires that the individual simultaneously hold many of the relevant motives in their 
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(Process 3b). In Jack's case, these 'biases' make it more likely that he will experience 
anger as the anger experiences have been reinforcing for him in the past. In the terms 
of dynamic systems, Jack could be described as a person for whom the attractors for 
angry experiences are deeper than for other people. He is motivated to become angry 
disproportionally to other emotions and probably experiences the emotion more 
frequently than other people. As such, it is likely that Jack will find the experience of 
anger more pleasant than do other individuals. The experience will probably be 
slightly more intense than other emotions he experiences, will arise comparatively 
quickly and easily, and Jack will feel better about himself following the experience. 
However, it is not necessary that Jack experience any 'pure' form of anger. Equally 
possible, depending on the availability of linguistic terms and more precise 
socialisations, is that he may experience a constructed variant of anger. 
Developmentally, he might be more 'comfortable' experiencing 'frustration' or 
'irritation,' either generally or specifically in respect of particular others or situations. 
In part, the accessibility of such variants will be related to his ability to label his 
experiences as different. 
Finally, Jack's experience will also be influenced by situational variables (Process 3c) 
and their interactions with his personality structure. He may find he gets less 
intensely angry when there are women present, or he could experience exasperation if 
the other is younger than him or has been told repeatedly. In certain situations, Jack is 
likely to express the emotion differently which will necessarily feedback and have 
consequences for his experience either directly or through reappraisal of his 
physiognomy and behaviour (see Chapter 8). 
consciousness. Most often, this will also involve the concurrent activation of the meta-management or 
'growth' motivations necessary to a re-arrangement of their state space or motivational system. 
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Chapter 7.9 - Concluding remarks on the conceptualisation of emotional 
states and conscious emotional experiences 
Conscious emotional experience is clearly a domain of unsurpassed complexity. 
Nonetheless, the analysis above has shown that experience can be realistically 
considered within the appropriate scientific framework. Although the methodological 
developments needed to test some aspects of the theory described here may be some 
time in coming, several preliminary conclusions are nonetheless possible. 
~ Conscious emotional experience is a complex, poorly understood and 
important domain that is open to scientific inquiry 
~ Although related, emotional states are not the same as emotional 
experience, the latter being a more integrative and temporally less discrete 
phenomenon 
~ Emotional experiences are both highly motivated and constructed within 
limits, namely: 
~ Limits imposed by phylogenetic function 
~ Constraints and attractors imposed by each individual's 
macro development (measurable as goals about emotions) 
~ Situational variables 
It appears near-indisputable that the conscious experiences of emotions are a different 
concern from emotional states. Furthermore, it has become evident that the 
conceptual and methodological separation of states from experience may be a 
necessary step in the construction of explanatory models of experience. While states 
. . 
and experience are presumed to interact, emotional states appear finite in number and 
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biologically driven. They contain a normative action impulse (see Chapter 8), follow 
inevitably from particular appraisals, and may only occur sequentially. 
In contrast, experience is in no way as fixed, mayor may not be the same as a 
constituent state, and may incorporate a combination of experiential elements. The 
current theory has framed conscious emotional experience as a motivationally 
constructed variant on emotional states, emerging as constrained and influenced by 
many factors. 
While absent from the predicted effects, it has become clear that there are limits in the 
extent to which ideographic development can influence the experience of emotions. 
Abductive reasoning has suggested that selective pressures have imposed broad 
constraints on different aspects of experiential variance commensurate with the 
function of the emotional state. 
The importance of motivation to emotional experience was nowhere more evident 
than in the study conducted to illustrate this point. In this research, an individual's 
motivations regarding their emotional experience was shown to be predictive of many 
components of experience, most notably in their frequency. Although the data 
gathered thus far struggled to denote a clear time frame for the acquisition of such 
motivations, future research using tools more suited to the purpose should see an 
improvement in the specificity of theoretical predictions. 
In all, the developments described above offer much to the scientific study of 
emotions and conscious emotional experience. While complex, suitably informed 
theorising regarding the determinants and function of emotional experience are not 
beyond our grasp. The analysis presented above has shown that a motivational 
approach to experience as measured through the 'goals about emotions' concept can 
provide a valuable operationalisation of personality-affect links, partially explaining 
the critical phenomenology of conscious emotional experience. 
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Chapter 8 - Drawing some threads together: A functionalist take on 
emotions in development, experience and action. 
Chapter 8.1 - Introductory remarks 
It should be clear that the writer considers emotions central to personality, 
development, and motivation. To this point however, there has been no attempt to 
place the conceptualisation of emotions that underlies much of the developmental and 
personality theorising within contemporary emotions theory. Accomplishing this is 
the most general aim of this chapter. 
As will become clear, the current conceptualisation of emotions owes much to the 
seminal works of both Richard Lazarus (e.g. 1991a) and Carroll Izard (e.g. 1991). 
Lazarus' ideas regarding proximate cognitive causation in emotion are central, as are 
Izard's ideas concerning the importance of discrete emotions in development and 
motivation. 
While much is drawn from these works, the conceptualisation offered is not a simple 
recapitulation of previous ideas. Rather it is consistent with much of each author's 
theory while nevertheless expressing new emphases and variations. The 
conceptualisation of emotions developed here is in many senses a fledgling theory, 
yet a sufficient number of theoretical and empirical accomplishments stemming 
directly from its variations are presented to underscore its potential. Additionally, the 
framework used is sufficiently well grounded and inclusive enough to be 
systematically developed over time. 
The conceptualisation focuses on the emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
disgust, shame, embarrassment, guilt and pride. Readers familiar with the emotion 
literature will recognise the first five of this list (primary emotions) as being identical 
to those considered 'basic' by Oatley and colleagues (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; 
Oatley, 1992; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1992), Stein and colleagues (e.g. Stein, 
Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993), and similar to Ekman's original list, with the exception of 
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surprise!. The current author does not claim that these are the only emotions, rather 
that these are the nine considered in the model. 
The chapter begins by offering a characterisation of emotions. Following this, four 
further sections are presented in which four aspects of the basic characterisation are 
elaborated. The first section examines the issues involved in adopting a discrete 
perspective. The second considers the relationships between cognition, emotion and 
goals, and presents a series of diary studies investigating goal-emotion relationships. 
The third section reiterates the importance of function in emotion theory and presents 
a framework for functional analysis in emotions. The final section considers the 
systemic nature of an emotional response, and the relationships between the 
components of emotions. The emphasis of the section is on the relationships between 
emotions and overt behaviour and two studies examining emotional behaviour are 
presented. 
Chapter 8.2 - Characterising the phenomena of interest: What are 
emotions? 
Emotion is too broad a class of events 
too broad to be a single scientific category. 
Russell and Feldmann-Barrett (1999; p. 805) 
'Emotion', 'feeling,' and 'mood' - ostensibly each represents a comparatively simple, 
everyday concept and yet the adequate definition of each continues to prove a task 
beyond even the most articulate, erudite and industrious scientist. While many 
researchers have attempted to define emotion (see e.g. Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 
1981; Frijda, 1986,1994a; Izard, 1991; Campos, et. aI., 1994), no commonly accepted 
definition is yet available (Mandler, 1982, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Forgas, 1991a, 1991b, 
1995; Scherer, 1994a; Parkinson, 1997). Although this difficulty may reflect 
1 Surprise is not an emotion within the current theory insofar as it does not have an inherent valence 
(Ortony, et. aI., 1988) or encapsulate a response to a particular goal relationship (see also Ortony & 
Turner, 1990). Similarly, the 'emotion' of interest (Izard, 1991a) is more usefully considered a 
cognitive state that frequently occurs in conjunction with positive affect, than it is a discrete emotion 
per se. 
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something of the complexity of the topic material (Plutchik, 1994), any inherent 
difficulties are compounded through the inadequacies of our language (Harre, 1986), 
and the occasional use of definitions as a substitute for superior theorising (Haig, 
1999). 
It can first be noted that definitions are not isolated from the theory within which they 
are derived. Rather, definitions are thought to imply broader issues, areas of interest, 
or questions, hence comprise a type of 'mini theory' (Lazarus, 1984; Clore & Ortony, 
1991; Plutchik, 1994, see Chapter 6). This said, simply acknowledging that there 
exists a relationship between a theory and its definitional encapsulation may not 
adequately consider the 'proper' place of definitions In science. 
According to some writers, definitions should be constructed to serve a more exacting 
and limited purpose. Following Popper (1968), Haig (1999) suggests that definitions 
should be "used to facilitate communication amongst those familiar with the theories 
from which they are extracted, rather than as major vehicles for conveying meaning" 
(p. 67). By this he means that a definition should act as a 'convenient shorthand' to 
be used by the individuals who comprehend the larger context, rather than act as a 
substitute, stanchion, or escape clause for an inadequate or underdeveloped theory. 
Bearing such issues in mind, the writer will not provide yet another 'definition' of 
emotion. However, it is important that the reader have some idea of what the current 
writer means when emotions are being referred to. Consequently, a characterisation 
of emotion is offered. Although the difference between a characterisation and a 
definition may appear a trifle semantic, the distinction represents the writer's belief 
that a characterisation is advantaged in that it carries less theoretical weight. Too 
often, definitions are used to shore up weakness in theory or to exclude problematic 
observations. 
By contrast, a characterisation is a less restrictive means of delineating or describing 
the phenomena of interest in that it does not claim that x represents an emotion and y 
does not, but rather plainly informs the reader as to what the writer is discussing. For 
the purpose of this discussion then, emotions are characterised as: 
A heritable set of adaptive mechanisms that function 
systemically to inform, motivate, and organise an 
organism's responses to the perception of a change in 
goal-environment relationships. 
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This characterisation is clearly directed to a biological description of emotion at the 
level of evolutionary function, rather than at that of content, causality, or 
functioning/operation. More specifically, it is clear that the current writer has adopted 
a discrete approach to emotions in which distinct emotional states2 function to inform 
(Schwartz & Clore, 1988; Schwartz, 1990; Clore & Parrott, 1991, Clore, 1994b), 
motivate (e.g. Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1991; Buck, 1991, 1999) and organise 
(e.g. Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992) the organism's responses to a perceived change 
in the status of one or more goals. 
A characterisation of emotions as occurring in respect of goals is consistent with the 
impressive theories of Lazarus (e.g. 1984, 1991), Frijda (e.g. 1986), and Ortony, et. 
aI., (1988) as well as with many other cognitive theories (e.g. Roseman, 1984; 
Roseman et. aI., 1990, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Campos, et. aI., 1994). The 
subjective nature of these changes is important, Ortony et. aI., (1988) for example 
suggesting that emotions are "valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with 
their particular nature being determined by the way in which the situation is 
construed" (p. 13). The notion that emotions follow 'interruptions' to goal pursuit has 
a similarly distinguished history, being present in the work of Mandler (1982, 1984), 
and Frijda's (1988) law of change, and more recently in that of Carver and Scheier 
(e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
More generally, the characterisation of emotion offered here is consistent with the 
model of personality presented in the preceding chapters. Within the current theory, 
emotions arise due to perceived changes in the status of a very particular set of goals, 
namely those that together define the personality state space. As such, the goals that 
2 For the purposes of this discussion, emotional states are considered more simple phenomena than 
emotions as a whole. As is expanded upon in Chapter 8.6, emotional states are made up of three basic, 
tightly related and comparatively invariant parts - a central and peripheral physiological response, a 
motivational/action tendency component, and an expressive component. 
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emotions anse in respect of are not simply goals that 'a person' holds. Rather, 
emotions occur in respect of the goals that are the person. 
The notion that the responses engendered by discrete emotions occur at the level of 
the system is in line with the views of Scherer (e.g. 1997), Izard (e.g. 1991), Plutchik 
(e.g. 1994) Panksepp (e.g. 1993), and Levenson (e.g. 1994a). Scherer (1997) for 
example suggests that emotion produces a "synchronisation of all of the major 
organismic systems" (p. 119), while Levenson (1994a) suggests that emotions serve 
to coordinate response systems. As shall be expanded upon below, the current 
conceptualisation considers the overt action that occurs in emotions central to this 
response, particularly for primary emotions. 
Finally, it is notable that this characterisation omits the necessity for any part of the 
processes involved in an emotional response to include the awareness of them. 
Michael Lewis (M. Lewis, 1998b) for example suggests that "emotional states can 
occur without the organism's perception of these changes" (p. 33). In a similar 
manner, while the characterisation does not preclude a conscious or reflective 
awareness of the antecedent, concomitant, or consequent components of emotions, 
nor does it require them. 
Chapter 8.3 - Fleshing out the characterisation I: Basics, universals, 
primaries, blends, and discreteness 
Introduction 
Emotions are best regarded as categories that 
can be put on a dimension of intensity 
Lazarus (1991a, p. 84) 
There has long been tension between two conceptions of emotion, one based on 
discrete categories, and the other based on dimensions (Lazarus, 1991b; Buck,. 1999). 
On one hand, pan-cultural data covering appraisals, experience, physiology and action 
tendencies have suggested a typological classification (e.g. Ekman, 1972; Ekman, 
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Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988; Frijda, et. aI., 1989; Mauro, 
Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Roseman, et. aI., 1996; Scherer, 
1997). On the other, studies using the scaling of affective judgements suggest that 
affects, at least in humans, can be described by the dimensions of arousal and 
pleasantness-unpleasantness (e.g. Watson & Tellegen, 1985). 
Discrete approaches have been criticised for ignoring potentially important variations 
in emotion and for struggling to agree on either the number of basic categories 
(Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, et. al., 1999) or the basis for the inclusion of a given 
emotion (Ortony, et. aI., 1988, 1990). In return, categorical theorists suggest that their 
approach is more consistent with folk psychology (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992), 
and that they are merely trying to 'bring order' (Ekman, 1992) or 'organise' (Ekman, 
1999) emotional phenomena. They accuse the others of attempting to reduce 
qualitative differences to matters of valence and arousal (e.g. Ellsworth, 1991), and 
claim that the supposedly fixed dimensional structure of emotion in fact varies, thus 
undermining the key assumption of the approach (Lazarus, 1991a). Equally then, 
each approach has its strengths and weaknesses (Frijda, 1986), and each 
(unsurprisingly) offers its own criteria for deciding the issue (Stein & Oatley, 1992). 
As is expanded upon below, it is my belief that a discrete approach to emotion~ i~ 
considerably advantaged over a dimensional one. Although the interests of the 
current dissertation preclude a full discussion of such issues, the conceptualisation of 
emotions has clearly been written from a discrete perspective hence some small 
commentary will be provided. Given the limits of space, this commentary i~ 
necessarily a somewhat partisan one, although it is hoped not too selective. Brief 
attention is devoted to the vocabulary used in the area, before interest is concentrated 
on the extent to which each approach is consistent with a functional approach to 
emotions. Overall, it is suggested that both theory and data are more consistent with a 
discrete approach to emotional states. 
How will the terms be used? 
An initial impediment to the consideration of the issues involved in adopting either of 
the two approaches involves the irregular use of terminologies. Laden theoretical 
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terms like 'basic,' 'primary,' 'universal' are haphazardly and interchangeably used by 
emotion theorists, and their taken meaning differs considerably (Ortony, et. aI., 1988, 
1990). Dimensional theorists such as Russell (e.g. Russell, et. aI., 1999) have 
suggested that because "categories seem so natural that it is sometimes forgotten that 
they are semantic categories rather than facts of nature" (p. 806, italics added; see 
also Averill, 1994c). 
In stark contrast, Oatley and colleagues (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Stein & 
Oatley, 1992) have adopted a scientific realist (e.g. Hooker, 1987; Fletcher, 1996) 
perspective regarding the term 'basic.' As such, they argue that usage is not intended 
to imply that English words like 'happiness' are basic, but rather that there is a basic 
emotion for which this word is the nearest indicator (see also Frijda, 1996, p. 6). As 
they note, in another language the terminology will be different, and possess slightly 
different connotations. 
Ortony and colleagues (Ortony, et. aI., 1988, 1990) have been singularly critical of the 
'basic' approach. They have argued that "the search for and postulation of basic 
emotions is not a profitable approach" (1988, p. 7, italics added) and outline a 
mixture of conceptual and empirical difficulties inherent to the basic or 'palette 
approach' (cf. Scherer, 1984). Although their equation of 'basicness' with simplicity 
appears somewhat unwarranted, I am in agreement with them insofar as their critique 
does cast doubts on the utility of the term in the context of emotion research. 
While some usages of the term 'basic' are clearly not intended to do so (e.g. Johnson-
Laird & Oatley, 1992), the word nonetheless contains a number of connotations that 
unnecessarily complicate the scientific study of emotions. For example, should basic 
be taken to mean biological, functional (Averill, 1994c), or to mean that other (non-
basic) emotions are derived (cf. Plutchik)? More generally, does the term 'basic' 
imply 'universal,' 'primary' or 'separate'? 
Equally, the term adds very little, other than the opportunity for disagreements as 
evidenced above. Consequently, the conceptualisation of emotions developed here 
will not use the term, but will simply distinguish between phenomena that are 
considered to represent discrete (separate biological system) emotions, and those that 
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are not (Ekman, 1992). In referring to discrete emotional states, the discussion is of 
an innate response system (see Chapter 8.6) that results from innate appraisal 
processes, and involves a distinctive pattern of neural activation, a particular 
motivation or action impulse, and physiological arousal. 
While the term basic will not be used, some use will be made of the terms 'primary,' 
'secondary,' and 'universal'. In the current dissertation, the distinction between 
primary (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and disgust) and secondary (guilt, shame, 
pride, and embarrassment) emotions is not a roundabout manner of nonetheless 
distinguishing between basic and derived emotions, but rather is intended to imply 
that this subset of emotions are phylogenetic ally and developmentally both first and 
different. It is in this initial sense that the term primary is used, although there may be 
some grounds on which to suggest that some emotions may also be primary in terms 
of their relative importance and frequency (e.g. Wallbott & Scherer, 1988). 
In terms of 'differentness,' the five emotions described as 'primary' here bear a less 
intimate relationship with conscious self-awareness than do the four described as 
secondary. Both developmentally and phylogenetically, primaries are evident 
considerably sooner than consciousness, and are hypothetically capable of fulfilling 
their adaptive function in the absence of it (see Chapter 4). In addition, at least four 
of these emotions appear to hold a biological connection with an identifiable 
behaviour type (see Chapter 8.6 below). In contrast, secondary emotions necessarily 
follow the development of consciousness, and do not appear to urge immediate 
instrumental behaviour types as part of their function. While these emotions may 
come to operate at the level of the state without conscious awareness, their emergence 
nonetheless initially requires the ability to consciously self-represent. 
Finally, the current author considers all mne of the emotions described here to 
represent 'universal' phenomena. Here, the term 'universal' is used to describe 
emotions for each of which the fundamental, state-level components are inherent to 
the biology of homo sapiens (Lazarus, 1991a). As is expanded upon below, this 
statement is not intended to suggest that these emotions operate or are experienced 
equally across cultures or even individuals, but rather that each represents a real 
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phenomenon (Hooker, 1987) that exists at a heritable level (cf. Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1992), and is consistent in kind across individuals, situations, and cultures. 
The key advantage of a discrete approach to emotional states 
The major strength of the discrete approach lies in its explicit and mature 
incorporation of an evolutionary-functionalist analysis to emotions. . While a 
functional perspective is also purported to underlie both dimensional (e.g. Watson, et. 
aI., 1999; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999) and constructivist/relativist (e.g. 
Markus & Kitayama, 1994) approaches to emotions, a comparison suggests that their 
incorporation of functionalism is less mature and to a degree ad hoc. 
In contrast, discrete functionalists argue that each emotional state is a specific 
adaptation that has evolved to deal with what are variously termed fundamental life 
tasks (Ekman, 1992, 1994a, 1999), universal human predicaments (Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1992), core relational themes (Lazarus, 1991a; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), 
situational types (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b; Nesse, 1990) or adaptational 
demands (Campos, et. al., 1994). Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) for example argue 
that the multitude of real world events must be mapped onto a finite set of categories 
else the system will be quickly overwhelmed by processing demands (see also Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1990b). 
This approach is consistent with an enormous battery of cross-cultural data describing 
the relationships between discrete emotions and particular facial expressions (Ekman, 
1972; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Haidt & Keltner, 1999), appraisal patterns 
(Wallbott & Scherer, 1988; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Scherer, 1997), action 
tendencies (Frijda, et. al., 1989; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992), and actual behaviour (see 
below). Although a discussion regarding what will be taken as constituting 
'evidence' for discreteness, basicness, or universality involve issues of epistemology 
rather than ontology (see Klee, 1997\ a discrete framework seems to provide the 
3 Ontological issues relate to the very being of things, their existence, possibility or necessity and are 
clearly separable from epistemological issues that denote issues regarding how and when we could 
garner evidence of them (Klee, 1997). In emotion theory, these issues are typically ignored in the 
mutual critiques of dimensional and discrete theories (although see Ortony, et. aI., 1988) with most 
theorists focussing on epistemic issues (see e.g. Russell, 1994; Ekman, 1992, 1999; Izard, 1994b). 
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most viable explanatory framework for the cross-cultural data gathered thus far. 
Discrete theory seems better suited to explaining why we have emotions, and the 
functions they serve (see below) than do dimensional or relativist approaches. 
Simultaneous or blended emotions? 
it is perhaps surprising how few words in English 
denote mixed emotions 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1998; p. 93) 
The current author does not consider a blended, palette, or simultaneous approach to 
emotion states to be a theoretically sustainable position. The major reason for this 
decision stems directly from the incorporation of an explicitly evolutionary and 
functional approach to emotions. In respect of simultaneous emotions, Oatley and 
Duncan (1992) have suggested that "if emotions function to make ready a small set of 
action plans, each appropriate to the eliciting cause, it would be dysfunctional for 
several such sets to be made ready, since conflict and indecision could occur" (p. 
273). While their argument does rest to some extent upon a particular consideration 
of emotion and function, it is easily extended to include many other functions. 
Brehm (1999) has also argued that only one emotion can occur at a time. According 
to him, if we assume that emotions are largely motivational in nature, the behavioural 
option that will be chosen is the one with the largest urge. When that option is 
considered, no other feelings will be simultaneously present, as the emotion system 
gives the behavioural system clear instructions on how to proceed. He does however 
note that emotions may supplant one another as quickly as they arise, the time for 
replacement being how long the nervous system takes to appraise situational change 
and create the new feeling. 
As was noted in Chapter 7 however, perhaps the core difficulty with any discrete 
approach is that people frequently report themselves as experiencing two or more 
emotions simultaneously (Ellsworth, 1991; Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992). In 
Oatley and Duncan's (1992) study for example, more than one third of emotional 
experiences were reported as occurring in blends. While our current methodologies 
277 
do not enable a valid discrimination between true simultaneity and rapid alternation 
(Oatley & Duncan, 1992), we cannot ignore the fact that individuals do not 
experience themselves as rapidly alternating between discrete emotional states. 
Additionally pressing is the fact that self-reports describing emotional experience do 
not typically comprise! 'new' emotion, thus casting doubt on the idea of a blend (cf. 
Plutchik, 1980, 1982). Rather, more than one universal emotion is often reported as 
being present simultaneously. While the tendency to report discrete simultaneous 
emotions may be a limitation imposed by language, the conscious experience of 
emotions is characteristically at once holistic, and made up of phenomenally 
simultaneous discrete emotions. 
Certainly, definitional subterfuge might enable us to circumvent this problem, yet we 
should not underestimate the challenge that this issue poses for discrete theories. 
Even the most 'basic and biological' of emotion theorists acknowledges the difficulty. 
Contrary to his earlier positioning, Ekman (1999) for example has recently noted that 
he is "less certain now about whether or not two basic emotions can occur 
simultaneously" (p. 47). So given the purported functions of each discrete emotion, 
how can discrete function and the complexity of phenomenology be reconciled? 
Most emotion theories have not seriously considered this issue, despite having more 
or less discrete approaches by virtue of using the appraisal concept. The most salient 
exception is found in Izard's differential emotions theory4. Izard attempts to 
accommodate this difficulty by arguing that each discrete emotional state, while often 
occurring within a pattern of other discrete states, retains its unique motivational 
properties (e.g. Izard, 1991). His approach suggests that an emotion typically recruits 
other emotions and the person can be thought of as effectively responding to multiple 
conditions with multiple emotions (Izard et. aI., in press; see also Scherer, 1984, 
1993). The resultant set of emotions then self-organise as a coherent set or pattern. 
Each emotion in the pattern has the capacity to moderate (attenuate, amplify) the 
others, while at the same time retaining its individual motivational and organisational 
function. According to Izard, et. aI. (in press) such a response system provides an 
4 Ortony and Turner (1990) also offer a view of emotions based on the combination or co-occurrence of 
components of emotions. Their approach is not discussed here. 
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adaptive advantage III that it yields a greater variety of choices for decision and 
action. 
The current author's approach to this issue has previously been articulated in Chapter 
7. At this time it was suggested that by conceptually distinguishing emotional states 
from the conscious experience of emotions, one could neatly sidestep the problem of 
categorising the infinities of experience within a finite number of functionally discrete 
categories. In this view, emotions are never simultaneous at the level of the state, 
although they may change at this level as rapidly as the appraisal system allows (e.g. 
Brehm, 1999). Additionally, emotions that frequently occur in close temporal 
proximity to one another may come to operate as spatially proximate and saddled 
attractors in the state space (see Chapter 5.2), in that they preferentially activate one 
another. 
However, if genuine state-level simultaneity were possible, it is suggested that the 
complexity of human goal evaluations would mean that the organism would 
frequently be paralysed by a multiplicity of conflicting impulses (Oatley & Duncan, 
1992; Brehm, 1999). If two emotions could be present simultaneously, why not three 
or ten? Contrary to Izard, et. al. (in press) then, the current theory suggests that such a 
system would not in fact be adaptive, but rather would mean that the behavioural 
system would be near-perpetually paralysed by multiple and conflicting urges. 
So why then does conscious expenence appear to allow simultaneous emotions? 
Considering the issue once state and experience have been separated creates at least 
two interrelated possibilities. The first of these is that conscious experience 
represents a temporally less discriminating phenomenon, a form of experiential 
summation across the multiple, sequential and discrete emotions that are occurring at 
the level of the states. Put simply, the emotions seem simultaneous to each of us but 
they are in fact not. This explanation has the clear advantage of simultaneously 
retaining a discrete functionalist conceptualisation of sequential states, while not 
denigrating the validity of self-reports denoting the conscious experience of emotions. 
5 As was made clear in Chapter 6, this position represents that most currently favoured by this author. 
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The difficulty of course is that the position creates a new explanatory difficulty in that 
one must seek a viable reason (function) as to why experience occurs in this way6. 
Secondly and relatedly, it may well be that emotions are not accurately described as 
simultaneous at either state or experiential levels, despite the fact that people describe 
themselves as experiencing emotions in this way. One possible explanation for this is 
similar to that outlined by M. D. Lewis and Douglas (1998). Although their analysis 
is directed to a different issue, they suggest that at the moment of a phase shift, many 
possibilities are briefly available until the components couple and stabilise again. So 
when we describe ourselves as experiencing multiple simultaneous emotions we may 
be (a) recounting a representational perception of experiential possibility, that does 
not become an experience until a single possibility dominates, or (b) describing the 
emotions that we have, are, or may experience in this emotional sequence or about 
this event. 
This idea can be further considered as encapsulating an issue of figure and ground. In 
Boring's (1930) classic illusion, either the wife or the mother in law can be seen at 
one time, but not both at once. This holds, despite the fact that we are aware or know 
that both are actually present. Applying this to the domain of conscious experience, 
we could reason that only one experience (the figure) can be extracted from the 
possibilities (the ground) at one instant. Certainly, the 'figure' can change as quickly 
as we are able to move attention around the 'ground' but only one can exist in a literal 
moment. Although beyond the interests of this discussion, this conceptualisation 
creates the interesting possibility that the speed of sequential discriminations may 
represent a personality variable, wherein some individuals differ or can be trained to 
more finely differentiate their experiences. 
In any case, the current theory suggests that emotions are never simultaneous at the 
level of the state. Although the brief discussion of conscious experience above may 
have done little more than illustrate how poor our understanding is, discrete and 
sequential emotional states strike this author as a more adaptive response system. 
6 There are currently few theories that directly address this issue. One possibility is that the complexity 
of experience is a consequence of the complexity of goal concerns relevant in a situation. Explaining 
why, how, or if complex conscious experiences are functional are key issues in emotions research. 
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These states may change very quickly as the multiplicity of goals active in a situation 
are evaluated or as an episode unfolds and more information is obtained, yet in an 
instant only one state will be present. Which, whether, and how a rapid pattern of 
sequential states is made manifest in conscious experience represents a fascinating 
domain of future research. 
Chapter 8.4 - Fleshing out the characterisation II: Proximate causality, 
goals, and the relationships between cognition and emotion 
Introduction 
Nothing can be loved or hated unless it is first understood 
Leonardo da Vinci 
Arnold (1960a, 1960b) is generally credited with introducing the concept of appraisal 
to the study of emotion (see e.g. Parkinson, 1997). In her view, appraisal is a process 
whereby the personal relevance of an event is determined. While such an account 
suffered somewhat from a lack of specificity (Ortony et. aI., 1988), appraisal has 
become central notion in contemporary emotion theory (Parkinson, 1997). Arnold's 
comparatively simple approach was originally extended and rarefied by theorists like 
Roseman (1984), Scherer (1984), Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Lazarus (1968, 
1982, 1984, 1991a) and there are now a large number of competing cognitive (Ortony, 
et. aI., 1988) and appraisal models for emotions (e.g. Roseman, 1984; Roseman, et. 
aI., 1990, 1996; Scherer, 1984, 1997; Frijda, 1986, 1993a; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1992). While the details of each vary somewhat, disagreements among them typically 
denote issues of detail and emphasis rather than reflect any substantive controversies 
(Scherer, 1993; Parkinson, 1997), and the concept of appraisal occupies a pivotal 
position in present day emotion theory (Frijda, 1993b). 
All appraisal theories assert that emotions result from or are proximally caused by an 
analysis of meaning (e.g. Smith, 1989; Lazarus, 1999a) in which the adaptational 
significance of an event is determined. Frijda has termed this relationship the law of 
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situational meaning (Frijda, 1988, 1998), arguing that the presence of an emotion is 
dictated by the meaning structure of events. In slightly more precise terms, events are 
appraised in terms of their subjective implications for well-being or the satisfaction of 
goals or concerns (e.g. Frijda, 1986, 1993b, 1996; Ortony, et. aI., 1988; Lazarus, 
1991a; Oatley, 1992), the law of concern (Frijda, 1988, 1998). Importantly, emotions 
are thought to be dictated by the way in which an individual perceives an event, rather 
than any objective reality (Frijda's law of apparent reality). 
Appraisal theories suggest that each emotion is characterised by particular patterns of 
evaluations (appraisals), and that each emotion results from different evaluations 
(Frijda,1993b). While the many details of the many appraisal theories are beyond the 
interests of this dissertation, the notion that emotions follow the apperception of a 
particular organism-environment or goal relationship (cf. Lazarus, 1991a) is central to 
the current model of emotional states (see Figure 8.1). Consequently, one of the more 
lucid and comprehensive expressions of appraisal theory (Smith & Lazarus, 1993) is 
briefly outlined below. 
Before beginning, it is important to note that appraisal has a very specific meaning in 
emotion theory, particularly in relation to knowledge (Lazarus, 1991a). Lazarus and 
Smith (1988) suggest that knowledge consists of cognitions about the way things are 
and how they work, while appraisal involves the extraction of personal meaning based 
on the significance of an evene. According to them, knowledge is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for emotion. 
According to Smith and Lazarus (1993) the primary dimension of appraisal is one of 
motivational congruence-incongruence that distinguishes between positive and 
negative emotions - is the event good or bad for us. The term 'primary' may be 
misleading to a degree, for as Lazarus and Smith (1988) acknowledge, it may not 
come first in the appraisal process. Primary appraisal is not sufficient by itself to 
determine in which ways harm or benefit is involved (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). 
Rather, secondary appraisals further distinguish among other discrete emotions 
7 Strictly speaking, it might be more accurate to suggest that appraisal involves the extraction of 
personal meaning within the recurrent categories of goal-environment relationship that evolution has 
selected (cf. Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). This point is returned to in Chapter 8.5. 
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according to an individual's appraisals regarding emotion and problem-focussed 
coping potential, accountability, and expectations. It is generally accepted that 
appraisal processes may also include the individual's assessment as to how he or she 
might handle the event (Frijda, 1998). 
Smith and Lazarus' (1993) framework has the advantage over previous forms (and 
other models) in that it enables complementary analyses of cognition-emotion 
relationships at both molecular and molar levels8 (see also Lazarus & Smith, 1988). 
At the molecular level, an emotion is engendered by its own distinctive pattern of 
appraisals, although discrete emotions differ in the degree of cognitive involvement 
(Ortony, et. aI., 1988). The 'strong position' (cf. Lazarus, 1999) regarding cognition-
emotion relationships suggests that appraisals are both necessary and sufficient for an 
emotion (Lazarus, 1982, 1991a; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Roseman, et. aI., 1990, 
1996). As such, they assume that the same molecular appraisals will produce the 
same emotion within and across individuals, while different appraisals will produce 
different emotions9. 
The individual or component appraisals involved in each emotion can also be summed 
at a molar level as the emotion's core relational theme. A core relational theme is the 
central (or core) harm or benefit that underlies each of the emotions (Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). They acknowledge that such 'themes' are likely to be "greater than 
the sum of the components that imply them, and to have properties and adaptational 
implications that cannot be easily derived" (1993; p. 260) from the appraisal 
components alone. Nonetheless, according to these authors "the bottom line, so to 
speak - is that an emotional reaction is always based on personal meaning" (Lazarus 
& Smith, 1988, p. 297). 
Generally speaking, it is assumed that neither appraisal nor emotion represent static 
entities. Rather, the appraisal process is seen as constantly operative, with evaluations 
being continuously performed in order to 'update' the organism's understanding of an 
8 Whether emotions are caused through molecular or molar evaluations is beyond the interests of this 
discussion, although a molar level is used for descriptive purposes. 
9 One clear advantage of such a theory is that it is apparently open to falsification (cf. Popper, 1968). 
Unfortunately, the nature of emotional responding is typically such that there are no temporally 
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event or situation (Scherer, 1993). As he notes, emotions are probably not static 
states either, but rather a continuous affective reaction (see also Lazarus, 1991a; 
Frijda, 1993b). So while emotions are always about the manner in which an encounter 
is appraised, emotional states can only change as quickly as the appraised meaning 
changes (Lazarus, 1995). 
A conceptual critique of appraisal and cognition-emotion relations 
This so-called 'commonsense' position (Ellsworth, 1991) regarding cognition-
emotion relationships first came under substantial attack in the early 1980s. Robert 
Zajonc (1980, 1984) outlined a series of conceptual and methodological criticisms of 
the position, arguing that affective responses frequently occur in a manner that casts 
doubt on the necessity for cognition. In his provocatively titled critique on the 
cognitive position, "Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences" (Zajonc, 
1980), he denoted a large array of empirical evidence that can be interpreted as being 
inconsistent with the necessity for cognition. Judging by the response, Zajonc had 
touched a nerve (Lazarus, 1999). 
Zajonc (1984) accused Lazarus of being circular in his definition of cognition, while 
Lazarus (1984) in tum suggested that Zajonc was being unnecessarily "ambivalent" 
(p. 1021) and that he persisted in conflating 'cognition' with notions of deliberateness, 
reflectivity, and rationality. Lazarus' initial response to this challenge (Lazarus, 
1982), the pair's mutual rejoinders in 1984 (Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1984) as well as 
many commentaries since this time (see e.g. Buck, 1991; Scherer, 1993; Ellsworth, 
1994a; Frijda, 1994a) have tended to suggest that the disagreement may ultimately 
rest upon the definition of 'cognition' 10. 
In a recent chapter, Lazarus (1999) has bemoaned certain aspects of this now-famous 
debate, particularly the titling of the 'second round.' According to him the entire 
issue of primacy was misconstrued by a majority of readers, insofar that he never 
claimed that cognitions always came first in the cognition-emotion relationship, but 
localised events that constitutes a starting or end point for the episode (Lazarus, 1991a, 1995; 
Parkinson, 1997). 
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rather that each emotion was always preceded by evaluative cognitions - appraisal. 
As was noted in Chapter 7, any 'response' including an emotional one can be a 
stimulus, depending on where one begins one's entry into the flow of adaptive 
activity. 
Lazarus' (1999) concern is quickly evidenced in an examination of the literature on 
this issue. Following this debate, Michael Lewis and colleagues soon argued that the 
notion of primacy is inherently artifactual and depends on the focus of the theorist 
(Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1984). More recently, Matthews and MacLeod's 
(1994, cited in M. D. Lewis, 1996) review of mood-congruent retrieval demonstrates 
how difficult it may be to draw a sharp delineation between background affective or 
emotional states and new appraisals. Background states, for example one of irritation 
presumably make certain types of appraisals more likely (see also Ellsworth, 1991). 
In M. D. Lewis' (1996) view, the appraisal process similarly constitutes an ongoing 
trajectory of cognitive-emotional activity that surges and recedes, moves in and out, 
without beginning or end. 
M. D. Lewis and Douglas (1998) support the position taken by Izard and Malatesta 
(1987) arguing, contra the current theory, that emotion can be triggered independently 
of cognition (although it rarely is), yet at a sufficient intensity emotion always induces 
cognition. As they note, "emotion seems to function as a field that influences a wide 
spectrum of activity in the cognitive system" (p. 162, see also Oatley & 10hnson-
Laird, 1987). While the influence of emotions at a systemic level is important, and is 
discussed below, the mere fact that emotions may frequently influence cognitions 
does not pose a problem for accepting appraisals as either necessary or sufficient in 
the ontogenesis of emotion (Lazarus, 1999a). 
Michael Lewis and colleagues evidently disagree. In discussing cognition-emotion 
interactions, they suggest that "neither should be described as causing the other; 
rather, each continually and progressively chases the other, weaving separate threads 
of behaviour into a single composition, a fugue" (Lewis et. al., 1984; p. 285-6). 
While in keeping with the complexity of the topic material, such a statement appears 
10 Lazarus (1999) has recently (and, I think correctly) disputed the notion that the independence of 
cognition and emotion is only a definitional issue, suggesting instead that "it has great ontological and 
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to do little to advance emotion theory. More pointedly in terms of this position, it can 
be noted that no theorist has yet offered a satisfactory explanation of how emotions 
occur that does not involve some form of cognitive evaluation. 
Although it is highly likely that emotions are continually enhanced by changes in 
appraisal and that appraisal is progressively updated via the adjustments engendered 
by emotion, the most viable position nonetheless appears to be that advQcated by 
Lazarus. The position has the advantage of being falsifiable (cf. Popper, 1968), and 
requires relatively few assumptions regarding the make-up of the emotion systems. 
On balance, it appears that Leonardo was probably right - few things can be loved or 
hated until they are first understoodll . While this 'understanding' may occur, change, 
and update extremely quickly, and may operate with or without awareness (Lazarus, 
1991a), emotions are nonetheless thought of as being created in a cognitive system of 
goal-relevant evaluation that we call appraisal. 
What do the data from appraisal research actually tell us? 
empirical findings rarely alter the way we think about 
theoretical and metatheoretical issues 
Lazarus (1999) 
In addition to the substantial conceptual criticisms that have occurred in response to 
appraisal theory, a great deal of discussion has been devoted to examining the 
epistemological significance of data gathered under the appraisal umbrell •• 
According to many writers, it remains highly contentious as to what such d .. t.l 
constitute evidence for (Parkinson, 1997). Frijda (1993b) for example suggests th .. t 
appraisal may refer to the content of the experience, and argues that the roles of 
content and antecedent are conflated (see also Oatley, 1992). Parkinson (1997) has 
likewise argued that the 'commonsense' link between appraisal and emotion is often 
epistemological significance" (p. 10). 
11 This comment is made with the understanding that some emotional responses seem to occur without 
cognitive involvement (Frijda, 1994a). A small class of stimuli may have hard-wired appraisals and 
emotional responses associated with them (Lazarus, 1982; Scherer, 1984), parenthetically one that is 
invariably 'primary.' While it has been argued that these responses are actually sensory states that only 
become emotions when the state is appraised (Lazarus & Smith, 1988), such an issue thankfully 
remains well beyond the focus of this discussion. Some small number of evolutionarily critical stimuli 
may hold some special place in the generation of emotion, but the vast preponderance of occurrences of 
emotions are caused by the more general cognitive process of meaning extraction - appraisal. 
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misrepresented and that appraisals can be seen as constitutive features of emotions in 
everyday experience (see also Ekman, 1994b) rather than as causal entities that 
determine the structure of that experience. 
This issue is further complicated by the manner in which some appraisal research has 
been conducted. Early research (e.g. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) asked subjects to 
focus on appraisals made during rather than prior to emotional experiences 
(Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; Roseman, et. aI., 1996). Several theorists have cast 
doubt on the purportedly explanatory methodologies that rely on self-report, 
particularly when investigating the causes of emotion (Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; 
Frijda, 1993b). Frijda (l993b) for example suggests that appraisals are as readily 
construed as a consequence of an emotion as they are a cause, and that there are often 
'discrepancies' between the cognitive content of the emotion and the presumed 
structure of the antecedents12 (see also Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1993). Lazarus (1995) 
likewise acknowledges the tautology implicit in the methods used to investigate the 
causal status of appraisals. 
Because there is a correlation (typically from self-report data) between certain 
emotions and specific cognitive micro-assessments (appraisals), most theorists accept 
a causal role for cognition in emotion. Yet because much of the data on the 
relationship is correlational it is incapable of providing direct support for a causal 
position (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) even where laboratory manipulations are involved 
(Parkinson, 1997). 
A further problem is that early studies of appraisal-emotion relationships typically 
gathered data on the causes of hypothetical or prototypical events, rather than actual 
experiences (Roseman, et. aI., 1990). Even studies that use recollected events to 
examine appraisals may produce data. that are biased or reconstructed based on 
culturally scripted theories of emotions (Roseman, et. aI., 1996), although this 
problem is reduced when cross-cultural data are considered (e.g. Wallbott & Scherer, 
1988; Frijda, et. aI., 1989; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Scherer, 1997). 
12 Although it is beyond the interests of this discussion, the current theory sees no a priori difficulty 
with such discrepancy. Given the generally constructive nature of reports regarding experience (see 
Chapter 7), there is no reason to expect an isomorphism between theoretically derived appraisal content 
and the cognitive content of experience. 
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A final consideration that appears problematic for appraisal research lies in specifying 
the number and nature of the appraisal dimensions necessary to account for 
differentiation among emotions (Parkinson, 1997), and identifying which dimensions 
are the most important for which emotions and which cultures or persons (Scherer, 
1997; Parkinson, 1997). Authors have used various numbers of different 
dimensions/factors with differing results. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) for example 
correctly classified 42% of 15 emotions using 6 factors, while Frijda et. aL's (1989) 
studies reported 32% and 43% for 32 emotions using 19 and 23 dimensions 
respectively (see Scherer, 1997; Roseman, et. al., 1996 for recent reviews). 
Nonetheless, it remains debatable as to whether an average discrimination rate of 30-
40% is 'good' (Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1993). While the issue of discrimination rates 
is not only a methodological issue, the complexity of the literature does not help in 
interpreting what the results mean. 
In concluding, it can be safely remarked that the status of data from appraisal research 
in establishing cognition (appraisal) as causal in emotions remains unclear. Appraisal 
research been subjected to a series of penetrating methodological critiques a~d the 
data must be taken as equivocal. That said, there are two further comments that bear 
consideration. Firstly, there are some senses in which this ambiguity is inevitable 
given the methodological difficulties inherent in measuring what is purported to be a 
near-automatic (Lazarus, 1984) and unconscious (Scherer, 1993; Lazarus, 1995) 
process. Perhaps as a consequence, researchers appear to have resorted to theoretical 
rather than empirical defences (see above), and it may be that the connection between 
emotion and cognition represents a definitional requirement (Parkinson, 1997). 
However, even if we accept that appraisal researchers are yet to produce evidence that 
definitively establishes appraisals as necessary in the creation and differentiation of 
emotions, the same can be said of the position that criticises the necessary and 
sufficient position. As Lazarus (1984) notes, this position "can no more prove that a 
cognition is not present in any emotion ... than I can prove it is present" (p. 126, his 
italics). Certainly, more rigorous experimental methods may help, but a critical 
experiment may never be forthcoming (Tetlock & Levi, 1982, cited in Lazarus,. 1984), 
and it is debatable whether research findings will ever settle the issue (Lazarus, 1999). 
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Concluding remarks on cognition-emotion relations 
While cognitive theories differ in their level of interest, specificity and in the details, 
the common core of the cognitive approach to emotions is that appraisal and emotion 
are causally related (Parkinson, 1997). As is evident in Figure 8.1 (below), the 
current theory endorses the 'strong' view (cf. Lazarus, 1999) on the relationship 
between goal-relevant cognition (appraisal) and emotion. It suggests that in most 
instances appraisal is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of 
an emotional response at the level of the state. Following this it can be seen that the 
function of the emotional response following appraisal is to a degree independent of 
the particular content of the activating goal or goals (Frijda, 1994b) 13. 
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Figure 8.1 - A causal model showing the necessary and sufficient relationship 
between goal-relevant appraisal and emotional states (NB: Solid lines denote 
inevitable consequences, while dotted lines represent less necessary influences). 
13 As is discussed below, there is an extent to which the behavioural impulses that are a key part of the 
emotional response are also independent from their activating motive and the situational affordances. 
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Unlike previous cognitive theories the current model presents the empirically 
demonstrable separation (see Chapter 7) between emotional states and the conscious 
experience of emotions suggested by Lewis and Michalson (1983). In this view, 
particular appraisals necessarily cause a state-level emotional response. However, the 
extent to which a particular pattern of appraisal is made manifest in a conscious 
experience of emotion is a different issue. While our current methodologies 
necessarily examine self-reports regarding the conscious experience of emotions 
when considering the structure of appraisal and its relationship to emotion, it is 
questionable whether this avenue is ever likely to illuminate the more basic causal 
relationship. 
As is also evident in the figure, the relationship between cognition and emotion is 
conceptualised as being necessarily causal, but not unidirectional. Rather, both 
emotional states and conscious emotional experience are almost certain to influence 
subsequent appraisals. Although research in this area has tended to examine the 
relationships between more global affective constructs such as mood with cognition 
(e.g. Forgas & Bower, 1987), some data do suggest a more precise influence for 
discrete emotions (e.g. Keltner & Ellsworth, 1990). More precisely delineating how 
these reciprocal processes interactively influence or cause one another, particularly 
over time, remain critical domains for future research. 
Chapter 8.5 - Goals and emotion: Theoretically 'al dente,' empirically 
still a little crunchy 
Introduction 
As indicated throughout the dissertation, the current author is of the belief that 
emotions arise when the individual perceives environments and events as impacting 
on their goals. This assertion is central to contemporary emotion theory, particularly 
cognitive theories, being present in the work of Frijda (1986), Lazarus (199Ia), 
Ortony et. al., (1988), and Oatley (1992) among others. Below, the current state of 
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knowledge in goal-emotion relationships is reviewed and the basic theoretical position 
is described. 
The section then turns to a consideration of the available empirical literature on goal-
emotion relationships, describing the relevant findings from clinical, personality, and 
emotion psychology. It is suggested that while the theoretical consideration of goal-
emotion relationships is very well developed, direct and naturalistic empirical 
demonstrations of cognitive emotion theory are lacking. The studies conducted 
within emotion theory are typically retrospective and inferential, while those 
conducted in other frameworks have been tailored to different theoretical issues, and 
have been conducted at a level unsuited to directly examining the assertions of 
cognitive theory. In seeking to go some way towards addressing this discrepancy, 
two longitudinal diary studies examining goals and emotion are presented. The 
results are interpreted within emotion theory, and directions for future research are 
discussed. 
Goals and emotion: The basic theoretical position 
In modem emotion theory, Arnold (1960a, 1960b) is generally credited with the 
notion that events are subjectively evaluated (appraised) in terms of their significanrc 
for the individuals. In her view, emotions are the end product in a process of goal 
relevant perception and appraisal. For Arnold, the goals and emotions are so c1():-.cI~ 
linked that evaluations are never objective, but always in the form 'knowing and 
liking' or 'knowing and disliking'. 
Since this time, an emphasis on emotions as arising due to perceived changes in thc 
status of one or more goals has exponentiated (see Chapter 8.3). In contemporary 
appraisal theory, emotions occur when events are appraised as having relevance for 
well being or the satisfaction of individual goals or concerns (e.g. Frijda, 1986, 1996: 
Ortony, et. aI., 1988; Smith, 1989; Smith & Pope, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a; Oatley, 
1992). In this view, emotions are inherently relational or interactional as they follow 
a meaning analysis in which the properties of both the person and the environment are 
combined to evaluate the adaptational implications of the new circumstances for the 
person's goals (Lazarus, 1991a; Smith & Pope, 1992). Each emotion is thought to 
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correspond to a particular pattern of evaluations (e.g. Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 
1989), or relationship (Smith & Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1991a), an assertion 
supported by much data (see Scherer, 1997 for a recent review). 
In justifying the place of goals in contemporary emotions theory, Novacek and 
Lazarus (1990) simply note that "it is not possible to understand individual 
differences in emotion ... unless one takes into account what is important t9 people" 
(p. 693 - 4). In their view, emotions and moods are the individual's reactions to the 
fate of their goals in everyday encounters (Novacek & Lazarus, 1990), with an 
event's significance determined by the extent to which it impinges on a person's goals 
(Lazarus, 1991a; Emmons, 1991). People do not become emotional about events that 
do not matter, but about the affected goals to which they have a commitment. As I 
have argued previously, without goals, there could be no good or bad events, for there 
would be nothing to evaluate events in respect of (see Chapter 5). 
This theoretical position is strengthened by its emphasis on the individual nature of 
both goals and (hence) the appraisal process (e.g. Frijda, 1988), and the idea that 
emotion can change as quickly as perceived meaning changes (Lazarus, 1995). As 
noted earlier, emotions are thought to result from the manner in which events and 
situations are perceived, rather than being determined by any objective reality. An 
emotional response will only be the same across individuals insofar as they appraise 
events as impacting on their goals in the same way. Furthermore, an emotional 
response can be transformed or replaced as quickly as a new meaning is extracted 
from the ongoing encounter. This theoretical position requires the study of goals at 
the level of the individual. 
Goals and emotion: The empirical picture 
I think that . . our understanding of the impact 
of issues of concern is rudimentary and ad hoc 
Nico Frijda (1996, p. 11) 
While the theoretical position advocated by contemporary cognitive theories of 
emotion appears plausible and robust, directly supportive empirical demonstrations of 
goal-emotion relationships are hard to find. Cognitive theories have been in 
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development since the time of Arnold, and yet in the four decades that have passed 
there have been few direct illustrations of the way in which goals are related to 
emotions, let alone which particular aspects of goals and emotions are important. 
Despite an emphasis on the individual's goals, we have neglected to examine the very 
phenomena that emotions are purportedly arising in respect of. This is a major 
problem. 
Below, I briefly review the available literature of goal-emotion relationships in three 
areas: emotion, motivation, and personality theory. As will become clear, only a 
small proportion of this research body has been generated from within emotion theory 
itself, and the utility of appraisal research is questionable. A far greater proportion of 
the relevant empirical work has been conducted under the personality umbrella, with a 
consequence that affect and goals have typically been operationalised and measured 
in ways less useful to the development of emotion theory. 
Appraisal research 
The most common technique used by emotion theorists to investigate the place of 
goals in emotion involves researching cognitive appraisal. Appraisal research 
typically involves asking subjects to recall a recent emotional situation, event, or 
experience, to describe it, and then rate it along a number of dimensions. A series of 
questions, each thought to tap a different appraisal dimension, is presented, and the 
responses compared across subjects (e.g. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Roseman, et. aI., 
1990, 1996) and cultures (e.g. Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986; Scherer, 
1988, Frijda, et. al., 1989). The results gathered within this framework have generally 
been consistent with the assertions of appraisal theory, although substantial work 
remains to be done (see above). However, this research pays little in the way of direct 
attention to the vital idiographic goals that are purported to underlie the entire 
response process. 
Scherer's (1988) International Survey on Emotion Antecedents and Reactions for 
example, asks subjects to categorically answer a number of questions about an 
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emotional event and their responses to it14. Subjects make ratings about the 
expectedness of the event, its pleasantness, how fair it was, who was responsible for 
it, their coping ability, any regulation of emotional displays, morality, and self-esteem 
and relationship consequences. However, in what is a comprehensive and important 
study, the only item that even mentions goals (see Item 9 in Appendix C) states: "How 
important was the event for your goals, needs, or desires at the time it happened?" 
Even in this item, the goals themselves are missing. We have little idea as to what the 
goals are about, how or where they fit within the individual's motivational hierarchy, 
or what it is about them that is central to the emotional response, although we do gain 
an appreciation of whether the event was motivationally congruent or not. It could of 
course be argued that directing the subject's attention to a supposed contingency 
between their goals and any associated emotional responding would 'guarantee' 
relationships through demand - implying that the subjects should feel something 
about their goals (cf. Russell, 1993, 1994, 1995). Conversely however, the absence of 
articulated goals in appraisal research essentially means that the data derived do not 
directly address goal-emotion relationships, but bear on appraisal-emotion 
relationships alone. While the term 'appraisal' is generally considered synonymous 
with goal-relevant cognition, the actual goals that life events are supposedly being 
appraised in respect of are missing. 
In considering this research program somewhat further, it appears as though the 
individual goals that are purported to underlie emotional responding can only be 
considered 'present' by inference and definition. Because we can demonstrate that a 
particular pattern of appraisal ratings is associated with a given emotion, we give 
goals themselves little further thought. We simply assume that there is a goal 
somewhere 'behind' the appraisal processes. Little of the appraisal research has been 
conducted within naturalistic settings or has examined goal-emotion processes over 
time (see below). Rather, cognitive theory has tended to concern itself with 
examining normative appraisal processes via hypothetical vignettes, imagery and role 
14 I have focussed on Scherer's (1984, 1993, 1997) stimulus evaluation check model of appraisal 
simply because it represents a well-known investigatory framework. The concerns I outline in respect 
of appraisal methodologies and their suitability to uncovering goal-emotion relationships apply equally 
to most appraisal research (e.g. Smith & Lazarus, 1988; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Roseman, et. aI., 
1990, 1996;). 
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playing, and through retrospective memory procedures. The consequence of these 
methodologies and interests is that while the emerging data are consistent with 
cognitive theory, they offer little direct support to the notion that emotions arise in 
respect of goals, and do nothing to identify the characteristics of goals that influence 
the structure of the emotional response. 
Motivation theory 
Motivational theories have long advocated the consideration of a relationship between 
goals and emotion. At its broadest level, motivational research has demonstrated that 
intimacy motivation is correlated with increased happiness in women and less strain 
and uncertainty in men (McAdams & Bryant, 1987, cited in Emmons, 1991). 
Developments in achievement motivation theory have emphasised the role of 
affective processes and goals (e.g. McClelland, 1955; Atkinson, 1964; Atkinson & 
Raynor, 1974), and there is good evidence to suggest that depression is associated 
with the blockage of self-defining goals (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, 
1987; Higgins, et. al., 1997) and that goal conflict is associated with stress and 
negative affect (Pervin, 1983). 
The essence of control theory (e.g. Powers, 1973; Campion & Lord, 1982; Lord & 
Hanges, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1990, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998) is 
similar in many regards to the cognitive theories of emotion, particularly in 
emphasising affect as a form of goal status or progress feedback. Aptly termed a 
'cruise control' model of affect, Carver and Scheier's (1998) model suggests that 
affect arises from a 'meta-monitoring loop' that continually checks the rate at which 
the action system is reducing the discrepancies between extant and desired states 
(goals). According to them, where progress towards a goal is slower than the 
reference value, negative affect results, and the action system increases effort. 
Conversely, where progress rates exceed the reference value, positive affect results 
and the action system 'coasts' until equilibrium is restored. Their model is important 
for it removes the emphasis on end states or a sequence of end-states (subgoals), 
replacing it with a nonlinear and continuous process of goal striving and monitoring 
(see also Austin & Vancouver, 1996), a key point that is returned to below. Their 
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1998 book denotes a large array of evidence consistent with the predictions of their 
model. 
Perhaps ungenerously, my central comment in respect of this (abridged) review is that 
affects are not emotions (Forgas & Vargas, 1998). While emotions are certainly 
affective, they represent a more distinct variety of phenomena. In the approach 
adopted here, each emotion is generally considered to be a discrete response to the 
perception of a very particular type of goal relationship. Furthermore, discrete 
emotions generate a comparatively precise form of systemic response, variously made 
up of expressive, experiential/motivational, and physiological patterns depending on 
the functions of the emotion in question (see Chapter 8.6 below). Because they are 
not measuring emotion, demonstrations of the relationships between affect and goals 
do little to advance cognitive theories of emotion, even though they are consistent 
with them. 
Personality theory 
Since the mid-1980s personality researchers have been investigating the relationships 
between goals and things emotional, typically as an entry point into the situation-
person debate (Pervin, 1989). In the view of some personality theorists, becaw,(' 
personal goals mark what the individual is trying to accomplish, measures of aIled 
are disproportion ally represented in events that impact on a person's goals (Flecs(Hl ""-
Cantor, 1995; Lavallee & Campbell, 1995). 
Higgins (1987) has suggested that the emotions experienced in respect of goal, 
depend on the standard used for evaluation. His theory of self-discrepancy consider, 
comparisons between actual, ideal, and ought self-goals. Different comparisons 
among these goals lead to different characteristic affects. At the level of personality. 
Higgins argues that individuals chronically differ in their typical focus on either ideal 
(promotion focus) or ought (prevention focus) self-goals (see e.g. Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). More specifically, he has also 
shown that the attainment and nonattainment of ideal and ought goals have different 
emotional consequences (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Specifically, attaining 
ideals produces cheerfulness-related emotions (e.g. happiness), while failing to attain 
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them produces dejection-related emotions (e.g. disappointment). By contrast, 
attaining oughts produces quiescence-related emotions (e.g. relaxation), where failure 
produces agitation-related emotions (e.g. nervousness). Similarly, Fleeson and Cantor 
(1995) have found that particular types of goals remain associated with particular 
types of affect, even where most contextual effects were controlled for. 
In a further study examining the relationships between the organisation and type of 
goals in a personality, Emmons and King (1989) have shown that individuals with 
highly differentiated goal systems are less emotionally reactive than their less 
differentiated counterparts. This finding is in direct contrast to the assertions and 
research of Linville (1982) who found that subjects with more differentiated selves 
(higher complexity) were less reactive to failure or success in an experimental task 
and showed less mood variability over time. Emmons (1992) has shown that 
individuals who articulate their goals at a high level of abstraction experience more 
psychological distress than low level strivers, who suffer greater levels of physical 
illness. In control theory terms, he explains this result by suggesting that progress 
towards higher level goals is typically slower and more difficult to monitor as the 
standards are more abstract. 
Emmons (1991) has shown that power and affiliation strivings strongly influence 
subjective well being (SWB). Cantor and colleagues (Cantor, et. aI., 1991) found that 
subjects experienced more emotional involvement in events that they perceived as 
more relevant to their life tasks. This result was partially replicated by Lavallee and 
Campbell (1995) who found that goal-related events (as rated by judges) were 
associated with affect. 
Personality research has also shown that the impact of daily goal progress on SWB is 
a part function of the relationship the person believes exists between those daily goals 
and broader life goals (Cantor, et. aI., 1991; Emmons, 1991; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995) 
or worst fears (King, et. aI., 1998)15. Sheldon and Kasser (1995) for example found 
that psychological well being was related to the degree to which daily goals related to 
future goals, particularly for goals that were intrinsically motivating. In a similar 
15 Paranthetically, it can be noted that Frijda (1996) likewise considers emotional intensity to depend on 
the degree to which an event is relevant to the eliciting motive. 
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study, King, et. al. (1998) showed that seeking daily goals instrumental in one's life 
goals only weakly predicted SWB, while seeking daily goals that help avoid worst 
fears was strongly associated with lower SWB (see also Lavallee & Campbell, 1995). 
A noteworthy addition to the research on affect-goal relationships from the 
personality literature is that presented by F1eeson and Cantor (1995). Utilising a 
clever design, they found that variations in individual goal relevance r.emained 
associated with variations in affect while statistically controlling for additional 
variations in situational, interpersonal and temporal contexts. So the affective 
experience of everyday life events, such as "a night at the library" is systematically 
related to the content and importance of the goals the individual is pursuing at the 
time. As such, an evening at home alone could be experienced as very pleasant if one 
desired relaxation, but quite distressing if intimacy goals take center stage. 
Of more specific relevance to emotion theory, personality research has also shown 
that both commitment to, and progress on, daily goals are systematically associated 
with the experience of subjective well-being (e.g. Emmons & Diener, 1986; Emmons, 
1989, 1991, 1992; King, Richards, & Stemmerich, 1998). Emmons and Diener 
(1986) for example, found that both positive and negative affect (PA and NA) were 
correlated with goal attainment (r = 0.46 and -0.19 respectively), the relationship with 
PA clearly stronger (see below). They also found that having important goals was as 
highly associated with affect as was progress towards such goals (r = 0.47 and -0.18), 
although goal attainment and importance were themselves strongly related (r = 0.77). 
These findings regarding the place of goal importance are critical to the current 
research and are returned to below. 
Concluding remarks on the state of knowledge 
The review above has been brief, and somewhat partisan. In critiquing the relevance 
of the three research areas, the review has deliberately been written from the point of 
view of an emotion theorist. This orientation, I believe, has been necessary in order to 
underscore the need for direct and naturalistic goal-emotion studies generated and 
conducted within emotion frameworks. 
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The first general comment that bears making about the review is that a greater 
proportion of the research into goals and emotion has not been conducted within 
emotion theory, but within personality and motivational frameworks. The basic 
consequence of this 'starting point' is that the research design reflects completely 
different interests and questions. In the personality literature, goals and emotions are 
often treated as potential moderators, rather than the variables of most direct interest. 
We know a great deal more about the way in which broad goals and broad measures 
of affect relate, particularly in respect of situational choice behaviour, than we do 
about the basic goal-emotion relationships relevant to emotion theory. 
From the point of view of emotion theory, the measures of 'emotion' used in this 
research are invariably too broad to be properly evaluated within a discrete 
functionalist perspective. Almost all researchers have operationalised emotion though 
measuring subjective well being (e.g. Emmons & Diener, 1986; Emmons, 1989, 1991, 
1992; King, 1995; King, et. aI., 1998) or another equally broad mood measure (e.g. 
Emmons & King, 1989; Cantor, et. aI., 1991; Fleeson & Cantor, 1995; Lavallee & 
Campbell 1995; Carver & Scheier, 1998). One notable exception to this trend is the 
more recent work of Higgins and colleagues (e.g. Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; 
Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998), although some of their 'emotions' (e.g. relaxation) 
would not be considered emotions by a discrete theorist. 
The second remark concerns the generality of the goal measures these researchers 
have tended to employ. Although goal-personality concepts like personal strivings, 
current concerns, personal projects, life tasks, are thought to represent "idiographic 
instantiantiations of nomothetic motives" (Emmons, 1991, p. 455), this level of 
operationalisation is again better suited to the interests of a personality researcher. 
From the perspective of an emotion theorist, it seems likely that widely shared goals 
such as achievement and affiliation (see e.g. Fleeson & Cantor, 1995; Cantor, et. al., 
1992) will be differentially susceptible to demand. Normative goals, even where they 
are idiographically instantiated, are probably sensitive to a greater number of rules, 
shared meanings, expectations and theories regarding how and where these goals 
should be pursued16, and how one should feel when succeeding or failing. Again, the 
16 This concern is in fact acknowledged by Cantor, Norem, Langston, Zirkel, Fleeson, and Cook-
Flannagan (1991) when they "begin with the assumption that individuals of particular ages, living 
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interests of personality research have lead to data unsuited to examining the basic 
goal-emotion relationships that might interest an emotion researcher. lllustrating the 
importance of daily and weekly goals to emotional responding is an important part of 
this research. 
On a more positive note, it is worth remembering that goals are central, explicit, and 
at least nominally individual in personality research. This orientation stands in stark 
contrast to the research conducted within appraisal frameworks, which while 
possessing the advantage of operating at a discrete emotions level, has somehow 
managed to avoid studying goals in a direct fashion. Surprisingly, there has been little 
in the way of cross-fertilisation between these two research areas, even though 
emotions are fundamental in many models of personality (see Chapter 6) and goals 
are central to personality (see Chapter 1). It is my belief that combining the strengths 
of these two approaches will produce methodologies and data of interest to both 
personality and emotion researchers. 
The current hypotheses 
The discussion above provides a general rationale for studying the basic relationships 
between goals and emotion within a theoretical perspective that emphasises emotion. 
Below, more theoretical detail is provided as relevant to the major hypotheses of the 
two studies presented here. In the interests of brevity, data from the second study are 
only presented in respect of the longitudinal hypotheses, although passing reference is 
made to some key parallels. 
Initially, it was thought important to demonstrate some baseline relationships between 
affective measures and specific individual goals. In part, I simply wanted to 
demonstrate that the status of an individual's daily goals was systematically related to 
affective experience. It was predicted that: 
1. Goal specific mood ratings will be dependent on the amount of progress 
made 'on that goal 
together in specific social groups, share an understanding of the life tasks that are deemed appropriate 
for their current age and living environment" (p. 427). 
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However, it was also important to begin generating greater precision in the measures 
of both affect and goals. In respect of affect, I wanted to show that people could feel 
quite positive about a certain goal despite feeling more negative in a general sense -
that fine-grained, and goal-specific discriminations of affect were obtainable. In 
considering a number of possible goal dimensions that might mediate this 
relationship, it was thought that the importance of a goal would be a key factor in 
determining in how closely goal specific and general mood were associated - the 
extent to which that feelings about that goal contributed to general mood. The status 
of more important goals, being higher in the motivational hierarchy, should contribute 
a greater amount to general mood. Consequently, it was thought that: 
2. Ratings of goal specific mood will be more strongly associated with 
general mood ratings the more important a particular goal is. 
Related to this hypothesis, it is worth remembering that Emmons and colleagues (e.g. 
Emmons & Diener, 1986; Emmons, 1989) have found that having important goals 
was strongly associated with positive affect irrespective of attainment. King et. al. 
(1998) failed to replicate this finding, showing that while daily goal importance was 
moderately correlated to progress (r = 0.43), that importance was not related to SWB. 
Although these authors explain the inconsistency between their and Emmons' data 
through reference to sample and methodological considerations, a weak correlation 
between importance and affect would be expected from a emotion theory informed 
approach to goals and affect. From a functionalist perspective on emotions, failure on 
a goal where investment is high should lead to strong negative (rather than positivl') 
mood, as the system motivates withdrawal from the goal (as in sadness) or increasing 
effort (as in anger and shame). In combining these ideas with those above, a further 
hypothesis was derived: 
3. That as goal importance increases, so too will the possible range of mood 
consequences. More important goals will produce more strongly positive 
mood when progressed towards, but more strongly negative mood when 
not. 
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As noted above, Carver and Scheier's (1990, 1998) control theory suggests that goal-
related affect derives from the rate at which a goal is progressed on, while Higgins et. 
al. (1997) suggest that it derives from the type of goal-focus present. Bearing emotion 
theory in mind, it Carver and Scheier's (1998) theory appears more likely, although 
ratings regarding goal progress may be problematic in that they do not tell us whether 
the rate or amount progress is high enough. In seeking to fine-tune the 
operationalisation of the goal feedback variables relevant to affective respondjng, goal 
progress and goal closeness measures were separated. 
While this is clearly a complex issue, it seems reasonable to suppose that progress 
rates vary more across time than do proximity or closeness estimates, which in most 
cases can only increase (i.e. you can only get closer to most goals). Within limits, the 
endpoint for most goals remains static over time, meaning that closeness ratings 
should provide a stable longitudinal measure indexing how proximate the subject is to 
the endpoint. In addition however, it may well be that closeness ratings indicate both 
how quickly the goal is being approached (as a goal gradient), and indirectly whether 
the subject feels they are approaching fast enough. In respect of these issues it was 
predicted that: 
4. Both goal progress and goal closeness will be associated with goal specific 
mood, but that closeness estimates will be more highly predictive of mood 
for longer term goals. 
Finally, the current studies sought to examine something of the coping processes 
people engage in when goals are not being attained. Carver and Scheier (1998) have 
suggested that where progress is less than the reference value the affect system will 
indicate a necessary increase in effort. However, it also seems reasonable to suppose 
that this process should be indicated by both negative mood and by a variety of other 
goal adjustments. Following the developments based on Lazarus and Folkman's 
(1984) coping model, it seems likely that there at least two major types of coping 
technique - emotion versus problem focussed coping. In this case, when individuals 
are 'failing' in long-term goal pursuit, they may 'cope' either by continuing to grapple 
with the goal (and showing negative affect), or by reducing the importance of the goal 
and thence its ability to contribute to their emotional experience. 
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5. That where progress on long term goals is not being made, at least one of 
two effects will occur. Subjects will either reduce the importance of the 
goal and show a lesser affective consequence (better mood) or will 
maintain goal importance and show more negative mood. 
-Methods 
Overview 
All of the studies presented here have employed essentially the same research 
framework, although there have been some small variations in implementation. 
Given the highly temporal nature of both goals and emotions, it was thought that 
tracking goal processes over time might provide additional insights into goal-emotion 
relationships (van Geert, 1997; King, et. al., 1998). Following increasing use in the 
emotion literature (e.g. Malatesta-Magai & Culver, 1991; Oatley & Duncan, 1992; 
Vittengl & Holt, 1998), a diary structured around goals and emotions was used. Each 
version. of this method required subjects to record individual goals relevant within a 
particular time frame and to rate a number of goal dimensions (e.g. importance and 
likelihood), as well as their emotions about the goal and in general. 
Goal criteria and instructions 
In these studies, the subjects were free to articulate any goal they chose but with three 
restrictions. Initially, they were informed that the goal must be of at least moderate 
importance to them. The simple reason for this is that ratings about things that do not 
matter were of no interest. Secondly, subjects were told that the goal must be 
reasonably attainable within the stipulated timeframe, neither an impossibility nor a 
certainty. Finally, subjects were encouraged to state their goal with as much 
specificity as possible. So far example, rather than state "I want to get a lot of work 
done on my essay" they were encouraged to operationalise their goal at a more precise 
level, for example "I want to have finished a complete draft on the first half of my 
essay." As is expanded upon below, goals frequently encapsulate an implicit criterion 
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regarding their performance. In making criteria more explicit, it was felt that more of 
the relevant variance would be captured by the measures used. 
Pilot study 
The initial study was preceded by a pilot study conducted approximately one month 
earlier. This was undertaken in order to assess practical difficulties such as 
compliance and to provide an opportunity for senior peer feedback on the 
methodology. Twenty senior postgraduates completed the basic goal diary twice 
daily for five consecutive days and filled out a detailed 'comments' form. Following 
complaints regarding the time involvement, several items were removed on the basis 
of (a) effectively measuring the same phenomenon as another item (r> 0.75) or (b) 
failing to be associated with any other item (e.g. an item on the quality of sleep). 
Study 1 
Participants 
Twenty-five female (MAge = 23yrs, s.d. = 5.89) and 23 male (MAge = 21.6yrs, s.d. = 
3.7) psychology students at the University of Canterbury (New Zealand) participated 
in the initial study. Of this group, 42 undergraduates were recruited from stage one 
laboratory sessions, while six postgraduates were approached by the experimenter and 
asked if they would be willing to participate. Subjects were not rewarded for their 
efforts. Participation in the study was very good. Sixty-five diary forms were handed 
out, of which 51 were returned. Six subjects withdrew from the study for personal 
reasons (external stressors, personal bereavement), while eight could not be contacted 
for the return of the forms. 
Procedure 
Participation in the study required that subjects complete a structured goal diary form 
(see Appendix 4) morning and night for five consecutive days. On the morning of the 
first day, subject's formalised a single goal for the following week (the weekly goal), 
and two goals for that day (daily goals). On each of the remaining four days, the 
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weekly goal remained the same while two fresh daily goals were generated for that 
day. 
Each morning, participants made three 7 -point Likert ratings about each of the two 
daily and single weekly goals. Goal importance was rated, as was the likelihood of 
the goal's achievement and the subject's current mood. In the evening, ratings were 
made about the amount of progress that had been made, the way they felt about each 
goal, their general mood, the amount of effort that had been made and the opportunity 
they had had to achieve the goal. Completed forms were deposited anonymously in a 
collection box. 
Study 2 
Participants 
Nine female (MAge = 30Ayrs, s.d. = 9.27) and seven male (MAge = 25.9yrs, s.d. = 
4.67) postgraduate psychology students at the University of Canterbury (New 
Zealand) participated in the second study. Of this group, three males and one female 
subject did not provide enough data be used (less than 18 of 36 ratings) so have been 
excluded from analysis. Subject reward involved a monetary raffle with 5 prizes from 
a pool of $NZ 250. 
Procedure 
Upon indicating a willingness to participate, subjects completed an induction session 
with the experimenter. An "account" for each subject was created within the 
Departmental computer system, and subjects were given a login and password to the 
study. Subjects then recorded a single goal relevant over a three-month timeframe 
using the same directions as in the study above, and completed the first set of ratings 
while the experimenter remained nearby in case of difficulty. Subjects were informed 
that 36 separate sets of ratings (sessions) were required in the study, and that each set 
of ratings could be completed no sooner than 48 hours after the last set. Subjects 
completed the remaining 35 ratings as they wished over the next three months. To 
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facilitate compliance, each participant's name was added to the Departmental login 
script which then reminded them to complete the study each time they used any of the 
Departmental computers. 
While the method employed in this study is essentially similar to that used in study 
one, a computer-administered methodology has a number of practical and theoretical 
advantages over the paper-based method. Initially, it is of note that the administrative 
software continuously presented the subject's goal (at the top of the screen) during the 
time ratings were made, ensuring that the goal was kept highly salient during this 
period, and reducing the likelihood that the goal would change in unmeasured ways 17. 
Item order was randomised at each session, reducing the likelihood of demand created 
by theoretically undesirable item ordering. Only one question could be viewed at a 
time, reducing conscious comparisons among temporally proximate ratings. To 
further reduce demand, the second study used simple bipolar scales rather than the 
Likerts used in study one. Subjects simply indicated their response by shifting a 
marker to the appropriate place (see Appendix 5 for an example). The use of 
computers in doing this enabled the sensitivity in the dependent measures that had 
been indicated as necessary by study one. Additionally, it made it difficult for 
subjects to remember how they had answered each item on previous occasions, again 
reducing demand. 
Results 
The initial step in the analysis was to evaluate whether the stated goals were fresh 
each day, and to examine the types of goals recorded. Where the same goal was 
recorded as a daily goal on more than one occasion, only one was counted towards the 
subjects total of daily goals. All but one participant recorded 10 discrete daily goals 
(Total N = 479), and all 48 subjects recorded a weekly goal. 
17 As noted earlier, it seems likely that most goals have implicit criteria regarding the level of their 
performance. It seemed possible that subjects would unconsciously revise the criteria for the goal, 
effectively meaning that they were no longer rating the same goal. This point is returned to following 
the presentation of the study. 
306 
Reported goals were primarily academic for both daily (43.2%) and weekly goals 
(47.9%), a finding which was to be expected when drawing from a population of full-
time students. Nonetheless, substantial numbers of goals were observed in other 
categories. Observed goal types for daily and weekly goals were coded by the first 
experimenter, and are displayed in Table 8.1 below. 
Goal Type/Content % Daily Goals % Weekly Goals 
Academic 43.2 47.9 
Interpersonal 10.9 12.5 
Domestic 14.1 10.4 
Exercise/fitness 9.8 14.6 
Intrapersonal 6.8 8.3 
Leisure 7.1 2.1 
Employment 5.4 2.1 
Health 2.7 2.1 
Table 8.1 - DIstribution of goal types/content for daily and weekly goals 
The distribution of goal types showed in the table above give good grounds for 
confidence that the goals gathered represent a fair distribution of daily and weekly 
goals, at least for stage one university students. A preliminary analysis across these 
goal types showed no major differences as a function of goal content, so goals are 
collapsed across categories for the remainder of the analyses. 
Given the absence of this level of research, the next step in the analysis was to 
examine the basic relationships between the daily and weekly goals that people 
recorded, their ratings of mood regarding them, and the success or failure of their goal 
pursuit. Correlations showed that the way in which subjects felt about each daily goal 
(goal specific mood) was strongly related to the amount of progress made on that goal 
(r = 0.62, p < 0.0001). Progress was also positively related to goal specific mood on 
Day 1 (r = 0.57), Day 2 (r = 0.61), Day 3 (r = 0.46), Day 4 (r = 0.63), and Day 5 (r = 
0.45) of weekly goal ratings (all p-values < 0.005). Correlation coefficients of similar 
magnitude were also present in the relationship between mood and progress for goals 
in the three-month diary (see below). 
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Does having important goals lead to happiness? 
It was important to demonstrate that the relationships between mood and progress 
observed in respect of daily goals have real significance for the way in which people 
feel more generally. Based on a hierarchical model goal organisation, it was 
predicted that the relationship between goal specific mood and general mood would 
become progressively stronger the more important (or higher in the motivational 
hierarchy) each goal was. As can be seen in Table 8.2 below, the relationship 
between goal specific and general mood ratings increased systematically as a function 
of daily goal importance. 
Daily Goal Importance Goal specific x general mood Number of daily goals 
correlation 
1 0.59 9 
2 0.06 18 
3 0.07 25 
4 0.12 65 
5 0.17 102 
6 0.36 150 
7 0.34 110 
Table 8.2 - The correlations between goal specific and general mood as a function of 
daily goal importance 
As can be seen in the table above, there was a systematic relationship between goal 
specific and general mood as a function of daily goal importance. The more 
important a goal was, the more highly associated goal specific and general mood 
ratings were. The exception to this trend is the strong positive relationship between 
the two mood ratings where importance is very low (r = 0.59). However, there are 
only nine goals at this level, and th~ trend in the 'remaining' 470 ratings suggests that 
these observations are misrepresenting the trend. When excluding goals of very low 
importance, the correlation between importance ratings and the strength of specific-
general mood relationships is a staggering 0.94. Although these data are 
correlational, it seems reasonable to infer that the increasing relationship between the 
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two mood ratings is directly related to a goal's relative placement in the motivational 
hierarchy. Goals may contribute to overall mood proportionally to their importance18. 
As noted above, Emmons and colleagues (Emmons & Diener, 1986; Emmons, 1989) 
have shown that having important goals is predictive of P A notwithstanding whether 
the goal is actually attained. The current study predicted that goal importance would 
be associated with the range of mood consequences, with more important goals 
producing more positive mood at high progress rates, but more negative mood at low 
rates. Importance and progress ratings were recoded, so that ratings of one, two, or 
three represented goals of 'low' importance, ratings of four and five as being of 
'moderate' importance, and ratings of six and seven as being of 'high' importance. 
These results are shown in Table 8.3 below. 
Goal Progress Rating 
Importance Low Moderate High Mean Range 
Low 3.69 4.25 4.75 1.06 
Moderate 3.63 4.67 5.48 1.85 
High 3.35 4.35 6.06 2.71 
Table 8.3 - Mean goal specific mood as a function of importance and progress (NB: 
No account of repeated measures has been taken in these data) 
Table 8.3 shows the mean goal specific mood ratings as a function of goal importance 
and the amount of progress made. As predicted, goals of low importance produced a 
lower range in goal specific mood (1.06), than either moderate (1.85) or highly 
important (2.71) goals. Also notable is the fact that goals of high importance were 
associated with the most negative mood in the low progress category (3.35) and the 
most positive mood in the high progress category (6.06). Conversely, goals of low 
importance were associated with the least negative mood in the low progress category 
(3.69) and the least positive mood (4.75) in the high progress category. In each case, 
goals of moderate importance were associated with mean moods between these two 
extremes. 
18 This interpretation is also supported by the correlation between goal specific and general mood when 
analysed across the three timeframes employed here. Goal specific mood and general mood were 
correlated at 0.29 for daily goals, 0.43 for weekly goals, and 0.61 for three-month goals. 
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In preparing these data for further analysis, several steps were taken. Firstly, it was 
felt that treating different subjects' ratings of importance and progress as directly 
comparable was problematic. Equating ratings directly across subjects would 
effectively be assuming that a goal rated by one subject as being of '5' importance 
was of exactly the same relative importance as a goal also rated as a '5' by a different 
subject. To account for this potential difficulty, progress and importance ratings were 
z-standardised within each subject across the ten daily goals they provided. In 
addition to ensuring that ratings actually represent relative importance, this procedure 
has the advantage of maximising the likelihood that each subject would produce data 
within each of the nine cells in the ANOVA (see below). 
The transformed data was then split into three groups of equal size. Standardised 
importance ratings were split into groups of low, moderate, and high importance, and 
standardised progress ratings were split into the same three groups. However, not all 
subjects produced all nine combinations of progress and importance in their ten daily 
goals, despite the standardising procedure maximising this possibility, hence missing 
cells were replaced with the respective cell mean. 19 Where subjects produced more 
than one rating per cell, only the first was used. A 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOV A 
was then run. As predicted, there was a massive (and significant) main effect for 
progress (F(2,94) = 173.67, p < 0.000001). There was also a main effect for goal 
importance (F(2,94) = 8.34, P < 0.001). Finally, as indicated by the ranges and means 
shown in Table 8.3 above, there was a significant interaction between progress and 
importance factors (F(4,188) = 3.46, P < 0.01). The means for this analysis are shown 
in the interaction plot below. 
19 This is less than ideal, particularly when, on average, each subject only produced 6 cells worth of 
data. It is difficult to imagine a naturalistic setting in which subjects would spontaneously generate the 
combinations of importance and progress desired here. Having a greater number of goals might help, 
although I suspect experimental designs might be better suited to this issue. 
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Figure 8.2 - Interaction plot showing mean goal specific mood as a function of goal 
importance and goal progress (NB: Both importance and progress ratings have been 
standardised within-subject prior to this analysis) 
Figure 8.2 clearly demonstrates the strong relationship between the amount of 
progress made on a goal and the way people feel about it. Greater amounts of 
progress are consistently associated with significantly better mood, irrespective of 
importance. However, the importance of importance is also clear. The curve linking 
the means for goals of moderate importance is consistently above that for low 
importance goals (main effect for importance), a point that is returned to below. 
Finally, the line linking the means for goals of high importance is probably that 
responsible for the interaction effect. Where progress is low, mood regarding an 
important goal is also low (2.56) although not significantly lower than either the low 
or moderate goal mood ratings at this progress rate. However, while mean goal 
specific mood climbs steadily to 3.94 (moderate importance), the curve for important 
goals becomes steeper, climbing to 5.09. These two means are significantly different 
according to a Scheffe post hoc (p = 0.02), and are the only two means of the same 
progress rate to differ. In all, these results can be taken as supportive of the 
predictions outlined vis-a-vis the interactions between importance and progress and 
their impact on mood. 
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A mountain walk: Is it the journey or the summit view that makes us happy? 
Of interest in the three month diary study was the possibility that there might be key 
differences in how ratings of goal progress and goal closeness related to mood. For 
the daily goals measured in the first study, these two variables were so highly 
correlated as to be effectively measuring the same aspect of goal processes (r = 0.89, 
P < 0.001). The same can also be said for the way in which progress and closeness 
ratings relate across each of the five days of the weekly goal. Progress and closeness 
ratings were highly correlated on Day 1 (0.71, p < 0.05), Day 2 (0.73, p < 0.05), Day 
3 (0.79, p < 0.05), Day 4 (0.91, p < 0.05), and on Day 5 (0.65, p < 0.65). This pattern 
of data suggests that progress and closeness ratings are measuring a very similar 
aspect of people's goals, although they may also indicate that closeness needs to be 
more carefully operationalised to separate it2o• 
Despite these similarities, closeness ratings appear to have additional utility when 
examining the processes people engage in during the pursuit of longer-term goals 
(e.g. three months). In these exploratory analyses, time was coded into nine 
categories, each typically about 10 days or four sets of ratings. Subject ratings of both 
progress and closeness to the goal were then correlated with the time category, with 
the expectation that closeness ratings would show a more stable relationship with 
time. 
As can be seen in Table 8.4 overleaf, 11 of the 13 subjects showed a significant 
relationship between closeness and time. Although these relationships were in both 
directions (see below), the relationships were nonetheless consistently strong, with an 
average correlation (ignoring direction) of 0.58. In contrast, progress was less 
strongly related to time with an average correlation of 0.29. A t-test for dependent 
measures showed this difference to be significant (t(12) = 3.83, P < 0.005), a finding 
which indicates a conceptual separation between closeness and progress. So while the 
relationships between static measures of goal proximity such as closeness, goal 
progress and mood clearly require further investigation, closeness is nonetheless a 
variable of considerable potential in longitudinal goal research. 
312 
Closeness Rating x Time Progress Rating x Time 
Participant 1 0.66* 0.14 
Participant 2 0.58* -0.15 
Participant 3 0.35 0.02 
Participant 4 0.51* 0.36 
Participant 5 -0.23 -0.30 
Participant 6 0.68* 0.28 
Participant 7 -0.69* -0.15 
Participant 8 0.46* 0.34 
Participant 9 0.82* 0.44* 
Participant 10 -0.80 -0.55* 
Participant 11 -0.46* -0.44* 
Participant 12 0.78 0.59* 
Participant 13 -0.47 -0.04 
Average 0.58 0.29 
Table 8.4 - The correlations between closeness and progress ratings with time for 13 
participants in a three-month diary (NB: Time has been categorised to nine lO-day 
slots). 
To examine the relationship of clo~eness with mood somewhat further, the thirteen 
participants were divided into two groups on the basis of their correlation between 
time and closeness ratings (i.e. whether they generally getting closer over time or not). 
Five participants (numbers 5, 7, 10, 11, 13) were assigned to the "no closer" group, 
while the remaining eight subjects were assigned to a "closer" group. 
From this point, goal related ratings were plotted as a function of time (see Figures 
8.3 and 8.4 below). Of primary interest were the relationships between goal specific 
mood and closeness, although following the fifth hypothesis presented above, the 
processes people engaged in during failure were also of interest. 
20 As is expanded upon below, post hoc consideration of the anchors on the closeness item in Study 1 
(see Appendix, 4) suggest that the closeness anchors represented a dynamic measurement of proximity 
more analogous to progress than closeness. 
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Figures 8.3a and 8.3b - Mean closeness and goal specific mood ratings for individuals 
getting closer (8.3a) and failing to get closer (8.3b) to a three month goal. 
Although the figure tends to exaggerate the differences between the two groups, it is 
nonetheless clear that the mood of people who are getting closer to their goal over 
time is gradually feeling more positive about their goal, with the closeness and mood 
curves gradually becoming more intertwined. The general impression given by th." 
curve is that people feel more and more positive as they get nearer the target, altholl~h 
the precise relationship of closeness estimates in goal specific mood remains undcar 
A further problem for these data is that both closeness and mood ratings drop sharp! ~ 
in the final time period. Possible reasons for this are discussed below. 
In contrast, the mood of people who are generally getting further away from their 
goals drops sharply over the first two time periods. From this point however, their 
mood appears to 'stabilise' somewhat, although the curve is very noisy. Given what 
has been demonstrated above regarding the relationships between closeness and goal 
specific mood above, this stabilisation begs the question of what is happening at these 
times. Why does the status of their goal no longer seem to bear such a strong 
relationship to their mood? 
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One possible answer is uncovered in a brief consideration of the final hypothesis 
offered above. Hypothesis five suggested that where people were failing to attain a 
goal, they would either (a) suffer a reduction in mood, or (b) reduce the impact the 
goal is capable of having on their mood by reducing its importance (see above). 
Figure 8.4 below shows the mean importance, perceived difficulty, and perceived 
opportunity ratings as a function of time and group. 
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Figures 8.4a and 8.4b - Mean importance, perceived difficulty, and perceived 
opportunity ratings for individuals getting closer (Fig 8.4a) and failing to get closer 
(Fig 8.4b) to a three month goal. 
It is immediately evident in the figures above that a far greater number of changes are 
occurring in the ratings for the group that were failing to achieve their goal. For the 
most part, individuals who were getting closer to their goal show little variation in 
these measures across time. Goal difficulty, importance, and opportunity fluctuate 
somewhat, but the essential pattern is of consistency during the pursuit process. 
In inspecting the data for the group who are failing to get closer to their goal (Fig 
8.4b), one can note that these goals were rated as progressively more difficult, and 
(more importantly) progressively less important. It is this latter observation that is 
critical, for it was predicted earlier. As some individuals fail their goals, they appear 
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to regulate their mood by reducing the importance of the goal, in effect saying "Ah 
well. It doesn't matter." As noted above, a given goal's ability to impact on mood is 
. strongly related to its importance, hence reducing importance will typically lessen the 
impact of failure. Additionally, a closer inspection of the curve for goal importance in 
Figure 8.4b shows a pleasant parallel to the data presented in Figure 8.3b (above). It 
will be recalled that goal specific mood for the "no closer" group dropped sharply 
across the first two periods and then stabilised. In contrast, the importance curve for 
this group remains stable (Figure 8.4b) for the time that mood is dropping, then drops 
as mood stabilises. The interactions between these adjustment process and their 
possible links to personality are discussed below. 
Discussion 
Although complex, the data presented above can nonetheless be taken as 
unequivocally indicating that self-reported daily, weekly, and three-month goals are 
systematically related to affective experience. This is an important finding for it 
extends previous research to the consideration of a level of goals not previously 
studied, to a greater variety of goals, and to goals that are highly idiographic. The 
current research has also shown that the way in which people feel about particular 
goals bears a systematic relationship to the way in which they feel more generally. 
The way people feel about a goal has been demonstrably related to both the 
importance of a goal, and to the amount of progress made on it. More important goals 
were moderately associated with more positive affect, particularly for longer-term 
goals, while progress on a goal was strongly associated with the wayan individual 
feels across all timeframes. Although the interactions between importance and 
progress appear quite complex, goal importance may operate as a constraint on the 
extent to which progress on that goal affects mood. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, goal closeness was difficult to distinguish from progress 
on a goal, and was no better a predictor of mood. However, goal closeness was 
shown to be a useful measure in longitudinal goal research. It appears to provide a 
more stable estimate of static goal proximity, and enables us to examine the processes 
accompanying goal failure in a manner not possible with progress estimates. In this 
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regard, unsuccessful striving (declining closeness ratings) was shown to be associated 
with a surprisingly stable pattern of mood decline and goal adjustment. 
In all, the relationships between goals and affect described here are encouraging. 
They are consistent with a series of hypotheses derived from within emotion and 
motivational theories of personality, and have been replicated when examining self-
articulated goals and affect across a number of timeframes. That said, there is a sense 
in which the questions created outnumber those answered. The discussion below 
considers some of the implications these data have for theories of emotion and 
personality, emphasising the complexity of the relationships between goals and affect 
and the need for more research. 
In extending previous knowledge, the current research has demonstrated that goals 
and affective experience remain systematically associated even when operationalised 
at a very high level of temporal and descriptive resolution - daily goals and goal 
specific mood. While the measures of affect employed here are still too broad to be 
taken as directly supportive of cognitive emotion theory, demonstrating that affective 
responses occur equally systematically at the level of single daily goals provides a 
closer approximation to a theory test than we have seen so far. 
The general finding that affective experience IS systematically linked to the 
importance of, and progress on, an individual's goals is consistent with previous work 
in personality theory (e.g. Emmons & Diener, 1986; Emmons, 1989, 1991, 1992) and 
with the premises of cognitive emotion theory (e.g. Lazarus, 1991a). In extending 
this research, the wayan individual feels about a particular goal has been shown to be 
an interactive function of the goal's relative importance and the amount of progress 
made. 
The current data offer a useful framework within which to examine exactly how much 
the status of a particular goal influences general affective experience. The analysis of 
daily goals has shown that goal specific and general mood ratings were differentially 
correlated depending on the relative importance of the goal. In this pattern, mood 
ratings regarding an important goal were more closely associated with variations in 
general mood than are ratings regarding less important goals. 
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This relationship is again evident when comparing specific and general mood ratings 
across the three levels of goal duration. As was briefly noted earlier, goal specific 
mood and general mood were correlated at 0.29 for daily goals, at 0.43 for weekly 
goals, and at 0.61 for three-month goals. Although changes in the methodology 
prevent direct comparisons among the importance of the goals from the different 
timeframes, it seems reasonable to suppose that longer goals will typically be more 
important than shorter goals. As in the analysis within daily goals, an analysis across 
goals of varied duration also supports the idea that a goal's relative importance is a 
key variable in the relationship that goal bears to general mood. Although the nature 
of the data prevents causal claims, it seems plausible to infer that goals of greater 
importance exert a proportionally greater influence on general mood (depending on 
progress) because they are higher in the motivational hierarchy. 
Whether this assertion is ultimately shown to be true, the pattern is at least consistent 
with hierarchical models of personality and affect like Carver and Scheier's (1998) 
control model, and with the approach to motivation and personality adopted in this 
dissertation. Previous research has shown that the impact of daily goal progress on 
SWB is related to the relationship that the person believes exists between these goals 
and broader life goals (e.g. Cantor, et. aI., 1991; Emmons, 1991). While beliefs 
regarding the relationships between levels in a goal hierarchy were not examined 
here, the current research is strikingly consistent with such an interpretation. 
In this regard, the measurement of daily, weekly, and three-month goals via their 
relative importance provides an additional means of assessing how these goals relate 
to more stable personality goals, one that avoids the limitations inherent in a 
framework that necessitates conscious awareness. While the direct measurement of 
goal relationships via belief is a useful approach, it cannot examine the relationships 
between goals where the individual is unaware that the goals are even related. These 
relationships may be of considerable interest to researchers, for example, in 
examining the relationships between core personality goals and their dysfunctional 
manifestations. However, by using simultaneously measuring mood ratings as they 
relate to two potentially connected goals, we may be able to indirectly investigate goal 
relationships that people are not aware of. In addition, this technique provides a 
potential means through which to assess goals and goal processes in populations that 
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are not able to describe their beliefs about goal relationships or contingency (e.g. 
children). 
Although measures of goal importance and progress have been employed in previous 
research, the interactions between goal progress and goal importance described here 
should not be underestimated for they suggest that we may need to reformulate our 
ideas regarding the place of importance in goal-affect relationships. While important 
goals may be associated with positive mood, irrespective of progress ratings (c.f. 
Emmons & Diener, 1986; King, et. al., 1998), the interactional effect uncovered 
suggests that goal importance may also help delimit the likely range of mood 
consequences associated with different rates or levels of progress. 
The idea that goal importance constrains and influences emotional responses at 
different levels of progress is implicit within hierarchical theories of personality and 
motivation (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1998, the current dissertation). In this view, more 
important goals should produce greater extremes of affective responding depending 
on the progress made. Interactions between goal importance and goal status are 
likewise implicit in a functionalist view of affect. If affective responding operates in 
order to motivate people to address particular goal relationships (see Chapter 8.6). 
then there should be affective consequences to goal failure. More specifically, thc:-.c 
consequences should be more severe (rather than less) the more important the goal i:-.. 
In everyday terms, it simply does not make sense to hold important goals, fail. .tnJ 
feel better than you would have were the goal to have been less important to you 
Taken to an extreme, equating importance with happiness would completely 
undermine the motivational functions of emotion and mood, in that one could 
progressively fail a series of important goals, and feel happier than if they had not 
mattered so much. Although several studies, including the current one have found 
and replicated an effect on mood for goal importance, the conceptual problems are 
such that I nonetheless believe it will ultimately prove more profitable to seek our 
answers in an examination of personality variables and methodologies. 
In explaining the main effect for goal importance on mood, Emmons and Diener 
(1986) have previously suggested that it may be "because most people in this setting 
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are confident, based on past experience, that if they have goals, eventually they will 
achieve them" (p. 322). They correctly note that the direction of causality among goal 
variables and affect is unclear. It might be, for example, that happy people are better 
equipped to achieve important goals, or that happy people differentially ascribe more 
importance to goals. It is likewise possible that because people typically exert more 
effort towards important goals, that they either (a) attain them, or (b) simply feel 
better about the goal simply because they have tried. 
Finally, it would also seem likely that people engage in both self-protective and self-
enhancing ascription practices both when pursuing goals, and when making ratings 
about goal processes. People may ascribe importance to goals they are confident of 
achieving (Emmons & Diener, 1986), and downplay the importance of goals they are 
not so sure they can attain. In the analysis of daily goals, importance was positively 
related to the likelihood of their attainment (r = 0.32), although this could reflect the 
increased effort people exert toward more important goals (r = 0.33). However, it 
seems possible that people seek to enhance positive affect and minimise negative 
affect by moderating the importance they ascribe to their goals based on their 
estimations of that goal's likelihood. Clearly, a great deal of research is needed in this 
area. 
Methodologically, one further reason for the continued association of goal importance 
with positive affect may lie in the difficulty involved in measuring goal importance. 
As was argued in Chapter 7, goal importance can be usefully conceptualised at both 
trait and emergent levels, in that the importance a person attaches to a particular goal 
in a general sense probably differs from its importance within contexts of varying 
relevance (cf. Fleeson & Cantor, 1995). As such, rated importance of the same goal 
may vary considerably, perhaps within a certain range as indicated by the goal's trait 
importance. If this is true, then the measurement of both goal-related emotional 
responding and ratings of goal importance must be very carefully formulated and 
temporally sensitive. If we ask people how important a given goal is at a time when 
they are aware they are failing, the data presented above suggests they will reduce the 
importance of the goal. If however, we ask them to rate importance prior to the time 
at which mood ratings are taken (as in the current studies), and they make their mood 
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rating during a time that they know they are failing or have failed, the importance of 
the goal may drop in unmeasured ways during the interim. 
The complexities described above underscore the importance of a longitudinal 
perspective when considering the relationships among goal processes (van Geert, 
1997; King, et. aI., 1998). The temporal nature of goals and goal pursuit is clear in 
the data described here, as is the need for multiple measurements of goal and affective 
dimensions over time. Specifically, it seems clear that multiple measures of goal 
status may be required to adequately describe the adjustments and effects involved in 
successful and unsuccessful goal pursuit. 
This noted, the data presented here cannot be taken as supportive for the separation of 
goal progress and goal closeness estimates in terms of their relationship to mood. 
Closeness was no better a predictor of goal specific mood than goal progress ratings 
for goals of any timeframe. One initial possibility is that people are temporally bound 
in their awareness of longitudinal goal pursuit processes. If this is true, their mood 
ratings might be based on perceptions of progress without an appreciation for the 
larger timeframe within which a goal is being pursued, or the rate of progress that is 
needed (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998). This does however seem unlikely. 
Although individuals may well differ systematically in the degree to which their mood 
ratings are based on perceptions of progress, ideas about the amount of progress 
needed, or the static place in relation to the end state they wish to be, it is unlikely that 
people are not aware of anything other than the amount of progress they have made. 
Accepting this suggests that operationalising alternate measures of goal status such as 
closeness, requires more methodological precision than has been employed this far. 
In retrospect, the anchors for what was intended to be the closeness item in Study one 
(daily goals) for example, appear more likely to measure progress (see Appendix 4). 
Although the 'top' anchor, "completely achieved," (high closeness) would appear 
suitable, the 'bottom' anchor "no closer" which was supposed to represent low 
closeness, clearly is not. An examination of the anchors used in Study two reveals a 
similar problem. Again, the anchor -representing high closeness or proximity to the 
goal "almost completely achieved" appears adequate, while the anchor representing 
low closeness simply states "not very close at all." The difficulty with both these 
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anchors, and particularly the latter one, is that they are not relative to any particular 
stage of the goal pursuit process. This is a problem, given that the concept of 
closeness implies relativity, stretching at least a far as the last rating, and preferably to 
the beginning of the observations. Although subjects appear to have interpreted the 
item as desired (see below), future studies of this type should more carefully 
operationalise closeness, preferably implementing a closeness measure that has 
unambiguous and static anchors. 
Despite these problems however, the distinction between progress and 
closeness/proximity has clear theoretical and methodological import, and encourages 
some interesting questions. It would be interesting to know for example whether an 
individual who has almost achieved their goal, but who has not made recent progress, 
is likely to feel better or worse than a second individual who is not as close to 
completing their goal, but who is currently making high progress. Furthermore, we 
can wonder what degrees of progress, proximity, or combinations of the two are 
associated with a variety of mood states, and for which individuals. 
Carver and Scheier (1998) would argue that it is the rate of progress the person 
perceives themselves as making that will determine their affective response -
operationally, the rate at which subgoals are being attained. However, accessing and 
validly measuring a· multitude of highly abstract and inchoate subgoals regarding 
progress rates may prove problematic. Nonetheless, if a more precise measure of 
static goal proximity could be developed, it could potentially be used to assess both 
the degree of closeness and the rate of progress. Proximity could be assessed as a 
static measure, while the rate of progress could be derived through calculating the 
gradient of the closeness curve. 
In any event, goal closeness ratings, even when assessed in the comparatively 
primitive form employed here, nonetheless enabled the examination of some 
interesting effects. In the analysis presented above, participants who were generally 
getting closer to their goal across the three-month study showed few changes in either 
their goals or their affective responses' to them. Their goals remained of 
approximately the same level of importance, their goals seemed no more or less 
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difficult, and their mood steadily increased as they approached the goat21• In contrast, 
their less successful colleagues rated their goals as being progressively less important 
and increasingly difficult. Moreover, this latter group showed an interesting (if 
unproven) trend whereby changes in affective and goal dimensions occurred in 
tandem. In the small sample studied here, the subjects who were generally failing 
across the course of the study initially showed quite severe mood consequences to 
failure in the early stages of goal pursuit. Following the initial drop however, mood 
stabilised, and the importance of the goal immediately began to decline. 
Although speculative, it seems reasonable to perceive the beginnings of normative 
coping and regulatory processes in goal failure here. Consistent with the motivational 
model of affect described above, subjects could not avoid the initial affective 
consequences of goal failure, probably because the goals were too important to be 
immediately discarded. However, within a matter of weeks, subjects were able to 
adjust the goal itself and their mood consequently stabilised. To an extent, mood and 
goal importance appear to dance in intimate counterpoint during longitudinal goal 
failure processes. 
It has been suggested that goal importance constrains the consequences of goal 
success or failure, hence it is not surprising that goal importance is the key goal 
variable to bear the weight of failure. It appears as though most individuals cannot, or 
are unwilling, to tolerate the mood consequences associated with protracted periods of 
low progress-high importance, although this remains to be seen. Future research 
should look to examine how deliberate or unconscious changes in mood and 
importance are, and the extent to which they vary across or within individuals. As 
Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999) have noted "individuals may differ .. with regard to 
the extent to which they try to attain a goal and persist in goal-directed action in the 
face of difficulties" (p. 4). Moreover, in terms of the effects uncovered here, it would 
21 In fact, both mood and closeness ratings dropped sharply in the last time period. Exactly why this 
occurred remains unclear, although Carver & Scheier (1998) have suggested that goal attainment can 
paradoxically lead to negative affect. In their view, 'success' will only be positive, where other goals 
become available and where attainment of one goal slides smoothly into a sense of progress towards 
other goals. Alternately, it may be that people become more realistic regarding their closeness 
estimates as they get closer to a goal. People may have realised that more work remained than they had 
thought. Importantly however, their mood also dropped. 
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be interesting to know whether different people exhibit differential tendencies toward 
goal or mood adjustments during goal failures. 
Overall, the studies presented here provide a useful addition to our knowledge 
regarding the manner in which goals and emotional responding interact over time. 
Although the patterns of goal and affective responding described here are entirely 
based on self-report data, and the sample such that it is difficult to make 
generalisations with complete confidence, they nonetheless portray a remarkably 
consistent pattern of goal-affect interactions across a number of timeframes. While 
these studies do not provide the evidence needed to directly support the premises of 
cognitive theories of emotion, they are nonetheless consistent with this literature. 
Future research in this area should seek to extend an examination of goal-affect 
processes to discrete emotions and should employ more precise, and alternate, 
measurements for the key goal dimensions like importance (see e.g. Locke & Latham, 
1990). There is likewise a clear need to relate the data presented here to well-
recognised personality dimensions, to the content and form of different goals (cf. 
Higgins, 1987), and to measures of coping style. 
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Chapter 8.5 - Fleshing out the characterisation III: The functions of 
emotions 
Introduction: Being clear about function 
The definition of proper function may also be read 
as a theoretical definition of "purpose" 
Millikan (1993, p. 17) 
In considering function in contemporary emotion theory one is immediately struck by 
the sheer number of theorists describing their approach as a functionalist one (see e.g. 
Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). Most theorists seem to accept that 
emotions fulfil key functions (Frijda, 1994b), and functionalists attempt to explain 
phenomena through reference to the function or functions that they serve (Keltner & 
Gross, 1999). In contemporary emotion theory there is so much agreement on the 
importance of function to an understanding of emotion that some authors have 
suggested that "current approaches .. have converged on a functional perspective" 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b, p. 302; see also Barrett & Campos, 1987). 
Be this as it may, any apparent 'convergence' retains a number of difficulties, and 
some theorists are not so sanguine regarding the consideration of function in emotion 
theory. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992), Barrett and Campos (1987), as well as 
Ekman and Davidson (1994) have complained that the broad issue of function is 
somewhat neglected by emotion theorists (see also Scherer, 1982). The current 
dissertation would take this censure somewhat further, suggesting that not only is 
function neglected in general, but that true or original function is frequently ignored, 
obscured or confounded with a consequence that the terms function, functionalist, and 
functionalism are perpetually misused. 
For example, cultural relativists like Markus and Kitayama (1994) have suggested that 
"the functionalist sees emotion as an assortment of socially shared scripts" (p .. 5). 
According to them, emotions will only -be shared across cultures insofar as each 
culture shares common ecological conditions and prototypic models of social 
relationships. As such, they suggest that an understanding of function in emotions is 
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necessarily found at the cultural level. Even more perplexingly, other theorists have 
argued that "functionalism in emotion theory is concerned not with evolutionary 
survival value, but rather with the link between emotion and what a person is trying to 
do" (Campos, et. al., 1994, their itaZics)22. 
In considering such remarks, one is immediately struck by the discrepancy between 
the manner in which these theorists have described 'function,' and the more general 
use of the term in psychology. Although function in emotion theory is usefully 
described at a number of levels (see below), the most fundamental level of a 
functional analysis should remain that of evolutionary biology (e.g. Malatesta & 
Wilson, 1988). In fact, Parrott (1995) has suggested that it is evolutionary theory that 
is responsible for the incorporation of functionalist perspectives in emotion theory. 
Moreover, if we accept that emotions are adaptations to historically recurrent 
evolutionary challenges (cf. Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a; 
Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 1994a, 1999), then the function of them must initially be 
construed in terms of that challenge. According to Griffiths (1992), the function(s) of 
a thing are what the thing is for (see also Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992, p. 204). 
As such, the first question we should ask ourselves when considering the function of 
emotions is not "How does an emotion operate in its current contexts?" or "What 
functions does this emotion appear to serve?" but rather "Why was this emotion 
selected for in the first place - what is its original evolutionary purpose?" 
This emphasis is not intended to suggest that the manner in which emotions function 
and appear to serve functions within a particular culture, person, or context are not 
critical areas in emotions research. However, such 'functions' are not necessarily 
directly related to evolutionary function in themselves (Keltner & Gross, 1999). As 
was noted in Chapter 7, the identification of evolutionary function on the basis of the 
way in which a certain adaptation functions (abduction) is a complex process that 
22 The position adopted by Campos and colleagues provides a good example of the 'adaptiveness' view 
. of function (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). This view stresses the role of present contexts and the 
individual, and appears partly a reaction to the teleology implicit in the alternate 'adaptionistic' view 
emphasising past challenges. This author takes the latter adaptionistic view, but eschews the 
implication that adaptations like emotions were designed in order to meet challenges. More valid it 
seems, is to suggest that adaptations like emotions were selected because they met challenges. 
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requires an explicit consideration of the challenges that we have previously faced as a 
species (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988). 
To infer function without bearing the relationship between original function and 
subsequent functioning in mind is to ignore an extended history of selective pressures 
and shared evolutionary challenges that have shaped our makeup as a species (Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1990b, 1992). Moreover, in terms of explaining emotions, not only will 
such an approach tend to miss 'the point,' but in ignoring proper function will ignore 
data critical to any level of functional analysis. As Buss et. aI., (1998) note, the fact 
that a mechanism currently enhances fitness in a particular way, does not necessarily 
explain why the mechanism exists or (more to the point in the current case) how it is 
likely to be structured or operate. 
The importance-of proper or original function thus underscored, there is however no 
reason to suppose that emotions initially evolved in order to fulfil only one function. 
In this sense, searching for the function of an emotion may be erroneous (Averill, 
1994b; Clark & Watson, 1994), in that emotions may not have always existed as they 
do now.23 Likewise we should not presuppose that a given emotion, initially selected 
for a particular purpose, was not subsequently maintained on the basis of serving 
different or additional functions. As Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) note, 
"evolution is notoriously a "tinkerer" not a grand architect" (p. 204). Rather than 
create completely new structures, the process of evolution frequently appears to co-
opt existing capabilities within new adaptive systems. Finally, there is no particular 
reason to presuppose that every aspect of all emotions has a functional history or 
serves function, in that they may be either by-products or vestiges (Frijda, 1994b). 
In evolutionary psychology, acquired or co-opted 'functions' are sometimes described 
as exaptations, to distinguish them from the original adaptation (see e.g. Gould, 1991; 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, J998). Exaptations refer to 
mechanisms (such as components of emotions or emotions themselves) that are now 
useful to an organism in a role that differs from that which caused the original 
selection (Gould, 1991; see also Griffiths, 1992, p. 123-5). For example, it could be 
23 It is for this reason that theorising regarding function in emotions needs to develop to the point where 
we can theorise about individual components of discrete emotions. 
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argued that the baring of teeth characteristic to the facial expression of anger was not 
originally a social-communicative bluff (cf. Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), but rather a 
functionally adaptive behaviour that simply prepared the organism to bite. ill this 
sense, any communicative or bluff 'function' that anger expressions may currently 
serve, are later co-opted functions to the original function - an exaptation. 
ill addition to acquiring new functions, adaptive mechanisms occasionally produce 
effects that have little or nothing to do with the reasons why the mechanism was 
selected in the first place. Merely because an effect exists is insufficient reason to 
presuppose that the effect represents function (see Frijda, 1994b). The whiteness of 
bones for example, is a by-product of their containing large amounts of calcium, 
which was presumably selected for on the basis of its strength rather than its 
whiteness. ill emotion, the facial flushing associated with anger (Izard, 1991) may not 
constitute function, but may represent a by-product of the arousal or action readiness 
changes associated with anger. Even where this aspect of the anger response later 
acquires utility in a communicative sense (exaptative function), flushing will never be 
the original function of anger. 
Although the details of the evolutionary frameworks used to consider function are 
beyond the scope of this chapter, the discussion above does suggest that emotion 
theory could substantially benefit from incorporating some of the distinctions 
contained within this literature. Broadly speaking, three points have been made. 
Initially, it has been suggested that emotion theorists need to be more careful in their 
use of terminologies in considering function and what it means (Ekman & Davidson, 
1994). The term 'function' should not be used as a catchall phrase as it contains a 
number of implicit assertions regarding explanation that should be frankly made and 
critically assessed. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that all levels of a functional analysis should be 
informed by an understanding of function. The simple reason for this is that the 
original function or purpose of an adaptation determines the basic form of the 
adaptive mechanism and thus the manner in which it functions. This does not mean 
that other levels of functional analysis are undesirable, rather that they should be as 
well informed as current understanding permits. Finally, we should not assume that 
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emotions necessarily serve a single function, or that merely because an effect or 
phenomenon can be observed that it necessarily has a function, or has anything to do 
with function. As a consequence of these concerns, the discussion uses the term 
'function' to denote the original evolutionary purpose of emotions, rather than the 
manner in which an emotion functions, or the functions they can be seen as serving. 
Levels in a functional analysis 
As was noted earlier, a functional analysis need not limit itself to a single level of 
description or explanation (Averill, 1994b; Keltner & Gross, 1999; see e.g. Keltner & 
Raidt, 1999 for a tiered analysis of social functions). While all analyses should 
ideally be informed through a consideration of proper function, function can 
nonetheless be profitably examined at multiple and complementary levels. The 
discussion below outlines the beginnings of a four-tiered conceptual analysis for 
function in respect of nine emotions (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust, 
embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt). 
The first level is the most global, and involves a description of function at the level of 
the emotion systems. Although, such a level may seem to conflict with the general 
'adaptation as a solution to a specific problem' framework described above, thi!\ 
author believes that it provides a useful heuristic device through which to 
contextualise emotions in a motivational theory of personality. Additionally. many 
previous functional analyses of emotions have occurred at this level (Leven~()n. 
1999). 
The second level outlines four interrelated types of function that can be used to more 
precisely examine function and the emotions. In considering function in the 
emotions, different theorists have typically emphasised what are herein termed 
communicative/social, informational, motivational, and developmental/organisational 
function. The section explores the possibility of a more discriminating approach to 
function, suggesting that the functions of each discrete emotion are likely to be made 
differentially manifest in different types of function. 
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The final section briefly describes two future analytic levels that may usefully build 
upon the first two. It suggests that to understand emotions properly, we must 
carefully develop functional theorising at the level of discrete emotions (Averill, 
1994b), and perhaps even consider the function of individual components of discrete 
emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Although space prevents the full application of 
such an analysis to all nine emotions, some examples are presented to underscore the 
potential of the approach. Finally, a model depicting four levels of functional analysis 
and their interactions is presented. 
Levell: A global or heuristic description of function for the emotions 
Although some authors have used the term 'functionalist' as a descriptive category for 
a particular type of emotion theory (see e.g. Griffin & Mascolo, 1998), a 
conceptualisation of function is nonetheless at the core of any theory of emotions 
(Averill, 1994b). While this author is of the opinion that functional analyses of 
emotion need to be undertaken at the level of discrete emotions (and perhaps even at 
that of components of discrete emotions), global functional descriptions are 
nonetheless important in a communicative sense. A broad understanding of the 
purported function of emotions in a given theory provides a working characterisation 
of each author's explanatory framework and enables the reader to gain a feel for the 
writer's emphasis. 
Frijda and colleagues for example have long considered the function of emotion to 
involve preparing the organism to 'engage or not engage' in interaction with the 
environment (see e.g. Frijda, 1986, 1993b; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). In this view, 
emotions have two broad functions. They function to signal events that are relevant 
to the individual's concerns and motivate behaviour to deal with them (Frijda, 1994b). 
While Frijda's enduring emphasis on 'action tendencies' distinguishes his approach 
from those of other theorists, he shares with them the notion that the function of 
emotions is to mediate between stimulus and response, creating flexibility in the 
response system. Many theorists appear to consider such an approach to constitute 
the best broad level description of function in emotion. 
330 
The so-called 'functional-cognitive' theorists similarly view emotions as a flexible 
system that mediates between environmental stimulation and response (Ellsworth & 
Smith, 1988b; Campos, et. al., 1994; Scherer, 1994b). According to them, emotions 
arise in situations that combine an objective event or situation with the person's goals, 
and prepare or motivate the person to respond. The basic idea is that emotions are 
integral to person-environment transactions (Jenkins, Oatley, & Stein, 1998) in that 
they function to decouple stimulus and response (Scherer, 1984). Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley (1992) suggest that "the function of emotions is to fill the gap between fixed 
action patterns and impeccable rationality" (1992, p. 206, see also Scherer, 1994b for 
a similar comment). Scherer (1982) suggests that this 'decoupling' is adaptive in that 
it increases the flexibility of behaviour and allows for a continuous re-evaluation of 
the stimuli and response. 
While it is frequently an argument by implication, other theorists have suggested that 
the emotions have predominantly interpersonal or social functions (e.g. Averill, 1982; 
Harre, 1986; Armon-Jones, 1986; Campos, et. al., 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). In 
this view, emotions are inherently social in origin and consequently, it is reasoned, in 
function or purpose. Parkinson (1997), for example, suggests that emotions are a 
means of communicating an evaluation and interpretation as well as a way of directly 
influencing the relative social relations in a situation (see also Scherer, 1982; Izard, 
1991, p. 5). 
Finally, differential emotions theorists like Izard (1991) and Malatesta (e.g. Malatesta 
& Wilson, 1988) following Tomkins (1962, 1963) have suggested that the function of 
emotions are to be found in their relationships with motivational and developmental 
processes. Izard and Malatesta (1987) for example suggest that emotions function as 
the primary motivators/organisers of behaviour and cognition, with additional 
functions being served in development. According to Malatesta and Wilson (1988) 
emotions comprise a key part of an adaptive system that serves species survival. At 
least one aspect of this adaptation was to ensure social bonding between the mother 
and the infant (Izard, 1991). 
Following these authors, the conceptualisation being developed here suggests that the 
general adaptive function of emotions is to inform, motivate, and organise an 
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organism's responses to the perception of a change in goal-environment relationships. 
Unlike most previous theory however, the conceptualisation presented here suggests 
that emotions achieve this general adaptive function in two complementary 
timeframes (cf. Averill, 1994b). In each microdevelopmental instance, emotions help 
orient the organism to significant events as well as motivating and organising their 
behaviour in respect of the eliciting stimulus. Such a description appears to represent 
the type of function that many functionalists see emotions as serving. 
In addition however, I believe a persuasive case has been made (see Chapter 5) to 
suggest that a key function of emotions may relate to the manner in which they are 
involved in learning and personality development - a parallel macrodevelopmental 
function. While the limits of space prevent full consideration of this comparatively 
speculative idea, there does not seem to be a significant problem in supposing that 
emotions may serve parallel functions across two interacting timeframes. If one 
wanted to ascribe a single function to the emotions or to a single emotion this 'two 
birds' strategy would obviously be problematic. However, this is not the case here. 
As noted, there· is no particular reason to suppose that all emotions were selected in 
evolution in order to serve only one or the same adaptive function. 
Nonetheless, having remembered the importance of proper function described above, 
a critic could be forgiven for wondering if the current author is not attempting to have 
it both ways. If an understanding of proper function is so important, why then does 
the current author not base his theorising upon an understanding of proper function. 
My 'defense' to this potential challenge is twofold. Firstly, this discussion is not, and 
was never intended to be a pioneering exploration of function in emotion. While I do 
not believe that we currently possess either the knowledge or the methodologies we 
would need to comprehensively understand proper function for the discrete emotions, 
theorists should nonetheless incorporate proper function insofar as we currently 
understand it. This has been accomplished here. 
Secondly, there is no reason to suppose that emotions were selected in order to serve a 
single function. Our knowledge is such that it is difficult to know whether the 
hypothesised developmental mechanism is the original adaptation, an epiphenomenal 
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result that later was selected for (an exaptation), a simple by-product or a vestige. 
Only continued theoretical developments and suitably informed empirical work will 
answer the questions raised in this. 
Level II: Four types of function 
A critical impediment to functional explanations of emotion is the implicit assumption 
that all emotions may have the same function (Averill, 1994b). Averill (1994b) 
suggests that asking whether all emotions serve the same function is like asking 
whether all thoughts serve the same function, a question he rightly argues is simply 
too broad to allow a meaningful answer. Although emotions can usefully be thought 
of as functioning "to rearrange the priorities of goals" (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; p. 
60), is the true function to shift goals or to escape danger (Averill, 1994b)? To 
understand function it appears that each emotion must be analysed in its own right. 
However, moving from a heuristic level analysis of function like that above to a 
discrete level analysis is not as simple a matter as it might first appear. In fact, the 
transition is very awkward. On the one hand, if we analyse discrete emotions in the 
absence of a global or unifying analysis, we risk losing sight of the fact that the 
emotions are a group of related adaptations. On the other hand, if we decide to use 
the two levels simultaneously we are confronted with a very real difficulty in 
synthesising the levels of analysis. 
The pnmary problem in translating across these particular levels of functional 
analysis lies in what each level represents. A global description of function for the 
emotions is more accurately considered a 'conceptual shorthand' than it is an actual 
explanation of proper function. In contrast, discrete emotions are thought to possess 
and be explainable through reference to proper function. Hypothetically, each 
emotion has been selected for its utility in meeting a particular adaptive challenge - a 
particular purpose or function. The problem then is in attempting to reconcile an 
explanatory account of function for a discrete emotion or component with a 
conceptual framework used to describe the function for all emotions. In· 
reconciliation, any particular detail regarding a discrete emotion may well be 
'incorrect,' and the theorist may be forced to ignore contrary data or to manufacture 
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similarities where in fact none exists. More broadly, given that some aspects of 
emotions may well be extrinsic to the function of the emotion in question (Frijda, 
1994b), how do we decide which parts are of greater or lesser importance, and to 
which emotions? 
Given the difficulties that arise when attempting to denote the relationships between 
these two levels, the analysis presented here suggests that we should use a 'bridging' 
concept or analytic level - a typology of function. While discrete emotions are 
presumed to have arisen to meet discrete types of evolutionary challenges, and thus 
have distinct functions and functioning, considering types of function provides a 
conceptual bridge between global and discrete level analyses. 
Below, four types of function are discussed as categories for organising theory 
regarding the functions of discrete emotions. The categories are not necessarily 
functions in themselves, although they may be. In general, they are better thought of 
as a typology of function or the domains in which the functions of discrete emotions 
are differentially manifest. As will become clear, the categories offered here are not 
themselves completely discrete in that certain elements of each function type overlap 
with others for some emotions. I have used four categories, but a different theorist 
might prefer more or fewer categories. 
Infonnational Functions24 
Given the importance of cognitive approaches to emotion, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that emotions are thought by many to serve a critical function in infonning the 
organism of goal-relevant environmental change (e.g. Schwartz & Clore, 1988; 
Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Schwartz, 1990; Clore & Parrott, 1991; Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1992; Clore, 1994c). Clore (l994c) for example suggests that a primary 
function of emotion is to provide infonnation about how a situation has been 
appraised. This infonnation is conveyed internally by experience (see Chapter 4) and 
24 Some theories have tended to emphasise the value of emotion signals in informing conspecifics. 
However more recent theory places equal emphasis on the function of emotion in informing the self 
(Malatesta & Wilson, 1988). The current dissertation uses the term 'informational function' to denote 
the function of emotion serves in informing the self as to relevant environmental change. Social or 
communicative functions of emotions are considered within a different category. 
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serves as data for judgement and decision making. A similar point is made by Oatley 
and Larocque (1995) who suggest that emotions sometimes provide the first 
indication that something has gone wrong. 
Frijda (1994b) offers a similar conceptualisation of emotion-as-inforrnation, 
suggesting that emotions can be seen as a key mechanism whereby the organism 
signals to its cognitive and action systems that events are relevant. According to him 
then, affects are signals that indicate the relationship between the desired state of 
affairs and the current state. He describes this function of emotions as being one of 
'relevance signaling,' a function described by Scherer (1994b) as one of 'relevance 
detection,' and by Malatesta and Wilson (1988) as a 'signaling system.' Overall, there 
appears to be a high level of agreement across theorists regarding the functions of 
emotion in informing an organism of relevant environmental events (Ekman & 
Davidson, 1994). 
Motivational Functions 
Motivational functions appear likewise central to the functional analysis of emotions. 
Although theorists vary in the degree to which they emphasise the motivational 
aspects of function, many have proposed that a key function of emotions is to prime 
particular action tendencies (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). According to Frijda (1994b) 
emotions act as a motivator for the behaviour that is meant to deal with the event the 
emotion has signaled as relevant (see above). Scherer (1982, 1994b) is somewhat less 
explicit in emphasising motivation, but nonetheless suggests that the emotions 
physiologically and psychologically prepare the organism for action appropriate for 
dealing with the relevant stimuli. According to Oatley and Larocque (1995), each 
emotion functions to bring into readiness a suite or repertoire of stored plans and 
action types. 
Of the function types considered here, motivational function appears to be that which 
has historically been the most explicit and sensible in its incorporation of evolutionary 
reasoning (see e.g. Plutchik, 1980, 1991; Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Buck, 1991; 
Izard, 1991). Frijda (1994b) for example, argues that emotions are the proximate 
source of motivation for adaptive behaviours. "What" he asks, "does "survival" mean 
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to the individual besides the distress of pain or the horror at the idea of death?" (p. 
118). Following Tomkins (1962, 1963), Izard (1991) is similarly explicit in 
emphasising the importance of a motivational function for emotions. According to 
him, emotions represent the primary motivational system. For these theorists, a large 
part of the adaptive function of emotions is achieved through the manner in which 
they motivate goal-directed behaviours. 
However, not all theorists consider emotion and motivation to be suitable bedfellows. 
Brehm (1999) for example asks, "How can one think that emotions are motivational 
states, when there are several, sadness being one example, that produce overt 
passivity, rather than activity" (p. 4). It should be admitted that sadness is sometimes 
seen as a problematic emotion for a functional theory that supposes emotions are 
necessarily motivational. After all, sadness appears to be a comparatively 
amotivational state. However sadness may still be 'motivational' in that it motivates 
the organism to cease directing effort towards a lost goal (see below). The passivity 
induced by sadness may thus 'save energy,' allow meaning change to take place 
(Frijda, 1994b), or motivate the organism to introspect and rearrange goal 
commitments (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; see Chapter 7). 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in arguing that all emotions are motivating, some 
theorists have argued that emotions are motivational both in experience and in the 
anticipation of certain states and experiences25 . Frijda (1994b) following Averill 
(1968), suggests that emotions can be motivational via their anticipation (see also 
Averill, 1994b). Although Frijda's (1994b) discussion focuses on explaining how 
sadness fits within a motivational approach to function (incipient sadness motivating 
efforts to prevent a potential loss), a more general comment would be to note that 
emotions motivate behaviour both through their anticipation and in situ. Shame and 
guilt for example, serve as social regulators by motivating certain pro-social 
behaviours that prevent their occurrence (Frijda, 1994b). Finally, it is of note that the 
behaviours motivated by emotions are not thought to be a simple approach-
withdrawal dynamic as implied by some theorists (e.g. Lang, 1994; Russell, & 
25 The interplay between general conceptualisations and specific functions evident here provides a nice 
illustration of how different levels of a functional analysis can inform, complement, and (thUS) 
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Feldmann-Barrett, 1999). Rather, the behaviours engendered by different emotions 
are qualitatively distinct, commensurate with the function of the discrete emotion, and 
for primary emotions systems constitute an innate part of the emotion systems (see 
Chapter 8.7). 
Communicative/social functions 
In many theories the emotions serve critical social functions, often although not 
necessarily, through the facial, verbal, vocal or postural communication of the 
particular emotion (see e.g. Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Below, 
communicative functions are described as being one of three types, a regulative-
informative function, an intention-signaling function, and a group-coordination 
function. 
According to some authors, emotional displays indicate to social others that a 
particular event has emotional potential or content (Levenson, 1994a; Buck, 1999). In 
this view, the display of an emotion such as fear indicates the likely presence of 
something to be frightened of and so forth. As such, displays and the communication 
of the emotions are thought to be functional in that they inform social others of 
potential dangers (Levenson, 1994a), social infringements (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), 
and more generally impart the emotional value of events and objects, thus 
contributing to the acquisition of shared values. Within large groups, expressed 
emotion informs the individual whether their behaviour conforms to group norms, and 
help to define an their position within societal structures. 
In Plutchik's (1980, 1982) theory, an important social function of emotions is to 
communicate information to others about one's intentions, internal states (see also 
Izard, 1991), and probable courses of action, typically expressed in communicative 
facial displays (see also Levenson, 1994a; Jakobs, et. aI., 1999). Scherer (1982; 
1994b) likewise indicates a function for the communication of states, reactions and 
intentions to the social surround, his analysis emphasising the function of emotion in 
signaling behavioural intention. Given the importance of deceptive capacities to 
mutually develop one another. Weaknesses at one level of explanation necessitate developments at 
another which, in turn, produce development at the originally weaker level (see Figure 8.2). 
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human fitness, describing exactly how or why signaling intention would be functional 
for the individual remains understandably unelaborated in most theories, although 
Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) have suggested that emotions enable social species 
to coordinate adaptive behaviour. 
While acknowledging that some emotions have critical social functions, the analysis 
presented here questions the viability of general 'explanations' derived from this, or 
any other, single aspect of an emotion or emotions, particularly when applied to all 
emotions. Too often theorists begin with a certain effect or purported function that 
they have observed in association with a particular emotion in a particular context or 
contexts, and on this basis attempt to construct an explanatory model of function in 
emotions generally. 
In implicitly treating one possible aspect of function for one or some emotions as a 
'conceptual touchstone,' these models often ignore critical aspects of theory 
construction and testing processes. They must often discount or ignore data and 
theory from other levels of analysis, and are forced to create artificial explanations at 
the other levels. Although this criticism is a general consideration, it is clearly a 
problem for the models that overemphasise communicative/social functions of 
emotion. In stressing, for example, the function of emotions in communicating 
intentions to social others, the model subsequently labours to create complementary 
explanations at the broader and more specific levels of functional analysis. 
When moving to a broader functional description, an 'intention signaling' analysis 
struggles to adequately describe how this might occur for all emotions. If we examine 
the emergence of emotions and the ability to infer mental states across species and 
human development, the primary emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and 
disgust appear prior to any ability to infer mental states. If this is the case, then at 
least these five emotions are likely to have arisen in our phylogenetic history 
considerably earlier than our ability to infer intention. Consequently, primary 
emotions were successfully meeting adaptive challenges (fulfilling function) at a time 
when our phylogenetic ancestors were incapable of attributing mental or motivational 
states to other organisms. This inconsistency indicates that an adequate explanation 
of proper function is unlikely to necessarily involve the communication of intention to 
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others26. Likewise, when moving to a more precise functional account of discrete 
emotions an 'intention signaling' model has difficulty explaining emotions that have 
few known expressive characteristics (e.g. shame or guilt). 
Overall there appears a fair degree of agreement across theorists that emotions serve 
key communicative or social functions. Although the analysis presented above has 
suggested that these aspects of emotion are unlikely to constitute the function for all 
emotions (see Frijda, 1986; p. 60), some emotions certainly seem to have essentially 
social or communicative functions. The emotions of embarrassment, shame, guilt, 
and pride for example appear predominantly social in origin and function. These 
emotions would seem to have little relevance outside of a social context. Yet merely 
because some emotions appear to serve social functions, or because emotions are 
currently elicited by social stimuli, we should not suppose that all of them were 
selected or constituted for this reason. Such may be the case for some emotions, but 
not necessarily, and certainly not for all emotions. 
Developmental/Organisational Functions 
Finally, many theorists believe that emotions serve what IS termed a 
developmental/organisational function. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) for example 
suggest that emotions permit reconciliations between concurrently active goals, 
including mutually exclusive ones. According to them, emotions operate in real time 
to redistribute cognitive resources and manage goal priorities (see also Oatley, 1992, 
p. 36). Levenson (1994a) makes a similar point when he suggests that the essential 
function of emotion is organisation. In his view, the primary function of emotions is 
to organise or coordinate response systems (see also Levenson, 1999). He suggests 
that the emotions shift behavioural hierarchies, recruit physiological support, and 
occasionally act to short circuit cumbersome cognitive processing in situations where 
hesitation could prove fatal. 
26 That we can infer and attribute motivational or emotional states to social others is an important 
adaptation, but not one that describes the function of the emotions themselves. As Tooby and 
Cosrnides (1990b) note, the value of providing or obscuring emotional information will depend on the 
situation, which is partially defined by who is present. More likely if anything, is that emotions might 
have been selected in order to communicate the likelihood of specific behaviours (see Chapter 8.7). 
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In the theory presented here, emotions serve a critical developmental or organisational 
function simultaneously across two complementary time frames. In real or 
micro developmental time, each occasion in which a particular goal-environment 
relationship is appraised produces a discrete emotional state (see Chapter 8.4). As an 
innate part of these response processes, an emotion creates a new attractor for a 
response commensurate with the indicated relationship. So for example when a 
relationship of 'threat' is appraised, the emotion of fear results and creates an attractor 
for the behaviour of the organism, typically one involving their moving away from the 
threat. 
This assertion is similar to that made by Ortony et. aI. (1988) who suggest that many 
of the goals people have are constructed as and when needed. In both their and the 
current theory, these 'goals,27 are assumed to result from the interactions between 
goal-relevant emotional processes and relatively specific local considerations. It is 
likewise similar to Levenson's (1994a) notion of emotion as shifting behavioural 
hierarchies, although the current theory sees no reason that the emergent response or 
behaviour has necessarily been enacted previously. Rather, a behavioural attractor 
emerges in situ, as a function of the emotion, the eliciting motive and its interactions 
with other motivations and the situation. 
Additionally, the model presented here suggests that emotions serve an important 
developmental or organisational function across macrodevelopment. As noted above, 
most theorists have implicitly considered emotions as serving achieving functions in 
microdevelopment (although see Averill, 1994b). This seems a reasonable place to 
begin the consideration of emotions and function, but we should remember that a 
mechanism need not necessarily or only achieve function in an immediate sense. 
So as well as organising the individual's response at each microdevelopmental 
juncture, emotions also function as a macrodevelopmental learning mechanism by 
which the individual intemalises the relationships between goals and environmental 
stimuli - the process of personality development (cf. Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 
1971, 1991: Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Malatesta, et. aI.,· 1989). Across life 
27 See Killeen (e.g. 1989, 1992) for a discussion of the relationships between goals and behaviour in a 
dynamic systems framework. 
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development, repeated microdevelopmental responses are internally instantiated in a 
progressively more elaborate motivational state space. As discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6, the state space can be taken as representing an idiographic conglomeration of 
emotion-indicated goal-environment relationships28. Although this action is unlikely 
to represent an original function for emotions, what may have initially been an effect 
could well be maintained as achieving this end. 
Levels III and IV: The functions of discrete emotions and the components of emotions 
Many authors appear to explicitly (e.g. Izard, 1971m 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990b, 1992; Averill, 1994b) or implicitly (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992) deem 
discrete emotions the most useful level for the functional analysis of emotions. This 
emphasis seems well placed given that discrete emotions are thought to have been 
selected in evolution on the basis of their meeting a particular class of adaptive 
challenge (see above). 
There are however few functional analyses of discrete emotions (although see 
Plutchik, 1980; Lazarus, 1991a; Izard, 1991). More often, functional theorising at the 
level of discrete emotions occurs in a relatively ad hoc manner, with theorists limiting 
their analysis to a single emotion (e.g. Averill, 1968, 1982; Isen, 1993; Isen, et. aI., 
1998). A notable exception is Izard's (1971, 1991, 1993) differential emotions 
theory. In his latest book (Izard, 1991), he devotes entire chapters to the 
consideration of the ten emotions his differential theory addresses (joy, surprise, 
sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame, guilt, shyness). While the details of 
his comprehensive and mature conceptualisation of function and emotion is beyond 
the scope of this discussion, suffice to say that the product of a rigorous functional 
analysis at the level of discrete emotions speaks for itself. A further example is the 
treatment of discrete emotions by Malatesta and Wilson (1988). In their functional 
analysis, the discrete emotions serve particular 'communicative' functions at two 
complementary levels - within the self and within the social surround (see also Barrett 
& Campos, 1987; Clore, 1994c). 
28 In some senses, the function being described here is involved in the creation of an internal analogue 
of the world and the self that other theorists might wish to call an internal working model. 
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There is also good reason to suspect that components of emotions may in fact serve 
different functions (Keltner & Gross, 1999) for different emotions. So for example, 
the facial expression of an emotion like sadness may serve a different function from 
either the cognitive or motivational changes associated with it. If distinct functions 
exist for the components of a sadness response, then the function of the facial 
expression, typically purported to be to elicit assistance or social support (e.g. Izard, 
1991; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), may be distinct from the function of the motivational 
changes associated with sadness (see Chapter 6). 
Although any different functions for the components of an emotional response might 
conflict with one another, it seems more likely that the individual functions served by 
the different components of a discrete emotion complement one another, co-
operatively and interactively enabling the organism to respond appropriately to the 
stimulus. One possibility is that the different components of an emotion may serve 
co-operative functions across different timeframes. The facial expression of shame 
(Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996) for example may serve a comparatively 
immediate function, instantly communicating to social others that we know we have 
erred (e.g. Frijda, 1993a; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Einstein & Lanning, 1998). In 
contrast, the function of shame experiences appears to be more longitudinal. 
functioning to motivate the avoidance of certain acts or situations and the acquisition 
of the skills and attributes needed to redress inadequacies. 
Nonetheless, and however likely, the assertion that components of emotions sen e 
interactively supportive functions, should not be taken as necessarily true. While the 
adoption of such a premise may well improve our knowledge of function in emotion .... 
a great deal of theory and research are clearly needed. Even so, I am of the opinion 
that considering the components of emotions as potentially serving specific functions 
adds a much-needed element of complexity to our explanations for the functions of 
emotions. Within each emotion, we need not assume that all components of an 
emotional response are serving only one or the same function. Nor need we assume 
that a particular type of function is equally relevant to each emotion, or that the same 
component of the discrete emotions is serving the same function in every case. 
Finally, theorising at the very level of individual components has the potential to help 
342 
reduce the tendency for emotion theorists to unnecessarily generalise across emotions, 
function types, or components (see below). 
To this point, the discussion has spent a considerable amount of time arguing that 
emotion theory needs to develop functional theorising at the level of discrete emotions 
and the components of discrete emotions. Having made this point, it would seem 
appropriate to present a functional analysis of the nine emotions included in this 
theory and their components. Unfortunately, this is not possible for a number of 
reasons. Initially, it can be noted that neither the data, nor the conceptual consensus 
that would be needed for such an analysis are available. More salient however is the 
size of the undertaking described above. To adequately consider the functions of 
discrete emotions and the components of discrete emotions is no less than a Herculean 
task. Hence, while necessary and important it is beyond the focus of this dissertation. 
1\ 
1 \ 
1 \ 
I \ 
1 \ 
1 \ 
1 Heuristic, descriptive \ 
1 or global functional \ 
conceptualisation of emotions 
I \ 
1 \ 
Domains in which function manifests 
communicative/social 
motivation 
informative 
developmental/organisational 
\ 
1 Functions for the discrete emotions \ 
1 _______________________________ \ 
I Functions for the components of discrete emotions \ 
I (e,g, facial displays, neural pathways, concomitant and consequent \ 
I cognitive change, arousal and physiological change, action tendencies, \ 
I::: 
0 
'P 
u 
;:::I 
"0 
<1.l p:: 
0;; 
U 
'5h 
0 
'0 
"0 
0 
..c:: 
d) 
:::E 
conscious emotional experience) 
1 \ 
---------------------
Figure 8.5 - A conceptual pyramid describing four interacting levels of functional 
analysis for the emotions 
.0 
'u 
t;:::: 
Ti 
<1.l 
0.. 
U) 
C 
0 
~ 
I::: 
oj 
0.. 
~ 
i:I.l 
"0 
<1.l 
ell 
oj 
<1.l 
..... 
U 
I::: 
...... 
343 
Figure 8.5 shows the four levels of functional analysis combined within a single 
model. The 'top' level (1) is the level of functional analysis most common within 
contemporary emotion theory. It describes function or functions for the emotions as a 
group. This level is most accurately thought of as representing a descriptive/heuristic 
device or conceptual shorthand, rather than a true explanatory level. As indicated by 
the arrow to the right, explanations deriving from this level are lacking in specificity. 
The second level (2) denotes a level of functional analysis considering the domains in 
which function is made manifest. As noted earlier, different emotions tend to be 
made differentially manifest in particular domains of activity, depending on the 
function of each (3). This latter level of analysis is the focus of level three (3). The 
final level (4) is the most speculative of the pyramid addressing the possibility that 
particular components of discrete emotions have their own functions. 
Although the depiction of the model may tend to suggest it, the model is not a literal 
hierarchy. As indicated by the arrows around the outside of the pyramid, a particular 
level of functional analysis can be thought of as complementing and informing the 
other three levels of analysis, as well as being complemented and informed by them. 
Different theorists typically have their own preferences for where to begin examining 
function in the emotions, this author's being for the level of discrete emotions (3). 
Such a choice however is merely that, a choice. Each level in the analytic scheme 
presented has its own strengths and weaknesses, and contributes to development of 
functional explanations at the other three levels. Finally, the comparative size of each 
level can be taken as a rough indication of how much theoretical and empirical work 
remains to be conducted at each. 
Concluding remarks on functions in emotions 
If anything has been made clear in the analysis presented, it is that the functional 
approach to emotions is at once necessary, widespread, and (in places) dangerously 
underdeveloped. One can say with some confidence that emotions are no longer 
typically contrasted with reason (Keltner & Gross, 1999). Instead, emotions are 
thought to serve important functions in most, but not all instances (Forgas & Vargas, 
1998). This is an important development for emotion theory, as an understanding of 
function appears critical to an understanding of the emotions. Although there is 
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considerable diversity in the functions that different authors ascribe to emotions, there 
IS consensus insofar as a functionalist approach is seen as both necessary and 
desirable. 
However, the discussion has also suggested that contemporary emotion theory suffers 
somewhat from the way in which it has and continues to use 'functional' 
explanations. It has been argued that we should be far more careful in our 
consideration and use of the term 'function.' More specifically, it has been suggested 
that we should not treat any particular level of a functional analysis as if it were a 
sufficient explanation for all aspects of all emotions. In tacitly assuming this stance, 
emotion theory is weakened in that it typically directs the theory construction process 
from one or two levels of function alone (see Figure 8.2). Sometimes a theorist seems 
to begin with a certain heuristic-level function for the emotions in general and then 
attempts to fit multiple discrete emotions within this framework (Levenson, 1999). 
Levenson (1999) describes this as a "one-size-fits-all" (p. 493) approach to function. 
In this approach, broad assumptions and preferences for a general conceptualisation 
are unambiguously embraced, and unnecessary trouble is then necessarily taken to 
'force' all other emotions and aspects of emotions to fit. 
In other instances an examination of the functions of a set of discrete emotions is 
weakened because little more than a superficial attempt is made to link the purported 
functions to a broader conceptualisation of all emotions. The result of this practice is 
that several different functional accounts for several different emotions are created29, 
rather than an account of emotions that explains all emotions simultaneously on 
multiple levels. Finally, theorists occasionally adopt a particular aspect of emotions 
(e.g. facial expression) or type of function (e.g. communication), treat it as some kind 
of sine qua non, and proceed to construct a theory for all emotions and all functions. 
In contrast to what appears a comparatively ad hoc approach, the analysis above has 
suggested that substantial benefits may accrue through a more careful and informed 
functional theorising. This theorising should occur simultaneously across different 
levels of functional explanation; generally, across functional domains, at the level of 
29 Levenson (1999) suggests that this is in fact what is needed in emotion theory. I disagree. 
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discrete emotions, and perhaps even at the level of components of emotions. My 
argument then, is that not only is each level of this functional analysis necessary to 
the adequate understanding of the others, but that each will ultimately support and 
help advance developments at the others. 
Chapter 8.6 - Fleshing out the characterisation IV: Systems and the 
relationships between the components of emotions 
Introduction 
We don't truly know how all this works 
Lazarus (1991a; p. 198) 
In the model presented here, emotions are characterised as a set of qualitatively 
distinct responses in which the key components typically occur as a set (see Chapter 
8.2). To this point however the nature of the relationships between the components of 
emotions has not been explicitly considered. Rather, the notion that they are innately 
connected in some way has simply been presented by implication. 
However, a conceptualisation of the relationships between the components of 
emotions inevitably lies at the core of any theory of emotions (M. Lewis, 1998b). As 
such, it is an issue that cannot and must not be avoided. Such a conceptualisation is 
related to matters of definition, to the issues involved in considering cognition-
emotion relationships, to matters of innateness, universality, and discreteness, and to 
the developmental and process/operation aspects of a theory of emotions. While each 
of these areas is important, the discussion below will focus on three particular aspects 
- the heritable or developed nature of component relationships, on how the 
components interact in emotion processes, and on emotional behaviour. 
To begin, the developmental relationships among components of emotions will be 
discussed. The two major approaches purporting to describe how the components of 
emotions are related across development are described. In briefly evaluating them, it 
will suggest that the available developmental, comparative, and cross-cultural 
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evidence is more consistent with the 'innate tie' than the 'emergent' position, but that 
conclusive findings are still missing. It is suggested that not all of the components of 
the nine emotions discussed here are as heritable or fixed as the others. Neither are 
the relationships between components necessarily as fixed for each emotion. 
The section will then consider the process and interactive aspects of the relationships 
between the components of emotions in emotion processes. Following the discussion 
of cognition-emotion relationships above, it is suggested that while emotional states 
necessarily follow particular appraisal patterns in each instance, that activation of any 
particular component of the emotions can and does influence subsequent activity 
within the other components. 
Finally, the section will present two studies investigating the relationships between 
felt emotions and overt behaviour. The study of emotion and behaviour has a history 
dating back to Darwin (1872), yet more recent psychological research has continued 
to focus on facial behaviour (e.g. Ekman, et. al., 1972; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 
1997) or felt action tendencies (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Frijda, et. aI., 1989), rather than on 
overt behaviour. A rationale for emotion-behaviour relationships is developed, two 
studies are presented, and a conceptualisation of the overt behaviour 'component' in 
emotions, and the role of emotions in generating adaptive behaviour is offered. It i~ 
argued that emotional responses, particularly those that are either primary or highly 
intense, interact with situational and personality variables to produce an emergl'lll. 
though evolutionarily based behaviour type that is identifiable across cultures. 
The components of emotions 
Before beginning the discussion, the reader should be gIven some idea as to the 
phenomena that are being described when the term 'component' is used. Although 
the number of, and name given to, components is a comparatively arbitrary affair, the 
relationships between the various aspects of emotions are discussed within four 
categories. 
Cognitive components - can be thought of as being antecedent (i.e. 
appraisals), concomitant, or consequent to the full emotional response. 
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Behavioural components - facial, postural, and vocal expression as well as 
bothfelt action tendencies and overt behaviour. 
Physiological components - can be thought of as being either central or 
peripheral 
Experiential components - within the current theory these are described as 
being either non-conscious/pre-reflective or conscious/reflective (see 
Chapter 7). 
Systems in emotions I: Development and the relationships between components 
While different theorists would no doubt carve the 'bits' of emotions in a manner 
differently to the manner in which I have done, arguing about the categories 
themselves would do little more than obscure a more fundamental disagreement 
regarding how the components are related. At root, the conflict concerns whether 
emotions are more validly considered discrete response 'packets' that are genetically 
hard-wired in the human system as suggested by Izard and Ekman, or whether the 
individual components of emotions become progressively connected across 
development as argued by Camras (see M. Lewis, 1998b for a recent discussion of the 
two views). 
The innate position is most clearly exemplified and well-developed by differential 
emotions theorists (DET) like Izard (e.g. 1971, 1991, 1994a, 1997) and Malatesta 
(e.g. Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991; see also Ekman, 1992, 
1994a, 1999). DET suggests that the connections between components for a limited 
number of emotions (basics) are hard-wired, innate, and universal (Izard, 1997). In 
this view, emotional experience and emotional expression are innately tied to 
emotion-specific neural processes (Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Ekman, 1994a). 
Functionally speaking, emotions and expressions are 'pre-adapted' due to their 
importance in caregiver relationships (Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Izard, 1994a), and 
because hard-wiring helps fast processing (Ackerman, et. aI., 1998). 
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In their view, the basic motivational/feeling state of an emotion and its relationship to 
expressive and neural components is invariant across development (Izard & 
Malatesta, 1987), with only the relationships between cognitive and emotional 
components (affective-cognitive structures) changing across development (see e.g. 
Izard, et. al., 1995). The basic emotions themselves however are modular systems 
(Ackerman, et. aI., 1998; Izard, et. al., in press), and comprise the least flexible 
elements of the personality sub-systems. The DET school suggests that the 
"contribution of innate structure and hardwiring to system assembly is greatest for a 
discrete emotion" (p. 4)30. DET acknowledges that expressions can be inhibited and 
are highly modifiable, but suggests that each discrete emotion nonetheless retains a 
genetically-based expression that can be taken as indicative of an emotions presence 
(Izard, 1997). 
However, not all emotion theorists accept the isomorphic or "innate tie" position 
advocated by DET (see e.g. Camras, 1988, 1991, 1992; Camras, et. aI, 1993; Fogel, 
et. aI., 1992). Disputing the notion of centrally directed development (see Chapter 5), 
these theorists have argued that an application of dynamical systems (DS) principles 
to emotional development offers a more viable framework for considering the 
connections between the components of emotions. 
In its more gentle formulations, the DS position suggests that there should be no a 
priori acceptance of an innate connection between emotional states and expressions 
(Camras, 1988). Perhaps facial expressions are not tied to emotions, or are only 
linked to relatively diffuse hedonic states (Michel, Camras, & Sullivan, 1992). 
Instead, the components of an emotion may initially develop in a comparatively 
independent fashion and only later become organised into the target emotions 
(Camras, 1994; Scherer, 1994c; Dickson, Fogel & Messinger, 1998; Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1998). 
It has also been suggested that emotions might better be regarded as self-organising 
systems (Fogel, Nwokah, Dedo, Messinger, Dickson, Matusov, & Holt, 1992). These 
30 At the time of writing, this chapter cited had not yet gone to press. Hence page references and quotes 
may vary slightly between the version used and the published copy. 
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authors argue that the development of emotions must inevitably reflect variations in 
the interactions between the components of emotion, all of which emerge through 
reciprocal constraints upon one another (see also Michel, et. al., 1992). While the 
interactions between these components have the potential to interactively create an 
extremely large set of states, it is suggested that mutually regulating subsystems (like 
those involved in emotions) have a tendency to settle into a finite number of generally 
stable patterns (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998). At some point 
in development a critical factor or control parameter (see Chapters 5 and 6) will 
emerge, driving the system through a comprehensive re-organisation or phase shift, 
and produce a new emotion (Camras, 1992). 
Exactly what these parameters might be remains poorly articulated in DS theory (see 
Chapter 5), although continued theoretical development may see improvements in this 
regard. hnportantly however, the DS view of development does not presuppose that 
the control parameters for development remain constant (Camras, 1991). Rather, it 
suggests that changes in cognitive, expressive, or motor development might catalyse 
comprehensive restructuring of the emotion systems. Moreover, the developmental 
story is not necessarily synchronous across emotions, but might differ for different 
emotions, depending on their particular affective, cognitive, and action components. 
Finally, the application of systems principles (i.e. the absence of a meta-processor), 
suggests that no components of emotion (including facial expression) should be 
recruited for an emotion episode unless they are specifically appropriate in the action 
context (Camras, 1988, 1991; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). In Camras' (1991) view, the 
'task' assembles both behaviour and expression (see also Mascolo & Harkins, 1998). 
Although Scherer's work is not primarily a developmental model, the principles of his 
theory are consistent with the theory described by Camras. His self-termed 
'componential patterning theory' (e.g. Scherer, 1994c) argues that the evidence is 
more consistent with the idea that there are universal 'response elements,' than with 
the idea of a limited number of universal response 'patterns'. He acknowledges that 
some combinations occur more frequently and normatively than others, and suggests 
that we term these modal rather than basic emotions. Panksepp (l994c) is similarly 
cautious in his ascription of innate connections among components of emotions. He 
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notes that only the general groundplans for brain connections are encoded within the 
genes, those that are present being comparatively indirect. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the best critiques of each position are found in the writings of 
the 'opposing' theorist. Below, the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are 
presented as they bear on empirical, interpretation or theoretical issues. Of course, no 
literal separation between these concerns is intended or possible, but rather is simply 
used to organise the literature. 
The first major concern relates to the availability of data to support or contradict 
either position. While a review of the infant expression literature is not possible here 
(see e.g. Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Carnras, 1992 for reviews), the data that have 
emerged are more consistent with DET than they are with the DS position. For 
example, a recent study of 88 infants found no cross sectional or within-subject 
developmental trends in the frequency of interest, joy, sadness, and anger expressions 
between 2.5 and 9 months (Izard, Fantauzzo, Castle, Haynes, & Slomine, 1995). 
In contrast, and while it may reflect little more than the relative maturity of each 
approach, DS approaches have been criticised for failing to provide directly 
supportive evidence (Izard, 1994a), particularly that suggesting that the morphology 
of the innate/universal expressions actually changes (Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991; 
although see Carnras, et. aI., 1993, 1996). However, a growing body of empirical 
work by DS theorists has examined interest (Michel, et. aI., 1992) and surprise 
(Carnras, Lambrecht, & Michel, 1996), the interpretation of which casts some doubt 
on the strong DET position, particularly in its methodological inferring of emotional 
states on the basis of facial action alone. 
Despite such criticism, the DS position itself has yet to provide an entirely convincing 
empirical demonstration of its tenets. A possible exception to this absence is the now-
classic study by Carnras of her infant daughter Justine. Carnras and colleagues found 
that distinct facial configurations were produced, but that these expressions were not 
associated with body actions differentiable to adults (Carnras, Sullivan, & Michel, 
1993). Furthermore, the infant would frequently cycle among the configurations 
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within a single bout of crying (see also Malatesta, 1981 for a DET discussion of 
innateness in vocalisation). 
Overall, Camras suggests that the empirical evidence is less consistent with the 
position taken by DET than its proponents suppose (Camras, 1994). As she notes, 
some situations are generally acknowledged to elicit particular emotions (as indexed 
by action responses), and yet the corresponding expression is not necessarily seen (see 
also Camras, 1991; Camras, et. aI., 1996). Furthermore, the supposedly 'discrete' 
expressions of emotions contain a high degree of in-category variability (Camras, in 
press). Finally, the expressions can be seen to occur in such a wide range of situations 
that they might more reasonably be interpreted as expressions of either (a) 
qualitatively undifferentiated 'distress' signals (Camras, 1992, 1994; Michel, et. aI., 
1992) or (b) coordinative motor structures that are available for a variety of purposes, 
not all of which must be emotional (see Carnras, in press). Camras interprets the 
infant expressive data as suggesting that the facial configurations emerge as 
synergistic expressions of states related, but not identical to, adult emotions. It is only 
during the course of development that these configurations are eventually associated 
with the adult emotions. 
As with Camras' argument, the DET reply (e.g. Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 19(1) 
suggests that this disagreement may rest on a matter of interpretation. They argue thaI 
the presence of cycles or alternations in infant facial display does not interfere \\ Ith 
their position,31 and suggest that expecting infants to manifest only one response to d 
situation imposes a standard we would not expect in an adult. Similarly, they argul' 
that the fact that an emotional expression appears 'inappropriate' to an adult does not 
mean the corresponding expression is not present. 
The two positions have spent surprisingly little time critiquing the theoretical 
assumptions of the other. Camras (1992) briefly notes that the 'invariant experience' 
assertion of DET is unfalsifiable by its very nature (see Chapter 6). DET theorists are 
similarly brief, only noting that the DS position undermines the adaptive value of 
emotions and emotion expressions, leaving too much room for pathology (Izard & 
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Malatesta, 1987) and critical miscommunications between caregiver and infant 
(Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991).32 However, it can also be noted that many DS 
approaches to development, including that of Camras (1988, 1991, 1992, 1994) in 
emotions, remain vague in their specification of control parameters (see Chapter 4), 
and struggle in comparison to discrete approaches (e.g. Ackerman, et. aI., 1998) to 
reconcile their view with a functionalist view of emotions. 
Concluding remarks on component relationships in development 
Overall, this author's sympathy rests with the proponents of DET, although I share 
some concerns regarding the unfalsifiable nature of DET's theoretical claims, 
particularly in its definition of emotions as necessarily involving a distinct expression 
and invariant experience (see Chapter 8.6). Nonetheless, the assertion that the 
relationships between the components of many emotions are genetically fixed (or at 
least prepared to link) appears more consistent with the available data, particularly 
that of a comparative (across species) and cross-cultural nature (see Chapter 8.7). 
Additionally, the position appears more viable within a functional perspective. 
Yet as appears common in matters of such complexity, the 'right' answer to the issue 
of component relationships may well lie somewhere in between the DET and DS 
positions (see e.g. M. Lewis, 1998b). The DET position does not preclude 
developmental or emergent processes (Izard & Malatesta, 1987), or suggest that 
having genetic determinants for emotions means that they have to in place or fully 
functional at birth (Izard, 1994a). Conversely, moderate DS approaches do not rule 
out the possibility of some pre-existing links between the components of emotions 
(see e.g. M. D. Lewis, 1997; Lewis & Granic, 1999; Chapter 5.4). 
In the theory presented here, the core cognitive, expressive, motivational, and 
physiological components of the nine emotional states discussed are considered 
heritable. However, it is difficult to know whether the relationships between the core 
31 More generally, following Chapter 8.4 it can be argued that emotional expressions, states, and 
experiences can change as rapidly as situation and response are reappraised. As such, cycles or 
alternations bear little relevance to the issue of component relationships. 
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components (whether emotional states develop) are as heavily fixed as suggested by 
DET (M. Lewis, 1998b). A possibility to be explored in future is that the 
relationships between components of emotions are not either fixed or emergent, but 
that they exhibit degrees of fixedness (or flexibility) depending on the emotion or 
component in question. DS theorists Marc Lewis and colleagues (e.g. M. D. Lewis, 
1997; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. D. Lewis & Granic, 1999) have argued that 
the relationships between components in dynamic systems like emotions need not be 
considered either completely fixed or flexible. Lewis and Douglas (1998) for 
example note that some aspects of their personality variable, called emotional 
interpretations (Els), are normative attractors. In this, the authors mean that the 
components of some Els cohere in roughly similar ways for most individuals (Lewis 
& Douglas, 1998; see Chapter 5). Others however, exist only for some individuals, 
and even normative attractors may vary across individuals as a function of heritable 
and emergent constraints. 
Following the discussion of function earlier, it is suggested that the relationships 
between the components of emotions may be constrained to greater or lesser degrees 
depending on the component and the emotion under scrutiny (Izard, et. aI, in press). 
Referring to emotions in a general sense, it is suggested that the relationships between 
the components of the five primary emotional states (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
and disgust) are lik~ly to be more constrained than are those between secondary 
emotions. 33 In particular, it is argued that at least four of the five emotions described 
as primary exhibit a more intimate relationship with overt behaviour than do the four 
secondaries studied (see Chapter 8.7 below). In DS terms, the systems that comprise 
these primary emotional states include an innate link to a particular type of 
behavioural attractor. 
In respect of particular components, it is suggested that the antecedent cognitive 
(appraisal) aspects of the emotion systems are innately fixed to a particular state level 
emotional response (see Chapter 8.4 and Figure 8.6 below). However, and with some 
minor innate constraints (see Chapter 7.6), it is also suggested that conscious 
32 Given that parents have relatively few cues to the internal state of an infant, an initial concordance 
between state and expression would seem a necessary prerequisite for effective signalling between 
infants and caregivers. 
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emotional experience is not genetically linked to the remaining components of 
emotions (e.g. Lewis & Michalson, 1983; M. Lewis, 1998b). Although the 'flavour' 
of conscious emotional experience is typically related to the motivational/action 
tendency component of emotional states, conscious emotional experience is typically 
a more complex, motivationally constructed variant on a state or series of states. So 
while conscious experiences often follow emotional states, they are also highly 
variable at a qualitative level (which states are not) between individuals and 
situations. 
Systems in emotions II: Feedback and feedforward 
During the discussion of cognition-emotion relationships it was noted that the 
interactions between these two aspects of human functioning did not occur in a single 
direction. While particular appraisals have been suggested as necessarily resulting in 
particular emotional states, components of the emotional states and their 
consequences almost certainly affect temporally later appraisals (Mascolo & Harkins, 
1998). 
In exarrumng the emotion literature, it is probably fair to say that more recent 
theorising regarding the relationships between both the components of emotions and 
the interactions between emotions and other organismic processes have tended to 
avoid unidirectional causal accounts (e.g. M. Lewis, et. al., 1984; Scherer, 1984, 
1994c; Lazarus, 1991a; although see Panksepp, 1994c). Instead they have 
emphasised non-linear, systemic relations between emotions and other processes, and 
between the components of emotions. The emerging view of emotions appears to one 
of them as ongoing processes rather than discrete or modular states. Scherer (e.g. 
1994c) for example, has recently defined emotions "as an episode, a time window, 
during which the different components get synchronised and desynchronised in a· 
highly differentiated fashion" (p. 27). In his view there exist multiple feedback and 
feedforward effects depending on the recursive evaluation of the situation. 
33 This might constitute a further reason to differentiate between primary and secondary emotions. 
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Richard Lazarus (e.g. Lazarus, 1991a), likewise acknowledges the reciprocal 
relationships between aspects of the emotions in an ongoing encounter or process. He 
suggests that "it is possible to imagine an arrangement of the components of an 
emotional process as relatively independent" (p. 196) that produce the appearance of 
an innate, organised and universal process. In this view, the emotion systems would 
be both highly structured, but complex and flexible. Each component might function 
and coordinate in a more flexible way while still following biological constraints (see 
also Frijda, 1986; p. 83). 
Finally, the description of emotions provided by DS theorists like Mascolo and 
Harkins (1998) likewise suggests that appraisal generates physiological (CNS and 
ANS) reactions and a concomitant feeling tone or experience. In their tum, these 
processes feedback, influencing the selection of feeling generating appraisals from a 
pool of competing goal relevant appraisals (see Chapter 6). They write, "even though 
event-appraisals participate in generating physiological changes and corresponding 
feeling tone, feeling tone functions to bring these appraisals into the psychological 
foreground, and the emotion process continues" (Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; p. 193). 
In this way, they suggest, appraisal, CNS and ANS activity, and experiential systems 
coact and mutually regulate one another in the formation and evolution of an 
emotional episode. 
While most of the investigations in component relationships have focussed on the 
relationships between cognition and emotion or between facial expressions, 
physiology, and feeling (see below), it is nonetheless generally concluded that the 
relationships between the components of emotion are not unidirectional. Although 
appraisal is still seen by most theorists as the entry-point to the emotions systems, it is 
accepted that current emotional states, including expressions, action tendencies, and 
physiological states influence one another as well as affecting appraisal. These 
interactions are presented in Figure 8.6 below. 
The figure displays this author's thinking regarding the manner in which the 
components involved in emotion processes interact. Central to the model is the notion 
that appraisal processes typically constitute the entry point to the emotions systems in 
that they directly activate emotional states. Likewise important is the notion that the 
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states thus engendered constitute biological givens with the relationships between the 
three key components (physiological, motivational, and expressive) substantially 
constrained by phylogeny and the function of the emotion in question. The figure 
depicts the components of emotional states as exerting an influence on conscious 
emotional experience and behaviour as a unit, rather than independently, a 
speculation that is further considered upon below. Finally, the figure also denotes two 
highly speculative interactions among emotion components - those between overt 
behaviour and emotional states and between overt behaviour and conscious emotional 
experience. 
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Figure 8.6 - The relationships between the components of discrete emotions (The 
solid line between appraisals and emotional states represents an inevitable 
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relationshiplinfluence that must occur in each instance, the dashed lines likely 
influences, and the dotted lines speculative/possible relationships). 
In considering the model somewhat further, a brief review of the literature on facial 
expression, physiological responding and felt emotion is first presented. Although the 
data from this area are both complex and equivocal, the area constitutes the most 
heavily researched domain of core component interactions (Malatesta, 1981). 
Consequently they represent an excellent opportunity to consider how component 
relationships may inform general conceptualisations of emotions (McIntosh, 1996), 
The data presented are then used as a lead-in to the consideration or what this author 
views as critical questions in component relationship research. Initially, the 
discussion focuses on whether the components of emotional states influence 
behaviour and conscious experience as a state-level unit or as individual components. 
Following this, some attention is devoted to the possible influences that overt 
behaviour may have on other components of the emotion process. Specifically, the 
possibility that overt expressive behaviours may exert a direct influence on conscious 
emotional experiences or emotional states independently of reappraisal processes is 
explored. Finally, some general directions for future research are given. 
Facial expressions and the generation/mediation of physiology and feeling 
Proponents of facial feedback theories claim that facial expressions of emotion have a 
causal role in the generation of emotional experience (McIntosh, 1996), a view 
supported by over 20 years of research (Izard et. aI, in press). This view can be traced 
back to those of James (1890) and Darwin (1872), and has been more recently revived 
by Tomkins (1962), Izard (1971), and Ekman (1972). More generally, this view 
suggests that emotion programs (innate discrete states) are of a nature such that 
activating one part of the response set stimulates the others. 
In support of this view, the results of many studies have indicated that voluntarily 
configuring the facial muscles associated with discrete emotional states elicits both 
feeling and physiological change (see Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997; McIntosh, 
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1996; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1997 for recent reviews). Duclos and colleagues 
(Duclos, Laird, Schneider, Sexter, Stern, & Van Lighten, 1989, cited in McIntosh, 
1996) for example had participants contract the facial muscles involved in fear, anger, 
sadness, and disgust, then rate their emotions. Although the effect did not hold for all 
emotions, ratings of fear were significantly higher following the utilisation of the fear 
musculature, with a similar effect occurring for anger experiences. Overall, Izard and 
Malatesta (1987) suggest that the evidence is "substantial, though not conclusive" (p. 
522) that the manipulation of facial behaviour contributes to emotional feelings. 
While there have been some substantial critiques of the methodologies typically 
employe~ in testing facial feedback hypotheses (see e.g. Fridlund, 1994; McIntosh, 
1996), paradigms that avoided potential confounds have nonetheless delivered 
supportive results. Zajonc, Murphy, and Inglehard (1989, cited in McIntosh, 1996) 
for example, had subjects produce an it (activating musculature associated with 
scowling/anger) or 0 (relaxed face) sound for one minute. They found that the it 
sound produced increased forehead temperature (an indicator of negative affect) and 
that the sound was liked less. Overall it seems that both openly and covertly 
manipulated facial configurations increase the associated emotional experience, 
providing some support for the feedback position. 
On the other side of the equation, feedback theories like DET also suggest that innate 
expressive behaviours are so important to emotions that the other aspects of emotion 
are diminished if the expression is inhibited or suppressed (e.g. Izard, 1971). 
However, in a manner reminiscent of Freud, other theorists have argued that rather 
than decrease the activity in other components, that expressive inhibition leads to 
increases in activity for the other components - the emotion finds other outlets (e.g. 
Polivy, 1998; Pennebaker & Susman, 1988). Given the implicit presence of this view 
in much of psychotherapeutic practice (see e.g. Singer, 1990), there have been 
surprisingly few studies, particularly those of an experimental nature, that have 
directly examined the changes that occur in which other aspects of which particular 
emotions when expression is consciously suppressed (Gross & Levenson, 1993; 
Levenson, 1994b, although see Notarius, 1982). 
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In two such experiments, Gross and Levenson (1993) randomly assigned subjects to 
either a 'suppression' or 'no-suppression' condition, with the suppression subjects 
instructed to "try to behave so that someone watching you would not know that you 
are feeling anything at all.,,34 They showed subjects a stimulus film (depicting a limb 
amputation) designed to elicit disgust. They found that suppression subjects were 
able to reduce the overall signs of visibly felt disgust in both face and body, although 
there was some 'leakage'. Consistent with a 'hydraulic' view of emotion component 
relationships, the suppression of expression was associated with significant increases 
in parasympathetic arousal as indexed by skin conductance, finger pulse amplitude, 
and heart rate35. Additionally, and in direct contrast to the DET position, inhibiting 
the facial expression of disgust had no effect on the subjective intensity of disgust 
expenences. 
A sister study by Gross and Levenson (1997) describes data that parallels those 
described by Gross and Levenson (1993) for the emotions of happiness and sadness. 
While the general aspects of component relationships discovered were similar to their 
earlier work, they failed to replicate the lack of experiential differences between 
suppression and non-suppression subjects for both the emotions studied. While 
inhibiting sadness expressions did not reduce felt sadness, the change in the level of 
amusement was significantly different for the two groups, with subjects who were 
suppressing expressed emotion experiencing the amusement eliciting film as 
significantly less amusing. 
On balance, the data from the component relationship research described above can 
be taken as more consistent with the assertions of feedback theories than not. This 
said, the data are not altogether supportive, and a more parsimonious interpretation of 
the data gathered thus far might be that while facial expressions probably cause 
activation in the other components of the state, that suppressing expressions mayor 
may not reduce activity in the other components. As Gross and Levenson (1997) 
34 As the authors correctly note, instructing subjects to suppress all signs of emotion (rather than just 
those for the target - disgust) has the unwelcome consequence of meaning that the results cannot 
separate the effects of suppressing emotion per se, from those of suppressing disgust in particular. 
35 Although this type of finding is typically taken as supportive of the hydraulic view of emotion 
component relationships, theorists such as Tourangeau & Ellsworth (1979) have noted that the increase 
in arousal associated with suppression may result from the effort or concentration required, rather than 
as a direct consequence of the suppression. 
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note, it may be that suppression effects do not operate equally across emotions or 
across the components of emotions. Specifically, their research thus far suggests that 
suppressing expression of negative emotions like disgust (Gross & Levenson, 1993) 
and sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1997) does not affect the subjective experience of 
these emotions. However, suppressing the expression of amusement had a significant 
effect on the experience (Gross & Levenson, 1997). One possible explanation for this 
is that people are more practiced (and thus able to tolerate) dysjunctions between 
experience and expression for negative emotions. 
Concluding remarks and future directions 
Following Gross and Levenson's (1993, 1997) data, a less well researched, but more 
general explanation for inter-emotion differences in component relationships might 
simply be that the components of emotions relate slightly differently for different 
emotions. In this view, the relationships between the components of discrete 
emotions may be more or less constrained, and thus influential upon one another, 
depending on a number of factors36 . 
Following the discussions of function and the development of component 
relationships above, the most obvious place to begin such an examination would be in 
an examination of function. It may be for example that the three key components of 
discrete emotional states interact differentially depending on the importance of the 
component to the function of the emotion in question (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). As 
they note, not all combinations (of components) are possible due to the functional 
nature of the relationships between the components. So for example, the facial 
configuration for an emotion where the expression is critical to the function of that 
emotion should exert a greater influence upon other components than the expressions 
of emotions where the expressive component is less important. The same type of 
logic could clearly be applied in respect of other components. 
36 Although they cannot be discussed here potentially important factors in the relationships between the 
components of emotions include individual differences (M. Lewis, 1998b; McIntosh, 1996), 
differences between conscious and unconscious processes and manipulations, involuntary versus 
deliberate component activity, differences between component interactions across emotions, the 
timecourse of interactions, and the difference between causal, mediative and modulating effects 
ascribed to components. 
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A number of other issues also remam unclear. Initially, we are little closer to 
knowing whether experimentally induced activity (or lack of activity) in a single 
emotion component can alter the status of other components without cognitive 
mediation (reappraisal). Theorists strongly disagree on this matter. Lazarus (1991a) 
suggests that activity among components potentiates emotions, rather than causing 
them directly, while McIntosh (1996) suggests that "physical processes appear 
enough to generate feelings" (p. 138). Although I am inclined towards Lazarus' 
position on this issue, it never be methodologically possible to separate the role of 
neurochemical, hormonal or expressive change from the potentially mediating effects 
of cognitions (Lazarus, 1991a). One possibility is that we use hypnotic suggestion 
(e.g. Bryant & McConkey, 1989) to induce expression or expression-suppression. In 
this manner, we could potentially prevent (or at least reduce) the likely influence of 
appraisal processes in these processes (see Levitt & Chapman, 1972; Friswell & 
McConkey, 1989 for a discussions of hypnosis, induction and the investigation of 
component relationships). 
Relatedly, it is still difficult to determine whether activity within a single component 
of an emotional state individually influences either conscious experience or 
behaviour, or whether influence is directed via the state as a whole. While it is 
certainly possible that the activation of certain components like ANS physiology may 
exert a direct influence upon these latter variables, I am currently of the opinion that 
emotional components are more likely to exert an influence via the state as a whole. 
Although this opinion appears untestable given our current methodologies, the notion 
that emotions form a response pattern that coheres across expressive (Malatesta, 1981; 
Lewis, 1998b) or other modalities seems a more reasonable initial supposition than 
otherwise. 
Finally, the place of overt behaviour in these processes remams critically under 
researched. As is expanded upon in the following section, behaviour is typically 
treated as little more than a very indirect 'readout' of emotions. Yet given the highly 
interactive nature of the other components in emotion processes it would seem likely 
that overt behaviours exert a direct influence on the activity of other components of 
emotions (Frijda, et. aI., 1989; Frijda, 1996; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998; Mascolo & 
Harkins, 1998). More broadly, given the importance of emotions in promoting 
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behaviour, and the possible presence of innate behavioural prototypes for primary 
emotions (see Chapter 8.7), this area remains a tremendous opportunity for research in 
component relationships, with key implications for broader issues in emotion theory. 
Unfortunately, denoting exactly how overt behaviour might influence either the 
components of discrete emotions or other components of the emotion process can 
only be a matter for speculation. Despite my convictions regarding the causal role of 
behaviour in generating and mediating appraisal, emotional states and experience, I 
am unable to decide exactly how these influences might transpire. Consequently, 
while I have adopted reasonably firm positions on most issues in component 
relationships, I feel unable to do so in this regard. 
That said, a number of possibilities are evident. Firstly, behaviour may have no 
impact on other components of emotions at all, although this would seem unlikely. A 
comparatively conservative alternative prospect would be to claim that behaviour can 
only exert an influence on emotional states via appraisal. More speculatively, if we 
afforded 'emotional behaviour' a place in theory and research that even faintly 
approximates that currently given to facial expression, we might argue that behaviour 
can influence emotional states or their components independently of reappraisal. 
Finally, and most radically, we might cease treating behaviour as if it were nothing 
more than a consequence of emotional states, and instead consider it (in some cases) 
to be a component of the emotional response as well as a causal agent in other aspects 
of the emotion processes. This final comment is returned to below. 
Systems and emotions Ill: The links between emotions and overt behaviour 
Introduction 
Emotion mode should govern the construction of organised 
behavioural sequences that solve adaptive problems. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990b, p. 414) 
From a lay or folk psychological perspective, it is almost painfully self-evident that 
emotions are centrally and directly involved in the generation of behaviour. While a 
trifle Aristotlean in outlook, our common sense explanations for other people's 
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behaviour frequently refer to their emotions (Fitness, 1996). He's crying because he's 
sad, or even, she's only doing that because she's angry, and so forth. A similar 
scientific view is explicit in the view of evolutionary psychologists who suggest that 
(ultimately) all psychological mechanisms, including emotions, have almost certainly 
been selected for and retained based on their utility in generating and regulating 
behaviour (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b). 
Yet despite the evolutionary-functionalist zeitgeist in contemporary emotion theory 
and the intuitive appeal of a relationship between emotions and behaviour, most 
theories of emotions have been comparatively unclear regarding the relationships 
between emotion and behaviour (Ellsworth, 1991) and few systematic investigations 
exist (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Exactly why this discrepancy arose, and remains, 
has scarcely been addressed in emotion theory, although this author suspects a 
combination of methodological, institutional, and metatheoretical issues have made 
the area unattractive to researchers37 • It is my intention that the following discussion 
go some way towards compensating for this deficiency. 
The discussion will outline a theory describing the relationships between emotions 
and behaviour, particularly the place of emotions in generating behaviour. It will 
begin by expanding on the necessity of theory in this area, specifically describing the 
need to explicitly incorporate evolutionary-functionalist reasoning and cross-species 
comparisons. Previous conceptualisations of the relationships between emotions and 
behaviour are described, with attention focussed on the important theories of Nico 
Frijda (e.g. Frijda, 1986, 1996; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1994, 1998) and Robert Plutchik (e.g. 1980, 1984, 1991, 1994). 
Following this review, it is suggested that while the theoretical and empirical work 
comprising these two theorists' contributions constitute the best-developed views of 
the relationships between emotions and behaviour, that much remains to be 
discovered. In beginning this process, it is suggested that we need to move beyond an 
emphasis on action tendencies or felt urges to a focus on behaviour itself. Initially, 
37 The variability evident in behaviour and the difficulty in studying its relationship with behaviour 
combine to create a methodological and institutional situation where investigations of emotions and 
behaviour are seen as both problematic and unlikely to result in publication. 
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we can focus on how emotion-behaviour relationships vary between primary and 
secondary emotions, and on how the intensity of emotions influences the 
manifestation of emotions in overt behaviour. Two studies examining the recognition 
of emotional behaviour are presented, a new dynamic systems theory of emotion-
behaviour relationships is presented, and directions for future research are given. 
Evolutionary functionalism and the need for emotion-behaviour theorising 
Virtually all emotions get expressed 
(however minimally) in behaviour 
Solomon (1993; p. 11) 
Some time ago Plutchik (1977) suggested that we should consider the emotions (as 
they appear in humans) from a broad biological and evolutionary view. According to 
his evolutionary view, emotions are adaptive response patterns that have evolved in 
order to deal with the survival issues basic to all organisms, not only humans 
(Plutchik, 1962, 1980, 1994; see also Frijda, 1986). To this extent, the view that the 
emotions have evolved to help organisms respond adaptively to evolutionarily 
recurrent situational types dominates contemporary emotion theory (see Chapter 8.3). 
Yet despite the popularity and plausibility of this approach to emotions, few theorists 
have extended the evolutionary-functionalist logic to include an examination of how 
emotions impact on, or are manifest in, behaviour (Frijda, et. aI., 1989; Smith & Pope, 
1992; Frijda, 1993a; M. Lewis, 1998b). In modem emotions theory, most writers 
appear content to view emotions as providing a broad link between 'functionally 
equivalent' stimuli and 'functionally equivalent' behaviour (e.g. Smith & Pope, 
1992)38. Because the same self-reported and subjective ends can be achieved by 
multiple behavioural pathways (see Chapters 2 & 6), the experience of any emotion is 
thought to result in the production of just about any behaviour (Plutchik, 1980; 
Scherer, 1984; Ortony, et. aI., 1988). Instead, other factors like beliefs (Frijda & 
38 Other views are of course available. Cognitive theorists like Forgas & Vargas (1998) for example 
suggest that "the same affective state can have congruent, incongruent, or no effect on subsequent .. 
action, depending on subtle changes in people's information processing strategies" (p. 206, italics 
added). I completely disagree with this statement, instead choosing to believe that emotions were 
'designed to' and always influence behaviour, although not necessarily immediately, or in a manner 
our current methodologies and emphases enable us to discern. 
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Mesquita, 1994), perceived difficulty or deterrence (Brehm, 1999; Brehm, Brummett, 
& Harvey, 1999), and situations (Ortony, et. al., 1988) are thought to be as strongly 
influential on behaviour as the emotion itself. Certainly, emotions provide a strong 
motivational incentive to react in some particular way (an action tendency), but such 
action mayor may not occur (Smith & Pope, 1992). 
Taken at face value, this seems an eminently reasonable position to adopt. After all, 
we do not always (or even often) strike when we are angry, weep and withdraw when 
we are sad, or flee when we are afraid. Behaviour thus seems among the most flexible 
elements of emotional processes and consequence. At a different level, this view 
represents a surprisingly robust theoretical position in that one can posit mechanisms 
or tendencies rather than specific acts (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b), with a 
consequence that few specific predictions can, or must, be made. 
However, the generality of the theorising regarding emotions and their relationship to 
behaviour available leaves much to be desired and would be deemed unacceptable in 
another domain39. Exactly what, for example, does the term 'functionally equivalent' 
mean? Should it be taken to suggest that the behaviour is consciously aimed at, or 
unwittingly achieves, the same ends? If so, how are these 'ends' most precisely 
described? Are they ends as reported or desired by the individual, ends inherent in the 
emotional or behavioural response itself, or a combination of these two concerns? If a 
given behavioural sequence does not achieve the desired end, does it remain 
functionally equivalent to a 'successful' behaviour, or not? If not, how should we 
then characterise it? Most broadly, is functional equivalence being conceptualised at 
the evolutionary or individual levels? 
In addition to the problems evident in current conceptualisations of the relationships 
between emotions and behaviour, it is also important to remember that from an 
evolutionary perspective, adaptations (such as emotions) have absolutely no value 
unless they are ultimately reflected in an organism's behaviour (e.g. Tooby & 
39 Malatesta-Magai and Izard (1991) suggest that the lack of research on behaviour is partly due to the 
historical place of facial expression in emotions (see also Malatesta, et. ai., 1989) and partly due to the 
fact that methodologies are available for faces. Less generously, there also appears something a little 
'comforting' in the rationalist undertones captured by the position taken by most emotion theorists, 
encapsulating elements of free will and personal responsibility with regards to behaviour. 
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Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b). These authors argue that the mechanisms involved in the 
generation of action should be very sensitive to emotional states. Specific acts and 
courses of action should be 'more available' in some states than in others, and highly 
stereotyped behaviours may be released (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). 
More generally, if we fundamentally accept that emotions are adaptations, and that 
adaptations must ultimately be represented in behavioural changes, then emotions too 
must be represented in behaviour. This comparatively simple logical sequence 
appears to have been bypassed by much of emotion theory (despite its purportedly 
evolutionary approach) with a consequence that we know very little about the 
relationships between emotions and behaviour (Smith & Pope, 1992). As Frijda 
(1986) noted some time ago, an adaptive view of emotions requires "that expression 
not be linked to emotion in a haphazard way or in one primarily determined by the 
conventions of a given culture" (p. 63). According to him, a finite repertoire of 
expressive behaviours belongs to the biological disposition of humans as well as of 
other higher animals. 
Overall, whether one is completely taken by the rhetoric and concerns expressed 
above is irrelevant to the key issue at hand here. It is impossible to deny that the 
relationships between emotions and behaviour are among the most poorly understood 
aspects of emotion theory, despite their potential for a more general impact 
(Ma1atesta-Magai & Izard, 1991). While the subjective and agentic aspects of the 
relationships between emotions and behaviour will always remain, so too will the 
difference between the fact the one might hypothetically behave in any manner, in any 
situation, and in the presence of any emotion, and the fact that one does not! Despite 
important variations across individuals, situations, cultures, and emotions, the 
emotions themselves are generally conceived of as heritable, normative, and adaptive 
phenomena. At the very least then, there is a clear need for theory and data regarding 
emotion-behaviour relationships that complements the increased specificity of 
hypothesised antecedent cognitions (Smith & Pope, 1992). More strongly, it can be 
argued that emotions must exert a systematic influence on overt behaviour 
commensurate with the function of the emotion in question. 
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A few notable exceptions 
In some senses, the length to which I have gone to illustrate the magnitude and import 
of the discrepancy between emotion theory in general and any 'specific' statements 
regarding emotion-behaviour relationships in particular has been excessive. Across 
the history of what is a comparatively young science, there has been a smattering of 
commentators who have stressed matters evolutionary, comparative, and behavioural. 
Three of these analyses are briefly described below. 
Exception I: Robert Plutchik 
Robert Plutchik (e.g. 1977, 1980, 1991, 1994) has long been a key commentator in the 
evolutionary consideration of emotion. His analysis assumes that all primary 
emotions are in some way identifiable at all phylogenetic levels (Plutchik, 1962, 
1994). His theory offers eight such emotions (joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, fear, 
anger, expectation/anticipation, and surprise), and a variety of blend/mixtures of these 
primaries called secondaries (see e.g. Plutchik, 1980, 1991, 1994). More specifically, 
he also argues that the eight primary emotions correspond to both behavioural and 
functional languages. The primary emotion of fear for example is represented in both 
'escape' behaviours, and with a more general function of 'protection' (see e.g. Table 
2.1 in Plutchik, 1991)40. 
In explaining the link between emotions and overt behaviour, Plutchik alludes to the 
vulnerable state of the human infant at birth. He suggests that the altricial or highly 
underdeveloped state of the infant (cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989) constitutes a critical 
adaptive challenge, and explains the basic reason behind the behaviours that are 
present or available slightly after birth (Plutchik, 1994). According to Plutchik 
(1994), these behaviours increase the chance of survival, while, he argues, the absence 
of them would mean that the infant had to wait until it 'trained' the caregiver to give it 
what it needs. In this regard, the views he expresses are similar to those of Malatesta 
40 Plutchik's (1962, 1980) treatment of emotion and behaviour appears to owe a great deal to the early 
work of McDougall (1908/1921). McDougall organised his original treatment of emotions around 
seven core (and five less clearly defined) instincts, with each instinct being accompanied by a 
particular emotion. 
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et. al. (1989) who suggest that "prior to the onset of enculturation and learning, there 
is an innate connection between feeling states and behaviour" (p. 129). 
While it could of course be argued that the 'emotional' behaviours displayed by 
infants have evolved primarily in order to communicate needs to the caregiver41 , it is 
also possible that the emotional infant is attempting to behave in a way that has 
previously been successful regarding this type of organism-environment relationship 
(see also Izard & Malatesta, 1987). The fact that infants are comparatively ineffectual 
in this regard (see discussion of motor development in Chapter 5) and develop 
inhibitory abilities very quickly, are interesting and important considerations, but 
should not deter us from examining the possibility that certain behaviours may 
constitute an innate part of some emotional responses. This notion is returned to 
below. 
Overall, Plutchik's theorising has contributed much to a very small field of research. 
Like Plutchik, the current author does not accept that the emotions are a set of 
adaptations that is limited to humanity, and suggests that cross species comparisons 
can and should inform theorising about emotions in humans. Although Plutchik's 
formulations of emotion-behaviour relationships have occurred at a level inconsistent 
with the conceptualisation of emotions as engendering flexibility (Frijda, 1986), they 
represent one of the few coherent attempts to relate human emotions to the activities 
of other species and to adaptive behaviours that are not exclusively communicative. 
Exception II: Animal research in the emotions 
The emphases of Plutchik's phylogenetic analysis are also evident in the growing 
literature on emotions in other species and the activity of brain substrates. Panksepp 
(l994b) for example, describes evidence from his research program demonstrating 
how comparable 'emotional' behaviours can be elicited in many species through 
41 The notion that emotions were selected on the basis of communicative value is important, but runs 
into difficulty upon more rigorous evolutionary examination. My suggestion is that emotions do hold 
communicative value, but not only in order to communicate the emotional value of environmental 
events (e.g. Levenson, 1994b). In addition, emotions also indicate behavioural intention (e.g. Scherer, 
1982; Plutchik, 1982). If this is true, then we must wonder why or on what basis they do so. My 
suggestion is that emotions are able to communicate behavioural intention because they are (or at least 
have been) reliable predictors of behaviour. If they are reliable predictors of behaviour, how then can 
we believe that any emotion can lead to any behaviour? 
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direct brain stimulation, even in animals that have had little chance to learn 
behaviours. The question he correctly delivers is how we can explain such 
behavioural commonalities without reference to biological or genetic causes. 
Like Plutchik (1982, 1994), Panksepp (1994b) criticises the tendency to provide 
humans with a privileged metaphysical status. In his analysis, the so-called "blue-
ribbon grade-A" emotions coordinate diverse response processes so that they are well-
integrated within relatively stereotyped action tendencies. Cacioppo, et. al. (1999) 
likewise suggest that while specific behaviours may differ depending on stimuli and 
context, that there is an underlying commonality to these behaviours. While these 
authors have argued, contra Plutchik, that commonalities exist at the level of 
approach and withdrawal, other theorists like Ekman (1994a) note that there is no 
definitive evidence to suggest that all positive emotions always involve approach and 
that emotions like anger, fear, and disgust can certainly involve either. In delineating 
the neural mechanisms mediating emotion-behaviour relationships, Rolls (1990) notes 
that the amygdala, which is central to emotions (cf. LeDoux, 1989, 1992) has a strong 
output to the ventral striatum. This connection is of fundamental importance in that it 
may allow the affective evaluations performed in the amygdala (see Chapter 6) to 
access the basal ganglia and thus influence motor output. 
Overall, animal research provides a key domain in which we might more preci~c1y 
examine the basic relationships between emotions and behaviour. A1thoLJ~h 
arguments regarding whether the responses of other species constitute 'emotions' m.l~ 
never be settled, accepting that other mammals have emotions enables the 
investigation of emotion-behaviour links where the potential confounds imparted hy 
sophisticated subjective and inhibitory processes are greatly reduced. Because we 
have no means to directly ask our animal subjects how they feel and cannot as readily 
read their faces (M. Lewis, 1998b), we are often 'forced' to infer their emotions on 
behavioural observation alone, hence much research has been conducted here (M. 
Lewis, 1998b). The research that has emerged thus far is supportive of a general link 
between emotions and behaviour. 
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Exception III: Nico Frijda 
Of the leading emotion theorists, Nico Frijda (e.g. 1986, 1994b, 1996; Frijda, et. aI., 
1989, 1994, 1998; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) continues to be the most explicit in his 
incorporation of matters behavioural. According to him, the relationship between 
emotions and behaviour is an 'intimate one' (Frijda, 1992) and emotions are always 
and necessarily linked to behaviour, or at least to changes in action readiness (Frijda, 
1992; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). According to Frijda (1986), changes in action 
readiness characterise emotions, and represent and define the major aspect of the 
emotional response and experience. Emotions are "first and foremost, modes of 
relating to the environment, states of readiness for engaging, or not engaging" (Frijda 
& Mesquita, 1994). In his theory, the term 'action readiness' refers to a state of 
readiness or unreadiness for achieving a particular change in the subject-object 
interaction or for interacting with the environment in general (Frijda & Mesquita, 
1994). The action readiness concept includes elements of general activation or 
deactivation and may also include action tendencies, which are distinguished by their 
intentional content. 
Frijda (1986) originally offered 17 major modes of action tendency, each 
corresponding to a basic emotion within his scheme: The modes of approach, 
avoidance, being-with, attending, rejecting, nonattending, agnostic, interrupting, 
dominating, submitting, deactivation, bound activation, excitement, free activation, 
inactivity, inhibition, and surrender. He acknowledges that the list does not exhaust 
the variety of action tendencies, and stresses that emotions do not strictly consist of 
one or a blend of the 17. Nonetheless, every emotional reaction can be analysed in 
these terms. 
Like Plutchik and Panksepp, Frijda (1986) suggests emotional expressions are "not 
mere movements, but forms of behaviour: modes of interaction with the environment" 
(1986; p. 11). According to him, there are degrees of both 'primitivity' and 
impulsivity to expressive behaviours, as they are largely innate, prewired, or 
preprogrammed. They may show what he terms a 'weakness of stimulus control' in 
that they disregard control-relevant features of the situation or ignore context. 
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Additionally, he notes that certain behaviours may remain during episodes of 
emotion, even though they can currently serve no purpose. Crying when alone for 
example. Frijda (1986) takes this type of observation to suggest that the emotions 
have properties that promote behavioural activation "that is relatively unspecific in its 
manifestation, though still tied to its origins" (p. 36). In this regard, his position 
appears somewhat similar to that recently taken by Averill (1998) who suggests that 
"rather than automatic and highly stereotyped behaviour" that "emotional responses 
during an episode are flexible and often creative. What remains consistent, if 
anything, is the message, not the medium." (p. 852). 
There is one further line of argument presented by Frijda (1986) that is of interest 
here. It is a comparatively simple point, yet one that seems to escape many theorists, 
and (moreover) one that bears on the choice of methodology described below. Frijda 
notes that people frequently ascribe emotions to others on the basis of facial and other 
behaviour. Such ascription, he argues, is not a complex matter, and the reasonable 
success of social interaction can be taken as attesting to the connections between 
expressive elements and emotions. 
Despite his emphasis on innateness, Frijda has been careful to stress that expressive 
emotional behaviours are not fixed action patterns, as the properties of the stimulus 
and situation have profound influences on overt behaviour. Behaviours are frequently 
suppressed or inhibited (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Polivy, 1998), and the behaviours resulting 
from emotions are partially dependent on the 'availability' of the behaviour, and 
expectations regarding its effectiveness (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Differences in 
overt behaviour may thus result from different behavioural repertoires, differential 
accessibility within such repertoires, to differences in the extent to which the 
environment provokes or prescribes particular behaviours and to differential 
regulation of available behaviours (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Frijda, et. aI., 1994). 
Frijda's contributions to the understanding of emotion in general, and emotion-
behaviour links in particular cannot be overstated. Viewed from one perspective, 
Frijda's conceptualisation of emotion and its relationships with behaviour has been, 
and remains, an exceptionally astute theoretical maneuver in the arena of emotion 
theory (see Frijda, 1986; p. 71). Less cynically, his 1986 book (Frijda, 1986) and 
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1989 paper in particular (Frijda, et. aI., 1989) go a considerable distance towards 
bringing behaviour, or at least action tendencies (see also Arnold, 1960a), back to the 
fore in emotion theory. Through considering the emotion-behaviour link at a level of 
abstraction equivalent to other areas of emotion theory (i.e. in emphasising 
mechanisms/tendencies rather than acts) at a detailed level, he has operationalised 
behaviour in contemporary emotion theory in a manner palatable to most theorists 
(Ekman, 1994b). 
The current hypotheses 
The discussion above thus provides a general backdrop and rationale for studies like 
those presented below. Below, some small attention is focussed on the aspects of 
theory and previous data that underlie the specific hypotheses of the two studies 
presented here. Although the argument presented suggests that the emotions must be 
systematically represented in behaviour, there has been little empirical research that 
bears directly on the questions involved in considering emotion-behaviour 
relationships in humans. That said, the research that does appear relevant IS 
consistent with the idea of an innate link between emotions and behaviour. 
Rime, Boulanger, Laubin, Richir and Stroobants (1985) found that subjects from 
Belgium, the United States, and Zaire make comparable emotional interpretations 
when viewing abstract moving objects. Similarly, Wallbott and Scherer's (1988) 27 
country, cross-cultural has been taken as suggesting that action readiness reports are 
consistent across cultures42. Joy was characterised by approach behaviour as well as 
smiling and laughing, sadness by crying and the absence of hand movements, and 
anger by changed movement and speech qualities. Sogon and Masutani (1989) found 
no difference between American (52%) and Japanese (57%) subjects judgements of 
emotional cues in filmed body movements. Although not explicitly attended to in 
their cross-cultural study of pride, shame, and anger, Fischer, Manstead, and 
Rodriguez Mosquera (1999) data shows that self-reported actions differ less across 
cultures than do antecedents, consequences, or normative beliefs. 
42 Strictly speaking it would be more accurate to state that their ANOV As showed a greater effect for 
emotion than for country. 
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Finally, in a comprehensive discriminant analysis, Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 
(1989) found that action readiness cues enabled 34% (Study 1) and 46% (Study 2) of 
32 emotions to be correctly classified. As noted by these authors, the figures probably 
represent a fairly conservative estimate of predictive power because of the number of 
near-misses such as mistaking joy for happiness, or rage for anger. Although 
appraisal and action readiness cues did overlap, each appears to add some 
independent predictive value in the labeling of emotions43 • Most importantly, action 
readiness cues were at least as good as appraisal information in discriminating among 
emotions (Frijda, et. aI., 1989). 
Fridja's research and theory has deliberately mentioned last in the discussion above as 
it constitutes the most developed theory of emotion and behaviour in humans. As 
such, it is perhaps ironic that I take his particular theory as a basis from which to 
express my particular digressions and emphases. Despite immense respect for 
Frijda's contribution, it is suggested that action readiness changes or action tendencies 
are not themselves behaviour. Following the evolutionary-functionalist logic 
presented above, a tendency to act in a manner commensurate with the function of a 
discrete emotion is only adaptive and can only be selected for at the level of 
phenotypic display i.e. in behaviour itself. Put another way, if emotions are genuinely 
characterised by adaptive action tendencies then emotions should be recognisable in 
actual behaviour as well as in self reports of consciously felt urges. Consequently, the 
first two hypotheses examined here run as follows: 
1. Descriptions of emotional behaviour (behaviour clips) will be correctly 
recognised at greater than chance rates for all emotions. 
2. There will be few differences between cultures in recognition rates for 
any emotions (see Hypothesis 5). 
However, given the socio-regulatory processes that influence most of our behaviour, 
it was also thought that felt action tendencies might provide a closer approximation to 
43 Frijda et. aI., (1989) also note the possibility that some appraisal dimensions actually represent action 
readiness items. For example, the appraisal dimension of interestingness might be considered a 
response or action readiness variables. 
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the tendencies associated with the emotional responses themselves. Consequently, it 
was predicted that: 
3. Behaviour descriptions derived from self-reported urges and modified 
urges will be more readily recognised than actual behaviour descriptions. 
Given the lack of clear theory or data regarding the relationships between emotions 
and behaviour, more specific hypotheses (while consistent with the theory being 
developed here) were derived in a somewhat eclectic manner. Initially, it was thought 
that the distinction between primary and secondary emotions (see Chapter 8.3 above) 
was a viable place to begin more precise consideration of emotion and behaviour. 
Ekman (1994a) has suggested that if no particular pattern of motor behaviour is 
relevant to the function of the emotion, then there would be "no reason to expect a 
specific pattern of ANS activity to have been established for that emotion" (1994; 
p.17). According to him, specific patterns of ANS activity have only been established 
for fear, joy, sadness, and anger. Relatedly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
emotions that appear capable of achieving their functions prior to conscious self-
awareness (see Chapter 4) should bear a more intimate relationship with behaviour, 
and show less cultural variation (Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999). 
Additionally, a more fine-grained examination of the data from Frijda, et. aI., (19X9) 
reveals differences among emotions in the extent to which each is discriminahle on 
the basis of action tendency cues. Surprisingly, the so-called basic emotion~ of 
disgust, fear, anger, and sadness were poorly predicted, although it can be noted thaI 
several closely related words were available for each of these. However, emotion~ 
also differed somewhat in whether appraisal or action readiness cues were more 
useful in discriminating them. Consistent with Johnson-Laird and Oatley's (1992) 
view, 'cognitively complex' emotions like jealousy and love were better predicted by 
appraisal cues, while action readiness cues were more useful in discriminating 
emotions like anger and sadness. On the basis of this theory and research, two further 
hypotheses were derived: 
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4. The four primary emotions of (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) will 
be correctly recognised more often than will secondary emotions 
(embarrassment, guilt, pride, and shame). 
5. While the primary emotion behaviours will be equally recognised across 
all cultures, subjects from the culture in which the stimuli were derived 
(Australasia) will be significantly better at recognising the behavioural 
displays associated with secondary emotions. 
In addition to a distinction between primary and secondary emotions, it was also 
thought that the intensity of emotion would be directly related to the likelihood that 
prototypical (hence recognisable) behaviours would result. Frijda (1986) describes 
this effect as a form of 'trade-off' between urge or emotion-activation and 
inhibitory/regulatory processes. Presumably in his analysis, the stronger the emotion, 
and by inference the importance of the goal (see Chapter 7), the more likely a 
prototype behaviour will emerge (see e.g. Frijda, 1996). In fact, data from Table 3 in 
Frijda et. al., (1989) show that emotion terms that might reasonably be considered 
more intense descriptions of the same state (e.g. annoyance to anger to rage) exhibit a 
pattern of increasing discriminability consistent with this idea. 
In a recent microdevelopmental analysis of facial data, Rosenberg and Ekman (1997) 
showed that 16/20 and 19/20 subjects self reported emotion at exactly the time when 
video showed them to be presenting the most intense facial expressions. This type of 
data, coupled with general views of emotion as a systemic response (e.g. Izard, 1991; 
Plutchik, 1994; Levenson, 1994a; Scherer, 1997) suggest that behaviours that 
accompany or follow an intense emotion should be less inhibitable and hence more 
prototypical. 
Jack Brehm (e.g. Brehm, 1999; Brehm, et. al., 1999) has recently offered a theory of 
emotions and motivation that places an emphasis on the importance of emotional 
intensity in the generating adaptive behaviour similar to that expressed here. For 
current purposes, the key assertion of his model is that "the function of emotions is to 
urge behaviour designed to promote or prevent important potential outcomes or to 
urge adaptation to important outcomes that have already occurred" (Brehm, 1999; p. 
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4). According to Brehm (1999), the greater the intensity of emotion, the more 
powerfully it will recruit the cognitive, physiological and behavioural systems to carry 
out goal directed work. Consequently it was predicted that: 
6. The rate at which emotional behaviours are recognised will be positively 
related to the intensity of the emotional experience. 
Method 
Overview 
Below, data are presented from two studies examining the recognition of emotional 
behaviour for four primary (anger, fear, happiness, and sadness) and four secondary 
(embarrassment, pride, guilt, and shame) emotions. Both studies used a recognition 
paradigm similar to that originally employed by Ekman and colleagues (e.g. Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). In each study, 
participants were presented with text descriptions of behaviour (see below) and asked 
to choose which of eight emotions the protagonist had most likely felt immediately 
prior to the behaviour described. 
Although the initial research was designed as a 'stand alone' study, the intra-cultural 
nature of the data and the unreliability of the coding procedures necessitated by the 
methodology did not enable firm comment on the hypotheses above. Hence, the 
study is presented here as a pilot and stimulus generation exercise. 
Study 1: Pilot and stimuli generation 
Participants 
Sixty-five male (MAge = 22.3yrs, s.d. = 7.05) and 189 female (MAge = 22.6yrs, s.d. = 
6.43) first year psychology students at the University of Canterbury (New Zealand) 
participated in'the initial study as part ofa laboratory exercise (Total N = 254). 
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Procedure 
Given the teaching context, the experimenter provided a brief (three minute) 
introduction to emotion theory and the place of cross-cultural research in emotions44• 
Participants were then given a page of typed instructions (see Appendix 6), the key 
points of which were reiterated verbally by the experimenter. The instructions 
described the general procedure of the study, and gathered the required consent. 
Participants in each testing session numbered between 25 and 35. 
Part I: The derivation of the stimuli 
Following this, participants completed a questionnaire that asked them to describe and 
rate various aspects of two recent emotional events (see Appendix 6). Subjects made 
six ratings about each event, each subject always receiving a request for ratings about 
one primary and one secondary emotion. Emotions were counterbalanced across 
subjects and testing sessions so that approximately equal numbers of ratings were 
made about each emotion in tandem with each of the other four emotions. 
Presentation order of the two target emotions was randomised. The first three items 
on each form (Items a, b, & c) were of no direct interest, and were only included to 
maximise subject recollection and data validity in the latter items. The final three 
items (Items d, e, & f) asked the subject to rate felt intensity (Item d), what they first 
felt like doing (Item e), and what they actually did (Item f) at the time of their 
experience. The emphasis of the latter two items rested on behaviour, as they were 
designed to generate stimuli for the second part of the study (see below). 
Text data from Item d and Item e were then lifted from the original questionnaire and 
transcribed to the second (recognition) form (see Appendix 7). Data from Item d 
(what did you first feel like doing?) were coded as an 'urge' description, while data 
from Item e (what did you actually do?) were coded as 'actual' behaviour 
descriptions. In addition, urge descriptions were re-worded so that statements framed 
in an "I felt like" manner were represented in the form "I did" to provide a final 
'modified urge' description. 
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Of the 254 subjects in the first study, three refused or were unable to generate 
information regarding one of the two emotions they had been asked about, while the 
remaining 251 completed all ratings for both emotions. This provided an initial pool 
of 1515 text descriptions of behaviour (behaviour clips) prior to coding. 
Clip Coding 
Understandably, and despite the precautions taken (see Appendix 6) subjects varied in 
their ability to restrict their responses to a description of observable behaviour as the 
scientist might see it. Consequently, the 1515 clips were coded so that only a 
description of observable behaviour remained. 
Because the stimuli derived from a given laboratory session were used in sessions the 
following day, it was not possible to get inter-rater checks completed during Study 1. 
The stimuli used during Study 1 were transcribed and coded by the first experimenter 
as they were generated by each laboratory class. Given the unseasoned nature of this 
particular paradigm, the criteria stipulated a priori were less formal than those used in 
Study 2, although they were intended to achieve the same end (see below). This 
weakness noted, the similarities between the two data sets suggests that the initial 
coding was successful. 
Prior to the initiation of Study 2, seven coding criteria (see Appendix 8) were 
established to ensure that each clip represented a description of a behaviour that was 
or would be observable to another person, but nothing else. The first criterion stated 
that information could be taken from, but not added to the clips before their inclusion. 
Additional criteria were established to eliminate negatively oriented behaviours (e.g. I 
didn't do X), to eliminate descriptions of thoughts, feelings, or motivations, to restrict 
the clip to one behaviour only, to remove the content of verbal behaviour, and to 
remove the 'impossible' behaviours that were sometimes reported45 • Data regarding 
the reasons for clip exclusion have been retained for future analysis. 
44 As will .be expanded upon below, demand characteristics are likely to be absent in the design 
employed here since the key dependent variable (correct recognition rate) is a performance variable 
that should not be influenced by expectation. 
45 The reader can probably imagine that this particular criterion appears open to abuse. However, it 
was sparingly used, and only then to remove clips which were literally impossible. Typically this 
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To begin, a sample of 200 clips were randomly chosen from the initial 1515 and were 
coded by the experimenter and a second rater blind to the design. Having evaluated 
each criterion, each rater made a simple yes-no decision as to whether a given clip 
could constitute an observable description of behaviour, and could thus be retained. 
Inter-rater agreement was 92% for this sample. Given this level of agreement, the 
remaining 1315 clips were coded by the experimenter alone, with 1122 of the original 
1515 clips ultimately retained for further use (see Appendix 9 for examples). In terms 
of testing the hypotheses above, it is important to note that the behavioural clips thus 
coded removed much of the context for behaviour, strengthening the capability of the 
data to make claims about behaviour and emotions rather than situations and emotion. 
Part II: The recognition component 
Once the first questionnaire was completed by each class, participants were given a 
second form (see Appendix 7). The second questionnaire contained two behavioural 
clips (as above) and asked the participant to make four ratings about each. Based on 
the information contained in the clip, participants were initially asked to estimate 
which emotion (of eight) the protagonist was "most likely feeling at this time". The 
same eight emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, embarrassment, shame, guilt. 
and pride) were always offered, with a consequence that the 'correct' answer ".1 .... 
always available. Participants were then asked to describe the reasons for their choln: 
to record any other emotions that they would have liked to report. Finall~. 
participants made ratings regarding how pleasant or unpleasant the event was for the 
protagonist, and how intense they thought the emotional experience associated" 1111 
the behaviour had been. 
Study 2: Cross-cultural replication 
Participants 
One hundred and three males (MAge = 27.1yrs) and 213 females (MAge = 23yrs) from 
nearly 25 countries participated in Study 2 (Total N = 316). Subjects were 
predominantly university students and were recruited by electronic word of mouth via 
occurred in respect of 'modified urge' behaviours (e.g. "I felt like dying" would have become "I died" 
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contacts in the International Society for Research on Emotion held by the author and 
his supervisor46. 
Procedure 
The recruitment email contained directions to an Internet address that contained a 
software program that administered the recognition component of Study 1 (see above) 
electronically47. Participants read an introduction to the research, then recorded a 
number of demographics characteristics, including nationality as well as details on the 
countries in which they were born and raised. 
Participants then completed a recognition task identical to that described above. The 
administrative software randomly drew a single behaviour clip from the 1122 
available in the battery, and participants made the same ratings as described above. 
This process was repeated eight times, with each of 316 participants making ratings 
about eight different behaviour clips (Total ratings = 2528). Data were auto-posted to 
the experimenter on a daily basis in a spreadsheet compatible format. 
In the analysis, participants have been grouped in four geopolitical regions (North 
America, Europe, Australisia, and Asia), on the basis of their self-reported nationality. 
Participants from Canada and the United States are in the "North America" group, 
while those from Australia and New Zealand are in the "Australasian" group. 
Subjects from Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia have been placed in the "Asia" group, 
while subjects from Austria, France, Scotland, Wales, England, Germany, 
Switzerland, and Austria have been placed in the "Europe" group. Initially there were 
two European groups (English first language versus not). However, a combination of 
noisy data and no differences meant that these subjects were collapsed for analysis. 
which begs the question as to who had written the stimuli). 
46 I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the colleagues without whose support this research 
would not have been possible. I have never ceased to be amazed at the lengths to which this group of 
people went in order to assist a student that they had never met. Those whose support I am aware of 
include Keith Oatley (Toronto), Jim Averill (Massachusetts), Ross Buck (Connecticut), Carol Magai 
(New York), Carroll Izard (Delaware), Julie Norem (Boston), Colleen Ward (Singapore), Klaus 
Scherer (Switzerland), Nico Frijda (Netherlands), Aron Ben Z'ev (Israel), John Shepherd (Aberdeen), 
Hadyn Ellis (Cardiff), and Anthony Lysons (Swansea). Judging by the subject data, I have also had 
additional support from unknown colleagues in Australia, Germany, and Brazil. Thankyou all. 
47 I am grateful to Joffre Horlor (University of Canterbury) for his work in this regard. 
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Finally, data from two Israeli, two South African, and two Brazilian subjects were not 
placed. Their data are only used in the non-geopolitical analyses. 
Results 
Before beginning the analysis proper, it was important to examine the base rates at 
which particular emotions were being estimated. As Tables 8.5 shows, subjects 
appear to have been systematically more likely to make particular estimates, in the 
presence of particular stimuli. 
Raw estimates per target emotion (%) 
Target 
Happy Sad Fear Anger Embarr Shame Guilt Pride Total Emotion Targets 
Happy 197 39 14 23 21 5 17 41 357 (0.55) (0.12) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.13) 
Sad 51 148 20 42 16 18 16 18 329 (0.16) (0.45) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Fear 32 55 101 76 44 23 18 14 363 (0.09) (0.15) (0.28) (0.21) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
Anger 15 42 14 187 13 8 20 22 321 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.58) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
17 23 24 69 67 33 13 13 259 Embarrassment (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) (0.26) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) 
Shame 22 56 28 55 42 16 18 21 258 (0.09) (0.22) (0.11) (0.21) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Guilt 42 53 26 57 30 16 30 23 277 (0.15) (0.19) (0.09) (0.21) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
Pride 174 24 12 25 28 9 21 71 364 (0.49) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.20) 
Estimates per 550 440 239 534 261 128 153 223 2528 
emotion 
Table 8.5 - Showing the distributions of subject estimates per emotion (NB: the 
'correct' or 'hit' responses for each emotion are shown in bold) 
Subjects chose the correct or target emotion at the highest rate in cases where the 
stimuli had been derived from an experience of happiness (0.55), sadness (0.45), fear 
(0.28), anger (0.58), and were also better in the case of embarrassment (0.26). In 
comparison however, subjects infrequently chose shame when examining shame-
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based behaviour (0.06), gUilt when examining guilt behaviour (0.11) or pride when 
examining pride behaviour (0.20). 
Subjects were somewhat likely to rate happy as either sad (0.12) or pride (0.13) 
behaviours, and showed a tendency to make these errors in reverse. Sad behaviours 
were rated as stemming from happiness 16% of the time, while pride behaviours were 
rated as happy nearly half the time (0.49). As might be expected, fear and anger 
behaviours were frequently confused. Interestingly however, while 21% of fear 
behaviours were rated as stemming from anger, only 5% of angry behaviours were 
incorrectly rated as fear, with sadness a more likely mistake in this case (0.13). 
Stimuli derived from embarrassment were often mistaken as angry (0.27) or ashamed 
(0.13) behaviours. Shame and guilt behaviours were clearly the most difficult to 
discriminate, with the distribution of ratings suggesting that subjects were effectively 
guessing in many cases. For shame stimuli, many raters suggested that the behaviour 
had followed episodes of sadness (0.22), anger (0.21), and embarrassment (0.16), 
while shame itself was the least most frequently chosen option (0.06). Similarly, 
guilt-based stimuli were often rated as stemming from episodes of sadness (0.19) and 
anger (0.21), with happiness also a surprisingly popular choice (0.15). 
Upon examining the two 'border' rows of Table 8.5, the reader may have become 
aware that the frequency of correct identifications ('hits') is confounded by 
substantial differences in (a) the availability of particular targets, and (b) the rates at 
which each of the eight emotions were chosen. The first concern relates to the 
manner in which coding practices excluded particular classes of response. Although 
interesting, they are of indirect relevance to the main hypotheses and not addressed 
here48 . However, notwithstanding the mediation of response bias by this 
'availability,' subjects still chose certain responses at disproportional rates. 
For example, the proportion of correct identifications ('hits') for stimuli deriving from 
experiences of happiness was 197 of 357 possibilities (a raw proportion of 0.55). 
However, as can be seen in Table 8.5 above, subjects recorded happiness as their 
48 If anything, the fact that a substantially greater number of behaviour clips deriving from secondary 
emotions were excluded is indirectly supportive of Hypothesis 4. Given the more intimate relationship 
between primary emotions and overt behaviour hypothesised here, it is likely that 'behaviours' 
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answer 550 times. Consequently, the 'accuracy' of estimates in respect of happiness 
behaviours is substantially confounded by a base-rate estimation bias, in which 
happiness is chosen as an answer disproportionately often. To account for this, the 
biased hit proportions were adjusted using the noted signal detection transformation: 
P*(S Is) = [pes I s)-P(S In)] 
I-P(Sln) 
Green and Swets (1966, p. 129) 
This formula represents a correction for chance success, and adjusts the observed 
proportion of 'hits' (p* (Sis)) according to the observed proportion of 'false alarms' 
(P*(S/n)) to obtain an adjusted hit ratio. So for example in transforming the 
proportion of correctly identified happiness clips, the raw accuracy proportion 
(P(S/s)) is combined with occasions when the subjects recorded happiness incorrectly 
as their answer (false alarm probability or P(S/n)). The ratio enables a more valid 
estimate of how discriminable the stimuli are. Hits, misses and false alarms, along 
with the raw and transformed proportions are shown in Table 8.6 below. 
Raw hit Chance Emotion Hits proportion Misses False Alarms corrected hit proportion 
Happy 197 0.55 160 353 0.465 
Sad 148 0.45 213 292 0.366 
Fear 101 0.28 262 138 0.229 
Anger 187 0.58 134 347 0.505 
Embarrassment 67 0.26 192 194 0.189 
Shame 16 0.06 242 112 0.013 
Guilt 30 0.11 247 123 0.057 
Pride 71 0.20 293 152 0.134 
Table 8.6 - Shows the raw numbers of hits, misses, and false alarms for categorical 
recognition ratings about eight emotions. 
stemming from secondary emotions are less overt or immediate in nature, hence would be excluded by 
the coding criteria. This consideration is returned to below. 
384 
In the table above, it can be,seen how the raw hit rate is influenced by the proportion 
of false alarms to produce a more valid estimate of discriminability. On this basis we 
can safely note that behaviours deriving from experiences of happiness were correctly 
identified at a rate 46.5% greater than chance, sad behaviours at 36.6%, fear 
behaviours at 22.9% and anger at 50.5%. The corrected hit rates for secondary 
emotions were all lower, with embarrassed behaviours at 18.9%, shame at 1.3%, guilt 
at 5.7%, and pride behaviours at 13.4%. 
From the reader's point of view, the difficulty with this particular approach to the 
analysis is that the corrected hit rates change depending on the emotions, clip types 
and cultures one wishes to compare at any given time. Additionally, the non-matched, 
repeated and categorical nature of the data set means that analytic options are sadly 
limited. While imperfect, the best compromise in this regard was to use the 
transformed proportions for descriptive purposes (tables and figures), and to use a 
combination of chi-square analyses based on the raw data for significance testing. 
The key assumption of a chi square analysis is that each datum is independent. As 
such, data in one cell cannot influence the others. In this study, each subject made 
eight categorical ratings, hence could thus potentially have appeared in more than one 
cell within a given analysis, and influenced other ratings49• One possibility in thi~ 
regard was to use only the first row of data from each subject in a given chi square. 
The difficulty encountered in these analyses was that often the combinations needed 
for analysis were so fine-grained that N often became too small to offer a statistic that 
represented the data. However, this analysis is used in cases where the number of 
criteria separating the ratings is low (less than eight). 
A related possibility was to run separate chi square analyses on each of the eight 
ratings made by a given subject. Again, this appeared an unhelpful way to proceed. 
Not only would the reader soon be overwhelmed by statistics and left wondering what 
was being demonstrated, but additional analyses of the analyses would be required to 
'determine' which of the eight was in fact the correct or most representative statistic. 
49 There are in fact statistical procedures available for repeated-measures categorical data such as 
Cochran's Q or McNemar chi square. Unfortunately, these analyses require that the data represent 
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Consequently, a variant of chi square is occasionally used in which the frequencies for 
each cell were calculated for each of the eight ratings, and then averaged before entry 
into the chi square. Finally, where possible, chi squares were run using only the first 
time that data from each subject that met the desired criteria. For example, the first 
rating from a given subject with a target of happiness is used, but not the second. 
Overall, the variant used in each case represents the belief that the resultant statistic is 
the most representative of the raw data, and hence the most useful. To communicate 
these variants to the reader, the following notation is used: 
first -row only analyses are presented with an "a" in italic subscript 
average-based statistics are presented with a "b" in italic subscript 
analyses of the first relevant rating per subject are presented with a "c" in 
italic subscript 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that emotional behaviour clips deriving from all emotions 
would be correctly recognised at greater than chance rates . The transformed 
recognition data relevant to this hypothesis are presented in Figure 8.7 below. 
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Figure 8.7 - The chance-corrected proportions of correct identifications of happy, sad, 
fearful, angry, embarrassed, ashamed, guilt and proud behaviour. 
matched sets, which the random procedure used here does not enable. This is a weakness of the design, 
and will be rectified in further research of this type. 
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From the figure, it is evident that the first hypothesis has been substantially, although 
not completely upheld. Chi square goodness of fit analyses were conducted in which 
the expected frequency was stipulated at chance (0.125 or 1/8) levels (as if the 
subjects were guessing)50. Based on the first observation from each subject per 
emotion, the analyses showed that recognition rates were significantly greater than 
chance for happy (X2 (1) = 307.02c, p < 0.05), sad (X2 (1) = 226.68c, p < 0.05), fear 
(X2 (1) = 54.86c, p < 0.05), angry(X2 (1) = 427.70c, P < 0.05), embarrassment (X2 (1) = 
27.24c, P < 0.05), shame (./y2 (1) = 5.97c, n.s.) and pride (X2 (1) = 9.58c, p < 0.05) 
behaviour clips. Contrary to hypothesis one however, guilt (X2 ( 1) = 2.43c, n.s.), 
behaviour clips were not recognised at a rate greater than chance. 
In considering the recognition rates as revealed by the geopolitical breakdown, a 
similar pattern of recognition can be seen. 
08 
anger anger 
07 
0.6 
0 1.!Ippy 
~ 0.5 ~ 
I=: sa4ea g 0.4 
happy 
sad anger happy happy anger 
sad 
sad 
'2 
00 OJ 0 
<.) 
0 ~~II ~ 02 "'Cj .s 01 <.) Q) t: 
0 0.0 
<.) 
Q) 
fea 
I,e, fea mbarr 
barr 
pride arr pride 
gl.lil Ih.me I I .:.1 
sl l ne 8- It 
<.) 
-0.1 c:: 
<13 
..c: 
·0.2 U 
c.s 
.g 
(\) 
a 
<: 
:i 
Geopolitical Region 
Figure 8.8 - The chance-corrected proportions of correct identifications of happy, sad, 
fearful , angry, embarrassed, ashamed, guilt and proud behaviour across North 
American, European, Australasian, and Asian samples. 
50 Russell (1994) among others, has suggested that chance is not the proper baseline for these 
comparisons in that significance testing on this basis can only reject the null hypothesis that subjects 
are responding randomly (see also Keltner & Haidt, 1999). However, given the paucity of emotion-
behaviour theorising demonstrating this effect is a good start. In the case of at least seven emotions, 
subjects are clearly not guessing when they make their ratings. 
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As with the overall results, the North American sample were noticeably better at 
recognising behaviours stemming from the four primary emotions (happy (0.50), sad 
(0.40), fear (0.39), anger (0.71)) than they were are at recognising those from 
secondary emotions (embarrassment (0.24), shame (0.07), guilt (0.05), or pride 
(0.24)). The European sample recognised happy (0.50), sad (0.42), fear (0.21), and 
anger (0.44) at similar rates (see below), while recognising embarrassment (0.12), 
guilt (0.09), shame (-0.07) and pride (0.15) based behaviours at lower rates. 
The Australasian or 'source' group recognised happy (0.46), sad (0.40), fear (0.27) 
anger (0.71), at similar levels, while recognising embarrassment (0.15), shame (0.05), 
guilt (-0.0.9), and pride (0.15) based behaviours at poorer rates. Finally, the Asian 
sample appears to have recognised the behaviour clips at a slightly lower rate overall. 
Nonetheless, the primary emotions were far more likely to be identified, this sample 
correctly identifying recognised happy (0.44), sad (0.36), fear (0.19), and anger (0.46) 
clips at rate considerably higher than the rates for embarrassment (0.19), shame 
(0.01), guilt (0.07), and pride (0.10) based behaviours. 
In descriptively summarising the data thus far, it appears that the four primary 
emotions are consistently identified on the basis of behaviour at a higher rate than are 
any of the secondary emotions (see below). Among the secondary emotions, pride 
and embarrassment-based behaviour clips are typically the easiest to identify, with 
guilt and shame-based clips evidently the most difficult. 
As predicted, chi square analyses revealed no differences between the four 
geopolitical groups in the recognition rates for either primary (X2 (3) = 0.98b , n.s.) or 
secondary emotions (X2 (3) = 0.22b, n.s.)51. Additional analyses, comparing each 
emotion across the four groups showed no differences for happiness (X2 (3) = 1.79c, 
n.s.), sad (X2 (3) = 1.12e, n.s.), fear (X2 (3) = 2.84c, n.s.), embarrassment (X2 (3) = 
2.48e, n.s.), or shame (X2 (3) = 2.76e, n.s.) based behaviour clips. Similarly, the 
recognition rate for anger (X2 (3) = 6.74e, p < 0.05) and pride (X2 (3) = 5.73e, p < 0.05) 
based behaviours did not differ across the four geopolitical groups, although these 
results approached significance (p = 0.10 and 0.15 respectively). Inspection of Figure 
51 The finding of no difference in the recognition rate for secondary emotion based behaviours is in 
contrast to Hypothesis 5, and is presented again below. 
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8.8 suggests that there may be higher recognition rates for anger (in the North 
American and Australasian samples) and pride (in the North American sample). 
Possible reasons for these near-exceptions to a generally supportive data set are 
considered below. 
Hypothesis 3 
It was predicted that self reported behavioural urge and modified urge clips would be 
identified at a higher rate than actual behaviour clips. As can be seen in the figure 
below, this hypothesis was not supported for either primary or secondary emotions. 
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Figure 8.9 - Showing the raw identification rate for primary and secondary emotions 
as a function of behaviour clip type (NB: No transformations have been applied to 
these data, as the grouping variable is an independent variable only). 
Chi square analyses also show that there is no difference in the raw recognition rates 
of urge, actual, and modified urge behaviour clips (X2 (2) = O.86b, n.s.) overall, or in 
the specific analyses of primary (X2 (2) = O.14b, n.s.) or secondary (X2 (2) = O1.80b, 
n.s.) emotions. Contrary to much theory then, these data snggest that consistencies in 
behaviour are equally (and remarkably readily) evident to other people in both felt 
urges and in actual behaviour. 
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Hypotheses 4 and 5 
Having established some preliminary evidence for cross-cultural relationships 
between emotions and behaviour, the next stage of the analysis was to test the 
hypotheses designed to more precisely extend our knowledge about these phenomena. 
Above, data have been described that suggest that the behaviours deriving from the 
four primary emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger) are more easily identifiable 
than those from secondary emotion (embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride) behaviours. 
Analyses conducted on the first rating by each subject showed a significant difference 
in the overall frequencies of correct identifications of primary and secondary 
emotions (X2 (1) = 22.37a, p < 0.05). Similarly, North American (X2 (1) = 4.38b, P < 
0.05), European (X2 (1) = 4.49b, p < 0.05), Australasian (X2 (1) = 4.04b, P < 0.05), and 
Asian (X2 (1) = 19.80b, P < 0.05) samples analysed individually were all significantly 
better at correctly identifying primary emotions. 
It was also predicted that subjects from the geopolitical group that provided the 
stimuli (the 'source' culture) would be better at recognising emotional behaviours 
derived from secondary emotions than other groups (Hypothesis 5). However, there 
was no differences in the rate of correct identification of secondary emotion 
behaviours between the four geopolitical groups (X2 (1) = 0.22b, n.s.). Subjects from 
the source culture were thus no better than any other subjects at recognising 
secondary emotion based behaviours. 
Hypothesis 6 
Table 8.7 (overleaf) shows the rate of recognition for each emotion, as well as the 
overall rate, as a function of the intensity of the emotional experience. As predicted, 
the overall proportion of correct identification varied strongly with the intensity of the 
original emotional experience (r = 0.83, P < 0.05), in which behaviours deriving from 
more intense experiences were significantly more likely to be correctly identified (see 
Table 8.7 overleaf). 
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Emotion 
Intensity Happy Sad Fear Anger Embarr Shame Guilt Pride All 
1 4/12 3/4 2/6 0/6 2/14 11141 (0.33) - - (0.75) (0.33) (0.00) (0.14) - (0.26) 
2 6/11 7/12 2/22 0/24 0/2 15/77 - (0.35) (0.58) - (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) - (0.20) 
3 5/11 5/15 10142 13/18 7/34 2/23 6/36 0/4 48/188 (0.45) (0.25) (0.24) (0.72) (0.21) (0.09) (0.17) (0.00) (0.26) 
4 26/38 10122 13/51 9127 28/61 0/29 5/30 11148 102/306 (0.68) (0.45) (0.26) (0.33) (0.46) (0.00) (0.17) (0.23) (0.33) 
5 611127 29/80 22/59 21151 24/101 6/61 8/98 37/167 208/744 (0.48) (0.36) (0.37) (0.41) (0.24) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (0.28) 
6 61194 43/101 18/79 90/141 0/11 5/54 7/76 13/92 237/648 (0.65) (0.43) (0.23) (0.64) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.37) 
7 40/75 55/89 311120 51180 4/20 3/61 2/21 10/53 196/523 (0.53) (0.62) (0.26) (0.64) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.38) 
Pearson's 
r 0.62 0.76 -0.60 -0.28 -0.33 0.57 -0.05 0.49 0.83 
Table 8.7 - Raw correct identification (and proportion correct) per emotion and 
intensity and the correlation between intensity and proportion of correct recognition 
for the eight emotions (NB: Missing cells indicate that no clips of that combination of 
intensity and emotion were available for rating. Correlations calculated using N=7 
levels of intensity, and using casewise deletion) 
However, post-hoc analyses within each of the eight emotion categories suggests that 
the relationship between intensity and the 'identifiability' of behaviour may be 
somewhat more complex. While the rate of identification for happiness (r=0.62), 
sadness (r=0.76), shame (r=0.57) and pride (r=0.49) behaviour clips increased linearly 
with the intensity of the original emotional experience, fear (r=-0.60), anger (r=-0.28), 
and embarrassment (r=-0.33) showed the opposite trend, and guilt (r=-0.05) showed 
no relationship. Behaviours stemming from fear, anger, and embarrassment were less 
likely to be correctly identified the more intense the original experience had been. 
Methodological/statistical and theoretical evaluations of these data are made below. 
Discussion 
If anything, the data presented here demonstrate that people from a large number of 
countries are not guessing when they attempt to infer another person's emotion on the 
basis of their behaviour alone. As predicted, behaviours stemming from experiences 
of primary emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, and anger) were all correctly identified 
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at rates significantly above chance. The secondary emotions of embarrassment, 
shame, and pride were also recognised at above-chance rates, while participants 
appear to have been guessing when attempting to identify behaviours stemming from 
experiences of guilt. As expected, behaviours stemming from experiences of the four 
primary emotions were correctly identified at significantly higher rates than those 
derived from the four secondary emotions. Although the data do not enable a 
definitive comment, it seems reasonable to suppose that the emotions associated with 
these behaviours were somehow 'easier' to identify. 
fudirectly supporting the idea that there may be a systematic relationship between 
overt behaviour and emotion is the failure to support the third hypothesis. While it 
was expected that self-reported urges and modified urges would be less intertwined 
with self-regulatory and situational variables (hence be more readily identified) than 
actual behaviour, the data show that the identification of behaviour clips did not vary 
in this regard. Participants were equally able to identify emotions within the 
complexities of actual behaviour as they were from urges or felt action tendencies. 
As predicted, the rates at which emotional behaviours were correctly identified 
showed a strong positive correlation with the intensity of the original emotional 
experience. In these data, the more intense the original experience had been, the more 
likely it was that the emotion preceding or accompanying the associated behaviour 
would be correctly identified. The data do however suggest that the relationship 
between the intensity of emotion and the identifiability of behaviour is complex and 
may not be the same for each emotion. Positive relationships between intensity and 
rate of identification were found for behaviours associated with happiness, sadness, 
shame and pride, while negative relationships were evident in ratings about fear, 
anger, and embarrassment behaviours, and guilt showed no relationship whatsoever. 
Most importantly, the results presented here were consistent across four geopolitical 
samples. There were no differences between samples from the four geopolitical 
regions in their ability to correctly identify behaviours from either primary or 
secondary emotions. Contrary to expectation, further analyses likewise showed that 
participants from the four regions were equally capable of identifying the behaviours 
associated with secondary emotions. 
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Substantiating the forced-choice paradigm 
It appears typical in psychological presentations to offer a self-generated 
methodological critique during either the 'methods' section itself or later in the 
discussion. However, much of the theory 'supported' by this study rests on a 
particular interpretation of the data and certain assumptions regarding the method, 
hence some time will be spent considering methodological issues in advance. 
Forced-format methods are widely used in emotion theory, particularly in testing 
universality theses for facial expression. However, the method has recently been 
subjected to a series of critiques and their theoretical utility called into question (see 
e.g. Russell, 1993, 1994, 1995). While Russell's concerns are leveled at recognition 
and forced-format methods in facial expression, many of the criticisms he outlines are 
relevant to the methodology and interpretation here, hence are briefly rebutted below. 
Throughout the results section, and in the brief discussion thus far, descriptions of the 
data have deliberately been framed in terms of 'correct identification' rather than 
'recognition' per se. The reason for this terminology is not because I have difficulty 
believing that subjects are in fact recognising the emotions 'behind' the behaviour 
clips, but rather because the forced-choice paradigm does not actually enable 
comment on whether subjects 'recognised' the target emotion or whether they simply 
chose the option that most closely approximated that which they would preferred -
the best available option (Russell, 1993, 1994). Free response formats are one 
obvious answer to this concern (see e.g. Haidt & Keltner, 1999), although these 
methods have their own particular problems52. 
Russell (1994) has argued that the "forced choice format clearly alerts the subject to 
the experimenter's expectation that the ... expression is to be interpreted in terms of 
emotion, and even which emotions" (p. 116; although see Izard, 1994b for a 
response). While there are some senses in which this concern must be valid and poses 
52 Although Haidt and Keltner's (1999) research in fact suggests few differences. between free response 
and force choice methodologies, interpretative problems are likely in situations where (for example) 
the target emotion was 'angry' and the respondent reported that they thought the person was 'enraged'. 
In this situation it becomes difficult to know whether to score the estimation as incorrect, correct or 
somewhere in between. 
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a genuine concern (see e.g. Haidt & Keltner, 1999 pp. 228 - 9), it strikes this author 
as a generally unhelpful remark. In the current study the key item stated: "Based on 
the description above, which emotion do you think the person was most likely feeling 
at this time?" (see Appendix 7). Although it is not explicitly stated that the behaviour 
clip was emotional, this is clearly implied by the item itself as well as by the nature of 
the available responses. However, failing to direct the subject's attention to the 
phenomena of interest would (at best) have produced data relevant to an 
understanding of whether, how frequently, and how accurately individuals explain 
contextless behaviour in terms of emotion. Consequently, it would not elicit 
responses suitable to testing the hypotheses of interest here. If this criticism is taken 
too seriously we will find ourselves unable to ask people how they feel at all. After 
all, doing so would presuppose that they actually feel something, which in fact they 
may not. 
Russell (1993) also suggests that many previous studies usmg forced-choice 
methodologies are weakened in they cannot prove that a consensus or modal rating of 
the stimuli is actually the 'correct' answer. Insofar as this criticism goes, I am in 
agreement with him here, although his concern is somewhat less relevant within the 
current design. In the current study, the behavioural clip stimuli were derived from 
actual experiences and events, at least insofar as recollective self-reports can measure 
them. As such, we can be reasonably sure that a 'target' emotion was actually 
available for identification. While we can of course question the generality of the 
self-report stimuli on the basis of memory bias and prototype concerns (see below), 
we have no real grounds on which to challenge the presence of a clear target. If we 
do not accept our subject's reports of their own states, even where they are 
recollected, who are we to believe, and on what basis will we infer emotions? 
Finally, Russell (1994) has also been critical of both the lack of contextual 
information in previous research (see also Fernandez-Dols & Carroll, 1997) and of the 
'artificial' or posed nature of the stimuli typically used. In considering the first issue, 
it is simply noted that as much context as possible was deliberately removed from the 
behavioural clips. The simple reason for this is that the study was designed to 
illustrate that emotions generate a behaviour type that was recognisable to all people. 
Unnecessarily including context within the text stimuli could only have weakened the 
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ability of the data to speak to the issues here, instead creating competing explanations 
for consistency in terms of commonly shared contextual (Harrison, 1986) or 
antecedent variables (e.g. Ellsworth, 1994b; Frijda, 1994c; Keltner & Buswell, 1996). 
In considering the second issue, it is noted that the stimuli were only as artificial as is 
necessarily engendered by any self-report measurements of emotions. In creating the 
behavioural clips, the instructions asked participants to briefly read all items, to recall 
a recent occasion in which they had felt one of the eight emotions, and to report on 
what they first felt like doing (the urge) and what they actually did. The stimuli 
generating items were intentionally placed in this particular sequence in order to 
maximise the likelihood that subjects would express any discrepancies between felt 
urges and regulated actual behaviour (e.g. DePaulo, 1993). Although requesting only 
one episode of an emotion may encourage prototype emotion episodes or events 
(Keltner & Buswell, 1996), requesting recent occasions, coupled with an indicated 
opportunity and implicit encouragement to express both felt urges and actual 
behaviours would seem to minimise the artificiality of the stimuli used here. Finally, 
subjects were never explicitly made aware which parts of the data they provided 
would be re-used, although ethical procedures required that they be informed of this 
possibility in a general sense. 
Inferring universals in emotion and behaviour 
As noted earlier, the current studies were conducted to investigate a particular 
conceptualisation of the relationships between emotions and behaviour. Although the 
paradigm and data could well be used to do so, they were not designed to explore the 
accuracy with which participants identify emotions from behaviour. Rather, it was 
thought that a cross-cultural identification paradigm provided a well-developed 
framework within which to begin investigating the possibility of universals in the 
relationships between emotions and overt behaviour. While the thinking behind this 
interpretation is comparatively straightforward, the conceptual shift from 
identification data to theorising about universals in emotion-behaviour relationships is 
critical to the theory presented below, hence some time will be spent explaining the 
logic behind this particular use of the data. 
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The logical sequence begins with what appears a commonsensical view of emotions 
and behaviour. When we are attempting to work out how someone else feels we do 
so using a combination of vocal, facial, postural, and behavioural information, as well 
as cues about the situation and our knowledge of the people involved. Sometimes 
however, we make our estimations on the basis of one set of cues alone - we simply 
watch the way people act, and what they do. Describing just how effective people are 
at judging emotions from behaviour has been an important part of this research. 
However, demonstrating that people can identify emotions from behaviour alone begs 
a number of key questions. How and why could this ability could come to be? How 
is it that we can tell what lovers, friends, family and even strangers feel simply by 
observing the way they act? Equally importantly, why do we do so? 
Although the abilities to infer, represent, and utilise perceptions about the emotional 
states of others are different phenomena from emotion per se, they are clearly related 
to the 'why' component of this puzzle. It seems fairly evident that being able to infer 
and attribute internal states like emotions is a very useful adaptation, enabling more 
precise predictions regarding the likely behaviour of conspecifics, and communicating 
much about the state of the environment. A man shouting and gesturing violently 
with his fists is probably angry (and thus dangerous), while a person running quickly 
whilst looking over their shoulder is probably afraid (of something potentially 
threatening). Being able to extract these signals from a background of deception and 
regulation make inference a complex business, yet the adaptation nonetheless works a 
fair proportion of the time (Frijda, 1986). 
Given the evidence that this type of prediction appears useful, the next step then 
comes in determining how such prediction is made possible. Why does the prediction 
of emotions from behaviours, and of behaviours from emotions actually work? What 
is it about some behaviours that makes them so conspicuously emotional? More 
specifically, why is overt behaviour such a useful guide to internal feeling states, 
despite the fact that the predictor we are using (behaviour) is almost always 
confounded by personality, regulatory and situational variables? 
One initial possibility considered was that we simply learn that certain types of 
behaviour are a consequence of certain emotions. ill this view, we might watch and 
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listen to our caregivers, our friends, and ourselves, thus acquiring a working 
compendium of emotion-behaviour relationships that we subsequently use for both 
instrumental and predictive ends. Logically, the problem with this view is that it 
could not explain why our idiosyncratic compendiums continue to operate effectively 
in completely novel situations, allowing us to infer emotions in people that we do not 
know, in situations that we do not understand. Perhaps moreover, this view is 
difficult to reconcile with the data presented above. There were no significant 
differences between the four geopolitical samples in the rates at which they identified 
emotions from the behaviours of a single cultural sample (New Zealand). If our ideas 
about emotions and behaviour are learned, why then do people from nearly 25 
countries appear to be learning approximately the same things? 
My suggestion III this regard is that the ability to predict emotion-behaviour 
relationships has arisen and is retained precisely because emotions engender 
identifiable types of behaviour. If emotions and behaviour were not systematically 
related, people could not use behaviour to predict emotions and would fail an 
identification task. They would not be able to identify emotions from behaviour with 
anywhere near the accuracy levels that have been demonstrated, even within a given 
culture, much less across cultures. 
Other competing explanations for these data can be made through reference to a 
common English language and the comparatively 'Westernised' nature of the cross-
cultural sample. The nature of the stimuli, the use of the Internet as a collection 
method, and the consequent necessity for the sample to read and write English as well 
as have familiarity and access to the Internet mean that the sample is still reasonably 
homogenous, hence the data can probably be explained in terms of language53 . 
Although this explanation cannot be discounted, a serious application of a linguistic 
perspective would have predicted differences between the groups that speak English 
as a first language and those that do not. This was not the case here. Parenthetically, 
it can also be noted that a similar rationale led to the fifth hypothesis. It was thought 
53 Future research of this kind should use a variety stimuli (e.g. non-text based and as non-prototypical 
as possible). It should likewise investigate a wider range of emotions and a more strongly cross-
cultural sample, systematically considering how emotion and action relate. 
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that secondary emotion based behaviours would be more 'symbolic' and steeped in 
cultural meaning than primary emotions, with a consequence that the source sample 
would be better at identifying them. Again, this was not the case here, hence the 
equivalent identification rate across the groups in the identification of the eight 
emotions still begs for explanation. 
A more parSImOnIOUS interpretation of these data is that there are universal 
relationships between some emotions and overt behaviour. Notably stronger in the 
case of the four primary emotions considered here, these relationships are equally 
evident to people, irrespective of their facility with the English language or cultural 
background. It has been argued that we are only able to use behaviour as a cue to 
emotional states because they continue to be a reliable predictor of them. That people 
from a number of cultures were equally capable of identifying emotions from 
behaviour, is, I believe a reasonable basis upon which to theorise about biological 
universals in the relationships between emotions and behaviour. This is the focus of 
the next section. 
Emotions and behaviour: A conceptualisation and theory 
This final section is organised in three parts. The first of these reiterates how 
important an understanding of emotion-behaviour relationships is to the scientifi~' 
study of emotions. It revisits the conceptualisations offered by Frijda (1986) .1Ild 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990a, 1990b), and discusses the data in terms of evolutionaf)-
functionalism and its implications for emotion theory. The second section build~ on 
the first and offers a new dynamic systems theory describing how the emotion ... 
generate and influence behaviour. Specific attention is focussed on differences in 
emotion-behaviour relationships between primary and secondary emotions, and on the 
implications following the failure to find a difference between urge and actual 
behaviour identification. Ideas previously used in this thesis to describe the place of 
emotions in personality development are reconceptualised, and then integrated with 
elements from the theories of Ortony, et. al. (1988), Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992), 
and Frijda (1986) to create a theory of emotion and behaviour. Finally, directions for 
future research are given. 
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Emotions and behaviour: General views and evolutionary functionalism 
It was taken as a starting point in this research that the emotions have evolved because 
they increase the time-selected 'appropriateness' of the organism's interactions with 
the environment. Following explicit evolutionary reasoning (cf. Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990b), it was further argued that the emotions ultimately ought to be represented in 
overt behaviour if they are to be useful in meeting adaptive challenge (see also 
Solomon, 1993). The data presented. above clearly support this approach, 
unequivocally indicating that emotions are systematically related to identifiable 
patterns of overt behaviour. 
This is a singularly important result as the relationships between emotion and 
behaviour have been infrequently discussed in emotion theory. Where mentioned, 
theorists have preferred to focus on the flexibility of behaviour (e.g. Averill, 1998) 
and the notion of functional equivalence (e.g. Smith & Pope, 1992), consciously or 
unconsciously imposing a standard of specificity to potential emotion-behaviour 
relationships we would never expect in another domain. Of course emotions are not 
innately linked to fixed action patterns or reflexes (Frijda, 1986), but neither are 
emotions fixedly linked to the content of specific appraisals or exactly the same facial 
expression. In this sense, consistency and innateness rest in the eye of the beholder. 
That which we 'discover' is inescapably dependent on the standard of relationship we 
expect, ultimately resting on an issue of specificity. Although the data types are not 
directly comparable, the identification rates presented here in the context of emotion 
and behaviour approximate those discovered in appraisal (see e.g. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Roseman, et. aI., 1990, 1996; Scherer, 1997) and action tendency (e.g. Frijda, 
et. aI., 1989) research. 
The importance of this finding cannot be overstated, as it reaches to the core of our 
conceptualisations about emotions, the relationships between emotion and behaviour, 
and our ideas of emotions and function. While aspects of each emotion and each 
behaviour are to a degree unique (see below), so too are key aspects of them shared. 
Emotions are not only phenomenological or social phenomena, but rather biologically· 
based and systemic response patterns that continue to generate recognisable types of 
overt behaviour in our current adaptive context. Supporting this view, the current 
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research has demonstrated that the consistencies in emotion-behaviour relationships 
do not only exist at the level of felt urges or action impulses (Frijda, 1986), but are 
equally evident to an observer in displays of actual behaviours as well. 
More generally, the data presented here suggest that the functional equivalence of 
behaviour exists and can therefore be investigated at a discrete emotion, normative 
and cross-cultural level, rather than necessarily or only at the level of the individual's 
goals. They also suggest that behavioural correlates, outcomes and changes should be 
explicitly incorporated within discussions of function and the emotions. Emotions 
were selected as adaptations because they engender particular types of adaptive 
behaviour change. Exactly what these are and how they are best conceptualised 
remains unclear, but that emotions exert a systematic influence on behaviour cannot 
be denied and must not be forgotten. 
Emotions and behaviour: A dynamic systems conceptualisation of influence 
The view that emotions have evolved and function to generate adaptive behaviour 
appears substantially supported by the data from this study. These data cast serious 
doubt on the idea that any emotion can lead to the expression of any behaviour, and 
suggest that some emotions engender cross-culturally identifiable behaviour types. 
Below, a preliminary theory of emotions and behaviour is developed. The theory 
suggests that when goal relevant changes are signaled, the emotions exert a direct 
influence on adaptive response behaviour. Although the manner in which we actually 
behave is influenced by a large number of other factors (see below), it is suggested 
that the emotions automatically create an attractor for a behaviour sequence 
commensurate with the function of the emotion, the situation, and the goal in 
question. 
While this theory is intended to represent the beginnings of a general theory of 
emotions and behaviour, if focuses on the four primary emotions. The most obvious 
reason for this emphasis is because the data are considerably more supportive of 
emotion-behaviour links for the discrete primary emotions of anger (51 %), sadness 
(37%), fear (23%), and happiness (47%). Primary emotions were correctly identified 
significantly more often than the secondary emotions of embarrassment (19%), shame 
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(1 %), guilt (6%), and pride (13%i4. However, this difference was predicted precisely 
because the four emotions described as primary are 'different' from the others. Each 
is thought to be present in all mammals (cf. Plutchik, 1980, 1982), has clear ANS 
correlates (Ekman, 1994a), and is capable of fulfilling adaptive function and 
engendering behaviour in the absence of consciousness (see Chapter 4). Being less 
cognitively complex, these four emotions are more primitive and typically bear a 
more immediate and readily accessed relationship to overt behaviour. They are the 
focus of this section. 
In chapter six, it was argued that emotions reflexively generate new attractors or goals 
in the personality state space. It was suggested that these emergent forms represented 
the interactions between the activating goal or attractor, the situation, and the emotion 
in question. In chapter seven, this idea was extended somewhat and it was reasoned 
that the attractors created in these processors must inevitably represent something of 
the emotion responsible for their appearance in their form. Finally, in the section on 
function and emotion above (see Chapter 8.5), it was suggested that this process could 
be conceptualised as developmental, operating across two distinct, though 
complementary, time frames. 
Following this conceptualisation, it is suggested that a critical microdevelopmental 
function for the primary emotions is to reflexively generate a new attractor for 
adaptive behaviour. Within the current theory, this adaptive process occurs 
automatically, inescapably, and invariably. Primary emotions always create attractors 
for behaviour, whether or not enacting the new attractor would actually assist the 
organism at the time (see Frijda, 1986), whether they 'desire' it, and notwithstanding 
whether any behaviour is actually undertaken. At base, these attractors make 
evolutionarily selected behaviour-types more likely, encapsulating the function of the 
emotion in their form. Just as core relational themes allow an organism to map the 
54 The comparatively low recognition rate for fear, and the small difference between fear and 
embarrassment is thought to have arisen due to a differential tendency for people to describe 
embarrassment in terms of facial 'behaviour'. Additionally, gaining access to genuine episodes of fear 
proved very difficult in this study. Inspection of the fear stimuli suggests that unambiguous episodes of 
fear are uncommon in New Zealand society, particularly for male respondents. Many of their 
descriptions appear to describe what might better be categorised as experiences of anxiety or denote 
situations where fear was present but controlled, as in the case of extreme sporting events. This 
interpretation is supported by post-hoc t-tests which show female experiences to have been 
significantly more unpleasant (t (361) = -4.31, P < 0.01) and more intense (t (361) = 2.46, p < 0.01). 
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infinity of real-world events to a finite set of organism-environment relationships, so 
too do the emotions constrain the attractors for behaviour, enabling an instant 
synthesis of previously adaptive behaviour types with the demands of novel and 
completely unforeseen settings. 
Within the current theory, these automatic emotion-behaviour attractors always exert 
some influence on later behaviour, whether or not the system's functioning ever 
occupies this particular area of the state space (whether the'behaviour is ever enacted). 
Attractors do not immediately cease to exist or influence in situations where they are 
suppressed, inhibited or denied. Nor are they nothing more than a felt urge, although 
they may be experienced in this way. As attractors, they always influence the 
eventual form of overt behaviour, although this influence may be both indirect and 
difficult to discern. This, I believe, is one reason we are as able to identify emotions 
from actual behaviour as we are from descriptions of self-reported urges. 
While an emotional response creates recognisible, shared, and normative aspects in 
behavioural attractors, these attractors nonetheless emerge afresh at each 
microdevelopmental juncture. This is particularly important to the current model in 
that it provides one way in which to conceptualise both the flexibility and stereotypy 
of emotional behaviour, a difficult issue in emotion-behaviour theorising. 10hnson-
Laird and Oatley (1992) have previously argued that some action is probably better 
than becoming lost in thought, with a consequence that a biologically based response 
system makes ready a small repertoire of actions appropriate to a particular type of 
goal relationship. According to them, this mechanism then tends to constrain the 
individual to choose the next action sequence from the repertoire. In many respects 
their view is similar to that of Levenson (1994a) who regards emotions as shifting 
behavioural hierarchies. 
The most obvious difficulty with this approach is that it neglects the 'uniqueness' of a 
behaviour that necessarily varies in relation to the context in which it occurs. This 
implicitly treats the behavioural repertoire of a given individual as highly pre-existent, 
leaving little room for development, change, and situational demand. In contrast, 
Ortony and colleagues (Ortony, et. aI., 1988) have suggested that many of the 
behaviours made likely by emotions are constructed on-line - as they are needed. In a 
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manner similar to the current theory, they have suggested that behaviours result from 
the interactions between goal-relevant emotional processes and relatively specific 
local considerations. Extending this reasoning, the current theory suggests that while 
behavioural attractors may be present within the organism's existing action 
hierarchies (see below), that frequently they are not, and in most instances a novel 
behavioural attractor emerges. 
Behavioural attractors emerge in the immediate proximity of the activating motive or 
attractor, their form typically appearing as an interactive function of the emotional 
state with the situation or eliciting stimuli55 . In line with Frijda (1986), these new 
attractors can usefully be thought of as a form of 'automatic behavioural goal' and are 
accorded a similarly high profile in the current conceptualisation of the emotional 
response - they always emerge. Behavioural attactors are not random in their 
placement within the state space. Rather, specific behavioural attractors emerge in the 
proximity of the relevant attractor or attractors (Killeen, 1992), what I have (for 
simplicity) termed the' activating motive.' 
Despite the complexities involved in equating general motivational concepts such as 
'goal' with specific behavioural acts or sequences, the current writer considers 
emotionally generated behavioural attractors as essentially no different to any other 
attractors or goals in the personality state space56 (see Chapter 6). Following Killeen 
(1989, 1991, 1992) it is suggested that attractors exist in complex hierarchies where 
individual acts merely represent the most specific level of hierarchical description. 
General goals or attractors can be broken down in a series of ever more specific 
attractors, culminating in discrete behavioural acts (see Chapters 2 and 6). In this 
view, any demarcation between goal and behavioural attractors is strictly a matter of 
preference. Conversely, considering emotionally generated behaviours as 'merely' a 
55 The issue of whether situational affordances and the physical limitations imposed by the environment 
are central to the generation of this attractor is an interesting issue. On the one hand, people sometimes 
feel an urge to act in a way that is impossible (e.g. harming a loved one who is dead), suggesting that 
the initial response may ignore what Frijda (1986) terms 'stimulus control'. On the other hand, 
verbally recounted experiences of emotion-behaviour attractors are so complex, that they may not 
represent the attractor accurately. 
56 Although it is a thorny issue (see Carver & Scheier, 1998, p. 100), and somewhat beyond the 
interests of this dissertation, considering all goals as being a part of the self has the additional 
advantage of meaning that every act, even one that is statistically very uncommon for that person, is 
theirs - they are responsible for it because in the moment of its emergence it is a part of them. 
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new attractor within the vast field of attractors comprising the personality state space 
has some substantial advantages when attempting to determine when and how 
someone will act (see below). 
As has been noted by many previous theorists, other factors, some having little or 
nothing to do with the emotions, determine whether a particular (or any) behaviour 
actually occurs when emotions arise (e.g. Ortony, et. aI., 1988; Mesquita & Frijda, 
1992; Brehm, 1999). Mesquita and Frijda (1992) list a number of mediating factors 
including expectations about the behaviour's effectiveness, its accessibility, and its 
availability in the action repertoire. Above, I have argued that a new behavioural 
attractor always emerges as a central part of the emotional response, yet people 
frequently behave in ways inconsistent with their emotions and urges (Polivy, 1998). 
How can this be? 
Reconciling this discrepancy is no small task, and one that cannot be adequately 
completed here. However, three key factors appear likely to influence whether an 
automatic behavioural attractor is ever enacted. Foremost among these in terms of 
emotion theory is the intensity of the emotional response. In many cases, the intensity 
of an emotional response can be taken as indicative of both the degree of 'challenge' 
to a goal (see Chapter 8.4) and the importance of the activating motive (represented 
by the attractor's depth). More importantly, when viewed in DS terms, I suggest that 
emotional intensity directly corresponds to the depth of the new attractor - its power 
to attract behaviour. The stronger the emotional response, the more powerful the 
attractor created, the more influence the attractor exerts on eventual behaviour, and 
hence the more likely it is that a discernibly 'emotional' behaviour will be enacted. 
Indirect support for this conceptualisation is found in data from the study above. In 
these data, behaviours stemming from more intense emotional experiences were 
correctly identified at a higher rate than low intensity behaviours. The relationship 
between identifiability and felt intensity was very strong (r = 0.83), with identification 
rates increasing linearly with increasing felt intensity. While it is an argument by 
implication, it seems reasonable to suppose that the reason that the behaviours 
associated with higher intensity experiences were more readily identified is that the 
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intensity of the emotional response created a much greater likelihood that the person 
would enact the new attractor57 . 
In terms of operation, the depth of the emergent behavioural attractor is also likely to 
determine the extent to which an individual is able to consciously inhibit or prevent 
the behaviour from occurring. Where emotional intensity is very high, the attractor is 
likely to be considerably more powerful and may often attract behaviour despite a 
conscious desire to do otherwise. As Lewis (1998b) notes, "the more intense the 
emotional state, the greater the number of expressive modalities that would be used to 
express that state" (p. 39). So even in situations where we know that an emotional 
behaviour will not help us achieve what we want, high intensity emotional states 
create a very strong tendency to behave in a manner commensurate with the function 
of the emotion. 
A second general grouping of factors likely to influence the extent to which a new 
behavioural attractor draws the systems functioning involves the stability and breadth 
of the attractor in comparison to the remainder of the state space. As noted earlier,' 
attractors exist and emerge in vast and comparatively labile networks of other 
attractors, the most stable elements of which, I have argued, constitute the personality. 
In this view, overt behaviour is rarely the consequence or enactment of a single 
attractor, but is more often a complex form 'determined' by the interactions between 
an enormous array of attractors. 
In Chapter 6 it was noted that new attractors are likely to be very unstable 
immediately upon their emergence. They may emerge only briefly before other (more 
powerful) attractors emerge in proximity and thus attract systemic behaviour in this 
area of the state space. While the stability of emotion-behaviour attractors probably 
57 However, it should be remembered that intensity was not always positively correlated with the 
identification rate when each emotion was analysed individually. In the case of fear experiences for 
example, the correlation was moderately negative (r = -0.60), indicating that more intense fear episodes 
were actually more difficult to identify. Exactly why this is so remains unclear, although a number of 
possibilities occur. For example, some emotions may have a disorganising effect on behaviour at very 
high levels. Alternately, the relationship between intensity and recognition may be non-linear, having 
either a quadratic form (cf. Brehm, 1999), a ceiling effect, or interacting differently for different 
emotions. Finally, it may be that intensity ratings should be made within an emotion category rather 
than across categories and that multiple episodes of a single emotion should be obtained from each 
subject. 
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varies somewhat depending on the relationship between function and duration for 
each emotion (see Chapter 7), emotion-behaviour attractors are typically less stable 
than other factors in the personality state space, and are only one influence on the 
eventual form of overt behaviour. 
The macrodevelopmental processes of learning, habit, and practice are likewise key 
variables in determining the eventual form of overt behaviour. Historically-repeated 
learning processes, particularly those representing the previously experienced 
consequences of emotional behaviour, create enduring attractors that may 'compete' 
with automatic ~motion-behaviour attractors. As with all attractors, these may be 
more or less clearly defined, situation or state specific, powerful, enduring and swift 
in their emergence. 
In some instances, a person may never behave in an overtly angry manner because 
experience has taught them that angry behaviours do not help. In the terms used here, 
as the person initially becomes angry, an attractor for 'angry' behaviour will emerge 
for them as it does for everyone. Concurrently however, existing attractors for what 
have been more 'helpful' behaviour styles deepen and begin to compete for 
behaviour. In many individuals and situations, these secondary attractors (which a 
behaviourist might well call habit, and which I would call regulatory-expressive 
attractors) may emerge automatically following the initial response and may exert an 
influence such that the innate emotion-behaviour attractor is never enacted - the 
person may never behave in an obviously angry manner. Alternately, people may 
near-reflexively enact emotion-behaviour attractors, displaying little regard for 
consequences or utility, exhibiting what might be termed poor impulse control or a 
lack of inhibition. In the case of emotional behaviours, development is likely to see 
these tendencies become highly rarefied, operating differentially for different 
emotions and different situations. 
Increasing the complexity of these processes is the fact that both emotions and 
emotion-behaviour attractors emerge in rapid and highly interactive sequences. 
Although I have argued that only one emotion (and by implication, one emotion-
behaviour attractor) can emerge in any given moment, it is almost certain that each of 
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us evaluates each single situation or event in respect of its implications for multiple 
goals. In this process, emotion-behaviour attractors will emerge as a part of each 
emotional response, each new attractor emerging as quickly as our appraisal system 
can move between evaluative criteria. Ultimately, overt behaviour in each moment 
may represent the influences of many general and specific attractors, the attractors 
interactively creating new 'compromise' attractors for behaviour. 
Finally, the ability to consciously represent attractors and the likely consequences of 
particular behaviour sequences (beliefs) is a critical influence in the eventual form of 
overt behaviour. Although attractors can determine the form of behaviour irrespective 
of awareness or intention, human behaviour is frequently a conscious and volitional 
concern. When the emotion-behaviour attractor emerges, people near-automatically 
represent and evaluate the attractor in terms of its likely consequences for both the 
activating motive and other relevant motivations. They may for example believe that 
the action urged by the attractor will not assist them, or feel that enacting the 
behaviour would be greatly inconsistent with other motivations they hold, such as the 
desire to conform to social display rules. In doing so, they consciously regulate 
behaviour, intentionally creating new attractors for a behaviour they prefer. In 
planning, people may represent a series of possible behavioural attractors, extending 
the likely consequences of them through time to examine their utility. Again, the 
eventual form of overt behaviour may bear little resemblance to that urged by the 
initial emotion-behaviour attractor, although this attractor necessarily exerts some 
influence perhaps explaining phenomena like 'affect leakage'. 
An important implication stemming from this view is that a given person's ability to 
regulate or inhibit behaviour (control their action impulses) can be regarded as a 
personality variable. In Chapter 4.5 it was suggested that one way to think of 
consciousness was to think of it as a personality variable describing the extent to 
which each person is aware of their own goals. It was argued that holding goals in 
consciousness is a useful measure of fitness, in that more comprehensive 
representations of the state space goals capacitate a more accurate, informed, and 
deliberative evaluation of what is needed to accomplish them. Emotion-behaviour 
attractors emerge within the personality state space in the proximity of the relevant 
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goals, comprising one more attractor. As such, the conscious awareness of how 
emotion-behaviour attractors fit into the goal hierarchy should enable a person to 
more precisely consider whether specific actions will actually assist them. Where the 
purpose of the action is available to consciousness, emergent behaviour can be more 
precisely tailored to these ends. For some individuals, the purpose of behaviour may 
often be unclear, and actions may be implemented with little or no awareness of 
exactly what the behaviour is 'designed' to achieve. 
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Emotions and behaviour: A model and example 
To this point, the discussion of how emotion influences overt behaviour has occurred 
at a highly abstract level. The reader could thus be forgiven for wondering what the 
theory I have proposed here actually means. Above, I have suggested that emotions 
exert a direct influence on behaviour, automatically creating an attractor for behaviour 
that represents the interactions between the emotion and the environment. In addition 
however, behaviour is clearly influenced by personality processes, notably the nature 
of activating motive, previous learning, beliefs, and knowledge of emotions, 
behaviour, and the situation, inhibitory capacities, and the conscious awareness of 
these processes. The basic operations of these influences are depicted in Figure 8.10 
below. 
1 
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Figure 8.10 - Emotions, personality and the generation of overt behaviour. in 
microdevelopmental time (NB: Solid lines represent inevitable events, influences or 
relationships, while dashed lines represent likely events, influences or relationships). 
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To illustrate, take a general goal that most individuals hold such as maintaining 
physical integrity. Now imagine that you have been cajoled into participating in an 
introductory sky diving course, and are in the back of a single engine Cessna at about 
3500 feet. There is some nervous banter going on, but you feel quietly confident. 
Suddenly, the door opens, and two of your more experienced colleagues drop 
screaming into the atmosphere. The looks of the instructor let you know that you are 
next, and you labour to the doorway. It is both colder and windier than you had 
thought it might be, and you struggle to hold the doorframe and strut, your hands 
moving uncertainly across the surface. The instructor counts down your jump. Three. 
Two. One. GO! Nothing. You try to release, but your hands feel as if they are 
welded to the fuselage. You glance around the inside of the cabin, your mind racing 
as you desperately seek a socially acceptable manner in which to clamber back to 
your seat. It seems as though dozens of possibilities have been considered and 
discarded, when the instructor says, "Not going today, huh?" Surprisingly galvanised 
by this remark, you look over to receive the grins of your remaining colleagues. They 
give you a big 'thumbs up,' your hands somehow release their death grip, and you 
fall. 
In this example, your initial inability to release is (quite reasonably) the result of 
intense fear generated by an appraisal of the situation as threatening your desire to 
retain physical integrity. The innate emotion-behaviour attractor that emerges 
(desperate gripping of the fuselage) emerges as a part of the fear response in 
conjunction with· the affordances of the situation (the options that are literally 
available). Emotion-behaviour attractors are infrequently environmentally 
independent, although it is not strictly necessary that the initial emotion-behaviour 
attractor pay heed to environmental affordances. For example, you may initially have 
felt a strong urge to run, even though there is nowhere to flee to. More typically 
however, the innate attractor is a combination of the emotion along with the 
situational affordances. In any case, the important point in this example is that in the 
initial moments of the emotional response you literally cannot release the strut. The 
emotion-behaviour attractor is simply too powerful and dominates behaviour for the 
first few seconds. 
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Following the initial response however you begin to consciously evaluate your 
response options. Fear still dominates both the cognitive and the action systems, so 
your initial evaluations still involve moving away from the threat (getting out of the 
doorway). You swiftly consider and discard a series of potential behaviours (and 
explanations), thus implementing your knowledge of your own motive structure, 
situational rules, social mores, and your beliefs regarding the likely consequences of 
potential behaviour sequences in terms of other goals (see e.g. Schultheiss & 
Brunstein, 1999). Your analysis ultimately reveals that there are no behaviours that 
will enable you to return to your seat without damaging your esteem goals and that 
you will have to drop. Yet despite your eventual decision to release, the initial 
emotion-behaviour attractor never ceases to influence behaviour, but must be 
deliberately overwhelmed. You consciously create an attractor for the necessary 
behavioural sequence (releasing), simultaneously inhibit the desire to climb back into 
the cabin, and fall from the plane . 
. . In this example, the inhibition of the initial emotion-behaviour attractor required a 
great deal of conscious consideration and effort. However, there is no reason that 
inhibitory processes must be conscious. For some individuals, the inhibition of 
particular behavioural attractors occurs so repeatedly across development, that no 
conscious effort is required. Alternate behavioural attractors are generated in near-
instantaneous conjunction with the innate response, drawing behaviour to a type that 
has been (or is believed to be) more useful in accomplishing goals. In other instances, 
deliberate training can mediate the effects of innate attractors. If, for example, you 
had had a number of jumps prior to this experience your behaviour would emerge 
somewhat differently. Your movements in the doorway would be more precise as 
practice would have produced more clearly defined attractors for the necessary 
positioning behaviours. Similarly, releasing would not be so difficult. Experientially, 
you expect the inevitable presence of the innate response, and you have developed the 
ability to inhibit this attractor. Likewise, your ability to consciously create the release 
attractor in this situation has been developed. The release attractor will emerge more 
quickly and be more precise. 
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Concluding remarks and future directions in emotion-behaviour research 
As the reader is probably aware, the thesis presented above represents a very strong 
statement regarding how emotions relate to and influence behaviour. Although future 
examinations and opinion will no doubt discover omissions and errors in the theory 
developed here, it has gone some way towards an understanding of an area we know 
little about. The basic position adopted is somewhat similar to that taken by Frijda 
(1986) when he suggests that the emotions should first and foremost be viewed as 
changes in action readiness. Although I am less convinced as to the definition of 
emotions as the perception or experience of these changes, primary emotions do lead 
to recognisable behaviours a surprisingly large proportion of the time. It has been 
argued that an initial emotion-behaviour attractor always emerges as a critical part of 
the emotional response, and thus invariably exerts an influence over the eventual form 
of overt behaviour (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Solomon, 1993). An important part 
of demonstrating this likelihood has been to show that actual behaviours are no less 
identifiable than a felt urge. Emotions are identifiably present in behaviour, despite 
the complexities imparted by situational and regulatory processes. 
Although I have argued that emotion-behaviour attractors always emerge, it must be 
acknowledged that the extent and timeframes over which they influence overt 
behaviour remains unclear. The discussion above has however offered several factors 
that appear likely to influence the degree to which a given behaviour is identifiably 
'emotional'. Foremost among these is the intensity of the emotional response and the 
resultant strength or depth of the emotion-behaviour attractor. More intense 
emotional responses increase the likelihood that these attractors will be enacted, 
although the exact process by which this tendency operates is similarly unclear. It 
may be that more intense responses generate more powerful attractors and/or that they 
reduce the capacity of the individual to regulate or inhibit them. 
Clearly, the concepts used here need be operationalised in a way that enables the more 
direct examination of the emotion-related variables hypothesised to influence overt 
behaviour. For example, different emotions are thought to have different 
characteristic time-courses (Frijda, et. aI., 1991; Malatesta-Magai & Culver, 1991), 
the nature of which I have suggested is strongly influenced by the function of the 
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emotional state (see Chapter 7). Following this assumption is the possibility that 
emotion-behaviour attractors may exert an influence on observable behaviour in line 
with the temporal nature of the emotion's function. 
Although the theory being developed here has stressed the normative aspects of 
emotions and behaviour, both are strongly idiographic and cultural phenomena. Some 
attention has been given to these influences, notably in the discussions of 
development, beliefs, and consciousness. However, future research could go 
considerably further in the examination of how personality and cultural variables 
mediate the relationships between emotions and behaviour. An obvious candidate for 
such research would be the consideration of how relatively stable personality 
variables (such as beliefs) impact on behaviour when we are emotional. Similarly, 
other personality variables such as trait consciousness level (see Chapter 4) and 
inhibitory capacities can be measured and related to the basic model. 
Additionally, the model presented here would expect that emotion-behaviour 
attractors would exert a proportionally greater influence on overt behaviour in 
organisms that have developed fewer conscious or implicit regulatory-expressive 
behavioural attractors. For example, it would be expected that emotions should be 
more identifiable from the behaviour of young infants, despite the data from Camra\ 
et. aI., (1993). Although they have previously reported that infant facial expression ... 
were not associated with patterns of bodily action differentiable to adults, it may be 
that the same behavioural attractors are emerging, but that the necessary requi ... ilc 
motor and muscular control parameters have not yet developed. The infant may be 
attempting to enact attractors, but simply cannot do so in a way we can discern yet. 
Nonetheless, developmental and cross-species comparisons would provide an 
additional test of the model offered here. 
To an extent, the view taken here may appear to advocate an unnecessary degree of 
normative rigidity in emotion-behaviour relationships that rails against the 
conspicuous flexibility and social nature of most human behaviour. However, as 
Lazarus (1991a) has noted, the response components of an emotion, once provoked, 
must be coordinated while still operating with some degree of independence, 
depending on the immediate demands, constraints of the transaction. In 
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conceptualising emotion-behaviour attractors as a means of implementing 
evolutionarily useful behaviour types within the demands and affordances of a 
particular environment, I have provided a framework suited to describing and 
explaining how and when emotional behaviour is implemented in context. While the 
normative thrust of this theory may disagree with some readers, I believe that the 
construction of normative theories of emotion and behaviour is implicit in the 
evolutionary-functionalist framework, and has the potential to greatly improve our 
understanding of emotions. 
Chapter 8.7 - Full circle: Concluding remarks on emotions 
Earlier, emotions were characterised as a heritable set of adaptive mechanisms that 
function systemically to inform, motivate and organise an organism's responses to the 
perception of a change in the status of a goal. The chapter focussed on a 
conceptualisation of emotional states rather than emotional experience, the latter 
having been comprehensively considered in Chapter 7. Although the 
conceptualisation offered was both multifaceted and necessarily complex, the ideas 
within it are linked through a consistent emphasis on the importance of an explicit 
scientific realist and evolutionary-functionalist approach to emotions. 
In elaborating the basic conceptualisation four major aspects of nine emotions were 
more fully discussed. The first of these stressed the importance of a discrete approach 
to emotions, arguing that the five primary and four secondary emotions discussed in 
the theory are universal phenomena in which the basic state-level components are 
innate. Emotions were characterised as specific modular adaptations that have 
evolved to deal with evolutionarily recurrent types of adaptive challenge. Following 
from this was the suggestion that for emotions to remain functional, they must 
necessarily emerge sequentially rather than simultaneously, in that genuinely 
simultaneous operation of different emotions would critically undermine the 
functioning of the systems. Overall, it was suggested that a normative and discrete 
approach is more consistent with the available evidence, as well as being more viable 
from an evolutionary-functionalist perspective. 
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Secondly, it was argued the cognitive appraisal of events in terms of their relevance 
to the individual's goals is a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of 
emotional states. It was suggested that while each component of emotions exerts an 
influence on temporally later aspects of emotions, including appraisals (see below), 
that the appraisals themselves are nonetheless causal in, and precede, each emotion. 
However, it was acknowledged that appraisal-based research, even that of a cross-
cultural nature, may not constitute the optimal framework within which to examine 
the proximate causes of emotions. An alternative framework using a longitudinal 
goal-diary design was presented, and the data from the two studies found to be 
consistent with the basic cognitive model. 
Thirdly, substantial attention was given to the concept of function in emotion theory. 
It was suggested that while an understanding of function is critical to an 
understanding of the emotions, the utility of existing functionalist frameworks is 
substantially impeded by conflict and misunderstanding regarding the concept of 
function itself. A four-level framework for examining function was presented in 
which it was suggested that an understanding of emotions could be powerfully 
advanced by developing a series of mutually informing functional analyses 
simultaneously across four levels. Overall, it was argued that an understanding of 
emotions necessitates an understanding of function, which in tum requires we 
explicitly adopt evolutionary reasoning, and consider the emotions as serving multiple 
and evolving functions across multiple timeframes. 
The final section concerned some of the issues involved in considering how the 
components of emotions relate. Following differential emotions theory, it was 
suggested that basic state-level components of emotions are substantially constrained 
in the manner in which they relate. However, it was also suggested that the 
relationships between the components of emotions may be restricted to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on the component, function, and emotion in question. 
Specific attention was then given to the place of behaviour in theories of emotions. It 
was argued (and then shown) that emotions and behaviour must be systematically 
related, especially if a particular theory is to endorse an evolutionary view. A 
preliminary theory of emotions and behaviour was developed in which it was 
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suggested that primary emotions automatically interact with the affordances of the 
specific environment to produce what was described as an emotion-behaviour 
attractor in the personality state space which exerts an inevitable influence on later 
behaviours. The intensity of emotion, personality variables, beliefs, situational 
knowledge, as well as inhibitory and representational capacities were then considered 
as potential mediators of this fundamental relationship. 
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Afterword 
It is a strange feeling to begin writing the conclusion to a major theoretical work, the 
contents of which I have been considering for more than four years. When I began 
writing, I felt profoundly discontented with the state of psychological theorising, and 
notwithstanding my own subsequent research, my restlessness has endured. Although 
I believe that this volume represents a significant contribution to the science of 
personality and emotion, I am also aware that it has its weaknesses and limitations. 
Some of these are described below. 
Having struggled for some time, I eventually titled the work "A dynamic theory of 
personality and emotions," unconsciously, although perhaps not unintentionally, 
reflecting the titles and themes of major works from Lewin (1935), Arnold (1960), 
Tomkins (1962, 1963) and Izard (1971, 1991). In some ways, such a title does little 
to enliven a content matter that continues to stimulate and inspire me. It denotes 
nothing of that which makes my theory different from those of other writers, and does 
not precisely describe the approach I have taken. In other ways however, such a title 
is apt, informative and fittingly parsimonious. If one thing has become clear over the 
time of my writing, it is that psychological theories are always in development, and 
never complete - they themselves are inevitably and necessarily dynamic. 
More so than ever, I believe personality and emotion to be inevitable bedfellows in an 
adequate theory of either. In the theory I have presented here, personality could not 
develop without emotions, and without personality, emotions would have nothing to 
arise in respect of. Perhaps moreover, I have argued that these two phenomena are 
linked through a necessary, if not sufficient, concern with goals. Herein lie the 
beginnings of parsimony. 
Even so, it took me nearly three years to reach the point where I could readily 
describe the common threads in this work to another person. In retrospect of course, 
they have been there all along. Below, I describe three of these unifying themes, 
drawing from diverse parts of the dissertation in illustration. 
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The overarching theme in the theory presented here encapsulates my convictions 
regarding the importance and utility of a theoretical approach I have described as 
evolutionary-functionalism. In my view, emotions and personality are most usefully 
and validly thought of as adaptations that have evolved, are evolving, and continue to 
be selected because they are functional. Of course, such a statement appears almost 
impossibly simple when framed in this manner, but wholeheartedly implementing the 
philosophy of evolutionary-functionalism has lead me to conclusions that, in many 
cases, differ from those of other authors. 
In unpacking my views somewhat further, let me make two further comments. 
Initially, the 'evolutionary' component of this approach has been taken to mean that 
not only are we evolving both as a species and as individuals, but that we are evolving 
from, rather than to, somewhere. What this means is that the challenges our species 
have faced, and the solutions that have been selected (like personality, self, and 
emotion), are shared to a degree by other living forms. In addition to being consistent 
with evolutionary biology, accepting this likelihood has the advantage of acting as a 
form of theoretical safeguard against anthropocentrism and experiential essentialism. 
Most notable in the discussions regarding the self and the emotions, I have argued 
throughout this dissertation that the basic functions served by these adaptations do not 
fundamentally change merely because we become aware of their operation. 
Furthermore, the current dissertation has been more rigorous than is usual in its use of 
the term 'function.' To be a 'functionalist' is fashionable in contemporary 
psychological writings, although more so in emotion theory than in personality. Yet 
even within emotion theory where a functionalist approach has been utilised for some 
time, the term is used in ways that are unclear, misleading, incomplete, or simply 
incorrect. To my mind, functionalism is a necessarily a biologically-informed view of 
causes, as well as of effects and the means of explaining them. To benefit most 
however from the power of the framework, a theory must employ the concepts, 
rigorously, and wholeheartedly. Neither home appliances nor theories work properly 
when they are part-functioning. 
Rhetoric notwithstanding, a strict and thorough application of evolutionary 
functionalism in the context of emotion and personality research has led to some 
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substantial theoretical developments in this dissertation. The demonstration of 
emotion's relationship to overt behaviour for example, stemmed directly from the 
evolutionary-functionalist assertion that adaptations must ultimately be reflected in 
overt behaviour in order to be selected. 
The second major theme in this work has been the extensive use made of dynamic 
systems (DS) concepts and terminologies in the discussions of personality, 
development and emotion. Ironically enough, I am still unsure whether I view DS as 
a genuine explanatory framework or as a set of useful descriptive terms, although in 
other senses, it may not matter that much either way. If DS concepts are only 
descriptive terms, they are so laden with nuance and theoretical meaning that they 
engender genuine theoretical development nonetheless. The model of motive 
development described in Chapters five and six for example, in which the 
motivational arrangements in the personality are progressively or 'cascadingly' 
refined, could not have been conceived without an understanding of dynamic systems. 
My suspicion with regard to DS concepts is that they will generally prove most useful 
when coupled (sic) with well-developed functionalist explanations for personality and 
emotions. In the view presented here, personality and emotion systems are neither 
completely unbound, nor utterly fixed. Rather, degrees of fixedness (or flexibility) 
characterise different elements of each system, depending on the functions of that 
system. This synthesis between emergence and constraint is best evidenced in the 
model of conscious emotional experience presented in Chapter seven. In this model, 
it was argued that some elements of some conscious emotional experiences are more 
constrained than others because they are directly relevant to the function of the 
emotion in question. Within these broad constraints however, there is always room 
for emergent experiences which, while related to the functions of the emotion 
systems, the personality and the situation are nonetheless emergent as they may be 
completely novel and could not have been predicted. 
Finally, I feel that this dissertation has evidenced something of the theoretical 
development that can be accomplished when constructing large scale theories that 
attempt to synthesise and explain diverse pychological domains. In introducing this 
work, I bemoaned the absence of large-scale theories in psychology, suggesting that 
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much could be gained from such undertakings. In the years that have passed, my 
irritation and zealotry have waned somewhat, yet my conviction in this regard has 
only grown stronger. More so now than ever, I believe in both the importance and 
advantages of large-scale theorising. 
Theorising across domains and attempting to hold diverse ideas within a single, 
coherent framework frequently illuminates theoretical issues for each that might never 
have arisen were they not paired. Likewise however, the seeking of solutions for 
these 'problems' at once necessitates and engenders the creation of new ideas within 
each domain. Over time, a process of mutually recursive adjustments can occur 
across the two (or more fields), the end result being, I believe, better theories in each 
case. Within the current dissertation, this is nicely illustrated by the parallel 
development in aspects of the theory describing the transition from innate to 
representational goals and the functions of consciousness. In this case, it transpired 
that I was considering the place of consciousness in personality at a time when I was 
also pondering how innate motives changed. Somewhere among these two disparate 
areas, something clicked, I began considering the possibility that consciousness arises 
through the representational processes. 
As with any major piece of theoretical work, this dissertation has its weaknesses. 
Although I would prefer to leave the reader to ascertain these for themselves, two in 
particular are worth mentioning. To my mind, the primary weakness of the theory I 
have presented lies in a tendency to discuss extremely complex issues at a high level 
of abstraction. In part this has been a deliberate act, in that comprehensively 
unpacking the ideas here would necessitate a great deal more writing with a 
consequent (and undesirable) increase in the overall length of the work. In part 
however, it may simply reflect my own familiarity with the content, and a lack of 
appreciation for how involved some of the theory actually is. Treading the line 
between succinctness and conceptual clarity is a difficult matter, and only time will 
tell whether I have paced the appropriate path. Secondly, while several large studies 
have been presented, the dissertation nonetheless feels 'empirically light.' Although 
it is consistent with large bodies of existing research, many of its unique assertions 
remain unproven and have not been directly tested. Again, there is probably a sense 
in which the lack of directly supportive data represents little more than the relative 
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immaturity of the theory, yet systematic research conducted within the framework 
developed here is clearly needed. 
As I retrospectively consider the totality of my work, I feel a strange mixture of 
contentment and apprehension (although I may well be rapidly alternating between 
two discrete states). In most ways, I have accomplished what I set out to achieve 
here, although the journey was more demanding than I could possibly have foreseen. 
So despite my moments of disillusionment, I continue to feel very passionate about 
my work, and about psychology. I hope this has been clear. To my mind, there are 
few things more satisfying than the moments in which previously inchoate ideas 
suddenly crystalise. Exactly how long such moments last varies somewhat, as new 
challenges arise and my thinking takes me in new and exciting directions. This has 
been my first attempt. 
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Appendix 1 
Goals about Emotion Scale. 
The following questionnaire asks you to make some ratings about different emotions 
in your life. In each section, you will need to make some ratings about a particular 
(target) emotion. Overall, the questionnaire asks you about six different emotions 
(anger, sadness, happiness, shame, fear, and pride). The questions pertaining to one 
emotion (e.g. anger) are all presented together. Then the next set of questions about 
the next emotion are presented, and so on. 
You may feel that your answers might depend on the situation, but try to think about 
what you usually feel or do. Overall, try not to take too long to deliberate your 
answers. There are no right or wrong answers, and first impressions are what matter. 
Lastly, please briefly examine all the questions in a section before beginning your 
answers. 
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Note: The questions presented here are only presented for the emotion of anger. In the full scale, the 
questions were repeated for the emotions of sadness, fear, happiness, shame, and pride. 
Anger 
1. Please use the scale to indicate how much you like or dislike feeling angry. 
Very strongly dislike 
feeling angry 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very much like 
feeling angry 
2. Would you rate your typical experience of anger as more or less intense than your experience of other emotions? 
Less intense than most I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 More intense than most 
3. When did you most recently feel angry? Please provide a numerical estimate, rather than simply tick your answer. 
__ hours ago __ days ago __ weeks ago __ months ago __ years ago 
4. How frequently do you feel angry? Please provide a numerical estimate in one of the spaces, rather than simply tick your 
answer. 
__ times per hour __ times per day __ per week __ per month __ per year 
5. Which of the following emotions do you typically feel immediately following your experience of anger? Please circle only 
one. 
Anger Sadness Fear Shame Pride Embarrassment Happiness Guilt 
6. How do you feel about yourself when you have just been angry? 
Very Negative I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very Positive 
7. How easily do you become angry? 
With Difficulty 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very Easily 
8. How do you feel about yourself as a person who gets angry? 
Very Negative I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very Positive 
9. How long does an experience of anger usually last for you? 
A short time 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A long time 
10. How quickly do you become angry? 
Very quickly 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very slowly 
II. Are the consequences that follow feeling angry usually good or bad for you? 
Usually bad 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually good 
12. Does feeling angry help you attain your goals? 
Rarely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually 
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Note: The CES II Scale (adapted from Magai, unpublished) involves making essentially the same series 
of ratings regarding four emotions (sadness, anger, fear, and shame/shyness) rather than just the one 
here. 
Emotions as a Child Scale (CES II). 
Please indicate how you dealt with your feelings as a child, and how your mother (or other primary 
caregiver) responded to you, using the scale below. 
When you were sad as a child, what would you do? 
Not at all Somewhat Very much 
I. I have little memory of like me like me like me 
being sad as a child 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Go off by myself 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Go to my mother 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Act like everything was fine 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Cry 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Show my sadness, mope around 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Eat to make myself feel better 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Clam up and keep to myself 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Read, watch TV 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Withdraw 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. Tell my mother about the problem 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When you were sad as a child, what would your mother (caregiver) do? 
Not at all Somewhat Very 
typical typical typical 
I. Usually didn't notice I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Told me to cheer up 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Bought me something I liked 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Asked me about it 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Told me not to worry 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Consoled me 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Usually wasn't around 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Got sad herself 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Gave me a disgusted look 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Ignored me 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. Help me deal with the issue 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Got all upset 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Expressed disapproval 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Comforted me 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Called me a crybaby or such 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Appendix 3 
Adult Attachment Scale 
(adapted from Collins & Read, 1990) 
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The next part of the questionnaire lists a number of statements concerning different qualities that you have. Please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the appropriate number. Try not to take too long to 
deliberate your answers. There are no right or wrong answers, and first impressions are what matter. 
Disagree Agree 
Completely Neutral Completely 
I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on others. 2 3 4 5 
I do not often worry about being abandoned by my friends. 2 3 4 5 
I find it re1ati vely easy to get close to others. 2 3 4 5 
People are never there when you need them. 2 3 4 5 
I often worry that my friends do not really like me. 2 3 4 5 
I do not often worry about someone getting too close to me. 2 3 4 5 
I am comfortable depending on others. 2 3 4 5 
I find others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. 2 3 4 5 
I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others. 2 3 4 5 
I know that others will be there when I need them. 2 3 4 5 
I often worry my friends will not want to remain friends with me. 2 3 4 5 
I am nervous when anyone gets too close. 2 3 4 5 
I find it difficult to trust others completely. 2 3 4 5 
I am comfortable having others depend on me. 2 3 4 5 
I am not sure that I can depend on others to be there when I need them. 2 3 4 5 
My desire to get close to others sometimes scares people away. 2 3 4 5 
People often want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being. 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 4 
Structured Goal Diary 
Goals, Feelings, and Behaviour: A diary-based exploratory investigation 
You are invited to participate in the research project "Goals, Feelings, and Behaviour" by completing 
the following questionnaire. The aim of the project is to investigate the relationships between an 
individual's goals, their feelings, and behaviour. The questionnaire is anonymous and you will, at no 
stage, be identified as an informant. You may withdraw your participation at any time, including 
withdrawal of any information you have provided. The data generated in the study will be available 
only to the researcher and his supervisor. Diaries and all other data will be stored under code, and we 
ask that you do not use your own or anyone else's name on the forms. 
Participation in the study requires that you complete a structured daily diary on each of five 
consecutive days. At the beginning of day one you must write down one weekly and two daily goals. 
On each of the following mornings you should write down two fresh daily goals, while retaining and 
rating your original weekly goal. You must make ratings about your goals each morning and evening 
for the full five days. Please try to consider each question separately and answer as honestly as 
possible without concemfor experimental expectation. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Selecting Goals 
Articulating and writing down goals is probably more difficult than you think. For the purposes of this 
study, try to select goals, the attainment of which is neither a certainty, nor an impossibility within the 
stipulated time frame. On the first day you must create a single weekly goal which is reasonably 
attainable within the five days of the study. From now on, this goal is referred to as 'Goal A.' Write 
Goal A in the space provided. It may also be a good idea to write Goal A in the available space on 
each day. Next you should produce two daily goals for Day 1, again, goals that are reasonably 
attainable within this timeframe. These become Goals Band C, but only for that day. On the 
following days (e.g. Days 2, 3,4, & 5) you must create new daily goals for each day, while retaining 
Goal A (the weekly goal). 
Goals may be from absolutely any area of your life. They may be academic, interpersonal, leisure-
oriented and so on. Try not to worry about the wording or syntax of your goal expressions, as these are 
of no interest here. Try to state your goals in a reasonably brief form and do not feel as if you must 
accurately communicate your intent to the experimenter - you know what you mean! Finally, if your 
goals relate to another person, please do not use their real name. 
This project is being carried out by Nathan Consedine (under the supervISIOn of Prof. K. T. 
Strongman). Nathan can be contacted at 366 - 7001 extn. 7190 with any questions or concerns you 
have regarding the study. 
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DAY #1 
Morning 
Please complete as soon as possible after you wake. Read your weekly goal and generate your two 
daily goals, then answer the first three questions about each. Please circle the number which most 
accurately reflects you position and answer all questions. 
Please record your three goals for the day. Remember, Goal A should be the same on all days, while 
Goals Band C should be new each day. If you are having difficulty here, please re-read the 
instructions. 
A. 
B. 
c. 
l. How important is the achievement of each of these to you? 
Goal A Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
GoalB Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
Goal C Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
2. How likely would you say the full achievement of each is? 
Goal A Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
GoalB Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
GoalC Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely so 
3. How would you rate your mood at the moment? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly negative Moderately Mildly Indifferent Mildly Moderately Strongly positive 
or unhappy negative negative or neutral positive positive or happy 
Please wait until this evening before filling out the next part of the diary 
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Evening 
To be completed at the end of your day. Try to ensure that you are alone, in a reasonably quiet place. 
Refer to you weekly and each of the two daily goals you recorded this morning, then rate each of the 
following items. 
4. Think about you goals. Recall how important each is and what they mean to you. Think about 
what you have done towards achieving them today and how far you've come towards 
achievement. Thinking about each of you goals in turn, how does each make you feel? 
Goal A Very Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Positive 
GoalB Very Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Positive 
GoalC Very Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Positive 
5. How close have you come to achieving your goals? 
Goal A No closer 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely achieved 
GoalB No closer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely achieved 
Goal C No closer 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely achieved 
6. How would you rate your general mood for the day? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly negative Moderately Mildly Indifferent Mildly Moderately Strongly positive 
or unhappy negative negative or neutral positive positive or happy 
7. How much effort did you direct towards the achievement of your goals? 
Goal A Very little 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
GoalB Very little 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
Goal C Very little 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
8. How much opportunity did you have to act upon each of your goals? 
Goal A Very little 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
GoalB Very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
Goal C Very little 2 3 4 5 6 7 A great deal 
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9. Think about where your goals stood at the beginning of the day and where they are now. Have 
you made any progress in the advancement of your goals? 
Goal A Very little 1 2 3 
GoalB Very little 2 3 
Goal C Very little 1 2 3 
10. How would you rate you mood at the moment? 
1 
Strongly negative 
or unhappy 
2 
Moderately 
negative 
3 
Mildly 
negative 
4 
Indifferent 
or neutral 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Mildly 
positive 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
6 
Moderately 
positive 
A great deal 
A great deal 
A great deal 
7 
Strongly positive 
or happy 
11. Can you think of any other significant factors, events of interactions during the day, other than 
your stated goals, that are likely to be impacting on your mood? 
Definitely not 2 3 4 5 6 7 Absolutely 
Appendix 5 
For example: To finish three chapters of my Nlasters before the start of 
clinical next year 
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Below is an example of the Sliders used to answer questions in this study. 
You ust place the pointer exactly on the black line to register a response. 
How important is your goal to you today? 
Not very 
important 
• 
Very 
important 
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Appendix 6 
Emotions and Behaviour (Part 1): Clip Generation Form 
Note: Each participant received a request for descriptions of two emotions, chosen from the list of 
anger, fear, happiness, sadness, guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride. 
(1). Recall a recent occasion or situation when you felt happy. Think about the event, then in the 
space(s) provided, answer the following questions. NB: Remember to protect your own and other 
people's anonymity - do not use real names or identifying information on this form (refer to the 
instruction sheet if you are unsure). Please read all questions before beginning your answers. 
(a) In two or three sentences briefly describe what happened. 
(b) Briefly describe your thoughts at the time of the event. 
(c) Was the experience you've described above pleasant or unpleasant for you? (Please circle the 
number that most closely approximates your feeling). 
Very unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very pleasant 
(d) How intense was the emotion you experienced at this time? Please circle. 
Very mild 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very intense 
(e) When you experienced this emotion, what did youfirstfeellike doing? Remember, it is what you 
first felt like DOING that is important here. 
(f) In the situation, what did you actually do? Remember, it is what you actually DID that is important 
here. 
Thank you for your participation so far. When you have completed the second of these two 
pages, place the entire form in the box at the front of the lab. 
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Appendix 7 
Emotion and Behaviour (Part 2): 'Recognition' Form 
Note: Each subject in the pilot study received three copies of the following form, while those in the 
cross-cultural study received eight different behaviour clips in a similar format. 
Below is a description of a person's behaviour. For each description, please answer the four questions 
relating to each. If you are not sure about your answer, simply use your best guess. Please make sure 
you answer all questions. 
(1). I turned around and walked away. 
(a). Based on the description above, which emotion do you think the person was most likely feeling at 
. this time? (Please circle only one emotion). 
(1) shame 
(6) embarrassment 
(2) sadness 
(7) contempt 
(3) happiness 
(8) disgust 
(4) fear 
(9) pride 
(5) gUilt 
(lO)anger 
(b). Briefly note some of the reasons for your answer to the question above. Why did you decide on 
that particular emotion? Is there another emotion (not listed above) that you would have liked to have 
chosen? Why? 
(c). How pleasant or unpleasant do you think the event that provoked or preceded the behaviour above 
was for that person? Please circle the appropriate number. 
Very unpleasant 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very pleasant 
(d). How intense do you think the emotional experience was at the time, for that person? 
Very mild 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very intense 
Thank you for your time in completing this study 
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Appendix 8 
Coding Criteria for Emotional Clip Coding. 
(please record the two main reasons that a clip was excluded) 
The basic task in the coding is to make a descision (yes or no) as to whether (having 
satisfied all of the criteria below) enough information will be left in the clip to constitute a 
description of an observable behaviour. Remember you must satisfy all the criteria for a 
clip to be useable. 
a. No inferences are to be made and no text can be added to create meaning or clarity. The 
fact that context makes the meaning of the behaviour clear is not good enough. Only text 
. that is present can be used. 
b. Only positively oriented behaviours are to be included (i.e. I didn't do 'X' is omitted) 
c. Any text describing thoughts (i), feelings (ii), motivations (iii), (ie. not describing 
observable behaviour) is omitted. 
d. Only the first behaviour is recorded. If a second act was preceded by "after that I did Y" 
it is to be omitted, unless the two appear to constitute part of the same act for that person. 
e. No paraphrasing or corrections except insofar as grammatically necessary. 
Colloquialisms are to be substituted (e.g. cigarette will be substituted for durry or fag), and 
spelling mistakes corrected. 
f. Where the subject records the literal content of verbal behaviour (e.g. I told him to go 
away), the content of the speech is removed, but the speaking and manner of speaking 
remain. For example, 'I told him to go away' becomes, I told him "X". 
g. If the clip being coded is a transformation of an urge rating (modified urge) and the thus 
transformed rating is literally impossible (eg. turning back time, or dying) it is to be omitted. 
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Appendix 9 
Example Stimuli from Behaviour Recognition Study 
Happiness 
I gave him a big hug 
I skipped around 
I talked, drank, ate, and laughed 
I kissed her 
I sat by the river 
Fear 
I froze 
I screamed and ran away 
I wanted to hit something 
I tried to pull my friend away 
I cycled off really fast, without looking at the 
driver 
Embarrassment 
I felt like shrinking away in my seat 
I put chocolate sauce on his face 
I left the room 
I got up and slapped his face - hard 
I hid under the table and covered my face 
Guilt 
I walked out of the supermarket 
I handed the book to the tutor 
I talked to both flatmates 
I looked for the sheep 
I ate my pizza 
Sadness 
I clutched my stomach, screaming and crying 
I cried 
I wrote a letter 
I went for a drive 
I cried in the shower 
Angry 
I sat down, put the TV on and ate dinner 
I screamed at all the people in my room 
I said "X" and walked away 
I hit her 
I wanted to throw my drink on her 
Shame 
I walked outside into the rain 
I cried 
I threw my skateboard to the ground 
I wrung his neck 
I tried to hide my plastered fingers 
Pride 
I walked the dog to the video store 
I hugged TJ 
I laughed and yelled 
I went for a coffee 
I did some study 
